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Introduction
Since its beginnings more than one century ago, the investigation of the behavior of financial mar-
kets has become one of the primary and most thriving fields in economic research, which has led
to a huge variety of work being published in economic literature and in related fields. This field
of research hat two main aims. Firstly, it seeks to systematically observe diverse and, particu-
larly, universal characteristics in different types of financial markets, such as commodity markets,
precious metal markets, stock markets, foreign exchange markets or derivative markets. Secondly,
it attempts to find substantiated theoretical explanations for a multitude of related phenomena
through the development of models and generally accepted theories. Notable examples of these,
though by no means an exhaustive list, are the following seminal and outstanding publications:
L. Bachelier, who, in his thesis entitled ‘The´orie de la Spe´culation’, conducted both theo-
retical work on stochastic processes, most notably the first formulation of a theory of random
walks, and empirical analysis of actual market data (see Bachelier, 1900);
M. G. Kendall, who was the first to find empirical evidence that stock prices follow a
random walk (see Kendall, 1953) and M. F. M. Osborne, who rediscovered the Brownian
motion for stock markets (see Osborne, 1959);
P. A. Samuelson, who replaced the assumptions proposed by the random walk hypothesis
with the more general ‘martingale property’ and particularly linked this to the framework of
economic pricing equilibria (see Samuelson, 1965);
E. F. Fama and B. Mandelbrot, who systematically investigated the behavior of daily
stock and cotton prices (see Fama, 1965; Mandelbrot, 1963b, 1967), disproved the assertion
of normal distributed daily returns as proposed by the random walk model (see Fama, 1963;
Mandelbrot, 1963b) and proposed the Le´vy stable distributions as an alternative model (see
Mandelbrot, 1963a,b);
E. F. Fama, who reviewed in his classic survey for the first time the theory and empirical
work on the ‘Efficient Market Hypothesis’, which mainly states that prices reflect all available
information on the underlying asset at any point of time, and that they respond instanta-
neously and in an unbiased fashion to any new asset information entering the market (see
Fama, 1970);
F. Black, M. Scholes and R. Merton, who derived a theoretically based pricing rule
for options and corporate liabilities, which enabled the regular trade of such instruments on
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financial markets and which can therefore be regarded as the birth of modern finance (see
Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973b, and also Black, 1976a);
J. M. Harrison, D. M. Kreps and S. R. Pliska, who formulated and proved the ‘Funda-
mental Theorem of Asset Pricing’, in which the economic concept of arbitrage-free markets
is equivalently linked to the mathematical property of the existence of an ‘equivalent martin-
gale measure’ or ‘risk-neutral measure’ (see Harrison and Kreps, 1979; Harrison and Pliska,
1981, 1983). Their general theory of arbitrage-free pricing of derivative instruments using
the martingale formalism also opened up the asset pricing theory and the investigation of
financial markets to a research field of stochasticians;
R. F. Engle and C. W. J. Granger, who won the Nobel prize in Economics in 2003 for
developing methods to analyze economic time series with time-dependent volatilities (ARCH)
(see Engle, 1982, and for a further generalization see Bollerslev, 1986) and non-stationary
variables, nowadays known as the concept of ‘cointegration’ (see Granger, 1981, 1986; Engle
and Granger, 1987).
The above have all led to a generally better and fundamentally new understanding of the behavior
of financial markets and have encouraged other researchers to follow them in these newly discovered
research directions. Moreover, some of the ideas and techniques originally used for investigating
financial markets have gained influence in other areas of economics as well as in different, adjoined
sciences.
It might seem remarkable that, while most of this work investigating financial markets is moti-
vated by essentially economic problems, many of these publications also come from non-economists
such as stochasticians, mathematicians and physicists, as well as from scientists in different applied
research fields. As a physicist without a formal education in economics, it is of great interest to
me that the very notion of physicists contributing to financial research is actually as old as the two
separate fields themselves (see Voit, 2003, for a more detailed historical review). Indeed, besides
the work of I. Newton and C. F. Gauss relating to financial problems, it is generally accepted
that the French mathematician L. Bachelier’s thesis of 1900 (see above) is one of the first and
most important pieces of work on the behavior of financial markets. In his thesis, Bachelier devel-
oped and formulated the ‘Random Walk Process’ for the first time, which is nowadays regarded as
one of the best-known concepts in both statistical physics and quantitative finance. Hence it now
serves as a prominent example of a shared concept which is well established and widely used in
both research fields, albeit applied to different problems. Moreover, in the last 10 years it seems
that using models, concepts and techniques from physics (and of course from mathematics) to
describe phenomena in financial markets and other socio-economic systems has become even more
popular for a growing group of physicists. Proof of this popularity can be seen in the marked
increase in finance-related publications contributed by physicists in recent years, as well as by the
coining of the term ‘Econophysics’ (for a textbook treatment of Econophysics-related topics, see
Mantegna and Stanley, 2000; Bouchaud and Potters, 2003; Voit, 2003, as well as Levy, Levy and
Solomon, 1994; Mantegna and Stanley, 1994; Levy, Levy and Solomon, 1995; Mantegna and Stan-
ley, 1995; Levy and Levy, 1996; Stanley, Amaral, Buldyrev, Havlin, Leschhorn, Maass, Salinger
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and Stanley, 1996; Mantegna and Stanley, 1997; Stauffer, de Oliveira and Bernardes, 1999; Cont
and Bouchchaud, 2000; Cont, 2001; Bouchaud, Matacz and Potters, 2001; Lux and Sornette, 2002;
Plerou, Gopikrishnan, Rosenow, Amaral and Stanley, 2000 for a truly modest selection of related
paper publications strongly restricted by my own knowledge).
It is vital to stress that there is a huge variety of publications from mathematicians, which
have also led to a better understanding of the behavior of financial markets and to a new strand
of research activities within the applied mathematics community, nowadays called ‘Mathematical
Finance’. Nevertheless, as I am no expert in this strand of literature, the only example cited in
this thesis are those of Harrison and Kreps (1979); Harrison and Pliska (1981, 1983) (see above).
Whilst this brief introduction prevents me from going into more comprehensive detail, it should
nevertheless have become clear that the investigation of financial markets and their empirical data
is largely based on concepts stemming from mathematics, and on techniques used and formulated
by both economists and non-economists. These methods would be employed, for example, to
identify typical events or characteristic processes in the market, or to find explanations for financial
time series phenomena and to find modeling approaches for certain observed behavior in financial
markets.
However, there is also considerable and growing criticism of the increased and almost exclusive
use of mathematical (or ‘quantitative’) concepts and techniques to investigate and model financial
markets. Indeed, there is broader criticism of the overreaching mathematical character of economic
theories applying to a wider spectrum of economic research fields, such as game theory or the
principal elements of macroeconomics. In this sense it could be seen that economists are currently
faced with rather general criticism. Nevertheless, it is the investigation and modeling of financial
markets which is presently being criticized most fiercely. There are two main reasons for that.
On the one hand, the quantitative concepts in the financial industry, developed and implemented
with highly sophisticated methods, have exacerbated the currently active financial crisis, which will
likely impact dramatically on the worldwide economy. Some critics would even say these concepts
caused the crisis, along with other factors. On the other hand, it is becoming obvious that the
current financial crisis, with its catastrophic and disastrous implications for the individual, cannot
be explained by the traditional economic theories which are still mainly based on mathematical
concepts, such as ‘market efficiency’ and ‘market rationality’. Therefore, critics argue that using
a purely quantitative approach to explain the behavior of financial markets, or the economy as a
whole, neglects the fact that almost none of the observed fundamental economic events can ever be
fully explained if the psychologically motivated component of those events is disregarded. Instead,
an economic theory should also include factors such as confidence, reliance, suspiciousness, fairness,
deception and fraud, because such factors seem to play a greater role in economically based decision
making processes than a purely quantitative approach pretends. Some critics even argue that the
increasing and decreasing fluctuations in the economy are mainly based on the interplay between
an exceeding perception and an absence of confidence. Thus confidence is the main driver for
economic activities (see R. J. Shiller in Akerlof and Shiller (2009) for a very prominent and
up-to-date example of this statement).
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Although this thesis will also mainly build on mathematical concepts and techniques and can
thus be criticized for the same reason to some extent, it aims, at least, to improve the traditional
economic theories by investigating whether nonlinear economic laws can explain a significant part
of observed (irregular) fluctuations in economic and financial markets. In particular, different
types of market participants will be considered, whose heterogeneity seems to be one of the driving
economic mechanisms of the price dynamics in financial markets.
Motivation for the Thesis
Despite the general belief in the fundamental economic principle of balancing demand and supply in
different kinds of economic markets, very few economists or market participants would question the
need for and the usefulness of a basic understanding of the behavior and the dynamics of modern
day financial markets. In this context, one of the main interests is focused on the fluctuations of
prices (or relative price changes) observed in financial markets, which seem to be more volatile
than would be expected by the standard paradigms of asset price dynamics based on the geometric
Brownian motion price process and on the long established assumption that economic agents
have homogeneous beliefs. For this reason, different approaches now coexist emphasizing different
viewpoints to explain the observed fluctuations in financial markets.
Classic examples of these are the concept of ‘Rational Expectations’ (RE) and the ‘Efficient
market Hypothesis’ (EMH). The RE concept states that asset prices are completely determined by
their fundamentals, meaning that asset price fluctuations can only be traced back to exogenous,
randomly driven shocks to fundamentals. As a consequence, prices converge to a steady-state
like growth path if no shocks enter the market. Furthermore, ‘irrational’ traders using simple
speculatively driven forecasting rules to determine asset prices and ignoring information about the
underlying asset’s fundamental value should eventually be driven out of the market by rational
traders as already argued by M. Friedman (see Friedman, 1953). Closely related to this concept
of rational expectations is the EMH. It states that current prices already contain all the available
information on the underlying asset and therefore cannot be used to predict future asset prices.
Examples of stochastic processes consistent with this theory are the random walk processes as well
as the ARCH and GARCH processes, which have been extensively investigated in the empirical
literature. However, observations in real markets give reason to doubt that these paradigms can
fully explain the behavior of asset prices. For instance, if we look at the stock market ‘Millennium
Boom’ starting in the late 1990s and continuing into the early years of the next decade, the value
of all major stock indices rises dramatically (more than 100 percent!) and decreases accordingly
in the following. Unfortunately, neither the RE concept nor the EMH could deliver a satisfactory
explanation for the Millennium Boom. Furthermore, detailed investigation of statistical properties
of prices of stocks, commodities and market indices on different kinds of markets during the last
40 years has discovered a set of properties for asset returns, termed ‘stylized facts’, which are
common across many instruments, markets and time periods (see Pagan, 1996; Cont, 2001, and
references given therein for details). Interestingly, these stylized facts are partly inconsistent with
the geometric Brownian motion price process favored by the classic viewpoints mentioned above.
Examples of these inconsistencies are the absence of linear autocorrelations of asset returns, fat-
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tailed asset return distributions with clustered volatility and slow decay rates of the autocorrelation
of absolute and squared returns (see Figure 1 for an illustration of some of these features).
Figure 1: Time series of returns generated from empirical and ‘synthetic’ data. Both daily returns of the Deutsche
Mark vs. U.S. Dollar exchange rate (upper panel) and the German stock price index DAX (middle panel) form
a higher concentration of large returns (fat tails) and switches between tranquil and volatile sequences (cluster
volatility) compared with Gaussian distributed returns (lower panel). The plot can originally be found in Lux and
Heitger (2002).
Therefore, a different, more modern view on asset price fluctuations also considers the interac-
tion of market participants as well as herding effects influencing the trading process. Associated
to this idea, different trader types pursuing different trading strategies and thus forming different
expectations of future price movements do coexist in the market regularly, which might lead to
nonlinear price dynamics even in the absence of any external shocks. Proponents of this viewpoint
hold these mechanisms mainly responsible for the high volatility observed in financial markets, a
view which has become popular in the literature under the notion of ‘Animal Spirits’ or ‘Market
Psychology’ and ‘Heterogeneous Expectation Hypothesis’. Indeed, in contrast to Friedman’s asser-
tion mentioned above, De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) show that traders who
do not use or who misperceive the fundamentals can survive in financial markets. More precisely,
they show that a constant fraction of ‘noise traders’ (i.e., irrational traders) may on average earn a
higher expected return than ‘smart traders’ (i.e., rational traders). Indeed, the noise traders may
survive in the market with positive probability. Interestingly, one of the most prominent quotes
supporting this result stems from J. M. Keynes, a long time before the RE concept and the EMH
was even formulated and became a popular approach in finance. He stated (see Keynes, 1997,
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p. 157):
Keynes’s Beauty Contest Analogy of the Stock Market
Investment based on genuine long-term expectation is so difficult [...] as to be scarcely
practicable. He who attempts it must surely lead much more laborious days and run
greater risks than he who tries to guess better than the crowed how the crowed will
behave; and, given equal intelligence, he may make more disastrous mistakes.
(Keynes, 1936)
Obviously, this statement is in stark contrast to the EMH and instead emphasizes the role of non-
fundamental analysis in financial markets. Keynes argued that stock prices are less determined by
an objective view of fundamental values than by ‘what average opinion expects average opinion to
be’.
In recent years, the debate about the competing kinds of volatility concepts has led to pros-
pering research activities, resulting in a broad strand of literature that has developed in different
directions. Notable publications from the 1980s investigating the influence of non-fundamental
trading activities are Shiller, Fischer and Friedman (1984); Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990). Im-
portant empirically motivated contributions to this discussion which are based on survey data are
Frankel and Froot (1987); Froot and Frankel (1989); Allen and Taylor (1990); Taylor and Allen
(1992). Furthermore, since the beginning of the 1990s the number of related publications has
soared, with a large part of this work using the structural agents model approach, in which the
market dynamics is characterized by the interaction of individual heterogeneous agents. These kind
of artificial financial market models can be classified into two groups, namely the more theoretical
and the more computational orientated models. As it happens, most of them are computational
orientated, due to the tremendous increase in computer power and the increasing affordability of
appropriate computing technology in recent years. Prominent examples of computer simulated
market models are established by Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, Palmer and Tayler (1997); Chen
and Yeh (1997, 2002); Cont and Bouchchaud (2000); Day and Huang (1990); De Grauwe and
Grimaldi (2006b); Farmer and Joshi (2002); Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007); LeBaron, Arthur
and Palmer (1999); LeBaron (2000); Levy et al. (1994, 1995); Levy and Levy (1996); Levy, Persky
and Solomon (1996); Lux (1995, 1997, 1998); Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000); Kim and Markowitz
(1989); Kirman (1991, 1993); Palmer, Arthur, Holland, LeBaron and Tayler (1994); Westerhoff
(2003); Wilpert (2004). Although the study of agent-based models by computer simulations is
a promising and prosperous way of analyzing complex adaptive systems of many groups of het-
erogeneous agents, it is potentially flawed because it does not always seem obvious how certain
generated simulation results can be traced back to the economic ‘ingredients’ implemented in the
computer model. Therefore, slightly different approaches try mainly to build on a more theo-
retical framework, combining an analytical and numerical treatment, to analyze both simple and
more complex versions of their artificial market models (see Brock and Hommes, 1997b,a, 1998,
1999; Brock, Hommes and Wagener, 2005; Chiarella and He, 2001, 2002a,b,c; Chiarella, Dieci and
Gardini, 2006; Diks and von der Weide, 2002; Gaunersdorfer, 2000; Gaunersdorfer, Hommes and
Wagener, 2003, 2008).
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The research proposed in this thesis is largely motivated by the recent work of Brock and
Hommes (1997b,a, 1998, 1999), Levy et al. (1994, 1995); Levy and Levy (1996); Levy et al. (1996)
and in particular by the work of Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini (2001); Chiarella and He (2001,
2002a,b,c); Chiarella et al. (2006), which studies the dynamics of financial asset prices resulting
from the interaction of heterogeneous agents that have different expectations about the future
evolution of prices. The aim of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, I will analyze the asset price dynamics
of an extended version of the market model with heterogeneous agents under a Walrasian market
clearing scenario proposed by Chiarella and He (2001). Allowing agents for different risk-aversion
coefficients and assuming trading strategies that slightly differ from the original publication, I shall
investigate the impact of these newly introduced model variants on the overall dynamic behavior
of the original model framework. Secondly, I will use these results to propose a market model
under a market maker scenario which brings the model framework of the Chiarella and He model
to a more consistent model structure. For this improved model configuration, I will select stylized
representations of different types of market participants, namely fundamentalists and chartists, and
investigate how the heterogeneous expectations of investors drive economic mechanisms of the price
and how they drive investors’ wealth dynamics. I will show to which extent those heterogeneous
expectations in the agent-based market model can explain observed fluctuations in real financial
markets and lead to the emergence of complicated dynamics of growing asset price paths. Overall,
by proposing and analyzing a novel variant of a structural heterogeneous agents model, the thesis
aims to provide further useful insight and intuition into the understanding of the behavior of
financial markets.
Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is composed of four chapters divided into two parts. It also includes four excursuses
which are relegated to the appendices of the thesis. As might be expected from a typical ‘Disser-
tationsschrift’, it includes three main components all related to the topic:
• the preparation of relevant concepts
• a literature review
• my own contributions providing new results.
The first part, consisting of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 gives the reader a comprehensive in-
troduction to the basic concepts used in the remainder of the thesis and reviews the relevant
literature. Chapter 1 is devoted to traditional and widely accepted approaches for modeling finan-
cial markets and also considers these from a historical perspective. This chapter mainly focuses
on the concept of rational expectations equilibria (i.e., RE, see above) as well as on the related
concept of the efficiency of a market (i.e., EMH, see above), which can be regarded as two of the
fundamental paradigms of traditional finance theory. The appendix of Chapter 1 closes with a
first excursus, which gives a description of the standard expected utility maximization scheme.
The standard expected utility maximization scheme will be one of the main building blocks of the
artificial behavioral market models outlined in the second part of the thesis. Chapter 2 gives an
overview of two prominent and representative examples of behavioral models of financial markets
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proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997b,a, 1998, 1999) and Levy et al. (1994, 1995); Levy and
Levy (1996); Levy et al. (1996) respectively. Both model frameworks clarify the interplay of both
traditional ideas (i.e., RE and EMH) with more current concepts of modeling financial markets,
each of them highlighting slightly different facets of modern concepts in their approaches. The
study of the framework of the Brock and Hommes (BH) model as well as of the Levy, Levy and
Solomon (LLS) model also helps to give early insights into the specific class of behavioral models
on which my thesis is concentrated. It also serves as a motivation and as a starting point for my
own model framework, which will be proposed in the next part of the thesis. Additionally, I will
propose and analyze my own model variant according to the Brock and Hommes model, which
brings the original model framework to a more consistent model structure. Apart from my own
contribution mentioned above, the first part of the thesis includes the ‘result-invariant’ part of the
thesis. Finally, three further excursuses on selected topics in nonlinear dynamics are provided at
the end of the appendix of the second chapter, which are mainly intended to familiarize readers
with some theoretical background and useful techniques in nonlinear dynamics that will also be
applied in the following part of the thesis.
The second part, consisting of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, largely builds on the asset pricing
model with heterogeneous agents established by Chiarella and He (2001), which is mainly based
on the ideas of the BH model mixed with some assumptions made in the LLS model framework. In
these models, heterogeneous economic agents are faced with a standard asset allocation problem in
each trading period, where heterogeneity among agents is expressed in terms of different perceptions
of the expectations of future price movements. Besides a comprehensive model description of the
original Chiarella and He (CH) model, Chapter 3 focuses on a model extension in which agents are
allowed to have different attitudes towards risk according to their investment decisions integrated
in their CRRA utility function. In the course of an extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the
risk parameter using both analytical and numerical tools, the level of functionality of the original
model framework is inspected by means of testing the plausibility of the model structure and
reproducing important and already published results for the enriched model. Chapter 4 contains
the core chapter of this work and proposes a simple asset pricing model with heterogeneous investors
under a market maker scenario. The model framework is developed by including concepts of the
three artificial market models mentioned above (i.e., the BH model, the LLS model and the CH
model), but also incorporates new ideas partly motivated by the conclusions drawn from the
analysis of the enriched CH model outlined in Chapter 3. One of the new ideas includes the
explicit consideration of a risky-asset supply side within the model framework. This extension in
the model structure allows for modeling the risk premium demanded by the market participants
for taking market risk which appears to be endogenously driven by the market over time. After
a detailed model description of this proposed market maker model, a comprehensive analytical as
well as numerical treatment of both homogeneous and heterogeneous model designs is performed,
giving new insights into the understanding of asset price and wealth dynamics in agent-based
models with heterogeneous expectations.
The thesis closes with a concluding summary of the main results of this thesis and also indicates
some possible routes for future research.
Part One
Basic Concepts and Literature Review
Chapter 1
Prologue: Three Paradigms of Economic Modeling
This chapter is subdivided into five sections. After some preliminary remarks on the different use
of the idea of expectations in economics and natural science, three crucial paradigms of economic
modeling are proposed in the subsequent sections of the chapter. The ‘Efficient Market Hypothesis’
has been the basic building block of financial theory for nearly thirty years since its first formal
development in the mid 1960s, while the concept of rational expectations first formulated approxi-
mately in the same decade has become an indispensable tool in almost all fields of economics. The
third paradigm of economic modeling is the ‘Representative Agent Hypothesis’. Its importance in
financial theory is emphasized by its being one of the cornerstone assumptions in the prominent
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This model is therefore briefly summarized in this context.
Although for many economists these paradigms seem nowadays to be too restrictive to build a
modern economic and finance theory, they can still serve as an important benchmark in the sense
that more realistic and very often more complex market scenarios should still contain the homo-
geneous and rational expectation schemes as a special subcase. This is because, in spite of their
limited ability to explain realistic market scenarios, they are generally more tractable analytically
and therefore might help the researcher to better understand even the more complicated dynam-
ics of the more comprehensive underlying system. Thus the three hypotheses are still helpful as
benchmarks precisely because of their limitations. The chapter concludes with a summary.
1.1 Expectations in Economics and Physics
Before the three paradigms of financial modeling are outlined in the following sections it might
be worth making some basic remarks on the importance of the idea of expectation formation
in economic modeling since, at first glance, it very clearly displays one of the key differences
between economics and natural science. For this reason let us think for a moment about the
equation of motion in physics, which is used to describe the behavior of the dynamic process in
mathematical terms. In almost all cases it will never depend on expectations of future developments
of the relevant dynamic variables. However, in economics the dynamic process might indeed
depend on expectations as, for instance, in financial theory the decisions of agents today depend
on their expectations or ‘beliefs’ about the future. For instance, investment decisions are very
often determined solely by expectations of high future profits. The Dutch ‘tulip mania’ can serve
as a prominent and early economic example of this phenomenon. In 1636 the price of Dutch tulip
bulbs exploded by a factor of more than 20 within a short space of time, until it fell back to its
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former ‘realistic’ price level at the end of the year, when it had become clear that the dramatic
increase in tulip prices had only been caused by the investors’ dreams and beliefs of invariably
increasing returns on their investments in tulip bulbs. But even nowadays, over-evaluation of
certain asset prices and overreaction of certain investors can be detected at almost any time in
financial markets. Hence it can be concluded that a theory of expectation formation is an essential
component of any economic model or theory, which is totally untrue for models in classical physics,
such as the Kepler’s Law or the Maxwell’s Laws of Electrodynamics.
But even though this statement has to be treated with much greater care when regarding
modern physics, crucial differences in the understanding of the notion of expectation still remain.
In modern physics the idea of expectation is indeed well established, but it is exclusively understood
as the mathematical or, in other words, statistical expectation value that agrees with our intuitive
notion of ‘average measured value’. Of course, such an expectation value really does play a crucial
rule in modern physics; the whole theory of Quantum Mechanics, for example, which represents the
birth of modern physics, is based on this concept. However, such a narrow view of expectations in
economics coincides with the concept of ‘rational’ expectations, which is just a specific case of the
term ‘expectations’ used in economics. In other words, the notion of expectation in economics can
generally have a broader meaning, since the expectation formation mainly accounts for modeling
agent’s behavior or his/her decision making process, which inevitably need not be rational. I will
refer to this interesting fact in the following section in greater detail.
1.2 Rational Expectation Hypothesis (REH)
The concept of rational expectations was first introduced to economists in 1961 by J. F. Muth1,
whereas the basic idea of the rational expectation hypothesis had already been established seven
years earlier in a paper written by Grunberg and Modigliani (1954).2 Although there is an overall
consensus on the enormous importance and capacity of rational expectations in both microeconomic
and macroeconomic theory, there are today still verbally and formally slightly different versions of
the Rational Expectation Hypothesis, some of which are quoted in the following discussion. As a
first definition we can recapitulate Muth’s version of rational expectations as it is literally stated
in Redman (1992):
Definition 1.1 (Muth’s Version of Rational Expectations)
Expectations can be represented by the subjective probability distribution and tend to
be distributed about the prediction of the theory, that is, about the objective proba-
bility distribution of outcomes. In other words, the weighted arithmetic mean of the
expectations is equal to the prediction of the relevant economic model. The expected
values of the variable to be forecast and the actual variables of the variable have a
common mean value.
1See Muth (1961).
2For this statement and the following discussion see Redman (1992) and Sheffrin (1983). There is an exhaustive
bibliography of the literature on rational expectations in the latter.
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Muth therefore claims that, under rational expectations, agents do not make any systematic fore-
casting errors, since agents’ subjective expectations are, on average, equal to the true model vari-
ables.3 Note that in this definition, Muth restricts his consideration to the expectation (i.e., first
moment) of the probability distribution of a random variable. Obviously, higher moments are
negligible in this version of the REH.
While Muth initially applied this concept to microeconomic problems and specifically to the
cobweb model, in macroeconomics the REH was adopted for the first time about ten years later
(Walters, 1971; Lucas, 1972a,b; Sargent and Wallace, 1975; Lucas, 1977). Subsequent work on
macroeconomic problems during the 1970s was mainly associated with the name of R. E. Lu-
cas, who is regarded as the main force in popularizing the concept of rational expectations in
macroeconomics.4 In the course of this development, a second, slightly different definition of ra-
tional expectations was proposed, which is attributed to Lucas and Prescott (1971).5 According
to Redman (1992), they give the following definition:
Definition 1.2 (Narrow Version of Rational Expectations)
Subjective expectations held by economic agents are the same as the conditional math-
ematical expectations of the true probability model of the economy. In other words,
agents’ subjective probability distributions coincide with the objective probability dis-
tribution of events. The expected values of the variable to be forecast and the actual
values have the same probability distribution.
Thus in contrast to Muth’s definition, the subjective distribution (and not its mean) is exactly
equal to the true conditional distribution based on all available information at time t.
For the sake of completeness, I will offer a third and more generalized REH version from Redman
(1992):
Definition 1.3 (Weak Version of Rational Expectations)
Rational agents form expectations by acquiring and using information to the point
where expected marginal cost and the expected marginal benefit of gathering and using
this information are equal.
One major drawback immediately becomes obvious with this definition. As forecasts need not to
be on average correct, the weak version of the REH is not free from systematic error. For further
reading on the different definitions of the REH and their implications on economic modeling we
can refer once again to Redman (1992). With this reference, I would like to close the review of
alternative versions of the REH and now stress the main logic of the concept of rational expectation.
In the previous statement, Muth realized that economic models are extremely sensitive to the
expectation formation of agents who act in these models. Hence Muth’s basic idea was to link
the beliefs of individual economic agents to the actual behavior of the underlying economic model.
3See also Muth (1961, p. 316) for the original statement.
4In the 1970s traditional macroeconomic models lost their predictive power because of the breakdown of the
Phillips curve and the arising phenomenon of stagflation.
5See also Lucas (1978).
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He proposed that agents should exploit their knowledge of the economic model to form their
expectations with respect to the relevant variables of the model. He called such an expectation
formation ‘rational’, as it allows for the economic system to behave consistently according to the
agents’ individual beliefs. Let us state this idea now in a more formal way. In statistical notation,
Muth’s REH can be expressed in terms of conditional, mathematical expectation values in the
following manner:
Definition 1.4 (Statistical Notation of Rational Expectation)
Let It be the information set about the underlying economic model at time t. Then the
individual, subjective expectation about a stochastic, economic variableXt+1 formed at
time t denoted byXet+1 equals, on average, the true value of this variable conditioned on
the set of total information available at time t. Mathematically, this can be expressed
by
Xet+1 = Et[Xt+1] , (1.1)
where Et[Xt+1] ≡ E[Xt+1 | It] is the expectation value of a stochastic variable Xt+1
given the information set It at time t into.6
There are two important properties related to conditional expectations. On the one hand, the
conditional forecast error, which is defined as
ǫt+1 = Xt+1 − Et[Xt+1] ,
can be shown to be zero on average, as it is
Et[ǫt+1] = Et[Xt+1]− Et[Xt+1] = 0 .
On the other hand, the forecast error is uncorrelated with all the information given at time t (and
earlier), which is known as the ‘orthogonality property of conditional expectations’, and can be
mathematically formalized as
E[ǫt+1 It | It] = 0 . (1.2)
Thus, from these properties of conditional mathematical expectations, it follows that, under ra-
tional expectations (according to Definition 1.4), agents’ expectations are an unbiased forecast of
the economic stochastic variable,7 and that the information set It cannot be used to improve the
forecast. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the REH does not imply perfect foresight. Of course,
if there were no uncertainty, rational expectations would coincide with perfect foresight, which
would lead to unrealistic economic outcomes. Instead, in a given economic environment, rational
expectations generate model outcomes which equal these expectations only on average. Thus the
REH implies that deviations from agents’ expectations can solely be caused by non-anticipated (or
unpredictable) uncertainty of the economic model. In this sense the REH is closely connected to
the EMH as we will see in the next section.8
6For a formal mathematical definition of conditional probabilities, see Schmitz (1996) or Feller (1971).
7This property is also incorporated in Definition 1.1.
8For a more detailed discussion about the mathematical version of the REH according to Definition 1.4, see
Sheffrin (1983) and Cuthbertson (1996).
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Two further remarks are worth mentioning here. First, the REH is not only valid in economic
models with homogeneous agents, i.e., where all agents use exactly the same expectation formation
rule. In fact, the agents’ expectations simply have to be distributed about the true value, so that
no systematic forecasting errors exist and the average of all individual expectations equals the
expected true value given by the model.
Second, in contrast to the perfect, deductive rationality outlined above, there is a rapidly
growing new strand of literature on ‘bounded rationality’9, where agents are assumed to be provided
with limited knowledge and limited cognitive capacity and thus only behave in a manner that is at
most ‘nearly optimal’. Indeed, according to Arthur (1994) there are two main problems that come
along with the assumption of perfect or deductive rationality. On the one hand, it is conceivable
that the complexity of the underlying problem, e.g., given in terms of the form of an economic
system, can easily exceed the agents’ ability to cope with to a fully high degree. On the other
hand, in interactive situations of sufficient complexity, the agents cannot fully believe that all
other agents form their beliefs under perfect rationality. As a consequence, they have to guess the
other agents’ behavior. This brings the agents themselves away from totally deductive reasoning
and might force them to form subjective beliefs. In this sense, people act only ‘partly rationally’
and are in fact emotional (or irrational) in the remaining part of their actions. To summarize,
bounded rationality deals with the fact that agents often do not have a perfectly logical approach
to making their decisions but also form (partly) subjective beliefs, e.g., from a pool of (slightly)
different models or hypotheses. This also implies that agents are allowed to use learning models for
their expectation formation, which enables them to occasionally replace their poorly performing
beliefs. Furthermore, the concept of bounded rationality is concerned with the ways the actual
decision-making process influences decisions and is a central theme in behavioral economics.
1.2.1 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
As we have seen above, the concept of rational expectations takes the aspect of aggregate infor-
mation into consideration (see Eq. (1.1)). Interestingly, even though the REH has primarily been
applied to microeconomic problems, the idea of aggregating information had been ignored in mi-
croeconomic theory for a long time, until its potential capability was recognized for macroeconomic
problems in the 1970s.
Conventional microeconomic theory does not take the informational issue into account. For
instance, in the standard model of a pure exchange economy, where agents are characterized by
their preferences and their initial endowments, prices are determined simply by eliminating the
excess demands caused by the agents’ buy and sell orders. This situation does not change even
when uncertainty is introduced. Thus in the conventional microeconomic model, the economic
agents ignore the information of the other agents’ beliefs, which is potentially revealed through
the market price. Instead, the agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they simply determine their
demands under uncertainty and without using the aggregate information about the probability
assessment of all economic agents for a certain event which is embodied in the price system.10
9H. Simon coined the notion of ‘bounded rationality’ in 1957 (see Simon, 1957). See also Simon (1955) for an
earlier publication and Simon (1982) for an exhaustive paper collection.
10For more detailed remarks of this statement and the following discussion see also Sheffrin (1983).
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This perception changed in the mid-1970s, particularly in connection with a simple model
proposed by S. J. Grossman11, in which the agents are assumed to use the information revealed
by the market price. The model consists of I traders which can choose between two assets, one risk-
free asset and one risky asset. The price of the risky asset at time t+1 is uncertain, i.e., a random
variable, and denoted by pt+1. At time t every agent receives information Ii,t about the true price
pt+1 realized in t + 1. The information is normally distributed around the actual price pt+1 and
is different for every agent, which represents the agents’ uncertainty. In the naive equilibrium in
which the agents do not exploit the fact that the market price does reveal additional information
from their counterparts, all agents determine their demand Ni of the risky asset by maximizing
their utility function for the time period t + 1 with respect to their information Ii,t received one
period before. Hence, the market clearing price pt is determined by the naive equilibrium condition
given by
I∑
i=1
Ni[pt | Ii,t] = N ,
where N denotes the fixed supply of the risky asset.
In a next step, Grossman (1976) assumed that the agents do use the market price for acquiring
other agents’ information. Obviously, the equilibrium condition now changes, as the demand Ni of
each agent now depends also on the market clearing price pt which, in turn, reveals all the available
information. In such a situation, the market clearing price can be determined by solving
I∑
i=1
Ni [ pt(I1,t, . . . , II,t) | Ii,t; pt(I1,t, . . . , II,t) ] = N . (1.3)
Under the assumption of a CARA utility function12 for all agents and jointly normal distributed
and uncorrelated agents’ prediction errors, Grossman (1976) showed that such a price function pt
exists. Furthermore, it has the property of being a ‘sufficient statistic’ for all the information. In
other words, the solution of Eq. (1.3) contains all the information of the economy to predict pt+1,
which implies that all agents’ individual information Ii,t can be neglected as it does not reveal
any more information than pt itself.
13 Grossman named this equilibrium a ‘rational expectations
equilibrium’, whose solution is a price that is a function of all the underlying information available
in the economy.
1.3 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
As in the case of the REH, there is an entire collection of alternative definitions of the Efficient
Market Hypothesis, which I do not want to discuss extensively in this outline. Instead, I would
again like to stress the basic idea of the EMH, that is perhaps sometimes hidden behind all the
different captious or at least technical ways of expressing market efficiency.14 The discussion will
11See Grossman (1976, 1978).
12The term CARA denotes ‘constant relative risk-aversion’. See Appendix A 1.3 for details.
13In Grossman (1978), some of the assumptions could be weakened without losing the main results obtained in
Grossman (1976).
14For a prominent discussion of a proper definition of market efficiency, see the debate between LeRoy and Fama
(see LeRoy, 1976; Fama, 1976a).
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mainly follow the review article of LeRoy (1989) and the references given therein.15
Nowadays, every modern definition of the EMH mainly consists of two basic statements, namely
that
(i) prices reflect all available information about the underlying asset
(ii) prices respond instantaneously and in an unbiased fashion to any new information about the
asset.
This was formulated for the first time by E. F. Fama16 in his classic survey from 1970:
Definition 1.5 (Fama’s Definition of the EMH)
A market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ the available information is called effi-
cient.
Obviously, this definition is quite compact and leaves room for interpretation as hinted by the quo-
tation marks around the expression ‘fully reflect’. For instance, without specifying the underlying
price and information process, it is hardly possible to verify this assertion empirically.
For a long time, market efficiency was closely linked to the random walk model17 and serves as a
theoretical background for the statistical behavior of asset prices, whose origin can be traced back
to an eminent PhD thesis composed by L. Bachelier18 at the very beginning of the 20th century.
The empirical analysis began in the 1930s with the work of H. Working and A. Cowles.19
While Working claims that commodity and stock prices resemble cumulations of purely random
changes, Cowles focused attention on the use of fundamental analysis, finding that there was little
evidence that market analysts and financial services outperformed the market. Nevertheless, it
is generally held that the first appearance of the ‘Random Walk Hypothesis’ is associated with a
publication by M. G. Kendall20, who seriously examined the assertion that stock prices follow a
random walk. In his statistical study, he found that weekly changes in a wide variety of financial
prices are practically independent from former price changes and thus cannot be predicted from
either past changes in the series or from changes in other price series. According to these findings,
15For a textbook-like treatment, see Fama (1976b); Sheffrin (1983); Cuthbertson (1996); Campbell, Lo and
MacKinlay (1997) or Lo and MacKinlay (2002).
16See Fama (1970). For a more recent publication on the EMH by the same author see also Fama (1991).
17A stochastic variable Xt is said to follow a random walk (without drift), if Xt+1 = Xt+ǫt+1, where ǫt+1 follows
an ‘independent white noise process’, i.e., it has the following properties
ǫt+1 is i.i.d. , E[ǫt+1] = 0 and Cov[ǫm, ǫs] =
(
σ2 for m = s
0 for m 6= s . (1.4)
Note that it is also possible to consider processes as defined by Eq. (1.4), that lack the i.i.d. property, i.e., processes
that only have a zero mean and a finite variance. Such processes are simply called ‘white noise processes’ and might
have nonlinear dependence in higher moments. For the random walk (without drift) the mean and variance is given
by E[Xt] = 0 and V ar[Xt] = σ2t. For further details see Campbell et al. (1997) or Franke, Ha¨rdle and Hafner
(2000).
18See Bachelier (1900).
19See Working (1934); Cowles (1933, 1944) and Cowles and Jones (1937).
20See Kendall (1953). However, note that about 60 years after its first mention by Bachelier, a theoretical
exposition of the Gaussian hypothesis was made by Osborne (1959), who rediscovered the Brownian Motion for
stock markets.
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he supported Working’s results.21 More technically, Kendall’s conclusion can be summarized by
stating that the price itself follow a random walk, which is expressed by
pt+1 = pt + ǫt+1 , (1.5)
where ǫt denotes the price increments, which are assumed to be i.i.d. stochastic variables with
mean zero and finite variance. Obviously, Eq. (1.5) implies
Et[pt+1] ≡ E[pt+1 | It] = pt , (1.6)
which means that the best forecast for tomorrow’s price is the price observed today.22 In other
words, price changes are unpredictable and thus the forecast errors should be zero on average (and
uncorrelated with any information It) as price changes are only caused by the arrival of ‘news’ or
unanticipated events. This argument shows the close link between the concept of the REH and
the EMH, which has already been noted in the previous section.23
The modern literature of market efficiency in economics began in 1965 with a theoretical piece
of work by P. A. Samuelson, who generalized the assumptions of the random walk model and
particularly linked it to the framework of economic equilibria.24 He claimed to have weakened the
assumptions connected with the random walk model and replaced it with a martingale process25,
which still has the property of Eq. (1.6), but with the weaker assumption that for the price
increments only E[ǫt] = 0 holds. Thus price changes still remain unpredictable as proposed by
the random walk model (and the empirical findings) but martingale models also allow for diverse
dependencies in higher moments of the increments and do not restrict their distributions to being
identical.
Initially, Samuelson (1965) showed that the martingale property holds for futures prices26.
Assuming rational expectations by postulating that the futures price f(t, T ) at time t equals the
conditional expected spot price of the underlying asset at the maturity date T , i.e.,
f(t, T ) = Et[pT ] ,
he concluded by using the law of iterated expectations27 that
Et[f(t+ 1, T )− f(t, T )] = 0 for t = 1, . . . , T − 1 ,
21Analogous results was founded in an econometric study by Granger and Morgenstern (1963) using spectral
analysis.
22Quite often the Random Walk Hypothesis can be found to be formulated in the logarithm of prices instead of
prices themselves, i.e., ln pt+1 = ln pt + ǫt+1.
23For this reason the REH is sometimes even identified with the EMH or, is at least called the ‘rational expectations
element’ of the EMH (see Cuthbertson, 1996).
24See Samuelson (1965, 1973). Similar results were also published in 1966 by B. Mandelbrot (see Mandelbrot,
1966).
25A stochastic process Xt is said to be a martingal with respect to a sequence of information set It if Xt has the
property E[Xt+1 | It] = Xt. Note that stochastic processes following a random walk have the martingale property.
Thus martingale processes are less restrictive than random walk processes. Indeed, as in random walk processes,
the error terms ǫt are independent variables, which rules out any dependence between different error terms. In
martingale processes the ǫt only have to be uncorrelated, i.e., dependence in higher moments is allowed.
26For a definition of ‘futures price’ and connected terms as ‘spot price’, ‘underlying asset’ and ‘maturity date’ as
mentioned in the following, see Hull (2000).
27See a note in Chapter 2, Appendix A 2.2 for details.
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which states that there is no way of making an expected profit by extrapolating past changes in
the futures prices or, in mathematical language, future prices follow a fair game28.
In his subsequent publication (Samuelson, 1973), he carried over his result to stock prices and
linked the concept of describing the EMH by martingale processes to the notion of determining
of fundamental pricing equilibria. Maintaining that the current price pt equals the sum of the
conditional expected price of tomorrow and the conditional expected dividend yield discounted by
a discounting rate ̺, i.e.,
pt =
1
1 + ̺
Et[pt+1 + dt+1] , (1.7)
it can be easily shown (this simple transformation is relegated to Appendix A 1.1) that the excess
returns have the fair game property, namely
Et[ρt+1]− ̺ = 0 , (1.8)
where ρt+1 ≡ (pt+1 + dt+1 − pt)/pt denotes the return at time t + 1. Now, Samuelson concludes
that, in this case, prices are equal to the expected discounted sum of their future dividends, thus
pt =
∞∑
i=1
1
(1 + ̺)i
Et[dt+i] . (1.9)
Note that also the reverse assertion is true. If the economy follows the (fundamental) expected
present-value model, which is defined by Eq. (1.9), then the excess returns have the fair-game
property. To summarize, Samuelson showed that the framework of the EMH expressed by the
theory of martingale is consistent with an economy in which agents use fundamental pricing rules,
which leads to vanishing excess returns caused by the competing behavior among the agents.29
Two further remarks are necessary. First, it should be mentioned that until now, the question
has not been asked, whether the sum in Eq. (1.9) is in fact absolutely convergent. Indeed, one
further assumption has to be made, generally known in economics as the ‘transversality condition’.
Although this discussion might seem incomplete, I want to leave this item out for now and instead
refer to the description of the Brock-Hommes (BH) model outlined in the next chapter (see Section
2.1, Eq. (2.7) and Eq. (2.8)), in which we will recover an expression like in Eq. (1.9) when dealing
with the ‘fundamental equilibrium solution’ of the BH model. Second, no variable defined in the
previous comments has yet had the martingale property. In particular, pt is not a martingale.
Instead, it can be deduced that the discounted value of a mutual fund that reinvests received
dividends follows a martingale process (see Appendix A 1.2 for details). However, in applied
research it is quite common to assume that prices (or their logs) follow a martingale process. This
can be justified by the fact that when dealing, with e.g., daily data, the dividends and discounting
rates can be neglected, as their values are relatively small on this time scale.
28A stochastic process Yt is said to be a fair game if it is E[Yt+1 | It] = 0. Obviously, Xt is a martingale if and
only if Xt+1 −Xt is a fair game.
29In Samuelson (1965, 1973), the martingale property of rates of returns on stock (or futures) prices is derived
under the assumption of risk-neutrality. LeRoy (1973) showed that the martingale property does not carry over to
the risk-averse case.
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1.3.1 Fair Price and Martingale Property in Mathematical Finance Literature
In this subsection, the results of the previous discussion are restated in a slightly different way.
The expected present value given in Eq. (1.7) as well as Eq. (1.9) can also be seen as the fair or
arbitrage-free price30 of the investment at the current time t. Thus Samuelson’s result also links the
‘no-arbitrage principle’, which is the crucial tool in determining the fair (or fundamental) price of
an investment opportunity, to the concept of martingales.31 Interestingly, this perception is more
pronounced in modern mathematical finance literature, which started in 1979 with a publication
from J. M. Harrison and D. M. Kreps32 and was extended two years later by J. M. Harrison
and S. R. Pliska33. Here, the concept of the equivalent martingale measure was introduced
for the first time, thus allowing for fair price determination via expectation value calculations,
which constituted mathematical finance as a new branch of stochastics. In the past, the fair
price determination of assets and derivatives was mainly based on solving differential equation
problems (see the determination of the Black-Scholes formula by F. Black and M. Scholes34)
and therefore was not a research field for stochasticians. However, Harrison and Pliska (1981)
then proposed a theory which reduced the problem of contingent claim valuation to an equivalent
problem in martingale theory for markets operating in continuous time, while Harrison and Kreps
(1979) enabled this work by developing this theory, at first in the case of a finite market, in which
agents are only allowed to trade at discrete points in time and in which the underlying probability
space is finite.
In this strand of literature, martingale processes are introduced to extend results initially proved
for one-period models to the n-period case. More precisely, in an n-period model with Bi being the
(unique) discounting process and Pi being the price of the investment at period i, (BiPi)i=0,...,n is
shown to be a martingale with respect to a certain probability measure Q, i.e., it is
EQ[Bi+1Pi+1 | Ii] = BiPi , i = 0, . . . , n− 1 ,
wherebyQ is said to be an ‘equivalent martingale measure’ or an ‘equivalent risk-neutral probability
measure’, which is equivalent to the (initial) probability measure P, which describes the model in
the ‘real world’.35
Before I quote the ‘fundamental theorem of asset pricing’, which is one of the cornerstone results
in mathematical finance literature, I briefly want to give some further comments on the notion of the
‘equivalent martingale measure’, since it might be less common in economic literature. The basic
idea of stochastic modeling in finance is the transition from the ‘real world probability measure’ P,
30A transaction is said to be an ‘arbitrage’ if it is possible to make a risk-free profit by entering simultaneously
into transactions in two or more markets, e.g., to buying at the lower price on one market and simultaneously selling
at the higher price on the other market. In this case, the ‘no-arbitrage principle’ states that the price determination
of investments has to guarantee that no arbitrage opportunities are present on different markets. See Hull (2000)
for more detailed comments on this topic.
31To be precise, it is important to note that an arbitrage-free market is not necessarily equivalent to an efficient
one. However, the existence of an efficient market implies that there are also no arbitrage opportunities in the
market.
32See Harrison and Kreps (1979).
33See Harrison and Pliska (1981). See also Harrison and Pliska (1983) for a following publication on this topic.
34See Black and Scholes (1973). See also Merton (1973b) and Black (1976b) for related publications.
35See for example Irle (1998) or Reitz, Schwarz and Martin (2004) for a definition and further details.
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which describes the phenomenon in terms of a probabilistic model, to the ‘risk-neutral probability
measure’ Q, which is stochastically equivalent to P and in which the prices are assigned to their
‘natural’ values in the risk-neutral market in the sense that all discounted assets in the market have
the same expectation value. This property of assets is formalized by postulating that discounted
assets follow a martingale process. Let us consider Eq. (1.7). Since the current fair price of an
asset is assumed to be the discounted expected sum of tomorrow’s price and dividend payment,
an investor will be indifferent to investing in this asset or in another risk-free asset, realizing
a certain profit of (1 + ̺) in the next period, which is also expressed by Eq. (1.8). In financial
mathematics, this assumption exactly mirrors the changeover to the equivalent martingale measure
Q, which is the underlying probability measure with which the expectation value in Eq. (1.7) is to
be determined. Of course, this assumption simplifies reality, since Q does not take certain things
to account, for example different market perceptions of the market participants, or individuals’
risk aversion covered by a risk premium in real markets as it would do the real-world measure P.
After this short excursus I continue as earlier proposed. The ‘fundamental theorem of asset
pricing’ guarantees the existence of such a measureQ and states that an n-period model is arbitrage-
free if and only if such an equivalent martingale measure Q exists.36 Furthermore, under slightly
more restrictive assumptions, the fundamental price of the investment is uniquely determined as the
expected value of future discounted yields in the ‘risk-neutral world’, which can also be expressed
by
p(C) = EQ
[
n∑
i=1
BiCi | I0
]
,
where againBi denotes the discounting process, EQ[·] denotes the expectation operator with respect
to the equivalent martingale measureQ, andCi stands for ‘claim’, i.e., the payouts of the investment
at time i. For a more technical treatment and further details we can refer to Irle (1998) and Korn
and Korn (2001).37
1.3.2 Classification of the Information Set
In the previous discussion we have seen that the price process is linked to the process of information
transmission by the martingale property
E[pt+1 | It] = pt . (1.10)
However, nothing has yet been said about the structure of the information set It although, ob-
viously, for empirical tests of the EMH, the information set would have to be specified. For this
reason, Fama (1970) proposed three subgroups of information sets, with which he classified the
following three different forms of efficiency:
• Weak-form efficiency, i.e., the information set It includes only the history of prices or returns.
36In general the equivalent martingale measure need not be unique.
37Although the link between the determination of an arbitrage-free price and the martingale property of properly
discounted payouts has been stressed in the preceding discussion, the concept of market efficiency can also be found
in mathematical finance literature, where it is modeled by a Markov process that mainly states that future evolution
of a stochastic process given its history solely depends on its current value.
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• Semistrong-form efficiency, i.e., the information set It includes all publicly available infor-
mation, i.e., all information known to all market participants.
• Strong-form efficiency, i.e., the information set It includes all information known to any
market participant, i.e., it includes also any private information.
It follows directly from the law of iterated expectations (see Appendix A 2.2) that strong-form
efficiency implies semi-strong form efficiency, which in turn implies weak-form efficiency. Obviously,
this statement seems trivial, as of course, all information (i.e., including private information)
contains all public information, which in turn contains the historical prices and returns.
As we know from Eq. (1.8) that the expected excess return conditioned on a given information
set is always zero, it can be concluded that, in a weak-form efficient market, trading strategies based
on past price movements (i.e., ‘chartist strategies’) are not capable of outperforming the market.
In such a market, agents who use fundamental analysis and/or public or private information should
dominate the agents using only chartist strategies, since their information set is a superset of the
weak-form information set of the chartists, which would allow them to make better predictions by
more accurately deriving the expectation values via Eq. (1.10).
In the same fashion, it can be argued that for the semi-strong efficiency case only private infor-
mation can help to gain excess returns, or, in other words, neither fundamental nor chartist based
strategies should be able to outperform the market. Finally, in the strong-form efficiency case it is
even impossible to profit from private information. To see this, note that all other agents at least
know all publicly available information and, additionally, conclude the same value of the funda-
mental price, which means that the market participants already interpret any simple appearance
of an insider as revealed information. Consequently, the insider’s information is instantaneously
reflected in the price process. To sum up, under the strong-form efficiency it is not possible to
make any excess return profit.
1.3.3 The Grossman-Stiglitz-Paradoxon
Based on the martingale framework, the EMH implies that the movement of financial prices are an
immediate and unbiased reflection of incoming news and unanticipated information about future
earning prospects, which can be alternatively expressed by the fact that future price changes evolve
in a totally random fashion and are thus unpredictable.
This conclusion seems to answer a frequently asked question also formulated in Fama’s out-
standing piece of work, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices (Fama, 1965), namely:
‘To what extent can the past history of a common stock price be used to make mean-
ingful predictions concerning the future price of the stock?’
However, a puzzle remains with this implication, which was stated for the first time in economic
literature by S. J. Grossman and J. E. Stiglitz38 in the following paradox:
Theoretical Argument 1.6 (The Grossman-Stiglitz-Paradoxon)
38See Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
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According to the EMH, at any time all information is incorporated into the current
price, which leads to a fully revealing equilibrium, thus there is no incentive for anyone
to collect information if gathering the information is assumed to be costly. Thus, in
turn, no information can be incorporated into the prices if there is no one willing to
obtain it.
Grossman and Stiglitz overcame this theoretical argument against the EMH in the same publication
by pursuing the following idea. While in a market in which prices fully reveal information no
individual will acquire it by positive costs, he/she will do so in a market, in which the prices only
partially reveals relevant information. Therefore, Grossman and Stiglitz proposed a model with
rational expectations, which consists of two types of traders, namely informed and uninformed
ones. While the informed traders receive private information about the return of a risky asset in
the form of a noisy signal, the uninformed traders do not. Thus the rational, uninformed traders
have to use the equilibrium pricing rule for the risky asset, in which information from the informed
traders’ trades is conveyed, to gain any information about the payout of the risky asset. Since
the supply of risky assets is assumed to be an additional source of uncertainty in the model, the
uninformed traders cannot obtain all the private information of their counterparts from the market
price because they observe it only as a noisy signal. Grossman and Stiglitz showed that in such
a model scenario, a rational expectations equilibrium exists in which the equilibrium price only
partially reveals the privately informed traders’ information already paid for by these traders.
In other words, in the equilibrium, the uninformed traders know less than the informed traders
and thus are outperformed by them. The costs incurred by the informed traders for acquiring
private information are equalized by an increase in their utility, which is caused by their superior
information level. As a consequence, the Grossman-Stiglitz-Paradoxon does not appear in this
model framework.39
1.4 Representative Agent Hypothesis (RAH)
In contrats to the REH and EMH, which are two cornerstone concepts of economic modeling and
financial theory, the Representative Agent Hypothesis can be more properly classified as a useful
and popular assumption in equilibrium models. Its proposition is summarized in the following
definition:
Definition 1.7 (Extreme Version of the RAH)
An economic model is said to be provided with a representative agent framework if all
agents in the model are assumed to be homogeneous with respect to their preferences,
their expectation formation and their investment strategies.
Obviously, weaker forms of the RAH can be obtained by lowering the assumptions for example by
allowing for different preferences, investment strategies, etc.
39See also Lyons (2001) for a detailed description of the model.
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For decades and in almost all economic fields, homogeneity among agents has been the crucial
assumption in economic equilibrium models.40 A prominent example in financial literature is
the ‘Capital Asset Pricing Model’ (CAPM), proposed in the 1960s by several academics, namely
W. F. Sharpe, J. Lintner, J. Mossin and R. C. Merton.41 The CAPM is a classic equilibrium
model which seeks to determine risky-asset prices (e.g., stocks) and is based on the following
assumptions:42
(i) Homogeneity of information among agents, i.e., all agents have free and immediate access to
all available information in the market.
(ii) Homogeneity of agents’ expectations, i.e., all traders have homogeneous expectations about
returns, variance and covariances (correlation) between the various returns, and base their
decisions on that information.
(iii) Risk aversion of agents, i.e., all agents are risk-averse and maximize their expected utility at
the end of a one-period horizon investment.
(iv) Agents are price takers, i.e., agents’ investment decisions do not lead to changes in the
equilibrium prices.
(v) Existence of K assets and one risk-free asset in the market, i.e., there are K different assets
available in the market, whose individual risk can be measured by the variance of its return
σ2i . Furthermore, agents can borrow and lend as much as they want at the risk-free rate r.
(vi) No transactions costs, i.e., transaction costs and taxes are assumed to be zero.
(vii) Infinite divisibility of assets, i.e., arbitrary fractions of assets can be purchased.
(viii) Short selling is allowed.
Thus, unlike in Definition 1.7, the CAPM allows investors to have different preferences (as long
as they remain risk-averse), but the assumption of agents’ homogeneous expectations is crucial
in deriving the equilibrium of the CAPM, which, the other way round, will collapse if this as-
sumption is given up. The other crucial assumption in the model is that agents use the so-called
(µ− σ)-criterion for their optimal investment decision, which means that the agents only use the
information about the expectation value µi and variance σ
2
i of the risky asset for their utility
maximization problem, also called ’mean-variance maximization’ for short.43
Solving the CAPM leads us to a remarkable result, widely known as the ‘(two-fund) separation
theorem’, which I shall briefly discuss. Each agent’s investment decision can be subdivided into two
different parts. Since the perception of the objective market variables, which are the expectation
40Since the RAH cannot be attributed to certain authors as it is possible in the case of the REH and the EMH,
instead, I give two examples found in Levy and Levy (1996), namely Ramsey (1928) and Cass (1965).
41See Sharpe (1964); Lintner (1965); Mossin (1966) and Merton (1973a).
42The model description mainly follows Cuthbertson (1996) and Franke et al. (2000).
43It can be shown that sufficient conditions for the portfolio selection based on the mean-variance maximization
being exact are, on the one hand, that the investor has a quadratic function, or, on the other hand, that the returns
of the risky asset are normally distributed. Otherwise, the mean-variance approach can be viewed as an second-order
approximation.
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about asset returns and its variances and covariances, are assumed to be homogeneous among all
agents, all individuals therefore will hold the same proportions π∗i of the risky assets. Thus, in the
equilibrium, each agent is willing to hold the ‘market portfolio’ Xm,t, which is given by
Xm,t =
K∑
i=1
π∗iXi,t ,
where Xi,t is the price of asset i at time t. Then, in terms of returns, the return of the market
portfolio can be determined as44
Rm,t = lnXm,t − lnXm,t−1 .
This completes the first step of the agent’s investment decision problem. In the second step, the
individual preferences of each single agent enter the agents’ decision problem. According to their
chosen risk aversion, the agents determine their wealth proportion, they are willing to invest in the
market portfolio, and they invest the remainder of their wealth in the risk-free asset, providing them
with a risk-free rate r. Note that this agent-varying partitioning of their wealth does not affect
their relative demand for the risky assets, i.e., the proportions π∗i . Thus the equilibrium expected
returns of the K assets are independent of the individuals’ preferences, i.e., their magnitude of
risk aversion, and are actually only determined by the market variables such as variances and
covariances. It can be shown that the equilibrium expected return µi of asset i is given by
µi ≡ E[Ri,t] = r + βi(E[Rm,t]− r) , i = 1, . . . ,K , (1.11)
where Ri,t = ln (Xi,t/Xi,t−1). βi denotes the ‘beta-factor’ (or simply ‘beta’) of the risky asset i
given by
βi =
Cov[Ri,t, Rm,t]
V ar[Rm,t]
,
which measures the relative impact of asset i on the systematic risk of the portfolio of all assets as
a proportion of the total variance of the portfolio. Indeed, the CAPM implies that the covariance
of the return of asset i with the market return rather than its own variance σi determines the
asset’s expected return. Thus the covariance between asset i and the market seems to be the more
relevant measure of its risk. Rewriting Eq. (1.11) by
(E[Ri,t]− r) ∼ (E[Rm,t]− r)
with βi being the proportion factor, the CAPM implies that the excess return of asset i is pro-
portional to the excess return of the market portfolio and, in addition, that only the covariance
of returns between asset i and the market portfolio (and the variance of the market portfolio)
influences the excess return on asset i.
To sum up, Eq. (1.11) states that the expected return of asset i consists of two components.
More exactly, it is the sum of the risk-free asset’s return and a risk premium, which is determined
for each asset by its specific beta-factor. If there is a positive correlation between the asset i and the
44Rm,t is also called ‘log-return’. The log-return rˆt during the period t is defined as rˆt ≡ ln(1+rt) = ln pt−ln pt−1
where rt ≡ (pt−pt−1)/pt−1. The log-return is defined for the case of continuous compounding and therefore is also
called the ‘continuously compounded return’ or ‘continuous return’.
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market portfolio, the risk premium will also be positive, and vice versa. Furthermore, the stronger
the correlation between asset i and the market portfolio, the more significant its contribution to
the market portfolio risk. For a formal derivation of the CAPM model see for instance Cuthbertson
(1996).
It is no wonder that a lot of effort has put into finding a proper approach for testing the
empirical implications of the CAPM. Although even a brief discussion on this issue goes beyond
the scope of this thesis, it is widely known that different versions of the CAPM that are even more
general in their construction45 are rejected by certain empirical tests. Seen from a theoretical point
of view, this is mainly caused by the overly restrictive assumptions made in the CAPM. For an
introduction to these test procedures, see again Cuthbertson (1996).
Although the previous model was just an example of a financial market model under the as-
sumption of homogeneity among agents, albeit a rather seminal one, there is some general dissat-
isfaction with the assumption of representative investors, for example in Kirman (1992) and, again
referring to financial market models, in Levy and Levy (1996). While Kirman questions generally
the applicability of the representative agents approach in macroeconomic models and stresses the
importance of introducing heterogeneity and interaction between individuals in such models (an
approach which is well known from game theory), Levy and Levy focus on the fact that assuming
homogeneity among investors in financial models may lead to unrealistic and inefficient prices and
market behavior, which can be overcome by allowing for heterogeneity in agents’ expectations.
Note that their conclusion will be discussed in a more detailed fashion in Chapter 2, Section 2.3,
when I outline the Levy-Levy-Solomon (LLS) Model.
1.5 Summary
This chapter serves as the introductory chapter of this thesis, in which some basic and essential
economic ideas and concepts of modeling financial markets are summarized. It purely concentrates
on traditional and generally accepted approaches to financial markets and also considers these from
a historical perspective. The content of this chapter can be resumed as follows:
• For nearly the last forty years, two fundamental paradigms of the traditional theory of finan-
cial markets are the concept of ‘Rational Expectations Equilibria’ (REE) and the ‘Efficient
Market Hypothesis’ (EMH). While the REE assumes that all agents act perfectly rationally
in the sense that they have access to all relevant information on their economic environment
and always perfectly use it to make their economic trading decisions, the EMH states that
at any time the price of an asset incorporates all relevant information and thus price changes
simply occur when new information enters the market.
• Per definition, the ‘Rational Expectation Hypothesis’ (REH) states that agents’ subjective
expectations of future variables coincide with the (objective) mathematically computable
expectation value of these variables by using the underlying economic theory.
• Per definition, the ‘Efficient Market Hypothesis’ (EMH), closely connected to the REH, is
based on the assumption that the current price of an asset incorporates all relevant and
45For instance, in the first step, the betas can assumed to be time-varying.
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hitherto available information or, in other words, that future price changes are only caused
by unanticipated events and are therefore unpredictable.
• A third assumption often used in modeling financial markets is the representative agent
hypothesis (RAH), which is one of the crucial building blocks in the eminent CAPM model,
which still prevails to some extent. The ‘Representative Agent Hypothesis’ (RAH) assumes
the homogeneity of agents with respect to their preferences and their expectation formation.
How these traditional and classical concepts of financial economics are still included in newer
approaches of financial theory, and in which directions these concepts are generalized in more
modern theories of financial markets, can be seen to some extent in Chapter 2 where two different
model frameworks of prominent behavioral financial market models will be studied.
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A 1.1 Derivation of Eq. (1.8)
Rewriting Eq. (1.7) in a slightly different way leads directly to the wanted expression as it is
Et[pt+1 + dt+1]
pt
= 1 + ̺
Et[pt+1 + dt+1]− pt
pt
= ̺
Et[pt+1 + dt+1]− pt
pt
− ̺ = 0 ,
which can also be written with the definition of the return ρt+1 as
Et[ρt+1]− ̺ = 0 .
A 1.2 Further Notes on the Martingale Property of Prices
Let qt be the number of assets held by an agent at time t. Then reinvesting the returns at time t+1 means
that
pt+1qt+1 = (pt+1 + dt+1)qt .
Furthermore, define
xt ≡ δ
tptqt with δ ≡
1
1 + ̺
,
which is the value of the stock at time t discounted on the time period 0. Then it can be concluded that
xt follows a martingale process as can be shown from the following derivation:
Et[xt+1] = Et[δ
t+1pt+1qt+1]
= Et[δ
t+1(pt+1 + dt+1)qt]
= δt+1qtEt[pt+1 + dt+1]
= δt+1qt · (1 + ̺)pt
= δt+1qtδ
−1pt
= δtqtpt = xt .
Thus, it is
Et[xt+1] ≡ E[xt+1 | It] = xt ,
which states that xt has the martingale property.
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A 1.3 Excursion I: Basic Concepts of Utility Theory under Uncertainty
The concept of expected utility was first introduced by D. Bernoulli46 in 1738, when he proposed a
solution for the St. Petersburger Paradoxon. Nowadays, it is one of the cornerstone concepts of the
‘decision theory’. About 200 years after this idea first appeared in the literature, the concept of expected
utility was formalized in an axiomatic way by J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern47, when they
began to develop a framework for the analysis of strategical situations. This became known in economics
in the following years under the notion of ‘game theory’.48 I will here explain the basic idea behind this
concept. In many fields, individuals are faced with the problem of making decisions in situations in where
future outcome of the decision cannot be assessed with certainty. For instance, let us assume that each
of these possible outcomes of a decision can be measured by a value, or more precisely, that the future
outcome of the decision is a random variable. In such a situation of uncertainty, one appropriate strategy
would be to derive the expectation values of the future outcome for all possible decisions and choose from
among all decisions that alternative whose expectation value is the highest (if a higher value means also
‘better’). Restricting our considerations to investment decisions in the remainder of this discussion, as
is common in financial literature, we can use a scenario where the investor chooses the alternative which
gives the highest expected value of investor’s wealth given his/her chosen investment horizon. However,
one crucial drawback to this simple decision-making rule becomes immediately obvious. Since the degree
of uncertainty of the investor’s investment decision is ignored when using such a simple strategy, the
investor might choose an alternative where the expected outcome is only moderately higher but, in turn,
bears a drastically higher risk relative to the other alternatives. The expected utility framework helps to
overcome this drawback and also to implement the inherent risk of the different investment alternatives in
the decision-making process.
In this framework, it is assumed that people are endowed with certain preferences (for instance, they
prefer more rather than less), which enable them to find a solution for their decision-making problem.
To make this approach mathematically tractable, the investor’s preferences are mapped on an analytic
function U(W ). Furthermore, the following general assumptions are made:
• Each individual can be characterized by a utility function U(W ).
• In any uncertain situation, the individuals maximize the expected value of their utility function, i.e.,
they derive
max {E[U(W )]} . (A 1.1)
• All the information about individual’s preferences is represented by the analytic form of U(W ).
By deriving the utility of wealth for each possible investment decision the investor is able to rank the
different investment alternatives according to his personal preferences. Therefore the utility function is
simply a tool to rank random wealth levels and thus to compare risky investments.
In the first step, the huge number of possible forms that utility functions might take can be restricted
by the following two reasonable assumptions:
(i) More wealth is better than less, that is, if W2 > W1 then U(W2) > U(W1), which implies
U ′(W ) > 0 .
46See Bernoulli (1954).
47See von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, 1947).
48For the following discussion see Copeland and Weston (1988); Gollier (2001) and Levy, Levy and Solomon
(2000). For an original report about the collaboration between O. Morgenstern and J. von Neumann on that topic
see Morgenstern (1976).
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(ii) The higher the current level of wealth the less a further increase in wealth is worth or, in other
words, marginal utility decreases as wealth rises, i.e.,
U ′′(W ) < 0 .
These assumptions imply that U(W ) is a concave function and has a positive but decreasing slope. The
concavity of U(W ) implies that investors are ‘risk-averse’, which means that among investments with
identical expected yields, they choose the investment with the least risk.49
The characteristic property of U ′′(W ) being negative for a risk-averse individual can also be concluded
by a more analytically based argument. Following Eq. (A 1.1), the expected utility of an investor after an
investment with a probability density function p(W ) is given by
E[U(W )] =
Z
dw p(w)U(w) . (A 1.2)
Let us assume that p(W ) is approximately symmetric and relatively well concentrated around W and let
σ2W ≡ V ar[W ], that can be interpreted as a risk measure. Approximating the utility of wealth by a Taylor
expansion up to the second order Eq. (A 1.2) can be written as
E[U(W )] =
Z
dw p(w)
»
U(W ) + U ′(W )(w −W ) +
U ′′(W )
2
(w −W )2 +O(w3)
–
= U(W ) + U ′(W )
Z
dw p(w)(w −W ) +
U ′′(W )
2
Z
dw p(w)(w −W )2 +O(w3) .
Equating the first integral to zero by using the standard symmetry argument and the second integral to
σ2W , we end up with
E[U(W )] = U(W ) +
U ′′(W )
2
σ2W +O(W
3) . (A 1.3)
Eq. (A 1.3) implies that if U ′′(W ) is positive, the utility would rise by increasing the measure of risk, which
would contradict the assumption that the investor has a risk-averse behavior. Therefore, U ′′(W ) has to
be negative, which is in harmony with Assumption (ii).
As the assumption of risk aversion still includes many irrelevant utility functions, K. J. Arrow and
J. W. Pratt50 suggest defining two measures of risk aversion to restrict the analytic forms of meaningful
utility functions again, namely:
• an absolute measure RA(W ) which is defined as
RA(W ) = −
U ′′(W )
U ′(W )
• a relative measure RR(W ) which is given by
RR(W ) = −W
U ′′(W )
U ′(W )
.
For each measure, three different subcases are to be distinguished as there is decreasing, constant and
increasing absolute (relative) risk-aversion:
• A decreasing absolute (relative) risk-aversion is defined as
∂R⋆(W )
∂W
< 0 , and denoted by DARA (DRRA) .
49The concavity of U(W ) is equivalent to the relation U(E[W ]) > E[U(W )], which implies that this relation can
also be used as a definition for risk aversion.
50See Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964).
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• A constant absolute (relative) risk-aversion is defined as
∂R⋆(W )
∂W
= 0 , and denoted by CARA (CRRA) .
• An increasing absolute (relative) risk-aversion is defined as
∂R⋆(W )
∂W
> 0 , and denoted by IARA (IRRA) .
In all three subcases the star ⋆ has to be substituted by A (R). Note that absolute risk-aversion measures
risk aversion for a given level of wealth, while relative risk-aversion is obtained by multiplying the measure
of absolute risk-aversion by the level of wealth. From empirical and experimental studies it can be hy-
pothesized that basically three different types of risk aversion can be detected in reality,51 namely IRRA,
CRRA and DARA, on which I will here offer some remarks:
• An increasing relative risk-aversion (IRRA) implies that an investor will lower his/her proportion of
wealth invested in risky prospects as he/she becomes wealthier.
• A constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) is characterized by the fact that an investor maintains a
constant proportion of wealth invested in risky prospects as his/her wealth changes.
• A decreasing absolute risk-aversion (DARA) implies that an individual is willing to invest more
(absolute) money in risky prospects as he is getting wealthier.
Thus,
• the DARA assumption is a generalization of the CRRA case, i.e.,
CRRA ⊂ DARA .52
Prominent candidates for utility functions are the quadratic function53
U(W ) = αW − βW 2 ,
the negative exponential utility function
U(W ) = − exp(−νW ) , (A 1.4)
the logarithmic function
U(W ) = ln(W )
and, as a generalization of the latter one, the power function54
U(W ) =
W 1−ν
1− ν
, (A 1.5)
where α, β, ν > 0 are constant and denote the risk preferences. It is easy to see that the negative exponential
utility function (A 1.4) is of the CARA type whereas the power function and logarithmic function have
the CRRA properties. A summary of the Arrow-Pratt classification of utility of wealth functions is given
in Table A 1.1 (taken from Levy et al., 2000). Figure A 1.1 exhibits these two prominent examples of
51See Levy et al. (2000) and Chapter 3, Section 3.1 for details.
52This implication can easily be shown analytically. Since ∂RR/∂W = W∂RA/∂W−U ′′(W )/U ′(W ), it is obvious
that ∂RR/∂W = 0 implies ∂RA/∂W = U
′′(W )/(WU ′(W )) < 0.
53A quadratic utility function only makes sense for an positive W-range, that is, for W ≤ α/(2β).
54Using the rule of de l’Hospital it can be easily shown that the power utility function coincides with the logarithmic
function by setting the risk-aversion parameter α equal to 1. Let g(x) = W 1−x and h(x) = 1 − x, then it is
g′(x) = − ln(W ) ·W 1−x and h′(x) = −1 and, thus, g′(x)/h′(x) = ln(W ) ·W 1−x → ln(W ) as x→ 1.
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Utility Functions Absolute Risk Measure Relative Risk Measure
quadratic IARA IRRA
negative exponential CARA IRRA
logarithmic DARA CRRA
power DARA CRRA
Table A 1.1: Risk-aversion properties for different analytic forms of utility functions.
utility functions. In the left panel the negative exponential CARA utility function is shown for different
risk-aversion coefficients ν, while in the right panel the power CRRA utility function for different degrees
of risk aversion is plotted.
It is worth noting that the concept of expected utility provides a cardinal rank order for risky alterna-
tives. Thus cardinal utility functions map different degrees of utility on a scale according to the individual’s
preferences. Therefore, in contrast to an ordinal ranking, it can be determined to which extent various
utility values differ from each other. From the mathematical point of view, this implies that the rank order
is invariant against linear transformations, i.e., transformations of the form UT = a+ bU where b > 0. For
instance, U(W ) = (W 1−ν − 1)/(1 − ν) is very often used instead of the standard power utility function
given in Eq. (A 1.5).55
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Figure A 1.1: Negative exponential and power utility function for different risk-aversion coefficients. The left panel
exhibits a negative exponential utility function which is a CARA type and has the form U(W ) = − exp(−νW ). The
right panel shows a CRRA utility type and has the form U(W ) = (W 1−ν − 1)/(1− ν). In both cases a decrease in
the risk-aversion coefficient reduces the curvature of the utility function.
As already hinted above, there has been much debate about which analytic form of utility functions
describes the investors’ preferences best, although no final conclusion has yet been reached. Therefore,
choosing an appropriate utility function in economic modeling was for a long time mainly a question of the
function’s analytical manageability. For this reason, the negative exponential utility function is still often
used, since under the assumption of Gaussian distributed wealth the corresponding integral from deriving
E[U(W )] can be solved analytically. Furthermore, it can be shown that this approach is equivalent to the
standard mean-variance maximization approach, which takes solely the first and second moments of the
55See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.
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wealth distribution into account (see Appendix A 2.1 for details). For the same reason, the quadratic form
of utility functions is another particularly popular assumption. With this approach, E[U ] also depends
simply on the mean and variance of the wealth distribution hence higher moments can be disregarded.
Nowadays, the implementation of microscopic simulation methods in modeling financial markets allows
one to enlarge the number of feasible forms of utility functions in general. As they are supported by
empirical and experimental surveys, the DARA and CRRA class of utility function are of particular
interest. For this reason, a remarkable result is stated in Levy et al. (2000):
Theorem 1.8 If CRRA and DARA prevail, the only possible utility function is the power function, i.e.,
U(W ) =
W 1−ν
1− ν
.
Proof: A proof can be found in Levy et al. (2000).
The theorem clearly states that the power function is the only common function, that combines
the two properties, i.e., CRRA and DARA.
Chapter 2
Behavioral Models of Financial Markets
This chapter reviews two prominent examples of behavioral financial market models from the
1990s established by Brock and Hommes and Levy, Levy and Solomon. Both model frameworks
are outlined here to a certain extent as they can be understood as a starting point for my own
investigations summarized in the next part of this thesis. The Brock-Hommes (BH) model comes
from the economic branch of literature. It is a nonlinear evolutionary adaptive model of a financial
market with different trader types, which is nested in a widely applicable analytical framework.
Due to its crucial relevance for the remainder of this thesis, some modified versions of the original
model proposed by other authors and by me are also considered in a subsequent section of this
chapter. The Levy-Levy-Solomon (LLS) model outlined afterwards can be classified as a simple
microscopic multi-agent model that is mainly computationally orientated. In contrast to the first
model, it is published and frequently cited and discussed in both economics as well as physics and
computer science journals. The chapter concludes with a summary of the results of the analysis of
my own model modifications of the BH model and a final comparison of the two model frameworks
presented in the chapter.
2.1 The Brock-Hommes (BH) Model
In this section I will present a structural heterogeneous agents model established byW. A. Brock
and C. H. Hommes that is based on earlier contributions to nonlinear, complex asset pricing
modeling of the first author (see Brock, 1993, 1997). In numerous publications, Brock and Hommes
propose to model an economic or financial market as an adaptive evolutionary system where
boundedly rational agents use different trading strategies to compete against each other (see Brock
and Hommes, 1997b,a, 1998, 1999). As in many other models with heterogeneous interacting agents,
the market participants are classified according to the main ‘prototypes’ of trading strategies,
namely fundamental and chartist strategies.1 While fundamental based strategies assume that
asset prices follow, at least in the long run, their fundamental equilibrium price, chartist strategies
are basically based on extrapolating future asset prices from past price patterns. The agents choose
their trading strategies according to a ‘fitness measure’, such as average accumulated wealth or
accumulated past profits, and update their strategies occasionally when other trading strategies
seem to promise a higher fitness. In this way, an evolutionary competition between different trader
1See the introduction of Chapter 4 for further publications using the chartist-fundamentalist framework.
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types is established in the market and traders can be termed ‘bounded rational’, in the sense that
most of them pursue the most profitable strategy.2 To complete the model framework, Brock and
Hommes connect the dynamics of traders’ choice of strategies with the market price dynamics by
allowing for endogenous interaction between the equilibrium price dynamics and the evolution of
strategies. This means that changes in traders’ beliefs about which strategy is more favorable for
them leads to new equilibrium prices, which in turn may lead the traders to update their choice
of strategy.
Brock and Hommes coined the notion of ‘Adaptive Belief System’ (ABS) for this modeling
concept. In recent years, a remarkable branch of publications has followed, dealing with extensions
of the original ABS (see Brock et al., 2005; Brock and Hommes, 2001; Chiarella and He, 2002c;
Gaunersdorfer, 2000; Gaunersdorfer et al., 2003; Gaunersdorfer and Hommes, 2007; Gaunersdorfer
et al., 2008; Hommes, 2002) or using the ABS framework as a proper starting point for their
own slightly different approaches or modifications (see Chiarella and He, 2001; Chiarella, Dieci
and Gardini, 2002; Chiarella and He, 2002a,b, 2003; De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006b,a; Diks and
von der Weide, 2002; Hommes, Huang and Wang, 2005; Westerhoff, 2003). My own presentation
will mainly concentrate on the original ABS model and is mostly a condensation of both a review
article written by Hommes (2001) and the original publications on the ABS literature mentioned
therein. At the end of this section I will also give a brief summary of some publications from
Gaunersdorfer (2000) and Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007) as well as my own suggestion of a
model variant. All of these are closely related to the original BH model.
2.1.1 Model Description
The BH model is based on a simple discrete present value asset pricing model that is extended to
allow for heterogeneous trading strategies. Traders can choose between two different investment
opportunities:3
• a risky asset with an uncertain dividend payment dt and a current price pt
• a risk-free asset that is assumed to be perfectly elastically supplied at gross return R ≡ 1+ r,
where r denotes the interest rate.
In every period, the traders derive their optimal demand function from a standard mean-variance
utility maximization approach.4 Denoting Wi,t the wealth and Ni,t the number of shares of trader
i at time t respectively, the wealth dynamics of each single trader evolves according to
Wi,t+1 = Ni,t(pt+1 + dt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth invested in risky asset
+ (1 + r)(Wi,t − ptNi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth invested in risk-free asset
= RWi,t + (pt+1 + dt+1 −Rpt)Ni,t . (2.1)
2See also Chapter 1, Section 1.2 for details.
3For the following discussion, see also the Subsection 1.2.1 in Chapter 1 and Grossman (1976) as well as Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) and Bray (1982).
4See Appendix A 2.1 for details.
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As each trader is assumed to be a myopic mean-variance optimizer maximizing expected risk
adjusted wealth, their optimal demand for risky assets is determined by
Ni,t = arg max
Ni,t
{
Ei,t [Wi,t+1(Ni,t)]− a
2
V ari,t [Wi,t+1(Ni,t)]
}
, (2.2)
where Ei,t[·] and V ari,t[·] denote the conditional expectation and conditional variance of trader i at
time t based on a publicly available information set It.5 Furthermore, a denotes the risk-aversion
parameter which is the (constant) Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion.6 Using Eq. (2.1)
and Eq. (2.2), the optimal demand of trader i can be derived as
Ni,t =
Ei,t[pt+1 + dt+1]−Rpt
aV ari,t[pt+1 + dt+1]
. (2.3)
Note that, for each trader, the optimal demand for risky assets is independent of their initial
wealth.7
In the BH model, the number of interacting traders is assumed to be infinitely large. The
traders are classified into H groups according to the different trading strategies used in the model
market. Furthermore, in each time period every trader can be uniquely allocated to one of the
H trading strategies. The fraction of group h = 1, . . . , H at time t is denoted by nh,t
8 and the
conditional variance V ari,t[·] = σ2 is assumed to be constant for all trader types.9
Let zs be the supply of risky shares per investor (assumed to be independent of t), meaning
that the equilibrium of supply and demand implies
H∑
h=1
nh,t ·Nh,t =
H∑
h=1
nh,t
Eh,t[pt+1 + dt+1]−Rpt
aσ2
= zs , (2.4)
where now Nh,t denotes the number of shares held by one trader belonging to trading strategy
group h and Eh,t[·] denotes the ‘beliefs’ or forecasts of trader type h with respect to conditional
expectations. Making the further simplifying assumption of zero supply of risky shares, i.e., zs = 0,
the equilibrium price equation (2.4) can be simplified to10
H∑
h=1
nh,tEh,t[pt+1 + dt+1] = Rpt . (2.5)
Hence the price of the risky asset is the sum of tomorrow’s expected asset price and tomorrow’s
expected dividend yield discounted by the discounting rate 1/R and averaged over all trader types
h.
In contrast to many other computationally orientated heterogeneous multi-agent models, the
perfect rational EMH benchmark is nested in the ABS framework. Considering the homogeneous
5Remember, that Et[·] is a short notation for E[· | It], where It is the publicly available information set consisting
of past prices and past dividends, i.e., It = {pt−1, pt−2, . . . , dt−1, dt−2, . . .}.
6See Chapter 1, Appendix A 1.3 for details.
7See Chapter 1, Appendix A 1.3 and Appendix A 2.1 for details.
8This model structure is the same as assuming H representative investors (see Section 1.4 in Chapter 1) whose
impact on the market varies with the current number of investors in the different groups.
9In Subsection 2.2.1 we briefly reproduce the results given by Gaunersdorfer (2000), who investigates the case
with time varying beliefs about variances. She shows that the results are quite similar to those for constant variances.
10A motivation for this special choice of zs can be found in Brock (1997). See also Hommes (2001, p. 153),
Footnote 8 for a short discussion on this topic.
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case, i.e., H = 1, in which all traders are identical and form fully rational expectations about
future asset prices and dividend yields, the market equilibrium Eq. (2.5) is determined by
Et[pt+1 + dt+1] = (1 + r)pt , (2.6)
where R = 1 + r is used. It is well known that in general Eq. (2.6) has infinitely many solutions.
However, assuming that the ‘transversality condition’
lim
k→∞
Et[pt+k]
(1 + r)k
= 0 (2.7)
holds, for positive interest rates (i.e., r > 0), only one unique fundamental solution exists, which
is given by
p∗t =
∞∑
k=1
Et[dt+k]
(1 + r)k
, (2.8)
provided the limit series on the right-hand side is absolutely convergent. The price p∗t is also
called the ‘fundamental price’ and is completely determined by economic fundamentals, i.e., the
discounted sum of expected future dividends.11 In the special case of an i.i.d. dividend process dt
with constant mean E[dt] = d¯, the fundamental price p
∗
t becomes constant over time, which leads
to a simple form of the fundamental solution given by12
p∗ =
d¯
r
.
As already mentioned above, Eq. (2.6) has infinitely many solutions and only the transversality
condition ensures that the fundamental solution p∗t is unique. Conversely, if this condition does
not hold, further solutions, called ‘rational bubble solutions’, exists.13 Interestingly, although some
of these bubble solutions can even lead to continuously growing prices, traders that follow such
explosive price paths still have rational expectations. Nevertheless, as perfect rational traders know
that in real markets such speculative, explosive bubbles cannot exist forever, they will never jump
on these rational bubble solutions and thus the finite fundamental price p∗t is uniquely determined.
In other words, in a perfectly rational environment, rational traders with homogeneous expectations
believe in the parity of current asset price and its fundamental value, and changes in risky-asset
values can only be caused by randomly driven ‘news’ about the fundamentals, i.e., the unexpected
changes in the dividends.
If we now turn back to the heterogeneous case with evolutionary changes in the traders’ beliefs
about future price movements, the situation is quite different. Here, temporary deviations from
the fundamental price, which is denoted by
xt = pt − p∗t
11The fundamental price p∗t in Eq. (2.8) has exactly the same form as the fundamental price pt in Eq. (1.9) in
Chapter 1, Section 1.3. For further details on the technical part of the determination of Eq. (2.8), see also Appendix
A 2.2.
12Brock and Hommes also investigate more complicated versions of the dividend process dt (see Brock and
Hommes, 1997b; Hommes, 2002).
13For this reason, the transversality condition Eq. (2.7) is also called the ‘no bubbles’ condition. It can be shown
that p∗t + bt with p
∗
t being a specific solution (namely the ‘fundamental solution’) of Eq. (2.6) and bt being arbitrary,
but fulfilling Et[bt+1] = (1 + r)bt, is also a solution of Eq. (2.6). In this case, bt is also called a ‘rational bubble’
term (see Cuthbertson, 1996, pp. 157–158).
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in the following, can occur if the fraction of traders believing in an upwards or downwards price
trend is large enough. Contagion effects caused by the updating mechanism of traders’ beliefs even
enhance the current price trends, at least until fundamental forces bring the asset price back to
near its benchmark fundamental.
Before the traders’ evolutionary updating process is characterized in detail, the ABS is restricted
by the following simplifying assumptions. For the sake of analytical tractability, Brock and Hommes
assume that
• V arh,t[pt+1 + dt+1] ≡ σ2 for all h, t (as already stated above), i.e., the beliefs about the
conditional variance are constant and the same for all trader types,
• Eh,t[dt+1] ≡ Et[dt+1] (= d¯ for i.i.d. dividends) for all h, t, i.e., the expected future divi-
dends are the same for all trader types, which implies that each trader is able to derive the
underlying fundamental value p∗t of the risky asset from Eq. (2.8) and
• all beliefs Eh,t[pt+1] are of the form
Eh,t[pt+1] = Et[p
∗
t+1] + fh(xt−1, . . . , xt−L) , L ∈ N (2.9)
for all h, t, i.e., traders’ beliefs are restricted to time stationary functions fh of past deviations
of the risky asset from a commonly shared view of the fundamental. The function fh is called
a ‘forecasting rule’ or ‘trading rule’ and only depends on the trading type h.
Using the fact that obviously pt = xt + p
∗
t and p
∗
t satisfy Eq. (2.5) and introducing the shortening
notation fh,t ≡ fh(xt−1, . . . , xt−L), the market equilibrium equation Eq. (2.5) can be rewritten
subject to the deviation xt as
(1 + r)xt =
H∑
h=1
nh,tEh,t[xt+1] ≡
H∑
h=1
nh,tfh,t .
Note again that for fh ≡ 0 the homogeneous rational expectations model is nested in the more
general BH model.
To complete the model description, the evolutionary part of the BH model has to be specified
in the next step. The fraction of traders following a certain trading strategy h is time-dependent
and evolves over time (in the case of infinitely many traders) according to the discrete choice
probabilities or ‘Gibb’s probabilities’14
nh,t =
exp{βΦh,t−1}∑H
h=1 exp{βΦh,t−1}
, (2.10)
where β denotes the ‘intensity of choice’ and measures the traders’ sensitivity of strategy selection.
If β = 0, the fraction nh,t is constant over time and fixed to 1/H . Otherwise, if β →∞, the entire
mass of traders uses the strategy which has the highest fitness. Φh,t is called the ‘evolutionary
fitness function’ or ‘performance measure’ and is assumed to be publicly available to all traders.
14See Manski and MacFadden (1981) and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) for an extensive discussion of
discrete choice models and their applications in economics. See also Brock (1997) for the use of discrete choice
models in ABS and Hommes (2001, p. 155) for a very brief statement on this topic.
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Obviously, the structure of the nh,t-probabilities guarantees that the higher the current fitness of
the certain trading strategy, the more agents will be willing to switch to it. For an appropriate
fitness criterion, Brock and Hommes propose to measure the accumulated realized profits. Hence
they compose the concrete form of the fitness function as
Φh,t = φh,t − Ch + γΦh,t−1 (2.11)
with
φh,t = {pt + dt −Rpt−1}
(
Eh,t−1[pt + dt]−Rpt−1
aσ2
)
, (2.12)
where γ is a memory parameter which measures the weight of past strategy selections in the fitness
function15 and Ch accounts for costs to obtain the forecasting strategy h. Notice that the term
in the curly brackets reveals the traders’ realized excess return in period t, whereas the second
term simply mirrors the optimal demand for the risky asset (see Eq. (2.4)). After some simple
transformations (see Appendix A 2.3 for details), the realized profits φh,t can also be expressed
depending on the deviation xt from the fundamental as
φh,t = {xt −Rxt−1 + δt}
(
fh,t−1 − Rxt−1
aσ2
)
, (2.13)
where δt ≡ p∗t + dt − Et−1[p∗t + dt] is a martingale difference sequence with respect to It−116.
Considering the curly brackets in Eq. (2.13), the excess return in the ABS framework consists of
a conventional ‘EMH term’ δt and an additional ‘speculative term’ (xt −Rxt−1), which takes the
traders’ deviation from perfectly rational behavior into account and thus allows for excess volatility
in periods when asset prices increase by more or less than the risk-free rate of return. Hence, in
other words, the speculative term represents the specific contribution of the ABS theory exposited
here.
To summarize the model description of the BH model outlined in this subsection in terms of
its main equations that determine the evolution of the observed price and the fraction of different
trader types, we can collect the Adaptive Rational Equilibrium Equations of the ABS, which are
given by
Rxt =
H∑
h=1
nh,tfh,t , (2.14)
nh,t =
exp{βΦh,t−1}∑H
h=1 exp{βΦh,t−1}
(2.15)
with
Φh,t = φh,t − Ch + γΦh,t−1 , (2.16)
φh,t = {xt −Rxt−1 + δt}
(
fh,t−1 −Rxt−1
aσ2
)
. (2.17)
15For the extreme case γ=0, the traders have no memory and simply take the last realized net profits into
account, whereas if γ=1 a uniform weighting of previous realized profits is assumed for the performance measure,
i.e., Φh,t = φh,t + Φh,t−1 = φht + φh,t−1 + Φh,t−2 = . . ., which equals the accumulated wealth over time. In the
intermediate case (0 < γ < 1), the weight given to past realized profits decays exponentially with time.
16A martingale difference equation is also called a ‘fair game’ and has the property E[δt+1 | It] = 0 for all t as it
is already stated in Chapter 1, Section 1.3. Furthermore, note that for the case of i.i.d. dividends, i.e., dt = d¯+ ǫt
the expression for δt simplifies to δt = ǫt.
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2.1.2 Selected Main Results
Having outlined the ABS framework in the last subsection, we are still left with the specification
of the traders’ forecasting rules fh,t, which enable us to investigate the BH model for different
market scenarios. In their first publications (see Brock and Hommes, 1997b, 1998, 1999), Brock
and Hommes restricted their considerations to the simplest linear trading rules with only one lag,
i.e.,
fh,t = ghxt−1 + bh , (2.18)
where gh is a trend parameter and bh denotes a bias parameter.
17 For gh = bh = 0, Eq. (2.18)
reduces to a forecast rule of fundamentalists, i.e.,
fh,t ≡ 0
which leads to the beliefs
Eh,t[pt+1] = Eh,t[p
∗
t+1] .
about the expected future asset price. Trend chasers (contrarians) will select for a positive (nega-
tive) trend parameter, i.e., gh > 0 (gh < 0), which leads to the trading rule
fh,t = ghxt−1 , gh 6= 0 .
Furthermore, the perfect-foresight forecasting rule can also be interpreted in this framework in a
simple way. Assuming
fh,t = xt+1 ,
this forecasting rule models rational traders who are assumed to have perfect knowledge of all
relevant information of the equilibrium equation at any point in time, which, of course, might
seem to be quite an unrealistic assumption.18
To report all the relevant results on all the different versions of the BH model would go far
beyond the scope of this review. As stated in Chiarella and He (2001),
[t]he resulting dynamic system [i.e., the ABS] is capable of generating the entire ‘zoo’
of complex behavior from local stability to high-order cycles and chaos as various key
parameters of the model change. [...]
Instead, let us consider some illustrative examples. We will restrict our consideration to the purely
deterministic, nonlinear asset pricing model in the remainder of this subsection, with δt = 0 for all
t and constant dividend d¯ per time period. In Brock and Hommes (1998), for instance, the authors
investigate 2-trader-type examples, as well as examples with three and four different trader types.
Just to get an idea of their analysis let us consider a scenario with a fundamentalist trading group
vs. a group of trend chasers. Assuming the no memory case, i.e., γ=0, they show for this case
that, whenever the average per period costs for trend chasers are less than the average per period
17The following argument can serve as a motivation for the choice of such simple trading rules. Since it is quite
unlikely that more complicated forecasting rules will be used by enough traders to affect market equilibrium prices,
most simple trading rules should be more relevant for realistic market scenarios.
18See Hommes (2001, p. 155) for a brief discussion of this topic.
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costs for fundamentalists, an increase in the intensity of choice β creates a bifurcation route to
chaotic asset price fluctuations, which Brock and Hommes call a ‘rational route to randomness’ in
their work. More precisely, starting with a unique, globally stable fundamental steady state for
low values of β, this steady state becomes unstable and turns into a pitchfork bifurcation19 while
increasing the bifurcation parameter β. Via a further Hopf-bifurcation, quasi-periodic and even
chaotic asset price movements eventually arise for large values of the intensity of choice. For a
more detailed summary of the most relevant results on the ABS with simple linear trading rules,
we can refer to an excellent review article from Hommes (2001) and the original publications cited
therein.
Even so, in the remainder of this section I want to more carefully elaborate on one simple
example of an ABS with two different trading types before three modified ABS are presented in
the next section. This is done for the following reasons. On the one hand, this first example
will give us an opportunity to get some primary insights into the theoretically based analysis of
these specific types of nonlinear behavioral models of financial markets. On the other hand, the
analytical treatment also serves as a useful preparation for my own investigations conducted in
the next parts of this thesis since all the main tools for nonlinear dynamic analysis will already be
utilized in the following discussion.20
A Simple Example with Two Different Trader Types
In this subsubsection I will investigate a 2-traders-type example with fundamentalists and trend
chasers.21 In contrast to the previous discussion, we now allow for γ being between 0 and 1. The
forecasting rules of the two different trading types are given,
• for the fundamentalist group, by
f1t ≡ 0 (2.19)
• and, for the trend-following group, by
f2t = gxt−1 , g > 0 . (2.20)
It will be convenient to work with the difference in the fraction of the two different trader types,
which is defined as
mt ≡ n1t − n2t = tanh
(
β
2
[Φ1,t−1 − Φ2,t−1]
)
,
where the last transformation is obtained by using Eq. (2.10) and the identity
tanh
{
β
2
(a− c)
}
=
exp(βa)− exp(βc)
exp(βa) + exp(βc)
.
For the same reason we define the difference in fitness of the two trader types as
ut ≡ Φ1,t−1 − Φ2,t−1 .
19For a brief overview of different types of bifurcations in a nonlinear system of difference equations in discrete
time, see Appendix A 2.11 and the references given therein.
20See also Appendices A 2.10, A 2.11 and A 2.12 for an introduction to the dynamics of nonlinear systems.
21See also Brock and Hommes (1999) for the following discussion.
2.1 The Brock-Hommes (BH) Model 40
Positive, average costs of fundamentalists are introduced in the fitness function Φ1,t (see Eq. (2.11)),
here accounting for training costs, to understand how the market behaves according to the fun-
damental pricing rule. The training costs are denoted by C ≡ C1. Now, plugging Eq. (2.19) and
Eq. (2.20) in Eq. (2.14)
Rxt =
2∑
h=1
nh,tfh,t = n2,tgxt−1
and using
n2,t =
n2,t + n2,t
2
=
n2,t + (1 − n1,t)
2
=
1−mt
2
as well as
Φ1,t−1 − Φ2,t−1 = (φ1,t−1 − φ2,t−1)− C + γ(Φ1,t−2 − Φ2,t−2)
(2.17)
= {xt−1 −Rxt−2 + δt−1}
(
−gxt−3
aσ2
)
− C + γut−1
leads to the following ABS equilibrium dynamics in the case of fundamentalists vs. trend chasers:
Rxt =
1−mt
2
gxt−1 , (2.21)
mt = tanh
(
β
2
[
γut−1 − gxt−3
aσ2
(xt−1 −Rxt−2 + δt−1)− C
])
, (2.22)
ut = γut−1 − gxt−3
aσ2
(xt−1 −Rxt−2 + δt−1)− C , (2.23)
where δt−1 is the stochastic component in the realized excess return. Assuming i.i.d. dividends,
i.e., dt−1 = d¯ + ǫt−1 with ǫt−1 ∼ N (0, σ2ǫ ), the stochastic component δt−1 simply coincides with
ǫt−1. Obviously, the resulting dynamics can be described as a system of nonlinear autonomous,
ordinary difference equations, which is of third order in xt and of first order in ut, or equivalently,
as a four dimensional system of first-order ordinary difference equations.22
Brock and Hommes (1999) prove the following theorem on the existence and stability results
for the steady states of the system Eq. (2.21)–Eq. (2.23):
Theorem 2.1 (Result taken from Brock and Hommes (1999))
Denote
meq = tanh
(
− βC
2(1− γ)
)
and
m∗ = 1− 2R
g
.
Let x∗ be the positive solution (if existing) of
tanh
(
β
2(1− γ)
[
(R − 1)g
aσ2
(x∗)2 − C
])
= m∗ .
(i) For 0 < g < R, E1 = (0,m
eq) is the unique, globally stable steady state.
22One of the most crucial results in the theory of autonomous, ordinary differential and difference equation systems
states that dynamic systems of any order can always be transformed in a system of first-order equations. See for
instance Medio and Lines (2001, Chapter 1) for further details.
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(ii) For g > 2R, there are three steady states
E1 = (0,m
eq) , E2 = (x
∗,m∗) and E3 = (−x∗,m∗)
with E1 = (0,m
eq) being an unstable saddle point.
(iii) For R < g < 2R, two possibilities have to be distinguished:
(a) if m∗ < meq, then E1 is the unique, locally stable steady state.
(b) if m∗ > meq, then there are three steady states E1, E2 and E3; the steady state
E1 = (0,m
eq) is an unstable saddle point.
Proof: See Appendix A 2.4.
Theorem 2.1 states that if the trend chasers only extrapolate weakly (i.e., 0 < g < R), the
fundamental steady state E1 is globally stable. For no trading costs (C = 0) the difference in the
fraction of the trader type populations is zero for any β. If C > 0, the fundamentalists vanish from
the market when the switching intensity of choice β goes to +∞ or when the memory parameter γ
goes to +1 (i.e., for infinite memory). Since it is useless to pay for a trading strategy when staying
in a stable steady state, this result is economically reasonable.23 For strong extrapolation values
(g > 2R), two further steady states E2 and E3 arise regardless of positive or zero information
costs. Finally, if R < g < 2R, a bifurcation scenario occurs. If the intensity of choice β or the
memory parameter is high enough, the stable steady state E1 becomes unstable and two further
(stable) steady states arise. Thus both an increase in memory and an increase in the intensity of
choice up to a certain critical value lead to a pitchfork bifurcation and leave the steady state E1
as an unstable saddle point.
Since an analytical treatment of the local stability of the non-fundamental steady states is no
longer an easy task, Brock and Hommes also study the system by numerical simulations. As in the
case of no memory (γ = 0) and increasing the intensity of choice β (see the previous discussion in
Subsection 2.1.2) they show that a Hopf-bifurcation again arises when the memory strength γ now
serves as a bifurcation parameter and reaches a certain bifurcation value γ∗. After this, secondary
bifurcation periodic or quasi-periodic fluctuations occur. Finally, increasing γ even up to values
very close to 1, the orbits converge to the fundamental steady state. Interestingly, they find that
the attractors for the system Eq. (2.21)–Eq. (2.23) in the (xt,mt)-plane are very similar to the
attractors generated in Brock and Hommes (1998) by investigating β as a bifurcation parameter.
They conjecture that in both cases the system gets close to having a homoclinic orbit24.
2.2 Selected Modified Versions of the BH Model
In this section I will consider three modifications of the original BH model. First I will present
an extension of the BH model in which the traders are allowed to form time dependent beliefs
23In this scenario the fundamentalists can never dominate over trend chasers since we always find meq ∈ ] −
1, 0], which is a result of both the shape of the tanh(x) function and the (economic reasonably) positively chosen
parameters therein.
24In the simplest case, homoclinic orbits are orbits that connect a fixed point to itself. More formally put, the
orbit p is said to be homoclinic to an invariant set S of a flow φt (a map G) if φt(p) → S as t → +∞ and as
t→ −∞ (resp., Gn(p)→ S as n→ +∞ and as n→ −∞). See Medio and Gallo (1992, pp. 38–39) for details.
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about the first and second moments of the risky asset’s price movements. In this more complex
model framework, the bifurcation routes to chaos will again be analyzed analytically, but, numer-
ical aspects of investigation will also become more important. Additionally, I will also investigate
my own slightly different version of this model framework, where more realistic assumptions are
implemented. Afterwards, I will briefly discuss a further modification of the BH framework by
Gaunersdorfer and Hommes allowing to generate quite realistic properties in both prices and re-
turns, which are well known from empirical time series such as the volatility clustering phenomenon
and the fat-tail property of the returns distribution.
2.2.1 Gaunersdorfer’s Extension of the BH Model
As in the example before, the model framework proposed by A. Gaunersdorfer25 contains the
same trader types, namely fundamentalists and trend chasers. But compared to the BH model
outlined above, two main extensions are implemented which overcome the following two limitations
of the original model. On the one hand, the fitness measure assumed by Brock and Hommes (see
Eq. (2.12) and Eq. (2.13)) do not take into account the risk with which the traders are faced
in every trading period when choosing their optimal demand for the risky asset. This might be
slightly unrealistic as the BH framework is originally based on a myopic mean-variance approach,
which means that in their optimal portfolio decisions traders do take this risk into account.26 Thus
Gaunersdorfer proposes to use the ‘realized risk adjusted profits’ as an adequate candidate for the
performance measure instead of using the ‘accumulated realized profits’ proposed in the original
publication. On the other hand, besides the updating of traders’ beliefs according to a risk adjusted
performance measure, the traders should also update their expectations of conditional variances
of returns over time.27
More precisely, in Gaunersdorfer (2000) the realized risk adjusted profits are formulated as
φriskadj,t = Rt z
opt − a
2
(zopt)2V arh,t−1[Rt] , (2.24)
where Rt denotes the realized excess returns in period t and z
opt denotes the optimal demand
for the risky asset.28 Since subtracting a constant term from the performance measure does not
change the discrete choice fractions Eq. (2.10) the expression Eq. (2.24) can be transformed into
the following fitness function
φh,t = − 1
2aV art−1[xt −Rxt−1 + δt] (xt − fh,t−1)
2
, (2.25)
which uses (risk adjusted) squared prediction errors.29 Note that for analytical tractability reasons,
homogeneous expectations about conditional variances of returns are assumed in Eq. (2.25), i.e.,
V arh,t[·] = V art[·] .
Assuming furthermore that
25See Gaunersdorfer (2000).
26See also the comments given in Brock and Hommes (1999); Hommes (2001) on that topic.
27For my own model framework proposed in Chapter 4 a similar approach is used.
28The first term of Eq. (2.24) has an identical meaning as the right-hand side of Eq. (2.12). See also Appendix
A 2.3 for the notation.
29We relegate the respective derivations to the Appendix A 2.5.
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• agents have homogeneous, time varying expectations of conditional variances of returns, i.e.,
V art−1[xt −Rxt−1] = σ2t−1 ,
• the variance of the martingale difference sequence (see Eq. (2.13)) is constant over time, i.e.,
V art−1[δt] = σ
2
δ ,
and the covariance of xt −Rxt−1 and δt is always zero, i.e.,
Cov[xt −Rxt−1, δt] ≡ 0
the performance measure Eq. (2.25) of trader h at time t can be written as
φh,t = − 1
2a(σ2t−1 + σ
2
δ )
(xt − fh,t−1)2 .
Finally, the traders’ time varying beliefs about variances are assumed to be weighted averages
according to
σ2t = θσσ
2
t−1 + (1− θσ)(xt−1 −Rxt−2 − µt−1)2 , (2.26)
µt = θµµt−1 + (1− θµ)(xt−1 −Rxt−2) , (2.27)
where 0 < θσ, θµ < 1. µt defines the exponential moving averages of returns. As in the last
example, fundamentalists are faced with positive costs C ≡ C1 > 0 while for the trend chasers
C2 = 0 is assumed. Introducing an additional ‘stabilizing force’ +αx
2
t to the performance measure
φ1,t of the fundamentalists and choosing the memory parameter γ equal to zero, the Adaptive
Rational Equilibrium Equations of the ABS are given by
Rxt =
2∑
h=1
nh,tfh,t , (2.28)
nh,t =
exp{βΦh,t−1}∑2
h=1 exp{βΦh,t−1}
, h = 1, 2 , (2.29)
σ2t = θσσ
2
t−1 + (1 − θσ)(xt−1 −Rxt−2 − µt−1)2 , (2.30)
µt = θµµt−1 + (1− θµ)(xt−1 −Rxt−2) (2.31)
with
f1,t = 0 ,
f2,t = gxt−1 , g > 0 ,
Φh,t = φh,t , h = 1, 2 ,
φ1,t = − 1
2a(σ2t−1 + σ
2
δ )
x2t − C + αx2t ,
φ2,t = − 1
2a(σ2t−1 + σ
2
δ )
(xt − gxt−2)2 .
After setting mt ≡ n1,t − n2,t = 1− 2n2,t and introducing new variables σˇt ≡ σt−1 and µˇt ≡ µt−1,
which reduces the dimension of the system by one,30 the dynamic system Eq. (2.28)–Eq. (2.31)
30See also Gaunersdorfer (2000, pp. 807–808) for details.
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yields
xt =
1−mt
2R
gxt−1 ,
mt = tanh
(
β
2
[
g
2a(σˇ2t−1 + σ
2
δ )
xt−3(gxt−3 − 2xt−1) + αx2t−1 − C
])
,
σˇ2t = θσσˇ
2
t−1 + (1− θσ)(xt−2 −Rxt−3 − µˇt−1)2 ,
µˇt = θµµˇt−1 + (1− θµ)(xt−2 −Rxt−3)
which has quite a similar structure to system Eq. (2.21)–Eq. (2.23). In the last step, this system
can be reformulated as a five dimensional autonomous ordinary first-order difference equation by
setting yt ≡ xt−1 and zt ≡ yt−1 which leads to31
xt =
g
2R
xt−1
{
1− tanh
(
β
2
[
g
2a(σˇ2t−1 + σ
2
δ )
zt−1(gzt−1 − 2xt−1) + αx2t−1 − C
])}
,(2.32)
yt = xt−1 , (2.33)
zt = yt−1 , (2.34)
σˇ2t = θσσˇ
2
t−1 + (1− θσ)(yt−1 −Rzt−1 − µˇt−1)2 , (2.35)
µˇt = θµµˇt−1 + (1− θµ)(yt−1 −Rzt−1) . (2.36)
Thus, in comparison to the three dimensional system of the previous subsubsection, Gaunersdorfer
included two further dimensions in the model by introducing two further variables, namely the
average return µt (or µˇt) and the estimate of the conditional variance σ
2
t (or σˇ
2
t ).
A rigorous two-parameter bifurcation analysis with respect to the intensity of choice β and the
strength of stabilizing force α reveals a very complicated dynamics along the bifurcation route to
chaos.32 A restriction on the case with a constant beliefs on conditional variance, θσ = θµ = 1,
leads to identical results concerning the steady states analysis like in the original BH model with
a memory lag of one period (see Brock and Hommes (1998) and explanations in the previous
discussion on this case). Again, one fundamental steady state and two non-fundamental steady
states exist, whose existence and stability depend on both the extrapolation parameter g and
on the intensity of choice parameter β, which we will mainly concentrate on in the following
discussion. While for small values of β the fundamental steady state is unique and stable, an
increase in β leads to a pitchfork bifurcation and two non-fundamental steady states. These
two non-fundamental steady states are either both unstable (referring to a subcritical pitchfork
bifurcation) or both stable (referring to a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation) depending on the
value of the additional parameter α. Furthermore, due to the additional parameter α the situation
becomes even more extensive for the secondary bifurcation than in the original BH model proposed
by Brock and Hommes (1998). For relatively small α, the non-fundamental steady states again
undergo a Hopf bifurcation, while for larger realizations of α, a flip bifurcation is obtained. Thus
the specification of the stabilizing force α serves as a further bifurcation parameter. Remarkably,
the primary bifurcation of the fundamental steady state and the secondary bifurcations of the non-
fundamental steady states even hold in the case of time varying beliefs, i.e., for 0 < θσ, θµ < 1.
33
31Again we refer to Medio and Lines (2001, Chapter 1) for details.
32See Gaunersdorfer (2000) for this statement and the following discussion.
33For a detailed discussion on the existence and the stability conditions of the steady states in both cases we can
refer to Gaunersdorfer (2000).
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Of course, high-order bifurcations might be different for both cases as numerical simulations show.
Figure 2.1 refers to these results. It exhibits a bifurcation diagram with respect to the intensity
of choice parameter β for a large value of α. For example, while for the constant beliefs case
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15
x n
Bifurcation Parameter β
bifurcation diagram, α=0.75,wσ=1.00, wµ=1.00 (noe=200000)
(a) constant beliefs about variances
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 1.4
 1.6
 1.8
 7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15
x n
Bifurcation Parameter β
bifurcation diagram, α=0.75,wσ=0.85, wµ=0.85 (noe=200000)
(b) time varying beliefs about variances
Figure 2.1: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to the intensity of choice parameter β. The left panel exhibits
the case of constant beliefs on conditional variances of returns (θσ = θµ = 1), whereas the right panel displays
the time varying case (θσ = θµ = 0.85). In both cases α is chosen to be large (α = 0.75) and the secondary flip
bifurcation of one of the non-fundamental steady states can be observed. As in all following plots on this model,
the plot is generated by a GAUSS program which I wrote based on the model description given in the original
publication. For each plot 200,000 experiments with different values of β (between 7 and 15) are conducted where in
each experiment 5000 iterations are performed. The initial conditions for the dynamic variables are chosen randomly
for each experiment. Both plots reproduce the bifurcation diagrams found by Gaunersdorfer (2000) upon a visual
inspection. The parameters are chosen identically to the original article by Gaunersdorfer, i.e., g=1.2, C=1.0,
R=1.01, a=10.0, σ2=0.1 (left panel) and σ2δ=0.1 (right panel).
the flip bifurcation is destabilized by a Hopf bifurcation until a 6-cycle is created, in the case of
time varying beliefs on conditional variances of returns a further period doubling occurs before
it is destabilized by a Hopf bifurcation. For even larger values of β (but not too large), strange
attractors occur. Again, both cases, i.e., time varying and constant beliefs about variances, have
to be distinguished. As shown in Figure 2.2, the phase portraits in the (xt+1, xt)-plane and the
time series of strange attractors differ in both scenarios.
The bifurcation diagrams in Figure 2.1 seem to indicate that chaos arises in our dynamic system.
To confirm this conjecture the largest Lyapunov characteristic exponents (LCE) are computed for
the system (see Figure 2.3). As outlined in Appendix A 2.12 the LCE measures the asymptotic
exponential rate of divergence (or convergence) of orbits. Thus a positive LCE proves a sensitive
dependence on initial conditions of the system because, in this case, trajectories which were ini-
tially close to each other now separate exponentially as time evolves. In both model variations,
with constant and time varying beliefs on conditional variances of returns, positive LCE arise for
sufficiently large values of the intensity of choice β. Hence the system exhibits chaotic behavior in
such parameter ranges.
Finally, Figure 2.4 shows the time series of the dynamic variables, namely the price deviations
from the fundamental xt and the difference in the population fraction of the two different trading
typesmt. Furthermore, the return process is exhibited, where the return is defined as (xt−Rxt−1),
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Figure 2.2: Projection of strange attractors on the (xt+1, xt)-plane. As shown in Gaunersdorfer (2000) the shape
of the attractors may differ for the case with constant and time varying beliefs about variances. The return maps
are generated by 50,000 iterations and appear visually identical to the findings by Gaunersdorfer. Parameters are
β=12.0, α=0.65, θσ = θµ = 1 (left panel) and θσ = θµ = 0.85 (right panel). The remaining parameter set is chosen
as in Figure 2.1.
i.e., as excess returns. Let us first consider the case of constant beliefs on conditional variances
of returns. Obviously, the price evolution is characterized by irregular switching between periods
where prices are close to the fundamental steady state (i.e., xt=0), followed by episodes of upwards
trends and interim stronger deviations from it, which are again replaced after a while by a return
back to the fundamental. This price pattern evolves rather persistently over time. The model
based explanation of such a phenomenon is quite straightforward. Assume the dynamic system
is close to the fundamental steady state. Then both predictors provide good forecasts for future
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Figure 2.3: Largest Lyapunov characteristic exponents. After the secondary bifurcation of the non-fundamental
steady states (quasi-)periodic dynamics arises (λ=0). For large parameter values of β chaotic behavior is exhibited
interspersed with stable cycles for higher β values (λ < 0). All parameters are chosen as in Figure 2.2. In each
experiment (i.e., for all β values), the system is run for 500 iterations before the Lyapunov calculation is started.
The iteration length for the determination of LCE is chosen as 500. The initial condition of the dynamic system is
drawn randomly and then fixed for all experiments. Again as concerns the visual appearance, the plots reproduce
the results from Gaunersdorfer (2000).
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Figure 2.4: Time series of dynamic variables in the constant and time varying case. On the left-hand side the
time series of price deviations from the fundamental xt, difference in the fractions mt and returns are shown for the
case of constant beliefs on conditional variances of returns with α=0.75, β=15.0, θσ = θµ=1, while the right-hand
side exhibits the same dynamic variables for time varying beliefs with α=0.65, β=12.0, θσ = θµ=0.85. In all plots
the dynamic variables are randomly initialized. The remaining parameters are again identical to the previous plots.
On a visual level the plots reproduce the findings in the original publication.
price developments. Since the fundamental trading strategy implies costs, most traders will choose
the alternative strategy which will move the current price away from its fundamental value. Hence
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an upward moving price trend is created. But at a certain point the stabilizing force α gives the
fundamentalist strategy enough weight to push the price back to the fundamental steady state.
This mechanism gives an economic motivation for the observed irregular price movements. Note
also that a deviation from the fundamental steady state comes along with an increasing fluctuation
of returns.
In the case of time varying beliefs on conditional variances of returns, the situation is somehow
more regular (see Figure 2.4, right panels). Figure 2.5 also refers to this case and exhibits the time
series of average returns and conditional variances. The price evolution no longer exhibits such
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Figure 2.5: Time series of average return µt and conditional variance σ2t . The data are taken from the same
simulation run as shown on the right-hand side of Figure 2.4.
clearly apparent changes between periods where prices equal the fundamental value and converse
periods where rapidly upwards trend arises. Instead, the observed price is permanently above the
fundamental price. However, episodes with stronger deviations from the average price level can
still be detected. In addition, periods with low and high levels of volatilities can be observed.
One final remark should be made on the price evolution in this model structure. It might
be striking that the price deviations from the fundamental xt never become negative (see Figure
2.4 (a) and (b)). This is due to the fact that the evolution of xt mainly depends on a tangens
hyperbolicus term which can only take values between the range of -1 and +1. More precisely, the
equation of motion for xt is given by Eq. (2.32), from which it can immediately be seen that xt
can never become negative whenever xt is initialized with non negative values.
2.2.2 A More Realistic Model Setup of Gaunersdorfer’s Version of the BH Model
In this subsection I want to introduce a slightly different version of the previous model framework,
where traders use a modified estimate of the conditional variance. In Gaunersdorfer (2000) it
is assumed that all investors are homogeneous in their time varying expectations of conditional
variances of returns using exponential moving averages of past realized excess returns according to
Eq. (2.26) and Eq. (2.27). In other words, both investor types use the history of realized deviations
from the fundamental price in a uniform manner to extrapolate the future conditional variances
of returns. In this subsection a slightly different version of the fitness function for the two trading
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strategy groups h is considered which in my view is more in line with their different beliefs about
the deviations from the fundamental price.34 As before, the memory parameter γ is restricted to
being zero, which leads to
Φh,t = φh,t , h = 1, 2 .
Then, the fitness function is given by
φh,t = − 1
2aV arh,t−1[xt −Rxt−1 + δt] (xt − fh,t−1)
2
, (2.37)
where now
V arh,t−1[xt −Rxt−1] = σ2h,t−1 ,
V arh,t−1[δt] = σ
2
δ ,
Cov[xt −Rxt−1, δt] ≡ 0
with
σ2h,t = θh,σσ
2
h,t−1 + (1− θh,σ)(xt−1 −Rxt−2 − µh,t−1)2 (2.38)
and 0 < θh,σ < 1 for h = 1, 2 is assumed. Therefore the traders’ time varying beliefs about variances
are again formulated as exponential moving averages but now not longer necessarily have to be
identical for both trading strategies. Instead, the expected return µh,t−1 ≡ Eh,t−2[xt−1 − Rxt−2]
is allowed to be different for both strategy types and specified as follows. Note that
Eh,t[xt+1] = Eh,t[pt+1 − p∗t+1] = Et[p∗t+1] + fh,t − Et[p∗t+1] = fh,t
with f1,t = 0 and f2,t = gxt−1 for h = 1, 2, which states that all traders expect the deviations
xt+1 from the fundamental price for the next time period to be equal to their own forecasting
rule fh,t at time t. Hence, in this modified version of Gaunersdorfer’s model, both trader types
are assumed to use their corresponding forecasting rules to derive the expectation value for the
relevant expression (xt−1 −Rxt−2) in Eq. (2.38), which can be expressed in terms of the expected
return µh,t−1 as
µ1,t−1 = 0
µ2,t−1 = gxt−3 −Rgxt−4 .
Making these assumptions, the Adaptive Rational Equilibrium Equations of the ABS are given by
Rxt =
2∑
h=1
nh,tfh,t , (2.39)
nh,t =
exp{βΦh,t−1}∑2
h=1 exp{βΦh,t−1}
(2.40)
σ2h,t = θh,σσ
2
h,t−1 + (1− θh,σ)(xt−1 −Rxt−2 − µh,t−1)2 , h = 1, 2 , (2.41)
with
f1,t = 0 ,
34Chiarella and He (2002c) also introduce heterogeneity in beliefs about variances.
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f2,t = gxt−1 ,
µ1,t = 0 ,
µ2,t = g(xt−2 −Rxt−3) , g > 0 ,
Φh,t = φh,t ,
φ1,t = − 1
2a(σ21,t−1 + σ
2
δ )
x2t − C + αx2t ,
φ2,t = − 1
2a(σ22,t−1 + σ
2
δ )
(xt − gxt−2)2 .
Introducing again appropriate variables σˇ1,t ≡ σ1,t−1, σˇ2,t ≡ σ2,t−1, yt ≡ xt−1, zt ≡ yt−1, at ≡ zt−1
and bt ≡ at−1 to formulate the dynamic system as an autonomous ordinary first-order difference
equation, Eq. (2.39)–Eq. (2.41) can be rewritten as
xt =
g
2R
xt−1
{
1− tanh
(
β
2
[
(xt−1 − gzt−1)2
2a(σˇ22,t−1 + σ
2
δ )
− x
2
t−1
2a(σˇ21,t−1 + σ
2
δ )
+ αx2t−1 − C
])}
,
(2.42)
yt = xt−1 , (2.43)
zt = yt−1 , (2.44)
at = zt−1 , (2.45)
bt = at−1 , (2.46)
σˇ21,t = θ1,σσˇ
2
1,t−1 + (1− θ1,σ)(yt−1 −Rzt−1)2 , (2.47)
σˇ22,t = θ2,σσˇ
2
2,t−1 + (1− θ2,σ) [(yt−1 −Rzt−1)− g(at−1 −Rbt−1)]2 , (2.48)
which is a seven dimensional system. Hence, in contrast to the five dimensional system investigated
in Gaunersdorfer (2000), the dimension of the dynamic system has increased by two dimensions.
Furthermore, in comparison to the original BH model, four further dimensions are included in the
model by introducing two variables which describe the different estimates of the conditional vari-
ance σ2h,t of both trader types, and two further time lags of the deviation xt from the fundamental
price which account for the investors former beliefs about this deviation xt.
A rigorous two-parameter bifurcation analysis with respect to the parameters β and α reveals
similar results as proved in Gaunersdorfer (2000). Again it is helpful to first investigate the
reduced five dimensional system with constant beliefs about variances, i.e., θ1,σ = θ2,σ = 1 and
σˇ21,t = σˇ
2
2,t ≡ σ2, first.35 Due to this more simple case, the following theorem about the steady
states and their stability properties can be obtained:
Theorem 2.2 Let R, a, g, α, β, σ2 > 0 as well as C > 0 and θ1,σ = θ2,σ = 1. Furthermore, assume
that σˇ21,t = σˇ
2
2,t ≡ σ2 and σ2δ = 0.
(i) If 0 < g < R, the system Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.46) has a unique, globally stable (fundamental)
steady state E1 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
35More precisely, in the case of constant beliefs about variances V ari,t[·] ≡ σ2 is assumed in Eq. (2.37) and
consequently σ2δ is assumed to be zero in this case. Instead, in examples where the variance is time dependent, σ
2
has to be replaced by σ2δ in the following.
2.2 Selected Modified Versions of the BH Model 51
(ii) If R < g < 2R, the system Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.46) has at least one (fundamental) steady state
E1 which undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation at
β∗ ≡ 1
C
ln
(
R
g −R
)
.
The fundamental steady state E1 is stable for β < β
∗ and unstable for β > β∗. Furthermore,
in this case the following subcases have to be considered:
(a) if α < α∗ ≡ −g(g − 2)/(2aσ2), then the system Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.46) has two further
unstable (non-fundamental) steady states E2,3 for β < β
∗, i.e., the pitchfork bifurcation
is subcritical.
(b) if α > α∗, then the system Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.46) has two further stable (non-
fundamental) steady states E2,3 for β
∗ < β < min(βH , βF ), i.e., the pitchfork bifurcation
is supercritical.36
(iii) If g ≥ 2R, the system Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.46) has three steady states. The fundamental steady
state E1 is unstable for all β > 0. The two non-fundamental steady states are stable for
β < min(βH , βF ) (see Footnote 36).
Proof: See Appendix A 2.6.
Theorem 2.2 describes the existence and stability of steady states as well as the local be-
havior of the system near the steady states with respect to the intensity of choice parameter
β. Consequently, the results coincide with the results found by Gaunersdorfer (2000) since the
system Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.48) equals the System (10) in Gaunersdorfer (2000) for the case of
constant beliefs about variances. Hence, when the trend-following group only extrapolates weakly
(0 < g < R), then the fundamental steady state E1 is globally stable. Furthermore, defining
the difference in the population of the two different trading strategies in the same way as in the
previous discussion, namely
mt ≡ n1,t − n2,t = tanh
(
β
2
[
(xt−1 − gxt−3)2
2a(σˇ22,t−1 + σ
2
δ )
− x
2
t−1
2a(σˇ21,t−1 + σ
2
δ )
+ αx2t−1 − C
])
,
it can be shown that at the fundamental steady state E1 all traders are evenly distributed into both
trading groups if there are no information costs (C = 0) for the fundamentalist group. Indeed, it
is
meq ≡ mt|E1 = tanh
(−βC
2
)
which is zero for C = 0 for all choices of β. Otherwise, if the costs for the fundamentalists
are positive (C > 0), more traders switch to the group of trend chasers, which makes sense
economically, as there is no reason to choose a costly strategy if the dynamic system has settled
down to a fundamental equilibrium in which it is xt = pt−p∗t = 0 for all t. When the trend-following
group extrapolate very strongly (g > 2R), the fundamental steady state becomes unstable and the
dynamic system converges to a non-fundamental equilibrium. The results of the intermediate
36See Theorem 2.3 for a definition of βH and βF .
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case, i.e., when the trend chasers extrapolate strongly (R < g < 2R), are also reasonable. If the
stabilizing force measured by the parameter α is small and the switching intensity β is large enough,
but not too large, the prices of the artificial market eventually explode since the fundamentalist
strategy is costly and therefore, near the fundamental steady state, the traders switch to the other
trading strategy. This makes the prices increase and this will not stop if the stabilizing force α is
chosen too small.
The secondary bifurcations for the non-fundamental steady states E2,3 can also be determined
analytically. The next theorem shows that E2 and E3 become unstable either by a Hopf or a flip
bifurcation when the intensity of choice parameter β is even increased beyond the bifurcation value
β∗ defined in the previous Theorem 2.2:
Theorem 2.3 Let g > R and β > β∗. Under the remaining assumptions of Theorem 2.2
(i) if α∗ < α < α∗∗ ≡ g2/(2aσ2), the non-fundamental steady states E2,3 undergo a Hopf
bifurcation at βH(α) which is implicitly defined by Eq. (A 2.25) given in the Appendix A 2.7.
(ii) if α > α∗∗, the non-fundamental steady states E2,3 undergo a flip bifurcation at
βF ≡ 1
C
[
g
g −R + ln
(
g −R
R
)]
.
Proof: See Appendix A 2.7.
Theorem 2.3 states that for the secondary bifurcation of the non-fundamental steady states, too,
the stabilizing force plays a crucial role for the local behavior of the dynamic system near to its
steady states. Depending on the strength of the stabilizing force measured by α, both E2 and
E3 undergo a Hopf or a flip bifurcation at βH(α) and βF respectively. Figure 2.6 illustrates
these results for four different parameter sets. The upper panels show bifurcation diagrams
with respect to the intensity of choice parameter β when the trend-following group extrapolates
strongly (R < g < 2R). In both plots the positive branch of the primary (supercritical) pitchfork
bifurcation can be clearly detected. Depending on the choice of the strength of the forcing term,
i.e., α, the non-fundamental steady state is destabilized either by a Hopf bifurcation (upper left
panel) or a flip bifurcation (upper right panel). Note that in the case of the flip bifurcation
scenario (α large), further Hopf bifurcations and period doubling emerge when β is increased even
further (see also lower right panel). When the trend chasers extrapolate very strongly (g > 2R), β∗
becomes negative and E1 is no longer stable. Hence for small β the system converges immediately
to the non-fundamental steady states until they are destabilized by a Hopf bifurcation (lower left
panel) or a flip bifurcation (lower right panel).
Let us now consider the general case, when the traders are allowed to form heterogeneous
time dependent beliefs on the conditional variances of returns. In this case the complete seven
dimensional system Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.48) has to be investigated. The following theorem can be
proved:
Theorem 2.4 Let R, a, g, α, β, σ2σ > 0 as well as C > 0. Assume that 0 < θ1,σ, θ2,σ < 1, i.e.,
both trader groups form different time-varying beliefs on variances of returns. Then the primary
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Figure 2.6: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to the intensity of choice parameter β for constant beliefs on
conditional variances of returns. The upper panels exhibit the case when the trend-following group extrapolate
strongly (R < g < 2R). Both the upper branch of the pitchfork bifurcation (i.e., the primary bifurcation) and
the Hopf bifurcation (i.e., the secondary bifurcation of the non-fundamental steady states for α being small, upper
left panel) or flip bifurcation (i.e., the secondary bifurcation of the non-fundamental steady states for α being
large, upper right panel) can clearly be detected. The lower panels display the case when the trend-chasing group
extrapolates very strongly (g > 2R). For small α the non-fundamental steady state undergoes a Hopf bifurcation
while for large α a flip bifurcation occurs. For each plot 200000 (75000) experiments with different β values between
0 and 20 (0 and 7) are conducted, where in each experiment 5000 iterations are performed. The initial conditions for
the dynamic variables are chosen randomly for each experiment. The remaining parameters are R = 1.01, a = 10,
σ2 = 0.1, C = 1 and θ1,σ = θ2,σ = 1.
bifurcation of the fundamental steady state E1 as well as the secondary bifurcations of the non-
fundamental steady states E2,3 coincide with the bifurcations found in Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 for
the case of constant beliefs about variances.
Proof: See Appendix A 2.8.
Thus, Theorem 2.4 states that for the origin of the bifurcation routes of the fundamental
and non-fundamental steady states, the dynamic system Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.48) has local behavior
similar to that of the reduced system Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.46). In the time varying case, the
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fundamental steady state E1 is given by E1 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) while the non-fundamental
equilibria are determined by
E2,3 =
(±x∗,±x∗,±x∗,±x∗,±x∗, (1−R)2(x∗)2, (1−R)2(1− g2)(x∗)2)
where x∗ is given by Eq. (A 2.18) when σ2 is replaced by σ2δ .
37 Hence, the steady states also have
a similar structure in both the constant beliefs case and the time-varying beliefs case. Neverthe-
less, Figure 2.7 shows that higher-order bifurcations might be different from the reduced system
Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.46) as already observed by Gaunersdorfer (2000) (see Subsection 2.2.1, Figure
2.1). For instance, in the lower right panel the flip bifurcation undergoes further period doublings
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Figure 2.7: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to the intensity of choice parameter β for time varying beliefs
about variances. The primary bifurcation of the fundamental steady state and the secondary bifurcations of the
non-fundamental steady states are identical to those in the case of constant beliefs about variances for all chosen
parameter sets (see Figure 2.6). Nevertheless, higher-order bifurcations might be different in the time-varying case.
The experiments are conducted in exactly the same way as described in the previous Figure 2.6. The weight factors
θ1,σ and θ2,σ are chosen as θ1,σ = θ2,σ = 0.85. The remaining parameters are the same as in the constant beliefs
case.
instead of being destabilized by a Hopf bifurcation as can be observed in the previous Figure 2.6.
37The non-fundamental steady states E2,3 slightly deviate from the non-fundamental steady states found in
Gaunersdorfer (2000).
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Interestingly, for the time-varying case the bifurcation diagram also exhibits in each case at least
one quite expanded region (around β=11.0) where the system becomes stable again and undergoes
a 3-cycle. Note that this property is also shared by the findings reported in Gaunersdorfer (2000).
If we compare our results of an extended BH model with a modified estimate of the conditional
variance to those of the extended BH model proposed by Gaunersdorfer (2000) (which has also
been outlined in the previous subsection), the following summary can be made. According to the
bifurcation route to strange attractors, the local and global behavior of both systems are surpris-
ingly similar and both model outcomes only differ from each other in higher-order bifurcations. For
example, comparing the right panel of Figure 2.1 in Subsection 2.2.1 with the upper right panel
of Figure 2.7, those deviations in higher-order bifurcations can clearly be detected. Obviously,
after entering a chaotic region, stable cycles occur for smaller values of β in our model variant
than in the model extension of Gaunersdorfer (2000). Figure 2.8 shows the time series of price
deviations xt and the corresponding return map for different choices of the bifurcation parameter
β. Increasing β leads to increasingly complex behavior in the dynamic system. For β being high
enough limit cycles and strange attractors occur.
Finally, Figure 2.9 exhibits the largest Lyapunov characteristic exponents for two different
parameter sets of our model variant and corresponds to the bifurcation diagrams shown in the
upper panels of Figure 2.7. Note that a comparison of the LCEs of both model designs for an
identical parameter set (e.g., see Figure 2.3, right panel and Figure 2.9, left panel) again highlights
the existence of a different occurrence of stable regions for relatively large values of β. While in
Figure 2.3 (b) the system becomes stable again in a region where values of β are slightly larger
than 13.0 (i.e., negative LCEs arise), in Figure 2.9 (a) the system already becomes stable for β
being slightly smaller than 12.0.
2.2.3 Gaunersdorfer and Hommes’ Extension of the BH Model
In this subsection I want to very briefly present a further modification of the BH model proposed
by A. Gaunersdorfer and C. H. Hommes38, that mainly aims at generating more realistic time
series for both prices and returns in the sense that characteristic properties of real financial markets
are reproduced by this artificial market.39 The main reason for obtaining such artificial time series
with more realistic properties is to add some dynamic noise to the nonlinear system. Although
we want to concentrate on this noisy evolutionary ABS in this section it might be important to
mention that the deterministic nonlinear system exhibits periodic as well as chaotic fluctuations
38See Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007).
39As already mentioned briefly in the introduction of this thesis, almost all empirical data from financial markets
exhibit the ‘stylized facts’ which denotes certain universal statistical properties of financial time series: while prices
seem to follow a random walk or a martingale process (‘unit root property’) the unconditional distribution of returns
are characterized by a non-Gaussian behavior with a higher concentration of the probability mass in the center and
the tail of the distribution (‘leptokurtosis’). Furthermore, the magnitude of volatility is clustered exhibiting periods
of both tranquil and more turbulent episodes (‘clustered volatility’) which leads to a slow decay rate of the positive
autocorrelation for absolute and squared returns used as a measure for volatility. We can refer to Pagan (1996) and
Cont (2001) for further reading on this topic. For a discussion about the time-varying nature of the volatility of
financial assets originally recognized in the 1960s, see Fama (1965) and Mandelbrot (1963a,b, 1967).
2.2 Selected Modified Versions of the BH Model 56
 2
 2.02
 2.04
 2.06
 2.08
 2.1
 2.12
 2.14
 2.16
 9700  9710  9720  9730  9740  9750
pr
ice
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
 fr
om
 th
e 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
l x
t
time
time series of xt, g=1.2, R=1.01, α=0.65, β=8.00, w1,σ=0.85, w2,µ=0.85
(a) price deviation xt for β = 8.0
 2
 2.02
 2.04
 2.06
 2.08
 2.1
 2.12
 2.14
 2.16
 2  2.02  2.04  2.06  2.08  2.1  2.12  2.14  2.16
x t
xt+1
return map, g=1.2, R=1.01, α=0.65, β=8.00, w1,σ=0.85, w2,σ=0.85
(b) return map for β = 8.0
 1.1
 1.15
 1.2
 1.25
 1.3
 1.35
 1.4
 1.45
 1.5
 1.55
 1.6
 9700  9710  9720  9730  9740  9750
pr
ice
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
 fr
om
 th
e 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
l x
t
time
time series of xt, g=1.2, R=1.01, α=0.65, β=11.9, w1,σ=0.85, w2,µ=0.85
(c) price deviation xt for β = 11.9
 1.1
 1.15
 1.2
 1.25
 1.3
 1.35
 1.4
 1.45
 1.5
 1.55
 1.6
 1.1  1.15  1.2  1.25  1.3  1.35  1.4  1.45  1.5  1.55  1.6
x t
xt+1
return map, g=1.2, R=1.01, α=0.65, β=11.9, w1,σ=0.85, w2,σ=0.85
(d) return map for β = 11.9
 1.1
 1.2
 1.3
 1.4
 1.5
 1.6
 1.7
 1.8
 1.9
 9700  9710  9720  9730  9740  9750
pr
ice
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
 fr
om
 th
e 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
l x
t
time
time series of xt, g=1.2, R=1.01, α=0.65, β=12.00, w1,σ=0.85, w2,µ=0.85
(e) price deviation xt for β = 12.0
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 1.4
 1.6
 1.8
 2
 2.2
 0.4  0.6  0.8  1  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8  2  2.2
x t
xt+1
return map, g=1.2, R=1.01, α=0.65, β=12.00, w1,σ=0.85, w2,σ=0.85
(f) return map for β = 12.0
Figure 2.8: Time series of price deviations from the fundamental xt and corresponding return maps. The left-
hand side exhibits the time series of price deviations from the fundamental xt for different choices of the switching
intensity β. On the right-hand side the corresponding projection of the strange attractor on the (xt+1, xt)-plane
is shown. The upper panels correspond to a parameter set for which the dynamic system stays in a region of the
first Hopf bifurcation. The middle and lower panel on the right-hand side shows different shapes of attractors for
two higher values of β near a region where the LCEs are around zero (see also Figure 2.9 for details). The return
maps are generated by 50,000 iterations from which the first 250 are deleted afterwards. In all plots the dynamic
variables are randomly initialized. Parameters are R=1.01, a=10, σ2=0.1, C=1, α=0.65 and θ1,σ = θ2,σ=0.85.
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Figure 2.9: Largest Lyapunov characteristic exponents for time-varying beliefs about variances. Both plots corre-
spond to the bifurcation diagrams shown in the upper panels of Figure 2.7, i.e., when the trend chasers extrapolate
strongly (g = 1.2, R = 1.01). As expected, for small parameter values of β the dynamic system is stable (LCE< 0)
because of the primary bifurcation, which is a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation, and the secondary bifurcation,
which is a Hopf bifurcation (for α being small, left panel) or a flip bifurcation (for α being large, right panel).
For larger values of β, chaotic behavior is exhibited interspersed with stable cycles for higher values of β. The
experiments are conducted in exactly the same way as described in Figure 2.3. The weight factors θ1,σ and θ2,σ are
chosen as θ1,σ = θ2,σ = 0.85. The remaining parameters are chosen as in the previous three plots (see Figures 2.6,
2.7 and 2.8).
of asset prices and returns with coexisting attractors40 between which the system starts to switch
when noise is introduced into the model structure (see also the discussion at the end of this section
for more details).
The model modifications compared to the BH model are as follows. Besides using the evolu-
tionary fitness measure based on risk adjusted realized profits (as in the previous discussion) two
further modifications are proposed in comparison to the original BH model. On the one hand the
model allows for one further time lag in the trend following forecasting rule of chartists.41 Again
two trading strategies are assumed, namely
• a fundamentalist trading strategy forecasting via partial adjustment
E1,t[pt+1] = f1,t = vpt−1 + (1− v)p∗ = p∗ + v(pt−1 − p∗) , 0 ≤ v ≤ 1 ,
• and the trading strategy applied by the trend extrapolators
E2,t[pt+1] = f2,t = pt−1 + g(pt−1 − pt−2) , g ≥ 0 .
In the following consideration the strategy of fundamentalists is restricted to the simple case v = 1.
Thus fundamentalists believe that tomorrow’s price will be equal to the last observable price pt−1,
42
40For a detailed mathematical analysis of the bifurcation routes to strange attractors and coexisting attractors
see Gaunersdorfer et al. (2008).
41This assumption leads to a four dimensional system (in contrast to a three dimensional) in the simplest case of
zero memory, i.e., γ=0.
42In Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007) this trader type is also denoted as an EMH believer since his/her naive
forecast is consistent with a random walk of prices.
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while the other trader type is a simple trend extrapolator, extrapolating the latest observed price
change. Assuming an i.i.d. dividend process with Et[dt+1] = d¯ and expressing the dynamics in form
of prices rather than in price deviations leads to the market equilibrium according to Eq. (2.5),
namely
Rpt = n1,tpt−1 + n2,t(pt−1 + g(pt−1 − pt−2)) + d¯+ ǫt , (2.49)
where n1,t, n2,t denote the fractions of fundamentalists and trend extrapolators respectively and
ǫt is an i.i.d. random variable representing model approximation errors
43 which turns this model
modification into a noisy evolutionary ABS.
On the other hand a second updating scheme for the fractions of different trader types is
introduced where trend extrapolators now also condition their rules upon deviations from the
fundamental. This is modeled as follows. In the first step the fraction of traders following the
forecasting rule h = 1, 2 is again determined by the risk adjusted realized profits of the past
trading periods and given, as before, by
n˜h,t =
exp{β(φh,t−1 + γΦh,t−2)}∑2
h=1 exp{β(φh,t−1 + γΦh,t−2}
with44
φh,t = − 1
2aσ2
(pt − fh,t−1 + δt)2 . (2.50)
To complete the updating scheme in a second step the fraction of traders is assumed to evolve
according to
n2,t = n˜2,t exp
{
− 1
α
(pt−1 − p∗)2
}
, α > 0 , (2.51)
n1,t = 1− n2,t ,
where the additional exponential term in Eq. (2.51) assures that the population of trend chasers
decreases more than proportionally, the further prices deviate from their fundamental value.45
Hence, the exponential term can be seen as a correction term, that becomes more important the
further prices move away from the fundamental.
Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 show the time series of prices and returns (upper panels) as well as
properties of the return distribution (lower panels) of a real financial time series and from a typical
simulation run of the noisy ABS model. In Figure 2.10 the empirical data from Deutsche Aktien
Index (DAX) serves as a typical example for a time series of a financial market. Since the modified
BH model (as well as the original BH model) is a stationary model in prices by its construction
the price series is not strongly increasing as would be expected from empirical data (compare the
upper left panels of both figures). Nevertheless it can be shown, that prices are highly persistent
and are close to having a unit root (see Gaunersdorfer and Hommes, 2007). As in real markets the
time series of returns (compare the upper right panels of both figures) of the artificial market is
43The error term ǫt can also be interpreted as exogenous random shocks from outside.
44See also Appendix A 2.9 for details.
45Hommes (2001) states in his review article, that the conditioning on deviations from the fundamental may be
interpreted as a stabilizing transversality condition in a heterogeneous world. Temporarily, speculative bubbles can
arise that push the current price away from its fundamental but at some point, a correction towards the fundamental
price will occur.
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Figure 2.10: Time series of price and return properties for the Deutsche Aktien Index (DAX). The sample consists
of 9762 daily observations spanning the period from January 1959 to January 1999. The upper left panel shows the
price evolution of the index. The upper right panel shows the time series of the daily log-returns for the DAX. The
dashed lines refer to the ±3σ region. The lower left panel exhibits a histogram of the sample probability density of
normalized returns compared to a standard normal distribution. For a better visibility of the leptokurtic shape of
the empirical distribution the inverse cumulative distribution is shown for the empirical as well as for the normal
distribution in the lower right panel.
characterized by time-varying fluctuations with phases of low volatility and counterparts of high
volatility and, thus, clearly exhibits the phenomenon of ‘clustered volatility’. Note, that in contrast
to the empirical time series the returns of the simulated data are determined as net returns, i.e.,
relative price changes of the form
ρt =
pt − pt−1
pt−1
,
which simply follows the original publication and does not play a crucial role.46 Another char-
acteristic which is typically observed in empirical time series of financial markets is the ‘fat-tails
property’ which is also shared by the artificial market. The lower panels of Figures 2.10 and 2.11
serve as an illustration for this feature. Using normalized returns, the sample probability density
function of returns ρt are compared with the density function of a standard normal distribution.
46Return values defined as relative price changes do not deviate much from using log-returns on a daily level since
from a Taylor expansion it directly follows that the log-return rˆt ≡ ln pt − ln pt−1 ≈ rt with rt ≡ (pt − pt−1)/pt−1
is a proper approximation for rt close to zero.
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Figure 2.11: Simulation results for prices and returns in a modified BH model. The plots exhibit time series of
prices and returns (upper panels) and standardized return distribution properties (lower panels) in a modified BH
model. Initial prices are drawn from a normal distribution N (950, 100) while the initial population fractions is set
to 0.5. The parameter set is chosen as r=0.001, p∗=1000, d¯=1.0, a=1.0, σ=1.0, v= 1.0, g=1.9, β=2.0, γ=0.99,
α=1800, δt ≡0.0 and ǫt ∼ N (0, 121). The time series of prices and returns are generated by a GAUSS program
which I wrote following the model description in Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007). The parameter are chosen
according to the parameter values given in the original publication.
Obviously, in comparison to a normal distribution, which is the chosen distribution for the noise
term in the equilibrium equation for the price dynamics, the return distribution of the modified
BH model has a higher probability for large events and, consequently, contains also more prob-
ability mass around the symmetry axis of the distribution (see lower left panel in Figure 2.11).
This leptokurtic character of the entire distribution can also be assisted by investigating the outer
part of the empirical distribution more carefully. In the lower right panels of Figures 2.10 and 2.11
the inverse cumulative distribution P>(|ρt|) ≡ 1 − F (|ρt|) of absolute returns is plotted against
the return ρt.
47 It can be seen that the probability for large returns decay significantly more
slowly than under the assumption of a Gaussian distribution with the same standard deviation.
This phenomenon is coined by the term ‘fat-tail phenomenon’ which is one crucial regularity of
47Absolute returns are used to exhibit the presence of (positive and negative) extreme events in the distribution,
which is appropriate since both distributions show a symmetric behavior around zero as well as in the outer part of
the distribution.
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Figure 2.12: Normal probability graphs for the DAX and a modified BH model. The departures from normality
can easily be detected for both the empirical distribution of the DAX (left panel) and the return distribution of
the simulated artificial data (right panel). The dashed line refers to Gaussian distributed returns. The data for the
modified BH model are taken from the same simulation run as shown in Figure 2.11.
the behavior of financial data.48 This clearly departure from the Gaussian behavior can also be
illustrated in a slightly different way, namely by plotting the theoretical fractiles (or quantiles)
of a Gaussian distribution against the empirical fractiles of the return data which is done in a
‘normal probability graph’ (or ‘qq-plot’). This procedure is used for investigating financial data,
for instance, in the seminal survey of stock market prices in Fama (1965). The idea of this method
is as follows. Let u be a Gaussian random variable with mean µ and standard deviation σ and let
z be the standardized variable z = (u−µ)/σ. Then, the graph of z against u is just a straight line,
since z results from u by a simple linear transformation. If ui, i = 1, . . . , N are N sample values
of the random variable u ranked from smallest to largest, then each particular ui is an estimate of
the fi fractile of the distribution of u, where the values of fi can be estimated by
49
fi =
3i− 1
3N + 1
. (2.52)
Moreover, for the standardized normal distribution the exact value of z for the fi fractile can easily
be derived by using standard computer software or can be found in any standard table. Then, for
the case of a Gaussian random variable the plot of the sample values of u against the theoretical
determined values of z should be a straight line. Conducting the same procedure for the return
data of the DAX and the simulation data from the modified BH model, i.e., ranking the N sample
values from smallest to largest, deriving the fi fractile, i = 1, . . . , N , via Eq. (2.52) and comparing
the N sample values with the inverse of the cdf of the normal distribution evaluated for each fi,
shows an extreme departure from linearity for the outer part of the return distribution in both
cases (see Figure 2.12). To conclude, the heaviness of the tails and the leptokurtic behavior of the
empirical and simulated distributions confirm that the Gaussian hypothesis for the distribution
of both the returns of the DAX and the returns of the artificial market should be discarded. In
addition, these findings support the ability of the modified BH model to reproduce at least some
48Again we refer to Pagan (1996) and Cont (2001) for further details.
49There are many conventions for estimating the fi fractile. Other popular conventions are fi = i/(N + 1),
fi = (i− 0.5)/N and fi = (i− 0.375)/(N + 0.25). See also Fama (1965) for details.
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crucial properties of returns of financial data. The descriptive time series statistics of returns
for the DAX and the modified BH model are summarized in the first two columns of Table 2.1.
The first and second moments of both time series are of the same order of magnitude, as well as
the third moment indicates a symmetric distribution in both cases. The fourth moment, i.e., the
kurtosis, is also increased in comparison to the Gaussian distribution, but less significant for the
simulated time series than for the empirical data.
Finally, Figure 2.13 is devoted to the autocorrelation function of returns, absolute returns and
squared returns as well as to the return-volatility correlation. The upper left panel exhibits the
-0.1
-0.05
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0  20  40  60  80  100
a
u
to
co
rre
la
tio
n
lags
autocorrelation of raw, absolute and squared returns
raw returns
absolute returns
squared returns
(a) ACF of the DAX
-0.1
-0.05
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0  20  40  60  80  100
a
u
to
co
rre
la
tio
n
lags
autocorrelation of raw, absolute and squared returns
raw returns
absolute returns
squared returns
(b) ACF of modified BH model
-0.1
-0.05
 0
 0.05
 0.1
-100 -50  0  50  100
cc
f(τ
)
τ
return-volatility (squared return) correlation for the DAX, 1959-1999
(c) CCF of the DAX
-0.1
-0.05
 0
 0.05
 0.1
-100 -50  0  50  100
cc
f(τ
)
τ
return-volatility (squared return) correlation for the modified BH model
(d) CCF of modified BH model
Figure 2.13: Return-return and return-volatility correlation for the DAX and a modified BH model. In the upper
panels the autocorrelation function of raw, absolute and squared returns are shown. The upper left panel show the
typical decay behavior of the autocorrelation function of absolute and squared returns as qualitatively observed in
almost all time series of empirical financial data. The modified BH model shares the slow decay rate of absolute
and squared returns (upper right panel). The lower panels show the return-volatility correlation of both time series,
where the squared return is used as a volatility measure in both plots. While a short ranged negative correlation
is detected for the empirical data, the modified BH model hardly shares this feature. The dashed lines refer to the
±3σ confidence bands. The data are taken from the same simulation run as shown in Figures 2.11 and 2.12.
decay rate of the autocorrelation functions for the DAX which shows the typical decay behavior of
empirical time series of financial markets. The autocorrelation function of the raw returns perma-
nently moves around zero within the ±3σ confidence bands. For the absolute and squared returns
the autocorrelation pattern is crucially different. Both autocorrelation functions show a signifi-
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cantly positive autocorrelation which is persistent over a quite long time horizon. The modified
BH model is able to reproduce these empirical findings as it exhibits no significant autocorrela-
tions of returns but slowly decaying autocorrelations of absolute and squared returns (upper right
panel). Furthermore, we have also found some empirical evidence for correlations between future
volatilities and past price changes. The ‘leverage effect’50, due originally to Black (1976a), states
that a price drop increases the risk of a firm going bankrupt, which induces its stock to become
more volatile. However, there is also a counterargument, which states, that an increase in volatility
makes the stock less attractive which, pushing its price down. We can refer to Bouchaud et al.
(2001), Campbell et al. (1997, Chapter 12) and Bouchaud and Potters (2003, Chapter 8) and
the references given therein for further details on this debate. However, the lower left panel of
Figure 2.13 shows that negative shocks to returns drive up volatility within a short time period
for the DAX index. The modified BH model does not share this feature. Instead, current price
drops seem to be negatively correlated to the current level of volatility, which can be confirmed
by performing further simulation runs with identical parameter sets and averaging over many of
those experiments (not shown here).
I would like to make one final remark, not mentioned in the original publications, but which
might give further insights into the basic question of how to model financial markets generating
realistic time series properties. Running simulations of the modified BH model with different levels
of noise, it turns out that due to the statistical properties of the return series, the model outcome
seems to be very sensitive with respect to the chosen noise amplitude (see Lux (2003), i.e., private
communication with T. Lux). More precisely, the system loses its main features (particularly
volatility clustering, fat-tail phenomenon, typical autocorrelation pattern of raw, absolute and
squared returns as described above) when the variance of the approximation error ǫt of the system
falls below a certain threshold. In such a situation the time series of returns become less volatile
and move permanently within the ±3σ region except for very rare and very ‘synthetic’ spikes
simply caused by numerically based negative effects during the simulation run. Furthermore, the
autocorrelation of returns, absolute returns and squared returns becomes insignificant (see Figure
2.14). The descriptive statistics of the simulated time series in the right column of Table 2.1
confirms these findings. The standard deviation (and the mean) is reduced by a factor 10 in this
case. Moreover, even though the skewness and the kurtosis seem to fit better to empirical data, a
further look at the normal probability graph (see Figure 2.14 (c)) indicates that the relatively high
kurtosis is only caused by the very rare outliers mentioned above. Indeed the normal probability
graph shows a very sharp cut off slightly above and below the ±2.5σ region. For a possible
explanatory approach for this sensitive behavior of the system for the chosen noise level we might
have to return to the dynamic behavior of the model in the absence of noise. As already mentioned
above, in the deterministic case (ǫt = δt = 0) the nonlinear dynamic system Eq. (2.49) has two
coexisting attractors namely a locally stable fundamental steady state and an attracting quasi-
periodic cycle.51 Turning on the noise at a sufficiently high level makes the system start to switch
between these two attractors which generates dynamics that allows for quite realistic time series
50The ‘leverage effect’ is also a phenomenon attributed to the category of ‘stylized facts’ of financial time series
(see Bouchaud et al., 2001; Cont, 2001).
51For details see Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007).
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Figure 2.14: Return properties in a modified BH model with a lower noise level. However, the parameter set is
chosen as in the previous simulation run, where the noise level is reduced to ǫt ∼ N (0, 16). The dashed lines (upper
left panel and lower right panel) refer to the ±3σ region. Obviously, the time series of return and the distribution
of return lose their main characteristics which they shared with the empirical financial data (see Figures 2.11 and
2.12). Instead, with the exception of very few and very ‘synthetic’ outliers, the return pattern of both the time
series of returns and its distribution is very similar to a white noise process, i.e., Gaussian distributed returns.
Therefore, note that in contrast to Figure 2.11 (b) the normal probability graph only indicates a deviation from
the Gaussian distribution for very rare and very extreme events (lower left panel). The lower right panel shows,
that the autocorrelation functions of raw, absolute and squared returns decay rapidly to zero which is caused by an
undersized level of noise.
properties. At present the dependence between the amplitude of noise and the occurrence of such
switching regimes among different attractors of the system is an interesting but open question and
might be investigated more carefully in the future.
2.3 The Levy-Levy-Solomon (LLS) Model
Unlike the asset pricing framework of Brock and Hommes, the model formulated by M. Levy,
H. Levy and S. Solomon52 is based on the more realistic assumption that agents choose their
optimal investment decisions from an underlying CRRA utility function, which gives the agents’
52See Levy et al. (1994, 1995); Levy and Levy (1996); Levy et al. (1996).
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DAX vs. Modified BH Model
return DAX modified BH model modified BH model
statistics with lower noise level
mean 0.000270 -0.000185 0.000001
median 0.000373 -0.000002 0.000058
maximum 0.120038 0.099353 0.043286
minimum -0.137061 -0.089737 -0.055846
std. dev. 0.010824 0.015827 0.005071
skewness -0.321050 -0.072112 -0.263523
kurtosis 10.347282 1.902256 (14.744482)
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics for the DAX and a modified BH model with two different levels of noise. The
modified BH model shares some crucial features of real financial data as uni-modal and symmetric behavior around
zero and an increased kurtosis. In the case of reduced input noise the standard deviation of the output signal, i.e.,
the returns, is also reduced by the same magnitude. Note that the relatively high kurtosis is simply a result of
the occurrence of a few price explosions during the simulation run caused by the limitations of the used computer
system why its value is placed in parentheses.
current wealth a role in their portfolio optimization considerations.53 As a result, asset price and
wealth dynamics become growing processes in time, which makes the analytical tractability of the
model more challenging. Moreover, in the specific case of the LLS model, there is no analytical
solution for most of the model variants and therefore the greater part of the model investigations are
performed by numerical simulations.54 Levy, Levy and Solomon show that, under the assumption
of homogeneous expectations, highly unrealistic price variations with periodic booms and crashes
are obtained, whereas the heterogeneity of agents can generate more realistic price movements.
In the following, only the basic aspects of this model are outlined, which can be found in two
textbooks from the ‘econophysics’ strand (see Levy et al. (2000) and Voit (2003)), as well as in the
original literature.
2.3.1 Model Description
The LLS model is a microscopic model of a stock market with a variable but finite number of
agents, who pursue either all the same trading strategy (i.e., homogeneous model version) or
different trading strategies (i.e., heterogeneous model version). The microscopic ‘element’ of the
system is the individual investor. Each investor has the same attitude to risk and is characterized by
a standard CRRA utility-of-wealth function U(W ) = ln(W ) from which their investment decision
are derived.
Like in the BH model the stock market consists of two investment options:
53See Chapter 1, Appendix A 1.3 for some details on CRRA utility functions and their impacts on portfolio
optimization. See also the Introduction 3.1 in Chapter 3 for a more general discussion on the different types of
utility functions and their empirical validation.
54The following part of the thesis deals with a quite similar asset pricing model which shares most of the main
ideas of the LLS model but which, in turn, is analytically tractable. Within this discussion the LLS model framework
will be revisited at the end of Chapter 3 in Section 3.7.
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• one risky asset (stock) with an uncertain return
ρt =
pt − pt−1 + dt
pt−1
,
which is composed of the variations of the stock price pt and a fixed positive dividend payment
dt
• one riskless asset (bond) that returns a fixed interest with rate r in each period.
The time period between two time steps is taken as one year.55 In each trading period the investors
now have to split their wealth between these two investment opportunities where, of course, the
objective of each investor is to maximize their expected value of his/her utility. Cash, credit and
short selling of stocks are not allowed. For the expectations formation it is assumed that each
investor memorizes the last k returns of the risky assets and weights each of them with probability
1/k to reappear in the next trading period. From these recent observations, they eventually
determine their order volumes for the risky and for the riskless asset. Again, as in the former
model, each trader is assumed to be a price taker, so that the stock price in each trading round is
determined by equating supply and demand according to a Walrasian scenario.
In order to describe the architecture and the emerging dynamics of the model more precisely,
the whole trading and market clearing procedure within two time steps will now be discussed.
Note that Figure 2.15 summarizes the main aspects of the model’s time structure. Let us start at
time t directly after a trade (note that the next trade takes place exactly at time t + 1) and let
Wi,t and Ni,t denote the wealth and number of shares of the ith investor at period t respectively.
Hence between t and t+ 1, after receiving dividends and interest payments and before the trading
action, the wealth of investor i has changed to
W di,t =Wi,t +Ni,tdt + (Wi,t −Ni,tpt) r ,
where the superscript d labels the included dividend return (and interest payments) in investors
wealth Wi,t. All traders now have to make their investment decisions for the next trading period
t+ 1 based on their preferences, i.e., they must derive their optimal investment proportion πi,t+1
which they want to invest in the risky asset via
max
πi,t+1
Ei,t+1[U(Wi,t+2)] , (2.53)
where πi,t+1 is restricted to being between some lower and upper boundary.
56 Since at this moment
(i.e., before t + 1) the stock price pt+1 is not yet revealed, the investors have to determine their
optimal order volumes in a slightly sophisticated way. They derive their optimal demand function
for different hypothetical prices ph, that would lead to a total, hypothetical wealth Wi,h that is
defined as
Wi,h = W
d
i,t +Ni,t(ph − pt)
= Wi,t +Ni,tdt + (Wi,t −Ni,tpt) r +Ni,t(ph − pt) .
55In later versions of the model the time period (together with relevant parameters) is modified to quarterly (see
Levy et al., 2000) or daily (see Levy et al., 1996) time steps.
56In most of their simulations it is assumed that 0.01 < πi,t+1 < 0.99 for all t.
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Note that Wi,h is the wealth the investor will hold directly after the trade at t + 1. Thus only
the gain/loss of the Ni,t stocks held before the trade are to be included in his/her consideration.
As already mentioned before, it is assumed that each investor has a memory span of k time steps
t t+ 1 t+ 2
?
Wi,t
6
dividends
interest &
?
W di,t
6
trade ⇒ p∗h = pt+1
?
maxπi,t+1 Et+1[U(Wi,t+2)]
⇒ πi,h
⇒ Ni,h(ph)
?
Wi,t+1
6
...
Figure 2.15: Model time line of the LLS model. Below the time line all market actions are indicated, while their
impact on trader i, i.e., the change in his/her variables is illustrated above the time line.
and that he/she expects for the next time step a price taken from the past k prices with equal
probability 1/k. Using Eq. (2.53) and the explicit form of the investors’ utility function, the optimal
(hypothetical) investment proportion at time t+ 1, which, in general, depends on ph through Wh,
is given by
πi,h = arg max
πi,h

1k
t−k+1∑
j=t
ln[(1− πi,h)Wi,h(1 + r) + πi,hWi,h(1 + ρj)]

 ,
which can be solved at least numerically. Therefore the number of shares investor i wants to hold
at the hypothetical price ph is given by
Ni,h(ph) =
πi,hWi,h
ph
from which the aggregate demand function can be determined via summation that gives
Nh(ph) =
I∑
i=1
Ni,h(ph) ,
where I denotes the number of investors in the market. As it is assumed that the market has
a fixed number of available shares, denoted by N , at time t + 1 the market clearing equilibrium
price p∗h = pt+1 is simply determined by the intersection point of the aggregate demand function
and the supply function, which is a vertical line.57 Thus, as in real markets, the price pt+1 and
the wealth of investors Wt+1 ≡ (. . . ,Wi,t+1, . . .) is determined simultaneously. In the last step the
traders have to update their history of past price movements. This completes one single trading
procedure and a new trading period starts with the payout of dividends and interest payments.
57The riskless asset (bond) is assumed to be in infinite supply.
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So far, the model is purely deterministic. Now, randomness will be introduced by adding a
noise term to the investors’ optimal investment proportion by
π˜i,t = πi,t + ǫi ,
where ǫi is drawn separately for each investor from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
standard deviation σ. This random factor is assumed to take into account all individual (e.g.,
psychological) factors as well as those that cannot be mapped into the rational utility maximization
part of the model. Expressed in economic language, the random term captures the deviation from
utility maximization of each single investor and makes the individual’s and aggregated demand
function become a stochastic variable.
In most papers on the LLS model, the authors compare two different scenarios of the model,
one with homogeneous traders and one with a heterogeneous population. This will be discussed in
some detail in the following subsection.
2.3.2 Main Results
Early academic work on the LLS model is mainly concentrated on the unrealistic model outcomes
under homogeneous expectations in a representative investors framework (see Levy et al., 1994,
1995; Levy and Levy, 1996). Accordingly, Levy, Levy and Solomon conclude that different forms
of heterogeneity have to be introduced into the model structure to allow the model to be used for
more realistic market scenarios.
In the homogeneous model the only individual component of each investor is the random factor
ǫi added to each investors’ optimal diversification proportion. Assuming realistic parameter values
(annual interest rates are taken as 4%, initial dividend yield is fixed at 5% per year and increases by
5% annually58) Levy et al. (1995) show that in such a model structure unrealistic booms and crashes
of the market price are generated. A typical time series of the stock price for the homogeneous
model is shown in Figure 2.16. The explanation of these market phenomena is rather evident. In
the no-noise case (i.e., σ = 0), all investors behave in exactly the same way, which leads to identical
demand functions. As a result, in every trading period, the outstanding shares are divided equally
between the traders and all individuals will eventually hold the same number of shares, leading to a
market price which simply grows exponentially at the constant growth rate of the dividend. In other
words, there is no real trade and thus this market scenario is, of course, somewhat pathological.
Now let us turn to the homogeneous model with noise (i.e., σ > 0). Again, after a transient period
the stock price rises at the same exponential growth rate of the dividends as in the no-noise case.
However, the price does not increase in a smooth manner as in the latter case, but now fluctuates
around the trend. These price fluctuations are caused by fluctuations in the optimal investment
proportions, which in turn are caused by the noise term. Because of the rise in the market price,
investors become bullish about the stock and will invest in the risky asset as much as possible.
As the history of returns becomes relatively homogeneous in such a situation, a small change in
return caused by the noise term can induce a dramatic change in the investment proportion, which
58For the sake of completeness, in this model design the market consists of 100 investors with 10,000 outstanding
shares, the initial share price is set to 4 units of cash and each investor is initially endowed with 1000 units of cash
(see Levy et al., 1995).
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Figure 2.16: Time series of stock price in the LLS model (homogeneous case). With only one investor group, the
market price simply grows exponentially at the constant growth rate of the dividend in the case of no noise i.e.,
σ = 0.0 (dashed line). With investor-specific noise σ = 0.2, periodic booms and crashes arises (solid line). As the
plot is generated from the original LLS C-program provided by the authors, the visual appearance coincides with
the plot originally found in Levy et al. (1995). In this plot 100 investors with memory span 15 are chosen.
results in a market crash. Note, that this ‘discontinuity property’ (see Levy et al., 1995) is one
of the main features of the LLS model.59 After a market crash, investors again become more and
more homogeneous, and again start to buy the stock and sell the bond if a small increase in the
return is detected. The stock price increases sharply and a new boom is created. This pattern
recurs periodically, with the periodicity depending on the memory span k of the investor.
Heterogeneity can be introduced in different forms into the model (see Levy et al., 1995).
Firstly, agents can be grouped into investor types with different memory spans. Secondly, their
risk preferences can be diversified by allowing them to use different risk-aversion coefficients in their
utility function.60 Thirdly, Levy, Levy and Solomon use a mixture of both types of heterogeneity
and choose the investors’ memory span (1 ≤ k ≤ 20) and risk preferences (0 < ν ≤ 4) randomly. In
the last step, the latter scenario is coupled with investors following a long-run investment strategy.
This means that some agents keep their investment proportion in the risky asset fixed at a certain
rate (for instance, 20%).61 To summarize the results from all these different market scenarios
59As we will see soon, such discontinuous changes in investment preferences can be also detected in the heteroge-
neous framework.
60In this case, a more general version of a CRRA utility function is used that has the form U(W ) = W 1−ν/1− ν,
where ν is the risk-aversion coefficient. For ν → 1 this version converges to the logarithmic utility function that has
been assumed so far. See also Chapter 1, Appendix A 1.3 for the details.
61This strategy is related to the EMH (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3). As future prices cannot be forcasted by using
recent price observation, a buy-and-hold strategy should be at least as promising as any artificial trading strategy
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briefly, in all scenarios the resulting time series of the stock price are generally more irregular than
in the homogeneous case. The periodic occurrence of booms and crashes is relaxed, but price move-
ments still remain rather predictable (see Figure 2.17 for a typical example). Not surprisingly, the
time series of the stock price become more irregular the more elements of heterogeneity enters the
market. To sum up, in their early publications the authors focus on the necessity of heterogeneity
as the essential constituent of a more or less realistic model of financial markets. In other words,
in the microscopic, artificial world of the LLS model, the assumption of homogeneous investors,
although it is common and useful in many theoretical arguments and economic models,62 leads
overall to unrealistic time series of stock prices.
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Figure 2.17: Time series of stock price in the LLS model (heterogeneous case). With two different investor groups
(memory span k = 5, 15), the market price becomes more irregular but still shows rather predictable price patterns.
Again, the plot is made by the original LLS C-program and looks like the results in Levy et al. (1995). In this plot
100 investors and σ = 0.2 are chosen.
In the authors’ more recent publications, the base line version of the model is exploited again
(see Levy et al., 1996) and a slightly more general version of the model is investigated (see Levy
et al., 2000). In Levy et al. (1996) the dynamics of the system with one, two and three investor
subgroups is analyzed in a more exhaustive manner. It is assumed that all agents have the same
utility function and only differ in their memory spans. Additionally, the time step between the
trades is changed into days, and relevant parameters are adjusted to appropriately realistic values.
As the homogeneous case has already entirely been examined above, in the two population market
Levy et al. (1996) find that the dominance of one subgroup over the other in terms of the fraction
of total wealth depends significantly on the ratio of their memory spans. Furthermore, they give
based on past price movements.
62See the discussion about the notion of the ‘representative agent’ in Chapter 1, Section 1.4.
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very intuitive explanations for such phenomena in different scenarios that are all based on the fact
that each population remembers recent booms and crashes in a slightly but crucially different way.
Restricting their considerations to cycles up to length 2k0,
63 the results can be divided into the
following cases assuming a starting point where one population k0 dominates the market
64 and
dictates the dynamics (see Levy et al., 1996):
(i) If k0 < k1 < 2k0, k0 prevails over k1.
(ii) If 2nk0 < k1 < (2n+ 1)k0 , n ∈ N, k1 performs better than k0.
(iii) If (2n+ 1)k0 < k1 < 2nk0 , n > 1, k1 still dominates, but less strongly than in (ii).
(iv) If k1 < k0, k1 always prevails over k0.
Exemplarily, cases with memory spans k = 10, 14, k=10, 26 and k = 10, 36 are considered in
more detail, with Figure 2.18 showing some results on this. For a larger number of investor
populations, e.g., a three population case with k = 10, 141 and 256 or a six population case with
k = 10, 36, 141, 193, 256 and 420, the dynamics of the system qualitatively changes. No specific
cycle length can be detected any longer in the time series of the stock price, and the model shows
a more irregular structure. The system has become complex (see Levy et al., 1996).
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Figure 2.18: Time series of wealth share with two investor groups in the LLS model. In a market with two equal
investor populations and memory spans k = 10, 14, the group with the lower memory will dominate the market in
the long run (left panel). In case of k = 10, 26, no population can prevail over the other one forever. Nevertheless,
memory 26 dominates most of the time (right panel). The plot reproduces the findings in Levy et al. (1996) where
all parameters are discounted on a daily time period level. Parameters are I=100, N=10000, r=0.001, σ=0.2,
W0=1000 and p0=4. The dividend process is assumed to evolve according to dt = 0.004 · 1.00015ˆ (t − 1), which
corresponds to a realistic annual growth rate.
A recent book written by the authors of the LLS model also dedicates one chapter to their
financial market model, and this has already become well established in the relevant physics and
63Remember that in the heterogeneous case the evolution of the system is still determined by almost periodic
dynamics determined by the chosen memory spans.
64In this context by definition the dominating population is just starting to create a trend. Interestingly, dominance
over stock price evolution does not necessarily mean dominance over total wealth as it is shown in a more recent
publication by Zschischang and Lux (2001).
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economics branches of literature (see Levy et al., 2000). However, I wish only to summarize and
therefore only the main differences will be discussed here. Roughly speaking, the model is modified
in two directions. On the one hand, the dividend stream is assumed to be a stochastic variable
following a multiplicative random walk
d˜t = dt−1(1 + z˜)
where z˜ is a stochastic variable with an appropriate probability density function. The tilde denotes
the stochastic nature of the variables. On the other hand, in addition to the well known trading
strategy using the last k historical returns for price prediction, which are denoted by ‘Efficient
Market Believers’ (EMB), so-called ‘Rational Informed Identical’ (RII) investors are also intro-
duced. They know about the dividend process and derive the ‘fundamental value’ of the stock as
the discounted stream of future dividends. Most of the previous results qualitatively remain the
same with these modifications. In the case of a whole ensemble of EMB investors (and the RII
population) the time series of the stock price becomes quite irregular and seems, at least visually,
quite similar to empirical data. No periodicity in the time series can be detected any longer in this
scenario. Furthermore, the authors investigate their model version for different market scenarios
with respect to typical market anomalies such as heavy trading volume, autocorrelation of returns
and excess volatility. The results of these investigations are not stated here but we can refer to
Levy et al. (2000) for further reading.
Instead, some criticism or at least some limitation of the LLS model should be mentioned at the
end of this section. Some work has been published on this topic also giving new insights into the
dynamic structure of the model (e.g., see Hellthaler, 1995; Kohl, 1997; Zschischang and Lux, 2001).
Using a model design identical to the one in the original papers, E. Zschischang and T. Lux65
show that the long-run model outcomes are extremely dependent on the initial conditions, at least
in the case of a three investor population scenario. Providing the investor populations with slightly
different (random) return histories in different simulation runs in order to let them determine their
optimal investment proportion at time t = 0, the authors observe that different population types
can dominate their counterparts. Figure 2.19 shows a typical example of this result using the
same combination k = 10, 141 and 256 of memory spans as in Levy et al. (1996). Furthermore,
introducing a power utility function (see Footnote 60) instead of logarithmic utility preferences,
Zschischang and Lux detect the degree of risk aversion as the more relevant parameter for investors’
dominance in terms of wealth share. In their own experiments they generate scenarios in which
investor populations that have been dominated by other groups in former runs prevail over the
others when their degree of risk aversion is decreased. Note that this result is not surprising from
an economics perspective. Indeed, it is well known in economics that agents who are willing to
take a higher risk level will gain a higher profit (at least on average). Another similar finding is
certainly worthy of note. Introducing a small group of traders that follows a buy-and-hold strategy
leads to the result that these agents increase their wealth proportion and eventually dominate the
whole population in the long run in all experiment outcomes.66 Although the model cannot be
interpreted as an efficient market because of its generally regular price patterns and periodic price
65See Zschischang and Lux (2001).
66A simple explanation for this phenomenon can be found in Zschischang and Lux (2001).
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Figure 2.19: Time series of wealth share with three investor groups in the LLS model. In the case of a three
investor population with k = 10, 141 and 256, either the group with memory span 141 (left panel) or the group with
256 (right panel) may dominate the market. Note that this plot is based on the GAUSS program of the LLS model
also used in Zschischang and Lux (2001).
movements, this result nevertheless agrees with the EMH, confirming its conjecture that trading
strategies based on trend detection from past price movements should not be more profitable than
more simple and more fundamental trading rules (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3). In other words, the
LLS model also leaves the survival of trend-based trading strategies as observed in real markets
(see LeRoy, 1989) as a puzzle.
There are two further publications dealing with the LLS model which I want to mention here
very briefly. T. Hellthaler67 investigated the effect of increasing the number of investors in the
original model. In his own experiments he observed a strong sensitivity of the model to the system
size (i.e., number of agents). He shows that an increase in the number of agents (from 96 to 4
million) leads to periodic price movements in all model variants, while at the same time, the main
characteristics of the model (e.g., irregular price patterns in the heterogeneous cases) vanishes.68
R. Kohl69 simulates the LLS model for more than one stock and analyzes the model behavior
for small and large investor groups. In the case of small investor groups (100 investors) he shows
that, like in the original model with only one stock, irregular price developments can be observed.
He also demonstrates that an increase in the number of investors leads to periodic price patterns
(at least for almost all stocks) as already observed by Hellthaler for the one-stock scenarios.
The LLS model has another limitation of a different nature. Like many other multi-agent
models, the LLS framework relies exclusively on numerical simulations since the model framework
is more or less analytically intractable due to the fact that the resulting dynamics describes a
67See Hellthaler (1995).
68The LLS model shares this phenomenon with several other microscopic models of financial markets e.g., the
Kirman model (see Kirman, 1991, 1993), the SantaFe Artificial Stock Market Model (see Palmer et al., 1994;
Arthur et al., 1997; LeBaron et al., 1999; Wilpert, 2004), the Cont-Bouchaud percolation model (see Cont and
Bouchchaud, 2000), the Kim-Markowitz model (see Kim and Markowitz, 1989) and the Lux-Marchesi model (see
Lux and Marchesi, 1999, 2000). See also Egenter, Lux and Stauffer (1999) for some results on this topic for the last
two models.
69See Kohl (1997).
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growing process in time. However, this purely numerical treatment is somewhat unsatisfactory
because very often it cannot be precisely clarified which model effects cause certain simulation
outcomes. One possible respond to shortcoming in these kinds of financial market models is to
reformulate the original model structure in such a way that a stationary version of the model
framework is obtained. Such a financial market model which also shares some crucial ideas of
the LLS model will be outlined in the next chapter following Chiarella and He (2001). Hence this
model overcomes the drawback of solely relying on numerical simulation results, yet we will also see
that it still does not solve some of the limitations mentioned above for the LLS model framework.
Although I have summarized some critical statements and academic publications in the past
few paragraphs, it would also be useful to consider two citations emphasizing the value of the LLS
model before I close the section. The authors themselves state in Levy et al. (1995) that
[...] microscopic simulations [as performed in the LLS model] hold great potential for
new insights into the complex behavior of the stock market;
which can definitely be seen as a first resume for this section. Furthermore, this statement is to
some extent confirmed by two different authors working in the same field (see Lux and Ausloos,
2002) when discussing different model approaches proposed in physics and economic literature in
their review article, i.e., more precise models without any key economic concepts proposed by
physicists versus rather ‘complicated’ models favored by economists. Here they write that
[...], in order to take into account the peculiarities of economic systems (namely, in order
to account for the nonmechanical nature of individual decisions even within a multi-
agent framework), it seems indispensable to attempt a synthesis of both approaches.
The models by Levy, Levy, and Solomon [...] may constitute some modest steps in this
direction. [...]
In this sense the LLS model perhaps connects the physicists’ view (and maybe even the physicists’
way of thinking) for the first time with concepts hitherto used mainly by economists and thus
makes a valuable contribution to this branch of research.
2.4 Summary
This chapter presents two prominent economic models of financial markets as well as some re-
lated model modifications of the original models, which reveal basic concepts of modern financial
modeling. Furthermore, both models are closely connected to the model frameworks that will be
outlined in the following chapters of this thesis. Both the model framework by Brock and Hommes
(1998) and the model framework by Levy et al. (1994, 1995) are unified by the idea of removing
some of the limitations which come with the traditional view of theoretical finance. This revision
of the concepts of financial modeling is mainly based on a paradigmatic shift from a rational rep-
resentative agent model to a boundedly rational, heterogeneous agents framework. All financial
market models presented in this chapter use an agent-based modeling approach, where heteroge-
neous agents employ competing trading strategies and where prices are, at least partly, driven by
the ‘psychology’ of the market, i.e., prices are not anymore fully determined by their underlying
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economic fundamentals as proposed by the traditional theory (see Chapter 1). Instead, they may
also be influenced by the market perception and the individual behavior of the market participants.
But also a change in the research methodology occurs. As a result of the increased complexity of
the modeling framework caused by the implementation of agents’ heterogeneity, which very often
leads to its analytical intractability, a shift from a purely analytical treatment of the models to a
more computationally orientated approach becomes necessary.
To some extent, the model structure of both models is comparable. The heterogeneous agents
in the model frameworks proposed by Brock and Hommes (1998) and Levy et al. (1994, 1995)
are faced with a typical asset allocation problem in each discrete time step and therefore use a
straightforward myopic utility maximization scheme to determine their optimal demand for the
risky asset. This implies that all agents are assumed to be endowed with a certain amount of wealth
which they want to maximize via their utility function and which, in turn, determines their portfolio
decisions. Here, heterogeneity is introduced by positioning different trading groups with different
beliefs or expectations about future price movements. Thus in these model frameworks there is an
attempt to model the agents’ individual behavior and decision-making process in a rather explicit
and concrete way, in order to subsequently investigate whether the arising dynamics of the risky
asset’s equilibrium price (which is here determined by a Walrasian scenario) can reproduce some
of the important observed stylized facts often seen in real financial data. However, there are also
some crucial differences in the main building blocks of the two model frameworks presented in this
chapter. While the Levy-Levy-Solomon (LLS) model does not allow the agents to switch between
the different trading strategies even if one trading strategy is performing significantly better than
the other one(s), in the Brock-Hommes (BH) model the interaction of agents is implemented by
a switching mechanism between different trading strategies of agents. Depending on the current
state of the market, agents are allowed to switch between fundamental and chartist based strategies
which, in turn, again influence the price determination in the following time period.
Although this chapter mainly reviews some prominent examples of behavioral models of fi-
nancial markets, it also contains my own contribution to the discussion in Gaunersdorfer (2000);
Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007) relating to interesting model extensions of the original BH
model. While Gaunersdorfer (2000) studies the case of time varying homogeneous beliefs about
conditional variances, I propose to introduce heterogeneity in beliefs about variances, which makes
the resulting nonlinear dynamic system more complex, but also draws a more realistic picture of
the behavior of the two different strategy groups. Since the agents do believe in different price
deviations from the fundamental price, they should therefore use also their own expectations for
the determination of their time varying beliefs on conditional variances of returns. The results
of our modified version of Gaunersdorfer’s extension of the BH model might be summarized as
follows:
• The implementation of heterogeneous time varying beliefs about variances of traders in-
creases the dimension of the nonlinear system by two dimensions and thus leads to a seven
dimensional system with two further variables which describes the different estimates of the
conditional variance of both trader types. Otherwise, when restricting our model modifica-
tion to the case of constant beliefs about variances it equals the constant variance case of the
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model extension proposed by Gaunersdorfer (2000).
• Apart from the difference in the dimensions of the two considered model versions, the local
and global picture of asset price dynamics in our approach is surprisingly similar to Gauners-
dorfer (2000). In both versions a bifurcation route to strange attractors occurs when the
intensity of choice to switch strategies increases.
• Concerning the local behavior of the system near the steady states, the primary bifurcation
(with respect to the intensity of choice parameter) of the fundamental steady state as well
as the secondary bifurcations of the non-fundamental steady states coincides with the bifur-
cations found in the case of constant beliefs about variances and is thus the same for our
model modification as it is in Gaunersdorfer (2000).
• Higher-order bifurcation routes to chaos, however, might be different from the findings pre-
sented in Gaunersdorfer (2000).
In summary, introducing heterogeneous time varying beliefs into the model framework of Gauners-
dorfer (2000) generalizes her results to a more realistic but also more complex market scenario
where the main characteristics of the resulting price dynamic system still become valid. Never-
theless, there might several further ways of investigating our modified model version in even more
general and more realistic model variants. First, the model can be studied for the case of a non-zero
memory parameter γ, as is already the case for the original BH model (see also the simple example
in Subsection 2.1.2). Furthermore, investigating the case of a positive supply of risky shares of
the risky asset as well as introducing an asynchronous updating of beliefs mechanism might be an
interesting task.70 Since all these proposals to generalize the current model version also require an
extensively complex analysis of the arising nonlinear dynamic system, we can leave these problems
for future research.
This chapter closes the first part of the thesis, which has presented some mathematical back-
ground (mainly relegated to the appendices) as well as the basic economic concepts of modeling
financial markets and some prominent model frameworks. At the beginning of the next part of
this thesis I will introduce the constitutive asset pricing framework formulated by Chiarella and He
(2001), which will serve as a point of departure for my own contribution to the branch of research
presented in this thesis.
Appendix to Chapter 2
A 2.1 The Standard Mean-Variance Maximization Approach
The standard myopic71 mean-variance maximization approach assumes that the expected utility of in-
vestor’s wealth solely depends on the expected value of wealth µW ≡ E[W ] and the variance of wealth
σ2W ≡ V ar[W ] and has the form
E[U ] = µW −
1
2
aσ2W ,
70See also Hommes et al. (2005) for a discussion on this topic for the original BH model.
71A single-period decision rule is said to be ‘myopic’ when it is independent of the future (i.e., beyond the current
period) in a sequential decision problem. In other words subjects behave as if each trading period is the last decision
period.
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which can be motivated by the following, simple derivation.72 It shows that the mean-variance maximiza-
tion approach is equivalent to the maximization of a negative exponential utility function, which is a utility
function of CARA type, under the assumption of normally distributed wealth W .
To be precise, assume that the individual maximizes his/her expected utility of wealth at time t + 1
conditional on the information set It available one period before. For the sake of simplicity denote the
uncertain wealth Wt+1 of the individual with W
′. Furthermore assume that W ′ is normally distributed
conditional on It and let σ
2
t,W be the variance of W
′ conditional on It. Then the expected utility of wealth
is given by
Et[U(W
′)] = Et[− exp{−aW
′}]
= −
1q
2πσ2t,W
Z ∞
−∞
dW ′ exp
(
−
1
2σ2t,W
(W ′ − Et[W
′])2 − aW ′
)
= −
1q
2πσ2t,W
Z ∞
−∞
dW ′ exp
(
−
1
2σ2t,W
[W ′ − (Et[W
′]− aσ2t,W )]
2
)
· exp

−aEt[W
′] +
1
2
a2σ2t,W
ﬀ
= − exp

−aEt[W
′] +
1
2
a2σ2t,W
ﬀ
= − exp

−a
„
Et[W
′]−
1
2
aσ2t,W
«ﬀ
. (A 2.1)
Since in general it is
∂
∂x
n
− exp(−af(x))
o
= − exp{−af(x)} · (−a)
∂
∂x
f(x)
the maximization of Eq. (A 2.1) is equivalent to maximizing simply its argument, i.e.,
max{E[− exp(−aW ′)]} = max

− exp

−a
„
Et[W
′]−
1
2
aσ2t,W
«ﬀﬀ
= max

Et[Wt+1]−
1
2
aV art[Wt+1]
ﬀ
,
which becomes obvious by using the first-order condition.
Furthermore, it can be shown in this framework that an investor who is faced with two investment
alternatives namely a riskless asset giving the fixed return r and one risky asset giving the return ρt =
(pt+ dt − pt−1)/pt−1 determines his/her demand of the risky assets independently of his/her wealth level,
which is a crucial result in asset allocation theory. To see this, note that the wealth Wt+1 of the investor
at time t+ 1 is given by
Wt+1 = (1− πt)Wt(1 + r) + πtWt(1 + ρt+1) , (A 2.2)
where πt denotes the investment proportion invested in the risky asset at time t. At each time period t
the investor has to maximize his expected utility by deriving
max
πt

Et[Wt+1(πt)]−
1
2
aV art[Wt+1(πt)]
ﬀ
which leads to the following determination problem
∂
∂πt

Wt[(1 + r) + πt(Et[ρt+1]− r)]−
1
2
aW 2t π
2
tV art[ρt+1]
ﬀ
= 0 , (A 2.3)
where
Et[Wt+1] = Wt[(1 + r) + πt(Et[ρt+1]− r)]
V art[Wt+1] = W
2
t π
2
tV art[ρt+1]
72See also Grossman (1976).
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is used. The solution of Eq. (A 2.3) is given by
πt =
1
Wt
Et[ρt+1]− r
aV art[ρt+1]
,
which states that the wealth proportion invested in the risky asset has an inversely proportional dependence
on the current level of investor’s wealth, which is consistent with the property of an originally chosen IRRA
utility function. The investor’s demand of the risky asset at time t (i.e., the number of risky assets which
are denoted by Nt) can simply be calculated using the relation
Ntpt = πtWt
and is given by
Nt =
1
Wt
Et[ρt+1]− r
aV art[ρt+1]
·
Wt
pt
=
Et[ρt+1]− r
aV art[ρt+1]
·
1
pt
, (A 2.4)
which is obviously independent of investor’s wealth. Using the definition ρt+1 = (pt+1+dt+1−pt)/pt leads
to another version of Eq. (A 2.4) namely
Nt =
1
pt
1
pt
Et[pt+1 + dt+1]− 1− r
a 1
p2t
V art[pt+1 + dt+1]
=
Et[pt+1 + dt+1]− (1 + r)pt
aV art[pt+1 + dt+1]
,
which is the typical demand curve for an investor whose investment preferences are described by a CARA
utility function using the mean-variance maximization approach.
A 2.2 Further Notes on Eq. (2.8)
Rewriting Eq. (2.6) as
pt =
1
1 + r
Et[pt+1 + dt+1]
and shifting pt one period leads to
pt+1 =
1
1 + r
Et+1[pt+2 + dt+2] .
By iterated substitution we obtain
pt =
kX
i=1
1
(1 + r)i
Et[dt+i] +
1
(1 + r)k
Et[pt+k] , (A 2.5)
where the iterated conditional expectations have been simplified by the following rule (e.g., see Schmitz,
1996, p. 143): let I1 ⊆ I2, then the conditional expectation value has the following property
E[E[X|I2] | I1] = E[X | I1] P | I1 − asymptotically stable . (A 2.6)
Hence Eq. (A 2.5) can be obtained by setting X ≡ dt+i and X ≡ pt+i respectively, as well as I1 ≡ It
and I2 ≡ It+i for i = 1, . . . , k. Note that this property of conditional expectations is known as the ‘law
of iterated expectations’ in economic literature. By rewriting Eq. (A 2.6) as E[X − E[X|I2] | I1] = 0 it
suggests an intuitive interpretation. In words, it is not possible to use limited information I1 to predict the
forecast error one would make if one had superior information I2 (e.g., see Cuthbertson, 1996; Campbell
et al., 1997). Obviously, for Eq. (A 2.5) to converge for k →∞ the remaining term Et[pt+k]/(1 + r)
k has
to vanish in the limit, which is known as a terminal condition or ‘transversality condition’ and which rules
out rational speculative bubbles (see Cuthbertson, 1996, p. 78 for details).
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A 2.3 Derivation of Eq. (2.13)
Denote the realized excess return over period t−1 to period t by Rt. Then, Rt can be obtained depending
on the deviation xt from the fundamental by using the identity pt = xt+p
∗
t and adding a ‘zero-supplement’
which leads to
Rt ≡ pt + dt −Rpt−1 = xt + p
∗
t + dt −Rxt−1 −Rp
∗
t−1
= xt −Rxt−1 + p
∗
t + dt − Et−1[p
∗
t + dt] + {Et−1[p
∗
t + dt]−Rp
∗
t−1}
= xt −Rxt−1 + δt , (A 2.7)
where δt ≡ p
∗
t + dt −Et−1[p
∗
t + dt]. Note that the term in the curly brackets is zero since the fundamental
price p∗t satisfies the market equilibrium equation (2.6). To determine the optimal demand for the risky
asset with respect to xt by trader type h the following maximization has to be considered
max
z
n
Eh,t−1[Rt]z −
a
2
z2V ar[Rt]
o
= max
z
n
Eh,t−1[Rt]z −
a
2
z2σ2
o
, (A 2.8)
where z denotes the number of risky assets in a short-hand notation. As this maximization problem equals
the maximization problem in Eq. (2.2) up to a constant (i.e., RW⋆,t−1, see Eq. (2.1)), the optimal solution
is given by
zopt =
Eh,t−1[pt + dt −Rpt−1]
aσ2
=
{Eh,t−1[p
∗
t ] + fh,t−1}+ Eh,t−1[dt]−Rpt−1
aσ2
=
fh,t−1 −R(pt−1 − p
∗
t−1)
aσ2
=
fh,t−1 −Rxt−1
aσ2
,
where again Eq. (2.6) is used for the fundamental p∗t . For further details see Brock and Hommes (1999).
A 2.4 Proof of Theorem 2.1
The proof proceeds in three steps.
(i) Existence of Steady States
From Eq. (2.21) a necessary condition for the steady state (x∗,m∗, u∗) to exist is given by
Rx∗ =
1−m∗
2
gx∗ ,
which implies
x∗ = 0 ∨
„
x∗ 6= 0 ∧ R =
1−m∗
2
g
»
which is equivalent to m∗ = 1−
2R
g
–«
, (A 2.9)
whereas, additionally from Eq. (2.23) the steady state (x∗,m∗, u∗) has to fulfill73
u∗ = γu∗ −
gx∗
aσ2
(x∗ −Rx∗)− C ,
that implies
u∗ =
1
1− γ
»
(R− 1)g
aσ2
(x∗)2 − C
–
. (A 2.10)
Finally, according to Eq. (2.22) the steady state (x∗,m∗, u∗) also has to satisfy
m∗ = tanh
„
β
2
u∗
«
, (A 2.11)
73In the following, a (fully) deterministic scenario (i.e., δt−1 = 0) is assumed.
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which can be combined by using Eq. (A 2.10) as
m∗ = tanh
„
β
2(1− γ)
»
(R− 1)g
aσ2
(x∗)2 − C
–«
. (A 2.12)
Thus, neglecting the u∗ variable in the further considerations (because it can be simply derived by
Eq. (A 2.10)), if x∗ = 0 we get a fundamental steady state
E1 = (x
∗,m∗) = (0, tanh
„
−βC
2(1− γ)
«
) ≡ (x∗, meq) ,
whereas if x∗ 6= 0 two non-fundamental steady states arise
E2 = (x
∗
+,m
∗) and E3 = (x
∗
−,m
∗) = (−x∗+,m
∗) ,
where m∗ is given by Eq. (A 2.9) and x∗± is the solution (if it exists) of Eq. (A 2.12) given by
x∗± = ±
s
aσ2
(R− 1)g

2(1− γ)
β
[ arctanh(m∗) ] + C
ﬀ
. (A 2.13)
(ii) Uniqueness of Steady States
For 0 < g < R the fundamental steady state is unique as R/g > 1 implies
m∗ = 1−
2R
g
< −1
which is in contradiction to the necessary condition m∗ = tanh
`
β
2
u∗
´
∈ [−1, 1].
For g > 2R we get
0 < m∗ = 1−
2R
g
< 1
since 1 > 2R/g > 0. Hence, Eq. (A 2.12) has two solutions, one positive solution x∗+ and one negative
solution x∗− ≡ −x
∗
+. Overall, there are three steady states in this case.
For R < g < 2R consider m∗ at the boundaries g = R and g = 2R first, which satisfies m∗ = −1 or
m∗ = 0 respectively. From this, it is obvious, that
m∗ ∈ ]− 1, 0[
for R < g < 2R. Now, we show that Eq. (A 2.12) has two solutions if and only if
m∗ > meq .
Considering the following equivalences
m∗ > meq = tanh
„
−
βC
2(1− γ)
«
⇔
2(1− γ)
β
arctanh(m∗) > −C
⇔
2(1− γ)
β
arctanh(m∗) + C > 0
⇔
aσ2
(R− 1)g
·
2(1− γ)
β
arctanh(m∗) + C > 0
we end with a positive expression equal to the discriminant of Eq. (A 2.13). Since only equivalent trans-
formations are used, it is therefore shown that Eq. (A 2.12) has two solutions if and only if m∗ > meq.
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(iii) Stability of Fundamental Steady State E1
The system Eq. (2.21)–Eq. (2.23) can be equivalently transformed into the following canonical form of
ordinary first-order difference equations
xt =
1− tanh
`
β
2
ˆ
γut−1 −
gzt−1
aσ2
(xt−1 −Ryt−1)− C
˜´
2R
gxt−1 ,
yt = xt−1 ,
zt = yt−1 ,
ut = γut−1 −
gzt−1
aσ2
(xt−1 −Ryt−1)−C ,
where an appropriate number of auxiliary variables has been introduced.74 The Jacobian can be derived
as
J =
0
BBBB@
a1 a2 a3 a4
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
−
gzt−1
aσ2
gRzt−1
aσ2
− g
aσ2
(xt−1 −Ryt−1) γ
1
CCCCA
with
a1 = −
1
2R
(tanh[...])′ ·
βgzt−1
2aσ2
· gxt−1
+
1− tanh
`
β
2R
ˆ
γut−1 −
gzt−1
aσ2
(xt−1 −Ryt−1)− C
˜´
2
g ,
a2 = −
gxt−1
2R
(tanh[...])′ ·
βgRzt−1
2aσ2
,
a3 = −
gxt−1
2R
(tanh[...])′ ·
„
−
βg
2aσ2
(xt−1 −Ryt−1)
«
,
a4 = −
gxt−1
2R
(tanh[...])′ ·
βγ
2
,
where in each case (·)′ denotes the first derivative with respect to the currently appropriate variable.
Evaluating J at the fundamental state E1 = (x
∗,meq) = (0, tanh
“
−βC
2(1−γ)
”
), leads to
J|(x∗,meq,u∗) =
0
BBBBB@
1−tanh
“
−βC
2(1−γ)
”
2R
g 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 γ
1
CCCCCA
=
0
BBBB@
1−meq
2R
g 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 γ
1
CCCCA ,
where u∗ = −C/(1 − γ) and (tanhx)′ = 1 − tanh2 x are used for simplification. Now, the characteristic
polynomial can be derived by exploiting Laplace’s expansion rule as
det(λI− J) = (−1)6λ ·
„
λ−
1−meq
2R
g
«
· λ · (λ− γ)
ﬀ
from which the eigenvalues of the fundamental steady state can be determined as
λ1 = γ and λ2 =
1−meq
2R
g as well as λ3 = λ4 = 0 .
74As before δt−1 is assumed to be 0.
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As γ is always assumed to be in the interval ]0, 1[, the fundamental steady state is locally asymptotically
stable, if and only if −1 < λ2 < 1 that is equivalent to
−1 <
1−meq
2R
g < 1
⇔ −
2R
g
< 1−meq <
2R
g
⇔ 1 +
2R
g
> meq > 1−
2R
g
= m∗ .
Since it is meq ∈ [−1, 1] by definition, it can be deduced that λ2 ∈]0, 1[ if and only if m
∗ < meq. To
sum up and conclude, for R < g < 2R E1 is locally asymptotically stable if and only if m
∗ < meq .
Otherwise E1 is an unstable saddle point since |λj | < 1 for j = 1, 3, 4 and |λ2| > 1. For g > 2R it is
meq = tanh{−βC/(2(1− γ))} ∈ ]− 1, 0]. Hence E1 is an unstable saddle point since
λ2 = (1−m
eq)
g
2R
> 1 .
Finally, for 0 < g < R it is m∗ = 1 − (2R/g) < −1. Therefore, it is always meq > m∗ and thus E1 is
locally asymptotically stable. Furthermore, in this case E1 is even globally asymptotically stable, since
Eq. (2.21) can be written as xt = Atxt−1, where At = [(1 − mt)/2]g/R. Because the expression in the
square brackets is ∈ [0, 1], so |At| ≤ g/R < 1 and hence |xt| ≤ (g/R)
t|x0| → 0 as t → ∞ for every choice
of x0. This completes the proof.
A 2.5 Gaunersdorfer’s Risk Adjusted Profits Term
Using the same notation for the realized excess return Rt = pt+ dt−Rpt−1 as in similar considerations in
Appendix A 2.3 we obtain for φh,t
φh,t = Rtz
opt −
a
2
(zopt)2V arh,t−1[Rt] ,
where again, zopt denotes the optimal demand of risky assets in a short-hand notation. In Appendix A 2.3
zopt has already been derived from Eq. (A 2.8) as
zopt =
Eh,t−1[Rt]
aV arh,t−1[Rt]
,
which can also be expressed in deviation from the fundamental as
zopt =
fh,t−1 −Rxt−1
aV arh,t−1[xt −Rxt−1 + δt]
,
where the relation Rt = xt −Rxt−1 + δt is used (see Eq. (A 2.7)). Now, the performance measure can be
written as
φh,t = Rt
Eh,t−1[Rt]
aV arh,t−1[Rt]
−
a
2
„
Eh,t−1[Rt]
aV arh,t−1[Rt]
«2
V arh,t−1[Rt]
= Rt
Eh,t−1[Rt]
aV arh,t−1[Rt]
−
1
2a
(Eh,t−1[Rt])
2
V arh,t−1[Rt]
.
Note that for rational traders, i.e., traders who form their expectations according to ER,t−1[Rt] = Rt, the
performance measure simplifies to
φR,t =
1
2a
R2t
V arR,t−1[Rt]
.
For analytical tractability, homogeneous expectations of conditional variances of returns are assumed in
the following derivation, i.e.,
V arh,t[·] = V art[·] .
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To be able to use squared prediction errors for the performance measure, which might be an economically
more reasonable variable, we subtract φR,t from φh,t which leads to
φh,t − φR,t = Rt
Eh,t−1[Rt]
aV art−1[Rt]
−
1
2a
E2h,t−1[Rt]
V art−1[Rt]
−
1
2a
R2t
V art−1[Rt]
= −
1
2aV art−1[Rt]
(Rt − Eh,t−1[Rt])
2 . (A 2.14)
Using the relations
Rt
!
= ER,t−1[Rt] = ER,t−1[xt −Rxt−1 + δt] = xt −Rxt−1 , (A 2.15)
Eh,t−1[Rt] = fh,t−1 −Rxt−1 ,
finally, we end up with75
φh,t − φR,t = −
1
2aV art−1 [xt −Rxt−1 + δt]| {z }
Eq. (A 2.7)
0
B@(xt −Rxt−1)| {z }
Eq. (A 2.15)
−(fh,t−1 −Rxt−1)
1
CA
2
= −
1
2a(σ2t−1 + σ
2
δ)
(xt − fh,t−1)
2 . (A 2.16)
where, for the last step, the following assumptions
V art−1[xt −Rxt−1] = σ
2
t−1 ,
V art−1[δt] = σ
2
δ ,
Cov[xt −Rxt−1, δt] ≡ 0
are made. Note that in the main text the notation φh,t stands for the difference (φh,t − φR,t) calculated
in Eq. (A 2.16). Furthermore, the justification for this linear transformation is the following: since φR,t is
independent from h and since the discrete choice probabilities nh,t (see Eq. (2.10)), which are the fractions
of trader type h, are independent of the level of fitness, subtracting the term φR,t has no real effect on the
dynamics.
A 2.6 Proof of Theorem 2.2
The proof proceeds in three steps.
(i) Existence and Uniqueness of Steady States
Let x∗ = xt = . . . = xt−4 be the steady state of the system Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.46) and denote
m∗ ≡ tanh
„
β
2
»
g(g − 2)(x∗)2
2aσ2
+ α(x∗)2 − C
–«
.
From Eq. (2.42) a necessary condition for the steady state to exist is given by
x∗ =
g
2R
x∗(1−m∗) (A 2.17)
which implies
x∗ = 0 ∨
„
x∗ 6= 0 ∧ m∗ = 1−
2R
g
«
.
75Contrarily, Hommes (2001) also uses Eq. (A 2.7) for the left part in the big parentheses and consequently end
up with φh,t−φR,t = −(2aV art−1[xt−Rxt−1+δt])−1(xt−fh,t−1+δt)2. Obviously, for the ‘deterministic skeleton
model’, i.e., when all noise terms are set to zero, both transformations do not make any difference.
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Using the definition for m∗ given above for the non-trivial solution of Eq. (A 2.17) leads to a quadratic
equation, i.e.,
(x∗)2 =
2aσ2 [ln {(g/R)− 1}+ βC]
β (g(g − 2) + 2aασ2)
, (A 2.18)
if g > R. Thus, besides a fundamental steady state E1 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) which exists for all g > 0, additionally,
(only) two non-fundamental steady states E2,3 = (±x
∗,±x∗,±x∗,±x∗,±x∗) can occur if and only if
ln {(g/R)− 1}+ βC
g(g − 2) + 2aασ2
≡
N
D
> 0 ∧ g > R .
More precisely, it can easily be shown that
D > 0 if and only if α > α∗ ≡
−g(g − 2)
2aσ2
for all g > 0 ,
N > 0 if and only if β > β∗ ≡
1
C
ln
„
R
g −R
«
for R < g < 2R ,
N > 0 for g > 2R ,
which implies that for 0 < g < R the fundamental steady state E1 is the unique steady state, while for
R < g < 2R and α > α∗ (α < α∗) E2,3 exist if and only if β > β
∗ (β < β∗). Finally, for g > 2R all three
steady states E1 and E2,3 exist for all choices of α, β > 0. Note that in that case α
∗ becomes negative.
(ii) Stability of Fundamental Steady State E1
The Jacobian of the fundamental steady state E1 can be determined by
J =
0
BBBBBBB@
g
2R
`
1 + tanh
`
βC
2
´´
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
1
CCCCCCCA
,
from which the the eigenvalues of E1 can be derived as
λ1 =
g
2R
»
1 + tanh
„
βC
2
«–
and λ2 = . . . λ5 = 0 .
Obviously, E1 is locally asymptotically stable for 0 < g < R since then λ1 lies in the unit circle while for
g > 2R the eigenvalue λ1 > 1 which implies that in this case E1 is unstable. For the intermediate case, i.e.,
R < g < 2R, the eigenvalue λ1 ∈ (0, 1) if and only if β < β
∗. Furthermore, the global stability property of
E1 for 0 < g < R can be concluded in a totally analogous way as already outlined in the proof of Theorem
2.1 in Appendix A 2.4.
(iii) Stability of Non-Fundamental Steady States E2,3
The determination of the stability properties of the non-fundamental steady states is more comprehensive
and therefore supported by the software package Mathematica 4.1, which is able to give numerical as
well as analytical solutions for a wide range of standard mathematical problems. Thus the characteristic
polynomial of the Jacobian of the non-fundamental steady states E2 and E3 can be determined by
Γ(λ) = −λ2

λ3 −
„
1 +
g − 2aασ2
g
Ψ
«
λ2 − (1− g)Ψ
ﬀ
(A 2.19)
with
Ψ ≡ 2(g −R)
ln {(g/R)− 1}+ βC
g(g − 2) + 2aασ2
. (A 2.20)
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Hence E2,3 have two trivial eigenvalues λ1 = λ2 = 0 and three further ones which are implicitly given by
the expression in the curly brackets of Eq. (A 2.19).76
For R < g < 2R two subcases have to be considered. If α < α∗ the non-fundamental steady states exist
for β < β∗. In this subcase the three non-trivial eigenvalues λ3, λ4 and λ5 are all real. Two eigenvalues
(one negative and one positive) lie inside the unit circle while the third (positive) eigenvalue does not.
At β = β∗ two eigenvalues become zero and one eigenvalue is equal to one. Hence the non-fundamental
steady states are not stable in this subcase. Contrastingly, if α > α∗ the non-fundamental steady states
exist for β > β∗ and β being not too large. In this subcase all three non-trivial eigenvalues of E2,3 are real
(two positive which increase and one negative which decreases) and lie inside the unit circle. Hence the
non-fundamental steady states are stable. Increasing β up to a certain value the two positive eigenvalues
become complex and E2,3 undergo the secondary bifurcation. Note that in this case the third negative
non-trivial eigenvalue might already have crossed the unit circle (see next Theorem 2.3 and its proof for
details).
For g > 2R the non-fundamental steady states are stable since (besides the two trivial eigenvalues)
one negative and two complex conjugate eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle for all α and β being small
enough. Increasing β sufficiently, the complex eigenvalues as well as the negative eigenvalue cross the unit
circle and, therefore, E2,3 undergoes a Hopf or a flip bifurcation (see next Theorem 2.3 and its proof for
details). This completes the proof.
A 2.7 Proof of Theorem 2.3
As already mentioned in the previous proof, for g > R, α > α∗ and β being sufficiently large the three
non-trivial eigenvalues of the system Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.46) cross the unit circle. More precisely, either
the modulus of the two complex conjugate eigenvalues become greater than 1, or the negative eigenvalue
becomes equal to -1. Thus the proof has to consider two different bifurcation scenarios.
(i) Hopf Bifurcation of the Non-Fundamental Steady States E2,3
As stated in the previous proof, the characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian of the non-fundamental
steady states E2,3 are given by Eq. (A 2.19), which has two trivial eigenvalues λ1 = λ2 = 0 and three
non-trivial eigenvalues λ3, λ4 and λ5. Since the cubic term in the curly brackets has no linear term, one
eigenvalue can be expressed by the other two, i.e.,
λ3 = −
λ4λ5
λ4 + λ5
.
A Hopf bifurcation occurs if a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues cross the unit circle. Thus assume
that λ4,5 = A± iB and note that |λi|
2 = λiλ
∗
i = A
2 + B2, i = 4, 5, and λ4 = λ
∗
5 where the ∗ denotes the
complex conjugate counterpart. Then λ3 is given by
λ3 = −
A2 + B2
2A
. (A 2.21)
Writing Γ(λ) as
Γ(λ) = −λ2 {(λ− λ3)(λ− λ4)(λ− λ5)}
= −λ2
˘
(λ− λ3)[λ
2 − (λ4 + λ5)λ+ λ4λ5]
¯
(A 2.22)
76The ‘fundamental theorem of algebra’ assures that all non-constant polynomials with integer and real or complex
coefficients can be decomposed into linear factors in the complex space, which, in other words, guarantees as many
roots as the order of the polynomial is.
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and inserting Eq. (A 2.21) into Eq. (A 2.22) leads to
Γ(λ) = −λ2

λ3 +
»
A2 + B2
2A
− 2A
–
λ2 +
(A2 + B2)2
2A
ﬀ
. (A 2.23)
Comparing the coefficients of Eq. (A 2.23) with the coefficients of Eq. (A 2.19) yields»
A2 + B2
2A
− 2A
–
= −
„
1 +
g − 2aασ2
g
Ψ
«
∧
(A2 + B2)2
2A
= −(1− g)Ψ ,
which simplifies at the Hopf bifurcation point (where A2 + B2 = 1) to»
1
2A
− 2A
–
= −
„
1 +
g − 2aασ2
g
Ψ
«
∧
1
2A
= −(1− g)Ψ .
Eliminating the real part A of the complex conjugate eigenvalues λ4,5 from these equations leads to an
equation which describes the Hopf bifurcation curve on the (β, α)-plane implicitly by
(g2 − 2aασ2)(g − 1)
g
Ψ2 + (g − 1)Ψ− 1 = 0 (A 2.24)
which is only valid if
Ψ =
−g(g − 1)±
p
g2(g − 1)2 + 4g(g − 1)(g2 − 2aασ)
2(g2 − 2aασ2)(g − 1)
is real. It can easily be shown that Ψ is real for
α < α¯ ≡
g(5g − 1)
8aσ2
.
Furthermore Eq. (A 2.24) can be re-expressed in terms of the original parameters of the dynamic system
Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.46) by using Eq. (A 2.20) which leads to a quite complicated expression, i.e.,
2(g − 1)(g −R)[βC + ln {(g/R)− 1}]
(g − 2)g + 2aασ2
+
4(g − 1)(g −R)2(g2 − 2aασ2) [βC + ln {(g/R)− 1}]2
g [(g − 2)g + 2aασ2]2
= 1
(A 2.25)
which again describes the Hopf bifurcation curve on the (β, α)-plane in an implicit fashion.
(ii) Flip Bifurcation of the Non-Fundamental Steady States E2,3
In general, a flip bifurcation occurs if the eigenvalue of the dynamic system crosses the unit circle at -1,
which is λ3 in our case. Thus from Eq. (A 2.21) the non-fundamental steady states E2,3 undergo a flip
bifurcation for
λ3 = −
A2 + B2
2A
= −1 .
Then, Eq. (A 2.23) can be rewritten as
Γ(λ) = −λ2
˘
λ3 + [1− 2A] λ2 + (A2 + B2)
¯
. (A 2.26)
Comparing again the coefficients with Eq. (A 2.19) yields
[1− 2A] = −
„
1 +
g − 2aασ2
g
Ψ
«
∧ (A2 + B2)| {z }
=2A
= −(1− g)Ψ .
Eliminating again A leads to
Ψ =
2g
g(g − 2)− 2aασ2
which can be solved for β by using Eq. (A 2.20) and yields
β ≡ βF =
1
C
»
g
g −R
− ln
„
g −R
R
–«
.
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For β = βF , Eq. (A 2.25) gives two solutions for α, namely
α1 = −
g(5g − 6)
2aσ2
,
α2 =
g2
2aσ2
≡ α∗∗ .
It can be shown that α1 < α
∗ if and only if g > 1. Therefore, the first solution α1 is an irrelevant solution
for our proof since on the one hand E2,3 do only exist for g > R(> 1) and, on the other hand, are only
stable for α > α∗. Instead, the second solution α2 = α
∗∗ defines the intersection point (βF , α
∗∗) where the
flip bifurcation curve βF intersects the Hopf bifurcation curve in the (β, α)-plane.
Taking into account the fact that α∗∗ < α¯ if and only if g > 1 (which states that the same as E2,3
exist) the following summarizing conclusion can be drawn. If α ∈ (α∗, α∗∗), it is βH(α) < βF and the
non-fundamental steady states undergo a Hopf bifurcation at β = βH(α) which is implicitly given by
Eq. (A 2.25). Otherwise, if α ∈ (α∗∗, α¯], it is βF < βH(α) and then the non-fundamental steady states
E2,3 are destabilized by a flip bifurcation at β = βF . Finally, if α > α¯, then βH(α) 6= R and E2,3 undergo
an flip bifurcation at β = βF . This completes the proof.
A 2.8 Proof of Theorem 2.4
Following the lines of the proof of Theorem 2.2 (see Appendix A 2.6) it can easily be shown that the
fundamental steady state E1 of the seven dimensional system Eq. (2.42)–Eq. (2.48) is given by E1 =
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), and that two non-fundamental steady states E2 and E3 exist with
E2,3 =
`
±x∗,±x∗,±x∗,±x∗,±x∗, (1−R)2(x∗)2, (1−R)2(1− g)2(x∗)2
´
.
Fortunately, the structure of the dynamic system has the property that allows the Jacobian matrix J of
the system to be decomposed into two parts, i.e., one 5 × 5-matrix part which is exactly the same as in
the case of constant beliefs about variances, and one additional 2× 2-matrix part which has θ1,σ and θ2,σ
as its eigenvalues. Since θ1,σ, θ2,σ ∈ (0, 1) is assumed, these two eigenvalues are stable and therefore the
stability properties of the fundamental and non-fundamental steady states are solely determined by the
characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian J5x5 of the reduced five dimensional system’s steady state, which
has already been investigated in the previous two theorems. In other words, the characteristic polynomial
of J is given by
det(λI7 − J) = (λ− θ1,σ)(λ− θ2,σ)(λI5 − J5x5) .
Hence, in the case of time varying beliefs about variances the system has the same eigenvalues as in the
case of constant beliefs about variances and two further eigenvalues θ1σ and θ2,σ, which always lie inside
the unit circle. This completes the proof.
A 2.9 Notes on Gaunersdorfer and Hommes’ Risk Adjusted Profits Term
The risk adjusted profit term Eq. (2.50) can be derived in analogy to the considerations made in Appendix
A 2.5 as follows. Using Eq. (A 2.14) and assuming a constant conditional variance σ2, the performance
measure (φh,t − φR,t) can be written in prices as
φh,t − φR,t = −
1
2aσ2
(pt + dt −Rpt−1 − Eh,t−1[pt + dt −Rpt−1])
2
= −
1
2aσ2
(pt + dt − Eh,t−1[pt]−Eh,t−1[dt])
2
!
= −
1
2aσ2
(pt − fh,t−1 + dt − Eh,t−1[dt] )
2
= −
1
2aσ2
(pt − fh,t−1 + δt)
2 ,
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where δt ≡ dt−d¯ is again a martingale difference sequence. Note that in contrast to the previous calculations
(see also Eq. (2.9)) in this model modification, Eh,t[pt+1] = fh,t and i.i.d. dividends are assumed. In the
main text the notation φh,t again stands for the difference (φh,t − φR,t) calculated in this appendix.
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A 2.10 Excursion II: Theoretical Analysis in Nonlinear Dynamics
A general strategy for analyzing a nonlinear dynamic system starts with the determination of the steady
states (i.e., fixed points) and their stability properties. In particular, the analysis of steady states concen-
trates on how the stability behavior is influenced when crucial model parameters are varied. If the existence
or stability of a steady state changes by such a variation of the model parameters, a ‘bifurcation’ occurs
which very often leads to a region of more complicated dynamics (e.g., cycles) maybe even culminating
in chaotic behavior of the system. Hence, a ‘bifurcation’ means a change of the qualitative behavior of
the trajectories, and thus of the dynamic system, caused by a parameter passing through a critical value.
Steady states and primary bifurcation points in which the steady state becomes unstable can typically
be determined analytically even in higher dimensional nonlinear systems. The common procedure of this
theoretically based analysis is briefly discussed in this and the subsequent excursion. However, analyzing
the stability of cycles and detecting secondary and subsequent bifurcations of high-order cycles in a purely
analytical way is, generally, no longer an easy task. Consequently, numerical tools become important,
which I will refer to in Excursion IV.
Since only nonlinear difference equation systems will be examined in this thesis, we will restrict our
discussion to the theoretical and numerical analysis of discrete-time systems.
Stability of Fixed Points for Discrete Maps
In general, the stability of fixed points in nonlinear dynamic systems can be investigated analytically. One
of the most often used techniques in applications is the method of linear approximation, i.e., the nonlinear
system is replaced by its linear version around the examined fixed point, which preserves most of the crucial
properties of the system, in particular its stability properties relating to this fixed point. The main idea
behind this method provides the Hartman-Grobman Theorem78. But before I explain this procedure in
further detail, I will provide some precise and formal definitions of different types of stability of equilibrium
points in discrete-time dynamic systems.
Consider the difference equation system
xn+1 = G(xn) , xn ∈ R
m . (A 2.27)
Assume that x∗ is an isolated fixed point of the map G, i.e., it has a surrounding neighborhood containing
no other fixed points, so that x∗ = G(x∗).
Definition 2.5 (Lyapunov stable)
The fixed point x∗ is Lyapunov stable (or simply stable) if for every ǫ > 0, there exists δ(ǫ) so
that for ‖x0 − x
∗‖ < δ(ǫ) it is79
‖Gn(x0)− x
∗‖ < ǫ ∀n > 0 .
77See also Appendix A 2.5 for details.
78Roughly speaking, the Hartman-Grobman Theorem states that the qualitative properties of the solutions of a
nonlinear system x˙ = f(x), x ∈ U ⊂ Rn remain the same as those of the linearized system x˙ = Ax in a neighborhood
of a fixed point x∗ where A is a (n×n)-matrix of constant coefficients. For further details and proof of the theorem
see Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983).
79‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm, which defines a distance (or a metric) on the Euclidean space.
Appendix to Chapter 2 89
While Lyapunov stability only guarantees that a trajectory starting in a neighborhood of the fixed point x∗
stays in an ǫ-neighborhood (which can be larger than the δ-neighborhood) forever, the following stability
concept eventually claims a convergence to the fixed point.
Definition 2.6 (asymptotically stable)
The fixed point x∗ is asymptotically stable if
(i) it is stable and
(ii) there exists η > 0 such that for ‖x0 − x
∗‖ < η it is
lim
n→∞
‖Gn(x0)− x
∗‖ = 0 .
Thus a trajectory starting in a δ-neighborhood of x∗ converges towards the fixed point.
Remark 2.7 Property (ii) can be replaced by the following equivalent property:
(ii′) there exists η > 0 and for each ǫ > 0 there exists an integer T (η, ǫ) > 0 so that for
‖x0 − x
∗‖ < η it is
‖Gn(x0)− x
∗‖ < ǫ ∀n ≥ T .
Note that the previous two concepts of stability are both local ones, which is usually the relevant view
of stability for economic applications. Globally asymptotic stability can be defined in an analogous way
to Definition 2.6, with the only difference being that the δ-neighborhood can be arbitrarily large.
Definition 2.8 (globally asymptotically stable)
The fixed point x∗ is globally asymptotically stable if
(i) it is stable and
(ii) for every x0 in the domain of definition of Eq. (A 2.27) it is
lim
n→∞
‖Gn(x0)− x
∗‖ = 0 .
It is one of the most crucial characteristics of nonlinear dynamic systems that the notion of local and global
stability is not the same and has to be carefully distinguished in every stability analysis. While in linear
systems local stability always implies global stability80, nonlinear systems can have any finite, or countable
infinite, number of fixed points and, therefore, locally asymptotic stability does not imply global stability.
In the following we will mainly refer to the local stability concept.
The notion of instability of fixed points is quite straightforward and simply means the violation from
stability.
Definition 2.9 (unstable)
A fixed point of the system Eq. (A 2.27) is called unstable if it is not stable.
The Method of Linear Approximation
Since closed form solutions for nonlinear dynamic systems are scarce, it is necessary to find methods to
determine the stability of fixed points and which do not explicitly require the knowledge of their solution.
The method of linearization has this feature. The Hartman-Grobman Theorem81 guarantees that the
local behavior of a nonlinear dynamic system near to a fixed point can be investigated by analyzing the
80Linear systems generally have a unique equilibrium point from which the statement directly follows.
81Again we refer to Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983).
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behavior of the linear part82 of the system. The linearization procedure can be conducted by performing
a Taylor expansion of the system. The expansion of the coordinate functions Gi in a Taylor series up to
the first-order term leads to
x1,n+1 = G1(x
∗) +
∂G1(x
∗)
∂x1,n
(x1,n − x
∗
1) + . . .+
∂G1(x
∗)
∂xm,n
(xm,n − x
∗
m) ,
x2,n+1 = G2(x
∗) +
∂G2(x
∗)
∂x1,n
(x1,n − x
∗
1) + . . .+
∂G2(x
∗)
∂xm,n
(xm,n − x
∗
m) ,
...
...
xm,n+1 = Gm(x
∗) +
∂Gm(x
∗)
∂x1,n
(x1,n − x
∗
1) + . . .+
∂Gm(x
∗)
∂xm,n
(xm,n − x
∗
m) ,
where xi,n, x
∗
i denote the ith element of the vector xn and x
∗ respectively, and Gi is the ith coordinate
function of the map G. In vector notation the linear Taylor expansion can be written in a compact form
as
xn+1 = G(x
∗) + J|xn=x∗(xn − x
∗) (A 2.28)
with J|xn=x∗ being the Jacobian matrix evaluated at x
∗ and
J =
0
BBBBB@
∂G1
∂x1
∂G1
∂x2
. . . ∂G1
∂xm
∂G2
∂x1
∂G2
∂x2
. . . ∂G2
∂xm
...
...
. . .
...
∂Gm
∂x1
∂Gn
∂x2
. . . ∂Gn
∂xm
1
CCCCCA .
Obviously, if x∗ is a fixed point, it is x∗ = G(x∗). Hence, Eq. (A 2.28) can be rewritten as
xn+1 = x
∗ + J|xn=x∗ (xn − x
∗)
or in another, likewise intuitive notation
ξn+1 = DG(x
∗) ξn (A 2.29)
where ξn ≡ xn − x
∗ and DG(x∗) ≡ J|xn=x∗ .
So far, we have reduced the problem of determining the stability of a fixed point of a nonlinear dynamic
system to a corresponding problem in the linear world with the Jacobian matrix of G being the linear map,
which becomes particularly evident by considering Eq. (A 2.29). The theory of linear dynamic systems is
often subject to academic review and can be found in many textbook, hence only the basic principles need
be repeated here.83 Writing Eq. (A 2.29) more generally as
xn+1 = Axn , xn ∈ R
m , z ∈ Z (A 2.30)
where A is a (m×m)-matrix of constants, it is obvious that x∗ = 0 is an equilibrium solution (as a trivial
solution) and that it is, in general, the unique equilibrium.84 Furthermore, it can easily be shown that
82It is assumed, that a nonlinear system can be decomposed into a linear and nonlinear part, i.e., xn+1 =
Axn + g(xn) where A is a (m×m)-matrix with constant coefficients and g is a nonlinear vector valued function of
xn.
83See for instance Medio and Lines (2001, Chapter 2) and Gandolfo (1997) for a comprehensive introduction.
84A solution of the system Eq. (A 2.30) is called an ‘equilibrium solution’ if a system starting at the equilibrium
point stays there forever. Note that the equilibrium solution is unique if A is nonsingular, i.e., the determinant
det(A) is nonzero and thus there are no zero eigenvalues. In this case, A is also invertible.
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searching for non-trivial solutions of Eq. (A 2.30) directly leads to the eigenvalue problem85
Au = λu or (λIm − A)u = 0 , (A 2.31)
which has nontrivial solutions, i.e., u 6= 0, if and only if
det(λI− A) = 0 . (A 2.32)
Eq. (A 2.32) can typically be written in form of a polynomial in the variable λ, thus
Γ(λ) ≡ det(λI− A) = a0λ
m + a1λ
m−1 + . . .+ am−1λ+ am = 0 , (A 2.33)
where Γ(λ) is called the ‘characteristic polynomial’ and Eq. (A 2.32) is called the ‘characteristic equation’.
Hence we can conclude that nontrivial solutions of Eq. (A 2.30) exist if λ is an eigenvalue and u is the
associated eigenvector of A. This is a quite interesting statement. Obviously, solving the (linear) functional
equation Eq. (A 2.30) can be identified with the algebraic problem of finding the roots of the characteristic
polynomial given by Eq. (A 2.33) and, afterwards, solving the system Eq. (A 2.31), which is linear for
every fixed λ.
Having determined the nontrivial solutions of the linear system as described above, the solutions fulfill
the stability condition, i.e., they are (asymptotically) stable solutions, if they converge to the (unique)
equilibrium point x∗ = 0 for n goes to infinity. Looking at the structure of the non-trivial solutions of
Eq. (A 2.30) it becomes obvious that the eigenvalues λi of the matrix A play the crucial role for stability
conditions of the system as stated, for instance, in Gandolfo (1997, p. 115).
Theorem 2.10 (basic principle to check for stability in linear discrete systems)
For a linear system of difference equations, the solution’s stable or unstable behavior over
time depends exclusively on the roots λ1, λ2, . . . , λm. To analyze the stability of the system
we can examine only the nature of such roots, without any need to compute the elements of
eigenvectors ui,j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. For this purpose we have to check whether the roots of the
characteristic polynomial are in absolute value less then unity, without finding them explicitly.
As a matter of course, explicit stability conditions for linear systems of difference (and differential) equations
depend in particular on the order of the system and can be found in Gandolfo (1997).
To close this discussion, I will briefly summarize the procedure of analyzing the system with respect
to its existing fixed points from the practitioner’s point of view. Given a nonlinear system, the following
steps have to be performed to determine the stability properties of the fixed points:
Step 1: Determine the fixed points of the nonlinear system (existence and uniqueness).
then investigate the stability property for each fixed point, i.e.,
Step 2: Transform the system into its canonical form of ordinary first-order difference equations.
Step 3: Derive the Jacobian J and evaluate J at the fixed point.
Step 4: Determine the corresponding characteristic equation and solve for the roots.
Step 5: If all roots lie inside the complex unit circle, the fixed point is locally asymptotically stable,
otherwise it is not.
Step 6: If it exists continue with the next fixed point and start with Step 2.
85Without going into detail, a non-trivial solution of Eq. (A 2.30) can generally be obtained by exploiting an
Ansatz like xn = λnu (or considering superpositions of corresponding ones) where λ can be identified by a real or
complex eigenvalue and u by the corresponding real or complex eigenvector. Again we can refer to Medio and Lines
(2001, Chapter 2).
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A 2.11 Excursion III: Short Review of Bifurcation Theory for Discrete Maps
Consider a system of difference equations
xn+1 = G(xn;α) , xn ∈ R
n (A 2.34)
where α ∈ R is a parameter. Hence Eq. (A 2.34) describes an entire family of systems with xn being
the independent variable and whose members are identical except for the parameter α. It is obvious that
certain properties of the system Eq. (A 2.34), such as the number of fixed points or their stability, may
change if α varies. Assume that such a property holds for α ∈]a, b[, a, b ∈ R but is violated for any larger
interval. Then the points a and b are called ‘bifurcation points’.
Bifurcations can be classified as ‘local’, ‘global’ and ‘local/global’. Since the remainder of this thesis
mainly deals with local bifurcations we can refer to Medio and Lines (2001) for a discussion about the
latter ones or, for a more mathematical and technical treatment, to Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983) and
Kuznetsov (1995). Local bifurcations occur if the qualitative changes in the orbit structure can be analyzed
in a neighborhood of a fixed or a periodic point on a map (or a flow). More precisely, local bifurcations
are closely related to the loss of hyperbolicity in fixed points86. Consider two systems, one of which one
is slightly perturbated in the parameter space, i.e., a parameter value is slightly changed. Generally, near
each hyperbolic fixed point of the unperturbated system there will be a hyperbolic fixed point in the
perturbated system with similar properties. In particular, the Jacobian matrix of the perturbated system
evaluated at the ‘new’ fixed point will have the same structure of eigenvalues (i.e., for maps the same
number of eigenvalues inside and outside of the complex unit circle) as the Jacobian of the unperturbated
system at the original fixed point. However, at a bifurcation point the hyperbolicity of fixed points is
lost and at least one eigenvalue of the Jacobian evaluated at the fixed point crosses the unit circle in the
complex plane.
Local bifurcations in a system like Eq. (A 2.34) which depends on one parameter is always connected
with one real eigenvalue or a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues. Interestingly, they can completely be
characterized in a reduced one- or two-dimensional space even when the underlying system is originally
defined in a higher dimensional state space. This is guaranteed by the ‘centre manifold theorem’ which
involves quite technical details beyond the scope of this discussion.87 Thus, in the following, our brief
discussion about possible types of bifurcations can be reduced to a one- or two-dimensional setting. More
precisely, at the bifurcation value, three different types of bifurcation can generally occur:
• If an eigenvalue becomes +1, either a ‘fold bifurcation’ or a ‘transcritical bifurcation’ will be created
with a pair of fixed points, one of which is stable and the other unstable; or a ‘pitchfork bifurcation’
occurs in which two additional fixed points are created.
• If an eigenvalue becomes −1, a ‘period-doubling’ or ‘flip bifurcation’ will be created with two addi-
tional fixed points.
• If a pair of complex eigenvalues reach the unit circle, a ‘Hopf bifurcation’ or ‘Neimark-Sacker bifur-
cation’ occurs, in which an invariant circle with periodic or quasi-periodic dynamics is created.
Let us now consider these types of bifurcation in further detail.
86A fixed point of a system of differential equations is ‘hyperbolic’ if the Jacobian matrix evaluated at that point
has no zero or purely imaginary eigenvalues (i.e., no eigenvalue has a real part equal to zero).
87For an introduction to this concept we can refer to Medio and Lines (2001, Section 5.2). A more elaborated
and formal description can be found in Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983).
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Fold, Transcritical and Pitchfork Bifurcation
If in a system like Eq. (A 2.34) at a critical parameter value αc an eigenvalue of the Jacobian evaluated at
the fixed point x∗ is equal to +1, a fold, a transcritical or a pitchfork bifurcation occur. A ‘fold bifurcation’
is characterized by the fact that for α > αc two fixed points exist (one stable and one unstable) while
for α decreasing through αc these fixed points, at first, collapse (exactly at α = αc) and then dissappear.
The fold bifurcation phenomenon is said to be a ‘discontinuous’ or ‘catastrophic’ bifurcation since the
bifurcation point signifies the endpoint of the stable branch. Thus the fold bifurcation is useful in order to
find parameter ranges in which equilibrium points exist. Contrastingly, a bifurcation is called ‘continuous’
if there is a continuous path on the stable branch through a bifurcation point. Such a bifurcation is
the ‘transcritical bifurcation’. No fixed points appear or disappear at the critical value αc, but only the
stability properties change among each other, i.e., the stable branch becomes unstable and the unstable
one becomes stable.
A ‘pitchfork bifurcation’ generates both appearance and disappearance of fixed points as well as changes
in their stability properties. Precisely, in addition to the fixed points (x∗ = 0, α) two further (non-trivial)
branches of fixed points emerge which are only located on one side of the critical value αc. If the non-trivial
fixed points appear for α > αc the bifurcation is called a ‘supercritical’ pitchfork bifurcation, otherwise,
if the nontrivial equilibria exist for α < αc, the pitchfork bifurcation is called ‘subcritical’. Obviously,
supercritical pitchfork bifurcations are continuous bifurcations while subcritical pitchfork bifurcations are
discontinuous ones. Figure A 2.1 illustrates the qualitative change of the behavior of the fixed points at
the critical value αc for the three types of bifurcations in a ‘bifurcation diagram’ (see Appendix A 2.12 for
details) which is simply a plot of the fixed points in the (α, x)-plane.
fold bifurcation
α
x
α=αc
(a) fold bifurcation
transcritical bifurcation
α
x
α=αc
(b) transcritical bifurcation
(supercritical) pitchfork bifurcation
α
x
α=αc
(c) (supercritical) pitchfork bifurca-
tion
Figure A 2.1: Fold, transcritical and pitchfork bifurcation. The equilibrium value x∗ is plotted against the
bifurcation parameter α. The left panel shows a fold bifurcation. Two fixed points occur for α > αc, whereas for
a transcritical bifurcation the number of fixed points do not change (middle panel). The right panel reveals that
the shape of the bifurcation diagram of a pitchfork bifurcation gives this bifurcation type its name. In all diagrams,
stable fixed points are represented as a solid curve (stable branch) whereas unstable fixed points are plotted as a
dashed curve (unstable branch).
One further remark should be added at this point. Of course, necessary and sufficient conditions for
these bifurcation types to exist can easily be derived for one-parameter families of systems like Eq. (A 2.34)
in an analytic form by taking into account mainly the first three derivatives of G with respect to xn and
α (or combinations of them), evaluated at the fixed point and the critical parameter value. The explicit
form of these conditions (and also those for bifurcation types mentioned below) can be found in Medio
and Lines (2001) or Gandolfo (1997).
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Flip Bifurcation
A ‘flip bifurcation’ emerges when a real eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix calculated at the equilibrium
point goes through minus one.88 In this case, the non-zero fixed point loses its stability and a stable
period-2 cycle appears. Flip bifurcations and pitchfork bifurcations can easily be confused. Indeed, the flip
bifurcation of the map G corresponds to a pitchfork bifurcation for the map G ◦G = G2, i.e., G composed
with itself. Typically, the period-doubling phenomenon continues when the bifurcation parameter α is
further increased and the period-2 cycle of the map G loses its stability through a flip bifurcation of the
map G3. Thus period-4, period-8, period-16, etc. cycles occur step by step, which is often called a ‘route
to chaos’ since at some time an infinite number of periodic orbits with periods equal to 2k, k ∈ N+ appear
where all of them are unstable.
Neimark-Sacker Bifurcation
A ‘Neimark-Sacker Bifurcation’ or (‘Hopf bifurcation’ for maps) appears when a pair of complex conjugate
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at a fixed point of a map have modulus one.89 This might be the case
for both maps and flows. For flows, periodic solutions occur near the bifurcation value of the parameter α.
The dynamics of the system near to the bifurcation point is characterized by the eminent ‘Hopf-Theorem’
in which the conditions of stability of the periodic orbits are stated. An analogous theorem for maps also
exists. The ‘Neimark-Sacker-Theorem’ proves that, under certain assumptions, invariant circles exist in a
neighborhood of the critical parameter value, i.e., at the bifurcation point, bifurcating from the fixed point
x∗ and enclosing it. For further details about these extremely demanding theorems once again we refer
to the textbooks on nonlinear dynamics and bifurcation theory mentioned earlier in this chapter and the
even more specialized references given therein.
A 2.12 Excursion IV: Numerical Analysis in Nonlinear Dynamics
Theoretical analysis of nonlinear dynamics is frequently restricted to determining (the stability of) fixed
points and the corresponding first bifurcation points in ‘concise’ (or ‘manageable’) regions of the system.
However, for higher-dimensional systems and more complicated problems as subsequent bifurcations of
higher-order cycles, the analytical tractability of such systems comes rapidly close to its limits. In this
case, numerical simulations might give further insights into the behavior of the system. One easy procedure
is to plot the state variable xn for a certain choice of the parameter α in a (xn+1, xn)-plane.
90 Such a plot
is called a ‘phase diagram’ or ‘return map’.
A more systematic, numerical technique for finding stable cycles is very often preferable. A ‘bifurcation
diagram’ plots the long-term behavior of the dynamic system as a multivalued function of a parameter.
More precisely, such a diagram is obtained by plotting e.g., 200,000 points of an orbit (after a transient of
e.g., 5000 periods) for uniformly drawn parameter values from the parameter interval under consideration.
Thus the horizontal axis represents the parameter while the vertical axis represents higher iterates Gn(x0)
of a specific initial point x0, so that the diagram shows the limiting behavior of the orbit starting with x0.
Although phase diagrams and bifurcation diagrams are simple numerical techniques, they reveal already
a lot of information about the global behavior of a dynamic system. For instance, an infinite sequence
88For this bifurcation type, there is no analogon for corresponding flows, i.e., for one-parameter families of
continuous-time systems. However, the case of an eigenvalue passing through +1 for maps is analogous to the
case for flows, in which the eigenvalue goes through zero.
89In this case the system of difference equations have to have at least two dimensions (i.e., two independent state
variables).
90For the sake of simplicity we still assume the simple case of xn+1 = G(xn;α) where xn, α ∈ R.
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of period doubling leading eventually to chaotic dynamics can easily be discovered in such numerical
simulations as is well known for the so-called logistic map. However, further numerical tools should be
applied to analyze whether strange attractors arise as might be suggested by the phase and bifurcation
diagrams. In this connection, a quantitative tool to diagnose the presence of ‘sensitive dependence on
initial conditions’ (SDIC), and thereby of chaoticity, would be particularly useful. However, this can be
provided by the numerical computation of the Lyapunov characteristic exponents, which will be outlined
in the next subsubsections. Since this concept of Lyapunov is of particular importance in the analysis of
nonlinear dynamics, a more general treatment of the theory described in continuous-time is outlined first.
Afterwards, we will restrict our more practical considerations to the largest Lyapunov exponent in the
discrete-time case.
Lyapunov Characteristic Exponents
For almost 40 years, the investigation of the spectrum of Lyapunov characteristic exponents (LCEs) has
been one of the most useful tools for detecting and quantifying chaos in nonlinear dynamic systems or
experimental time series. While at first many papers on LCE came predominantly from physics and math-
ematics (see Oseledec (1968); Benettin, Froeschle and Scheidecker (1979); Benettin, Galgani, Giorgilli and
Strelcyn (1980); Shimada and Nagashima (1979); Wolf, Swift, Swinney and Vastano (1985); Eckmann and
Ruelle (1985)), in recent years the research in the calculation of LCEs has also become popular in economics
and has led to a significant increase in work published on LCEs (see Bajo-Rubio, Ferna´ndez-Rodr´ıguez and
Sosvilla-Rivera (1992); Dechert and Genc¸ay (1992); Eckmann, Oliffson Kamphorst, Ruelle and Scheinkamp
(1988); Frank, Genc¸ay and Stengos (1988); Frank and Stengos (1988); Bask (1996, 2002)). For instance,
since the LCEs of an unknown dynamic system cannot be derived straightforwardly from pure observa-
tions, a great effort has been made to improve Lyapunov exponent algorithms and to establish a statistical
framework for testing chaotic dynamics via Lyapunov exponents by both physicists and economists (see
Wolf et al. (1985); Brown, Bryant and Abarbanel (1991); Abarbanel, Brown and Kennel (1992); Abarbanel,
Brown, Sidorowich and Tsmiring (1993); Rosenstein, Collins and De Luca (1993); Genc¸ay (1996); Bask
and Genc¸ay (1998)).91
The Lyapunov characteristic exponents measure the average exponential rate of divergence or con-
vergence of nearby orbits in the phase space. The idea of this concept can be easily illustrated for a
one-dimensional nonlinear system. Consider two points x and xˆ in the phase space P which are arbitrarily
close to each other and determine their distance, d0. Applying a flow φt to both of these points leads to
trajectories x(t) and xˆ(t) respectively. Then, the ratio between their current distance dt and their initial
distance d0 can be expressed in terms of e
λt, where λ indicates the rate of divergence (or convergence).
If λ eventually converges to a limit for t → ∞, this limit will be called the ‘Lyapunov characteristic ex-
ponent’ (LCE).92 Obviously, a positive limit of the LCE implies that orbits which are initially close to
each other eventually diverge, while a negative LCE means that the nearby orbits stay close to each other
when the system evolves over time. Hence, in other words, since nearby orbits can generally be identified
with almost identical states, the Lyapunov exponents quantitatively characterize the sensitive dependence
on initial conditions of the dynamic system. As a consequence, a system in which at least one positive
Lyapunov exponent can be determined is said to be chaotic, where the (positive) exponent reflects the
time scale on which the dynamics of the system become unpredictable.
91For dynamic systems whose equations of motions are explicitly available there is a straightforward procedure
for determining a complete set of LCE (see Benettin et al. (1980); Shimada and Nagashima (1979)).
92In the case of a higher-dimensional system multiple LCEs can be determined. See the discussion below for
details.
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More precisely, the general theory of LCEs can briefly be outlined as follows.93 Let
x˙ = f(x) , x ∈ Rn (A 2.35)
be a system of ordinary differential equations and let φt : P → R
n be the corresponding flow, where
P ⊂ Rn is the phase space of the system.94 The solution of the system can be written as
x(t) = φt(x0) ,
where x0 is the initial condition of Eq. (A 2.35) and φt is taken as a map which describes the time-t-
evolution of all phase points. To quantify the evolution of the rate of change in the distance of initially
nearby points x, xˆ ∈ P (when applying the flow φt to these points), the first variation of the orbit is
considered, which can be formulated analytically by a set of non-autonomous linear differential equations,
namely
δx˙ =
∂f
∂x
[φt(x0)] δx . (A 2.36)
Note that the matrix
∂f
∂x
(x) =
„
∂fi
∂xj
«
, i, j = 1, . . . , n (A 2.37)
is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at x. Denoting the Jacobian in Eq. (A 2.37) by Dxf the solution of
Eq. (A 2.36) is given by
δx(t) = Dx0φt(x0) δx0 . (A 2.38)
Hence, in other words, the time-dependent matrix B(t) ≡ Dx0φt(x0) satisfies the matrix differential
equation
d
dt
B(t) = A(t)B(t)
where A(t) ≡ Dx0f [φt(x0)], which is simply a ‘variational equation’ with a matrix A(t) representing the
action of the vector field f for small displacements along δx0.
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The solution of Eq. (A 2.36) can also be written more compactly by using the notion of the ‘fundamental
matrix’ which is defined in the case of Eq. (A 2.36) as
U tx ≡ Dxφt(x) =
∂φt
∂x
(x) ,
where the following chain rule holds96
U t+sx0 = U
t
φt(x0) ◦ U
s
x0 .
Then, Eq. (A 2.38) can be written in terms of the fundamental matrix by
δx(t) = U tx0δx0 ,
where δx0 is a initial deviation at t = 0. Obviously, the asymptotic property of a small deviation is
determined by the asymptotic property of the fundamental, time-varying matrix U tx0 for t →∞. Now, it
can be shown that the asymptotic behavior of the fundamental matrix for t→∞ can be characterized by
the following exponents (see Shimada and Nagashima (1979) and references given therein)
λ(Ek, x0) = lim
t→∞
1
t
ln
‖U tx0e1 ∧ U
t
x0e2 ∧ . . . ∧ U
t
x0ek‖
‖e1 ∧ e2 ∧ . . . ∧ ek‖
(A 2.39)
93For the following discussion see Shimada and Nagashima (1979) and Medio and Gallo (1992).
94For technical reasons φt is also assumed to be measure preserving due to a probability measure µ on the phase
space P .
95Note that Dx0φt(x0) is the tangent (linearized) mapping at x0 of the nonlinear map φt, which maps the tangent
space Tx0P onto Tφt(x0)P , which is generally not equal to Tx0P .
96See Oseledec (1968) for details.
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for k = 1, 2, . . . , n, where Ek is a k-dimensional subspace in the tangent space Tx0P at x0, {e1, . . . , ek} is a
set of bases of Ek, ∧ is an exterior product (so-called ‘wedge product’) and ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm (or,
more generally, a norm with respect to some Riemannian metric) on Tx0P .
97 More concretely, the expres-
sion in the logarithmic function on the right-hand side of equation Eq. (A 2.39) can be interpreted as the
volume of a k-dimensional parallelepiped in the tangent space along the orbit starting in x0. Consequently,
λ(Ek, x0) is the expansion rate of this geometric object and is called ‘k-dimensional Lyapunov exponent’.
Furthermore, from this definition it can be concluded that λ(Ek, x0) only depends on the k-dimensional
subspace Ek and not on both the choice of a set of bases and the choice of norms. Note that the proof of
the existence of the limit in Eq. (A 2.39) for µ-almost all points x ∈ P is a crucial and demanding task
and has been performed by Oseledec (1968) under rather general conditions.
It is worth mentioning that an interesting relation between k-dimensional Lyapunov exponents and
their one-dimensional counterparts exists. Let λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λn be the no more than n distinct values
of the 1-dimensional exponent λ(E1, x). Then it can be shown that for a set of bases {e1, . . . , ek} chosen
at random in the tangent space TxP , the k-dimensional exponents λ(E
k, x) can be expressed by the sum
of the k largest LCEs of order one, i.e.,
λ(Ek, x) = λ1 + . . .+ λk .
However, this can also be reversed. Each LCE of order k can be connected to any k-sum of certain 1-
dimensional LCEs if k linear independent vectors wi ∈ E
k are chosen appropriately. The latter means
that in the case of n = 3, for instance,
• λ(e1, x) may take one of the values in {λ1, λ2, λ3},
• λ(e2, x) may take one of the values in {(λ1 + λ2), (λ1 + λ3), (λ2 + λ3)} and
• λ(e3, x) may take the value (λ1 + λ2 + λ3).
So far we have considered the most general case in the theory of LCEs in which orbits are not necessarily
periodic. To get a better and more intuitively understanding of the concept of LCEs, we will hereafter
restrict our considerations to 1-dimensional LCEs, i.e., LCEs of a vector98 and consider the particular case
of a periodic orbit with periodicity τ again. Then, Dx0φτ (x0) is a linear map on the tangent space Tx0P
onto itself and can be written as a matrix eAτ , where A is a (n × n)-matrix with constant coefficients.
Assume that this matrix has n independent eigenvectors u1, . . . , un with corresponding eigenvalues ζ1 . . . , ζn
which obey the property |ζ1| ≥ . . . ≥ |ζn| and let λi ≡ τ
−1 ln |ζi|. This directly implies that
‖Dx0φkτ (x0)ui‖
‖w‖
≃ eλikτ , i = 1, . . . , n .
Then, for a vector w with nonvanishing component along u1 it follows asymptotically for large t that
‖Dx0φt(x0)w‖
‖w‖
≃ eλ1t
in the sense that
lim
t→∞
1
t
ln
‖Dx0φt(x0)w‖
‖w‖
= λ1(x0, w) ≡ λmax . (A 2.40)
97Some further remarks might be useful. Note, that Ek ≡ span{e1, . . . , ek}, i.e., the space which is spanned by
all linear combinations of the vectors e1, . . . , ek. Without going into detail beyond the scope of this discussion, the
wedge product ∧ is a mathematical object related to the domain of differential forms and can be used to calculate
determinants and volumes of parallelepipeds. For further reading we can refer to standard textbooks on multilinear
algebra and tensor calculus.
98Note that 1-dimensional LCEs are also known as ‘LCEs of order one’.
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λmax is called the (largest) ‘Lyapunov characteristic exponent of vector w’. Obviously, as long as at least
the largest eigenvalue ζ1 is positive, one is faced with asymptotic exponential divergence of initially nearby
orbits and in this case, the periodic orbit is unstable. Of course, in the one-dimensional case with only one
single LCE this coincides with the motivation given at the beginning of this excursion, where the variation
of distances between points under the dynamic process in time has been considered. As a last remark, in
principle, all other LCEs can be derived in a similar manner. For further reading consult Benettin et al.
(1979) and Medio and Gallo (1992).
LCE for Discrete Maps
First, we discuss the concept of LCEs for the simplest case, i.e., a one-dimensional setting in discrete
time.99 Consider the difference equation
xn+1 = G(xn) , xn ∈ R , n ∈ N
with f : U → R, U being an open subset of R and f is continuously differentiable. After n iterations, two
initially nearby points x0 and xˆ0 are separated according to
xˆn − xn = G
n(xˆ0)−G
n(x0)
≈
»
d
dx
(Gn)(x0)
–
(xˆ0 − x0) , (A 2.41)
where a Taylor expansion around xˆ0 = x0 is used in the second step and G
n is the composition of G with
itself n times. Applying the chain rule of differentiation on (d/dx)(Gn)(x0) yields
d
dx
(Gn)(x0) =
d
dx
G(xn−1) ·
d
dx
G(xn−2) · . . . ·
d
dx
G(x0) , (A 2.42)
where xi = G
i(x0). Assuming that all factors of the right-hand side of Eq. (A 2.42) are of comparable
size, (d/dx)(Gn) should grow (or decay) exponentially with n. Since the same is true for |xˆn − xn|, i.e.,
|xˆn − xn| ∼ e
nλ(x0)|xˆ0 − x0| ,
the average rate of growth can be defined as
λ(x0) = lim
n→∞
1
n
ln
˛˛˛
˛ ddxG(xn−1) · ddxG(xn−2) · . . . · ddxG(x0)
˛˛˛
˛
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1X
j=0
ln
˛˛˛
˛ ddxG(xj)
˛˛˛
˛ ,
where λ(x0) is the (single) Lyapunov characteristic exponent for a one-dimensional map. Note that for
periodic orbits of period k, k > 1, the corresponding LCE is given by
λ(x0) = ln
˛˛˛
˛∂Gk(x∗)∂xn
˛˛˛
˛ ,
where x∗ is any periodic point and which can be interpreted as the eigenvalue of the matrix D(Gk)(x∗).
If x∗ is stable, then |(∂Gk(x∗))/(∂xn)| < 1 and the LCE λ(x0) becomes negative.
The generalization to the multi-dimensional case is straightforward. Consider
xn+1 = G(xn) , xn ∈ R
m , n ∈ N ,
where G : U → Rm, U being a subset of Rm. Then, the derivative (d/dx)(Gn) in Eq. (A 2.41) has to be
replaced by the Jacobian matrix D(Gn), where
D(Gn)(x0) = DG(x0)DG(x1) . . .DG(xn−1)
99See Eckmann and Ruelle (1985) and Medio and Lines (2001) for the following discussion.
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with xi = G
i(x0) and DG(xi) = (∂Gk/∂xl,i), k, l = 1, . . .m, i = 0, . . . , n − 1. Then, analogous to
continuous-time case (see Eq. (A 2.40)) the LCEs of the vector w are defined as
λ(x0, w) = lim
n→∞
1
n
‖D(Gn)(x0)w‖
‖w‖
= lim
n→∞
1
n
‖
Qn−1
i=0 DG(xi)w‖
‖w‖
,
where the matrix D(Gn)(x0) describes how the vector w will be stretched or contracted (and rotated)
by the action of the map G. Assume, without loss of generality, ‖w‖ = 1 and adopting the vector norm
‖·‖ = (., .)
1
2 , where (., .) denotes the scalar product operation, the image of w under the matrix D(Gn)(x0)
is given by
‖D(Gn)(x0)w‖ =
“
D(Gn)(x0)w,D(G
n)(x0)
” 1
2
=
“
wT
h
(D(Gn)(x0))
TD(Gn)(x0)
i
w
” 1
2
where the square root can be taken since the matrix within the square brackets is positive
definite. Hence the average rate of stretching (or contraction) per iteration step is given by`
wT
ˆ
(D(Gn)(x0))
TD(Gn)(x0)
˜
w
´1/(2n)
and thus the eigenvalues of the matrix
Ψ(x0) = lim
n→∞
h
(D(Gn)(x0))
TD(Gn)(x0)
i 1
2n
(A 2.43)
are called the ‘Lyapunov characteristic numbers’ and their logarithms the ‘Lyapunov characteristic expo-
nents’ provided that the limit in Eq. (A 2.43) exists.
LCEs and the Ergodic Approach
So far, the question of how or even whether the LCEs depend on the initial conditions has been left
out. Indeed, in all formulas of LCEs the initial condition x(0) = x0 has always been treated as a further
parameter. To answer this question, dynamic systems have to be reconsidered from a slightly different,
non-geometrical perspective. The ‘ergodic approach’ is based on the concept of measures and investigates
the statistical properties of ensembles of orbits. Since an introduction to this approach would go beyond
the scope of this chapter, only a few main results according to LCEs are quoted here. For a more detailed
discussion on that topic we can refer again to Medio and Lines (2001, Chapter 9).
Roughly speaking, elementary mathematical concepts from measure theory, such as measure space,
measurable maps, measure preserving maps, invariant measures, are applied to the analysis of dynamic
systems. In this context, the ‘ergodic measures’, a special class of invariant measures, play a crucial role
since they guarantee that the average of a certain property of a system calculated along a certain, randomly
chosen history of the system is a typical representative of the averages evaluated over most of the other
possible histories.
With respect to the determination of LCEs, two results should be stated now. In the simple case of a
one-dimensional map preserving a measure µ with µ being ergodic, it can be shown that the LCE is given
by
λ = lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1X
i=0
ln
˛˛˛
˛ ddxG[Gi(x0)]
˛˛˛
˛ =
Z
ln
˛˛˛
˛ ddxG[Gi(x0)]
˛˛˛
˛µ(dx) ,
where the integral is taken over the state space. Obviously, in this case the LCE no longer depend on the
initial condition x0.
For a multi-dimensional analogous result much more effort has to be made. Again, I will only quote
the result established in the eminent theorem by Oseledec (1968), which is known as the ‘multiplicative
Appendix to Chapter 2 100
ergodic theorem’ and states that for a diffeomorphism G : M →M preserving a measure µ, and M being
a m-dimensional manifold, the limit
λ(x,w) = lim
n→∞
1
n
‖D(Gn)(x)w‖ ,
where w is a vector in the tangent space at x and ‖w‖ = 1, exists for µ-almost all points x ∈ M .
Furthermore, λ(x,w) takes s ≤ m different values and, if µ is ergodic, the λs are µ-almost everywhere
constant, i.e., they do not depend on initial conditions (modulo sets of µ-measure zero).
Hence, in both cases given above, we can speak about the LCE(s) of the map G with respect to the
G-invariant measure µ.
A Practical Procedure to Derive the Largest LCE
Apart from few specific cases, the LCEs of a nonlinear map (or a flow) cannot be calculated analytically and
therefore numerical procedures have to be utilized. There are several numerical methods to compute LCEs
more or less accurately and efficiently.100 Indeed, in principle, Eq. (A 2.43) provides a passable procedure
to calculate the whole spectrum of LCEs for maps by iteration. However, in practice, the implementation
of this method causes some problems as stated in Brown et al. (1991):
The only problem in implementing this [see Eq. (A 2.43)] comes from the ill-conditioned nature
of the matrices DfK [in our notation: D(Gn)(x0)], but with care this can be handled. [...]
Furthermore, in applications the determination of LCEs mostly aims to detect chaotic attractors which
coincide with the presence of at least one positive LCE in both discrete and continuous-time systems.
Therefore, a method to compute the largest LCE of the whole spectrum of them is, for the most part,
completely sufficient. Moreover, its determination is comparatively simple since almost any arbitrary vector
will have some components in the direction of the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue.
Hence the quantity
λmax(x0) = lim
n→∞
1
n
ln ‖D(Gn)(x0)w‖
should provide a good approximation of the largest LCE, where w is chosen at random.
In the following, I want to briefly give a ‘recipe’ to compute the largest LCE for discrete-time nonlinear
systems in n dimensions as we will use it in the remainder parts of this thesis (see Wagner (2003), i.e.,
private communication with F. Wagner). Consider the map
x1,n+1 = G1(xn;α) ,
... (A 2.44)
xm,n+1 = Gm(xn;α)
with m ∈ N, α ∈ R and G : U → Rm, U being an open subset of Rm.
Step 1: If possible, choose the initial condition of the system so that the orbit starting in x0 is
taken from the attractor under consideration.
Step 2: Discard the first 500 iteration steps of the system.
Step 3: Then compute in each subsequent iteration step the Jacobian matrix
Sik(xn) =
∂Gi
∂xk |xn
, 1 < i, k < m
evaluated at xn for the next N (e.g., N=5000) iterations.
100For some general remarks consult Medio and Gallo (1992) and Medio and Lines (2001). For a more detailed
discussion about that topic see also Abarbanel et al. (1993).
Appendix to Chapter 2 101
Step 4: In each single iteration step compute
φn = S(xn)φn−1 , n ∈ N
+ ,
where φn is a m-dimensional vector with φ0 chosen at random.
101
Step 5: After the last iteration stepN the largest LCE of the system can approximately be calculated
as
λmax =
1
2N
ln |φN |
2 =
1
2N
ln
`
φ21,N + . . .+ φ
2
m,N
´
,
where, in general, λmax should not depend on the initial condition x0 as long as x0 is chosen from
the underlying attractor.
Step 6: To determine a whole set of largest LCE for different values of a model parameter α (see
Eq. (A 2.44)) Steps 1–5 have to be repeated for all different αs. In practice, one often starts with
a lower bound α1 for the parameter α and increases in each experiment α by a certain step width,
e.g., by 0.0001, up to an upper bound α2.
To close this excursion, I want to summarize the different types of attractors with respect to the sign
patterns of their LCEs. While for fixed points, all LCEs have to be negative, periodic orbits (limit cycles)
have one LCE equal to zero. A torus can emerge only in at least 3-dimensional phase space where the
number of LCEs equal to zero coincides with the dimension of the torus. Finally in the case of strange
or chaotic attractors at least one LCE has to be positive which, is conversely also very often used as one
working definition for the phenomenon of chaotic motion. These findings are also summarized in Table
A 2.1.
Type of Attractor Sign Pattern of LCEs
fixed points (−, . . . ,−)
limit cycles (0,−, . . . ,−)
T n torus (0,−, 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-times
,− . . . ,−)
strange or chaotic attractor (+, . . . ,+, 0,− . . . ,−)
Table A 2.1: Sign patterns of LCEs to classify different types of attractors.
101Note that φn =
ˆQn
k=1 S(xk)
˜
φ0 for n ∈ N+ where n is the current iteration step of the simulation run.
Part Two
Two Nonlinear Stationary Models of Asset Return
Chapter 3
The Chiarella-He (CH) Model with a Power Utility
Function
3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines a simple asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents proposed by
C. Chiarella and X.-Z. He1 and investigates how the dynamics of the model is affected by
allowing the agents to have different attitudes towards risk, which is characterized by the risk-
aversion coefficient in their utility function. It directly builds on the original publication and
borrows some of its structure as well as most of the notation. This analysis is inspired by another
work published by the same authors (see Chiarella and He, 2002c), in which they pursue the same
idea within the framework of the asset pricing model proposed by Brock and Hommes (1998).
The Chiarella-He (CH) model is based on both the asset pricing framework of the BH model
established in Brock and Hommes (1998) and the LLS model established in Levy et al. (1994,
1995), which have been both extensively reviewed in the first part of this thesis. Both models
consider heterogeneous economic agents who are faced with a standard asset allocation problem
in each trading period. The heterogeneity of agents is expressed in terms of them having different
expectations of future price movements on the risky asset. Brock and Hommes developed a financial
market as an ‘Adaptive Belief System’ (ABS), where agents can permanently choose between
different predictors or expectation functions for the future values of endogenous variables based on
their past performance as measured by realized profits (see Brock and Hommes, 1997a, 1998). In
the LLS model, however, agents are initially arranged in different strategy groups and constrained
to stay within their strategy group during the whole trading process. Another key difference
between these two models concerns the asset price and wealth processes. As a result of different
types of utility functions, the time series of the asset price in the BH model is different from the
time series in the LLS model. In the BH model the time series of the asset price is stationary
and the fundamental price equilibrium can be examined analytically. Furthermore, the resulting
nonlinear dynamic system can be characterized in terms of equilibrium equations which determine
the current endogenous variables of the system. Contrastingly, both price and wealth processes
grow over time in the LLS model, which is, of course, fairly consistent with observations made
in real financial markets. Therefore, the dynamic system in this model can only be analyzed by
numerical simulations, which is somewhat unsatisfying as it gives few insights into the underlying
1See Chiarella and He (2001).
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structure responsible for the more realistic time series (see Chapter 2, Sections 2.1 and 2.3 for
details).
The CH model is useful in that it combines the analytical tractability of the BH model with
some of the more realistic assumptions of the LLS model. The main idea of the CH model is
to formulate the resulting (non-stationary) growth model, which stems from the more realistic
underlying CRRA utility function taken from the LLS model, in terms of the return on the risky
asset and the wealth proportion among heterogeneous investors, instead of describing it in terms
of the price and the investors’ total wealth. This change in the state variables reduces the growth
model to a stationary model, which is a crucial step for the non-numerical analysis of the dynamics.
In the case of heterogeneous agents, grouped as fundamentalists and chartists, the arising dynamics
of the stationary model exhibits multiple steady states whose local stability mainly depends on
the extrapolation rate of the chartists. Furthermore, the convergence to the steady state follows a
‘market selection principle’, which states that the return and wealth proportions tend to converge
to the steady state, where a relatively higher return can be obtained.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate how the dynamic system of the CH model is influenced
by the relative risk attitudes of different trader types. More precisely, my approach is to take
the framework of Chiarella and He and to introduce one further parameter to characterize the
investors’ degree of risk aversion. This is done by replacing the CRRA logarithmic utility function
with the more general CRRA power utility function which includes the logarithmic utility function
as a special case. I will then seek to determine the robustness of their findings given changes in
the relative risk-aversion coefficient.
The link between differing attitudes towards risk and various types of investors has been high-
lighted in earlier literature. A prominent example is the discussion about the ‘smart money’
investors and ‘noise traders’ in De Long et al. (1990), who show that (irrational) noise traders
can gain higher returns than risk-averse rational traders if the noise traders are willing to bear a
higher amount of risk than their sophisticated counterparts. Further discussion of this topic can
be seen in Black (1986); Campbell and Kyle (1993); Miller (1977); Poterba and Summers (1988)
and Summers (1986). However, the precise way in which the risk attitude of investors affects the
dynamics of asset prices has not received a great deal of attention in economic literature. Neverthe-
less, in the case of the BH model, such an investigation has been carried out (see Chiarella and He,
2002c) and has produced some interesting results. For instance, assuming that fundamentalists are
relatively more risk-averse than their chartist counterparts, the dynamics of the system becomes
unstable and leads to complicated dynamics even to the point of chaotic behavior, which cannot
be detected if all traders are assumed to have identical risk-aversion coefficients. Hence allowing
for different risk preferences among the agents enriches the dynamics of the system and exhibits
some significant differences in the resulting dynamic behavior.
A discussion about relevant functional forms commonly used in the expected utility framework
can be found in Levy et al. (2000) and the references given therein. It also gives some justification
for the chosen type favored in this chapter. In summary, empirical and experimental studies
confirm that utility functions of the DARA type2 dominate within all possible characterizations of
2See Chapter 1, Appendix A 1.3 for a definition.
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investor’s preferences in terms of absolute risk measure (see Arrow, 1971; Friend and Blume, 1975;
Gordon, Paradis and Rorke, 1972; Kroll, Levy and Rapoport, 1988; Latane´, 1959; Hakansson, 1971;
Markowitz, 1976; Levy, 1994). Regarding the relative risk-aversion measures, most studies support
the CRRA type assumption (see Latane´, 1959; Hakansson, 1971; Markowitz, 1976; Levy, 1994),
although the agreement is not as complete as in the case of the absolute measure.3 Nevertheless,
these findings should be treated with care. It should be noted that there is a basic problem
with testing absolute and relative risk aversion by empirical analysis. As outlined in Chapter 1,
Appendix A 1.3 different analytic forms of utility functions imply different demand functions, which
generally depend on the investor’s current wealth. In other words, the amount (or proportion) of
wealth invested in the risky asset4 might change when the investors’ wealth increases. This means
that, in order to achieve an accurate testing procedure, the investment behavior of the same
investor has to be examined at various levels of their wealth (and thus at various points of their
lifetime). Of course, these studies are hard to perform and, even if such data collections can be
generated, it is almost impossible to isolate the pure wealth effect in the investors’ investment
behavior from general changes in the investors’ preferences caused, for instance, by their growing
age or a modified perception of their current environment.5 For this reason, experimental studies
seem to be an appropriate tool to overcome those difficulties. In such laboratory experiments,
the participants can be endowed with different levels of wealth within a very short time period
by letting them play a sequential series of games, where the wealth changes from one game to
another. In spite of this advantage compared to empirical studies, only a few experiments have
been conducted on this topic in modern finance (see Gordon et al., 1972; Kroll et al., 1988; Levy
et al., 1994). As already stated above, all three studies support the DARA hypothesis, while
the CRRA type is only favored by Levy et al. (1994). This might be explained by the fact that
only the study by Levy et al. (1994) accounts for financial penalty and financial reward in their
experimental setup. For more details about the empirical and experimental studies mentioned in
this discussion, we can refer to Levy et al. (2000).
Inspired by these findings, Chiarella and He follow the approach used in the LLS framework.
They propose to let the agents derive their optimal demand for the risky asset from a CRRA utility
function rather than from a CARA mean-variance approach as originally assumed in the BH model.
As a consequence, the optimal demand function for the risky asset is no longer independent of the
agents’ wealth level (see Chapter 1, Appendix A 1.3 and Chapter 2, Section 2.1) and causes growing
price and wealth processes. Chiarella and He’s model assumes the same logarithmic utility function
for all investors. This assumption simplifies matters, and can also be supported by the findings of
H. A. Latane´6, who theoretically claims that long-run investors (i.e., investors whose investment
horizon is very long) should be characterized by a logarithmic utility function.7 In his publication
3This result seems to be in some respects consistent as the DARA assumption is a generalization of the CRRA
case. Again we can refer to Appendix A 1.3 for further explanations.
4Let us here assume a standard asset diversification problem, where the investors have to diversify their wealth
between one risky asset and one riskless asset as assumed, for instance, in the BH and the LLS model.
5Instead, cross-sectional empirical studies are very often employed, e.g., in Friend and Blume (1975).
6See Latane´ (1959).
7The idea of logarithmic preferences was introduced 200 years ago by D. Bernoulli (see Bernoulli, 1954). In
his famous publication he proposed that gamblers should evaluate bets on the basis of mathematical expectations
of the utility of winnings instead of simply deriving the mathematical expectation value of their winnings. Giving
3.2 Model Description of the Chiarella-He Model 106
he concluded that the investment strategy with the highest geometric mean is almost certain to be
more valuable than any other investment strategy in the long run. Moreover, he argued that this
result implies a logarithmic utility function. In contrast, R. C. Merton and P. A. Samuelson8
disagree with Latane´’s conclusion that many-period expected utility maximizers should maximize
the expected logarithm of portfolio outcomes. Instead, they give some counterexamples to the
assertion and argue that Latane´’s result is caused by a fallacious use of the Law of Large Numbers
(see Merton and Samuelson, 1974). They also claim that, for the power utility function, the
investment strategy is independent of the number of periods engaged in the investment, thus
contradicting Latane´’s assertion still further. Hence, this discussion might allow us to reasonably
conjecture that the assumption of the logarithmic preference of investors seems too restrictive and
must be relaxed. This can be achieved by assuming the more general power utility function, which
coincides with the logarithmic function for a relative risk aversion equal to unity. This conjecture
is also supported by experimental studies (see Gordon et al., 1972), as well as by empirical surveys
(see Friend and Blume, 1975). In both publications it is shown that the risk-aversion coefficient
falls approximately in the range of 0.6–1.07 and 1.0–2.0 respectively, which is, nevertheless, also
in harmony with the assumption of logarithmic preferences. Given these findings, the following
analysis is not only an obvious extension of the CH model which simply enlarges the dynamic
system by one additional parameter, but also a means of bringing the current model to a more
realistic level.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section gives a detailed model description of the
CH model and summarizes some crucial results from the original publication. In the subsequent
section I will implement the risk-aversion measure in the utility function of investors. Three further
sections are then dedicated to my own investigations, where I will perform an extensive analytic and
numerical study of the extended CH model under homogeneous and heterogeneous expectations
for both the deterministic and a noisy model variant. In the last section of the chapter the LLS
model is revisited (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3), but from a slightly different perspective. This will
involve the dynamic system of the CH model being investigated by numerical simulations, but
now combined with all the assumptions made in the original LLS model framework. The chapter
concludes with a summary of the results of the analysis, while the detailed proofs of the theorems
can be found in the appendix.
3.2 Model Description of the Chiarella-He Model
In this section I will present the original framework of the CH model by referring to Chiarella and
He (2001). In the first step, I will summarize all necessary assumptions for the model structure and
develop the equilibrium equation in terms of growing prices and investors’ wealth. In the second
step, I will introduce new state variables and now describe the dynamics in terms of return and
proportions of wealth. This will provide us with the basis to extend the model in the subsequent
section.
very intuitive examples, he also argued for utility measures having a logarithmic form.
8See Merton and Samuelson (1974).
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3.2.1 Development of the Growth Model
The artificial financial market consists of two investment alternatives, namely:
• one risky asset with the uncertain return
ρt =
pt + dt − pt−1
pt−1
(3.1)
at period t, where pt and dt denotes the price and the dividend of the risky asset at time t
respectively
• one risk-free asset, which realizes the constant gross return R = 1+ r at each trading period,
where r denotes the risk-free rate.
The trading periods are assumed to be mapped on an equidistant, discrete time line and investors
are allowed to rearrange their portfolios at each trading interval. As already mentioned above, all
investors are identical in their preferences towards risk, which are analytically summarized in their
utility function U(W ) = ln (W ). Following the framework of Brock and Hommes and Levy, Levy
and Solomon, the wealth of investor i at time t+ 1 can be derived by
Wi,t+1 = (1− πi,t)Wi,tR+ πi,tWi,t(1 + ρt+1)
= Wi,t[R+ πi,t(ρt+1 − r)] , (3.2)
where πi,t denotes the proportion of wealth of agent i invested in the risky asset at time t.
9
The demand equation for the risky asset is assumed to be determined by a Walrasian scenario.
Thus we assume that each trader is a price taker and that the market finds the price pt that
equates the sum of investors’ demand to supply. In other words, at each trading period t all
investors treat the price pt as fixed when solving their optimization problem to determine the
investment proportion πi,t. As the investors’ wealth at time t+1 is an uncertain variable provided
that the price of the risky asset is not revealed for the current trading period t, the investors
have to form expectations about their wealth based on the currently available information set It,
which is given by It = {pt−1, pt−2, . . . ; dt, dt−1, . . .}. Let Et and V art denote respectively the
conditional expectation and variance based on It, and let Ei,t and V ari,t denote the belief about
the conditional expectation and variance of investor i. Hence the beliefs of investor i about the
conditional expectation and variance on their wealth at time t+1 follow directly from Eq. (3.2) as
Ei,t(Wi,t+1) = Wi,t[R + πi,t(Ei,t(ρt+1)− r)] , (3.3)
V ari,t(Wi,t+1) = W
2
i,tπ
2
i,tV ari,t(ρt+1) . (3.4)
According to the standard expected-utility-of-wealth optimization scheme, each investor has to
solve the following optimization problem
max
πi,t
Ei,t[U(Wi,t+1)]
9Note that Eq. (3.2) coincides with Eq. (2.1) of the BH model in Chapter 2 by using the identity πi,t =
(Ni,tpt)/Wi,t which will be motivated below.
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at time t. Assuming that all investors believe that the asset return ρt is conditionally normally
distributed with mean Ei,t(ρt+1) and variance V ar(ρt+1), the optimal investment proportion πi,t
is given by10
πi,t =
Ei,t(ρt+1)− r
V ari,t(ρt+1)
. (3.5)
Now, heterogeneous beliefs can be introduced by making the assumption
Ei,t(ρt+1) = fi(ρt−1, . . .) , (3.6)
V ari,t(ρt+1) = gi(ρt−1, . . .) (3.7)
for i = 1, . . . , I, where I denotes the number of investors in the market and fi, gi are some
deterministic functions which can be different within the set of investors. Eq. (3.5) implies that
the optimum proportion of investment πi,t is a function of the past prices and dividends, i.e.,
11
πi,t = fct.(pt−1, pt−2, . . . ; dt, dt−1, . . .) .
To conclude this subsection, the market clearing equilibrium price has to be determined. The
number of shares that investor i wishes to hold at time t is given by the optimal investment
proportion via the equality
Ni,tpt = πi,tWi,t , (3.8)
where Ni,t denotes the number of shares investor i wishes to hold at price pt. Different to the
framework of Brock and Hommes, in this model structure agents’ optimal demand for the risky
asset does depend on their wealth level (as a result of the underlying CRRA utility function),
which has a decisive impact on the resulting dynamics of the model as we will see in the equation
following the next.12 The market clearing equilibrium price is obtained by summing the demands
of all investors and assuming a fixed supply of risky assets, denoted by N , which leads to the
following constraint
I∑
i=1
Ni,t = N .
Thus the market clearing process leads finally to the conditional equation for the equilibrium price
pt, which is given by
I∑
i=1
πi,tWi,t = Npt . (3.9)
Obviously, Eq. (3.9) shows that the equilibrium price pt and the wealth of the investors
Wt ≡ (W1,t, . . . ,WI,t)
10A heuristic explanation for the formula can be found in Appendix A 3.1. A more formal derivation of Eq. (3.5)
is given in Chiarella and He (2001).
11In this model framework the currently unrevealed price pt is not included in the conditional expectations of
the risky-asset return. Thus the construction is in harmony with the BH model, while in the LLS framework the
optimal investment proportion of each investor explicitly depends on the ‘hypothetical’ price pt, which makes the
determination of the market clearing price analytically almost unsolvable.
12For a comparison with the demand function of the investors in the framework of Brock and Hommes, see also
Eq. (A 2.4) in Chapter 2, Appendix A 2.1.
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are determined simultaneously as in real markets. Furthermore, it can be seen from Eq. (3.2) and
by the fact that dividends are paid in each trading period (which interfere via ρt) that the model
outlined above is a growth model in both the asset price and wealth, as already emphasized in the
introduction of this chapter. In Figure 3.1 a model time line summarizes the main aspects of the
Walrasian scenario.
t− 1 t t+ 1
?
ωi,t−1
6
dividend yield αt
6
trade ⇒ ρt−1
6
trade ⇒ ρt
?
maxπi,t E[U(Wi,t+1) | It]†
⇒ πi,t
?
ωi,t
?
. . .
†It = {pt−1, pt−2, . . . ; dt, dt−1, . . . ;ωi,t−1, . . .}
Figure 3.1: Model time line for the CH model under a Walrasian scenario. Some variables will be first introduced
in the following subsection. The horizontal brackets indicate that the state variables are determined at the same
point in model time. The small shifts of the state variables within the brackets should simply give the reader a hint
as to the order in which the state variables are calculated in the simulation program.
3.2.2 Stationary Formulation of the Model
In order to transform the growth model into a stationary model, Chiarella and He reformulate
the market clearing process in terms of the return ρt of the risky asset and introduce a new state
variable ωi,t, which denotes the wealth proportion of investor i at time t. Thus, instead of the
total wealth Wt of all investors which is a growing variable over time, a normalized version of a
wealth measure is used to describe the dynamics of the model, which always stays between the
fixed interval [0,1].
The analytic derivation of the dynamic system in terms of the new state variables ρt and ωi,t
is straightforward, as outlined in Chiarella and He (2001). ωi,t denotes the proportion of wealth
of investor i relative to the total wealth of all investors at time t, that is
ωi,t =
Wi,t
Wt
, where Wt =
I∑
i=1
Wi,t .
Then, using Eq. (3.2)
ωi,t+1 =
Wi,t+1
Wt+1
=
Wi,t[R + πi,t(ρt+1 − r)]
Wt+1
=
ωi,t[R+ πi,t(ρt+1 − r)]
Wt+1/Wt
.
Rewriting the denominator of the last expression as
Wt+1
Wt
=
∑I
j=1Wj,t[R+ πj,t(ρt+1 − r)]
Wt
=
I∑
j=1
ωj,t[R+ πj,t(ρt+1 − r)] (3.10)
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leads to the following equation
ωi,t+1 =
ωi,t[R+ πi,t(ρt+1 − r)]∑I
j=1 ωj,t[R + πj,t(ρt+1 − r)]
, (3.11)
which describes the evolution of the wealth proportions among the investors in terms of the return
of the risky asset.13 Now we turn to the market clearing equation. Note that from Eq. (3.9)
Npt =
I∑
i=1
πi,tWi,t =Wt
I∑
i=1
πi,tωi,t . (3.12)
Rewriting this equation for the following trading period and considering the ratio of both leads to
Wt+1
Wt
∑I
i=1 πi,t+1ωi,t+1∑I
i=1 πi,tωi,t
=
pt+1
pt
.
Now, using Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.10) and defining αt+1 ≡ dt+1/pt leads to
I∑
j=1
ωj,t[R+ πj,t(ρt+1 − r)]
∑I
i=1 πi,t+1ωi,t+1∑I
i=1 πi,tωi,t
= 1 + ρt+1 − αt+1 , (3.13)
which still depends on the wealth proportion ωi,t+1, which is somewhat unsatisfactory. Therefore,
note that the enumerator can be expressed in terms of ωi,t using Eq. (3.11), which gives
I∑
i=1
πi,t+1ωi,t+1 =
I∑
i=1
πi,t+1
{
ωi,t[R+ πi,t(ρt+1 − r)]∑I
j=1 ωj,t[R+ πj,t(ρt+1 − r)]
}
. (3.14)
Inserting Eq. (3.14) in Eq. (3.13) results in
I∑
i=1
πi,t+1ωi,t[R+ πi,t(ρt+1 − r)] = (1 + ρt+1 − αt+1)
(
I∑
i=1
πi,tωi,t
)
, (3.15)
from which the return of the risky asset ρt+1 at time t + 1 can be determined. Finally, with
Eq. (3.11) and Eq. (3.15) it has been shown that a stationary model in the return and wealth
proportions exists. This result is summarized in the following theorem, which is quoted from the
original publication of the CH model:
Theorem 3.1 (First Result taken from Chiarella and He (2001))
The wealth proportions evolve according to
ωi,t+1 =
ωi,t[R+ πi,t(ρt+1 − r)]∑I
j=1 ωj,t[R + πj,t(ρt+1 − r)]
, i = 1, . . . , I , (3.16)
where the return ρt+1 is given by
ρt+1 = r +
∑I
i=1 ωi,t[(1 + r)(πi,t − πi,t+1)− αt+1πi,t]∑I
i=1 πi,tωi,t(πi,t+1 − 1)
(3.17)
with
αt+1 =
dt+1
pt
(3.18)
13The optimum proportion of investment πi,t is also a function of the past returns, see Eq. (3.5).
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and
πi,t =
Ei,t(ρt+1)− r
V ari,t(ρt+1)
, i = 1, . . . , I .
If it is assumed that the dividend yield αt+1 follows a normal distribution with mean α0
and variance σ20 , the system Eq. (3.16),Eq. (3.17) together forms a stationary model in
the return and wealth proportion.
The homogeneous scenario can be immediately concluded from Theorem 3.1 as a special case.
Assume that all investors form the same expectations about both mean and variance about the
return of the risky asset, i.e.,
Ei,t(ρt+1) = Et(ρt+1) (3.19)
V ari,t(ρt+1) = V art(ρt+1) , i = 1, . . . , I . (3.20)
Then, according to Eq. (3.5), the optimal investment proportion at time t is the same for all the
investors, that is,
πt ≡ πi,t = Et(ρt+1)− r
V art(ρt+1)
for i = 1, . . . , I .
Therefore, we get for the resulting dynamics of (ωi,t+1, ρt+1) from Eq. (3.16) and Eq. (3.17)
ωi,t+1 =
ωi,t[R+ πt(ρt+1 − r)]∑I
j=1 ωj,t[R+ πt(ρt+1 − r)]
=
ωi,t∑I
j=1 ωj,t
= ωi,t (= ωi,0) , (3.21)
and
ρt+1 = r +
(1 + r)(πt − πt+1)− αt+1πt
πt(πt+1 − 1) (3.22)
where in both cases
∑I
i=1 ωi,t = 1 is used. The above analysis can be summarized in the following
corollary:
Corollary 3.2 (Second Result taken from Chiarella and He (2001))
Under the assumption of homogeneous expectation about mean Eq. (3.19) and variance
Eq. (3.20), the wealth proportion of each investor stays at his/her initial level Eq. (3.21),
while the return dynamics is governed by Eq. (3.22).
The Model with Representative Agents
As a second application of Theorem 3.1, consider the case where all investors can be grouped
by their view of the conditional expectation and variance of the risky asset’s return distribution.
Suppose there are h different perceptions of the mean and the variance among the investors and
let nj , j = 1, . . . , h be the fraction of investors belonging to trading group j. The fractions nj are
assumed to be fixed during the whole trading process. Thus every single investor can uniquely be
associated with one of the h different trading types and the optimal investment proportion denoted
by π¯j,t is identical within each single trading group. It is straightforward to express the system
Eq. (3.16) and Eq. (3.17) in terms of the population proportion nj . This implies that the individual
wealth level Wi,t of investor i is no longer an appropriate variable to describe the dynamics of the
system. Instead, Chiarella and He propose to consider the average wealth of each investor within
each group denoted by W¯j,t, where j = 1, . . . , h. Hence the following wealth measures have to be
distinguished in the following analysis:
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• Wi,t being the individual wealth of investor i, where i = 1, . . . , I
• W¯j,t being the average wealth of each investor within group j, where j = 1, . . . , h
• Wt being the total wealth in the market, i.e., Wt =
∑I
i=1Wi,t.
Following the line of derivation in Theorem 3.1, the average wealth proportion of trading group j
can be defined as14
ω¯j,t =
W¯j,t
W¯t
, where W¯t =
h∑
j=1
W¯j,t .
A totally analogous derivation (which is relegated to Appendix A 3.2) leads to the following
theorem:
Theorem 3.3 (Third Result taken from Chiarella and He (2001))
The dynamics of average wealth proportions evolves according to
ω¯j,t+1 =
ω¯j,t[R + π¯j,t(ρt+1 − r)]∑h
ℓ=1 ω¯ℓ,t[R+ π¯ℓ,t(ρt+1 − r)]
, j = 1, . . . , h (3.23)
with the return ρt+1 given by
ρt+1 = r +
∑h
j=1 njω¯j,t[(1 + r)(π¯j,t − π¯j,t+1)− αt+1π¯j,t]∑h
j=1 nj π¯j,tω¯j,t(π¯j,t+1 − 1)
. (3.24)
Recall that the (average) optimum wealth proportion π¯j,t is calculated according to
Eq. (3.5). If it is assumed that the dividend yield αt+1 follows a normal distribu-
tion with mean α0 and variance σ
2
0 , the system Eq. (3.23), Eq. (3.24) together forms a
stationary model.
Referring to the Representative Agent Hypothesis outlined in Chapter 1 in the first part of the
thesis, Theorem 3.3 can be read in the following way. The system Eq. (3.23) and Eq. (3.24) describe
the dynamics of h different representative investors, whose individual wealth level is given by W¯j,t.
Hence the only difference between the system Eq. (3.23), Eq. (3.24) and the system Eq. (3.16),
Eq. (3.17) of Theorem 3.1 are the weighting factors nj , which take into account the different
market power of each individual representative agent. The close connection of both theorems are
also obvious by setting h = I and nj = 1/I for j = 1, . . . , h. Then, Theorem 3.3 leads to Theorem
3.1, which is not surprising because all investors are here pursuing their own trading strategies,
which implies that every trading group consists only of one single investor. Thus each single
trading group j can be 1:1 mapped to a single investor i. In other words the average wealth W¯j,t
of each investor i within group j coincides with his/her individual wealth level denoted by Wi,t
and, therefore, it is ω¯j,t = ωi,t with investor i belonging to trading group j for all trading groups
j.
The assumption of different trading groups having fixed proportions seems unrealistic. As
proposed in the framework of Brock and Hommes (1998), traders should be allowed to adjust their
14Obviously, the average wealth proportion again adds up to unity, i.e., it is
Ph
i=j ω¯j,t = 1. However, note that
W¯t has less of an intuitive meaning, but rather serves as a normalization quantity. Nevertheless, it can be denoted
as the total average wealth (see Chiarella and He, 2001).
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trading strategies occasionally according to some performance measure or fitness function, which
would lead to an adaptive model with changing population proportions.15 Since implementing the
population proportions as endogenous state variables causes insuperable difficulties when trying
to study the model analytically (because of the highly nonlinear nature of the CH model), it
will not be considered here.16 Instead, following the approach of Chiarella and He, I will keep
the proportions of different groups fixed, since our main interest is to investigate whether certain
trading strategies will prevail over others, which is much easier to keep track of when switching
between different strategies is forbidden for the investors. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter
concentrates exclusively on the fixed proportion model as proposed in Chiarella and He (2001).
In the next section a generalized form of utility function will be introduced. What then follows
is an investigation of this enriched CH model with respect to homogeneous and heterogeneous
expectation schemes on the conditional mean and variance of return of the risky asset.
3.3 Implementation of the Risk Aversion Coefficient
The implementation of a risk-aversionmeasure (or Arrow-Pratt measure) in the utility function and
the derivation of the resulting demand function of the investors for the risky asset can be carried
out easily. Having determined the new demands πi,t (or π¯j,t in the case of trading groups), the
dynamic system is of course changed via Eq. (3.16) and Eq. (3.17) (or Eq. (3.23) and Eq. (3.24)).
In the first step, the originally assumed utility function U(W ) = ln (W ) is replaced by the
power utility function, which allows for different risk-aversion coefficients, that is17
U(W ) =
W 1−νi − 1
1− νi , i = 1, . . . , I (or indexed by j with j = 1, . . . , h) . (3.25)
Hence investors can be assumed to have different attitudes to risk, characterized by their risk-
aversion parameter νi. In general, νi can be any finite number.
18 For νi < 0 investors are risk
lovers (which might be quite unrealistic in our framework), for νi > 0 investors are risk averters,
which coincides with empirical and experimental findings briefly outlined in the introduction of
this chapter. Nevertheless, in the remainder of this chapter the risk preference parameter is not
restricted to being positive in principle although our analysis will, of course, mostly focus on positive
risk-aversion coefficients. As with the logarithmic utility function, the power utility function is also
one of the CRRA type. In fact, it coincides with the logarithmic utility function for νi = 1, which
can be shown by applying the rule of L’ Hospital.19 Thus the replacement of the utility function
simply introduces one further parameter into the CH model.
In the second step, the influence of the newly introduced risk-aversion coefficient on the optimal
15See also Chapter 2, Subsection 2.1 in the first part of the thesis for details.
16Some effort has already been made to solve this problem, albeit with slightly unsatisfactory (see Chiarella and
He, 2002a,b, 2005).
17The (standard) power utility function is often defined as U(W ) = W 1−ν/(1 − ν), which causes no difference
since preferences are invariant under linear transformations of the utility function. See Levy et al. (2000) or Chapter
1, Appendix A 1.3 in the first part of the thesis for details.
18The parameter νi is the (constant) Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion introduced in Chapter 1,
Appendix A 1.3. Indeed, a short calculation shows that RR(W ) = −W (U ′′(W )/U ′(W )) = νi. A plot of the graph
of Eq. (3.25) for different choices of risk-aversion coefficients can also be found in Chapter 1, Appendix A 1.3.
19See Chapter 1, Appendix A 1.3 for the derivation.
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investment proportion of the investors has to be considered. Keeping the assumption that all
investors believe that the asset return ρt is conditionally normally distributed with mean Ei,t(ρt+1)
and variance V ari,t(ρt+1), the optimal investment proportion πi,t is now determined by
20
πi,t =
1
νi
Ei,t(ρt+1)− r
V ari,t(ρt+1)
, (3.26)
which can be derived analogous to Eq. (3.5). Eq. (3.26) indicates that the optimal investment
proportion is inversely proportional to the risk preference parameter νi, which implies that more
risk-averse investors are willing to invest only a lower fraction of their wealth in the risky asset.
Once more, it should be stressed that the optimal demand Ni,t for the risky asset does depend on
the individual wealth level of the investor in this scenario (see Eq. (3.8)), which results from the
underlying utility function that is still of the CRRA type.
The following sections closely proceed along the line of Chiarella and He (2001) and shows an
enlarged analytical and numerical study of the homogeneous model and a heterogeneous model
with two investors. Resulting from the model framework, almost all the results of the CH model
(see Chiarella and He, 2001) can be recovered by setting the risk-aversion coefficient of investors
to ν = 1. Nevertheless, introducing the new model parameter νi gives new insights into the
behavior of the underlying model dynamics and reveals some interesting conclusions regarding the
CH model’s limitations caused by its model design, which might be less clear from the original
publication.
3.4 The Model under Homogeneous Expectations: An Analytical
Treatment
This section deals with the simplest case, which is the price and wealth dynamics under homoge-
neous preferences. First, investors’ expectation formation is concretized. Second, I will investigate
the existence of steady states for different ranges of the risk-aversion coefficient ν. Third, I will
consider the local stability properties of the steady states. As we will see that, even in the homoge-
neous case, the analytical tractability of the study rapidly attains to its boundaries, I will conduct
a numerical analysis based on computer simulations for the heterogeneous case in the following
section.
3.4.1 Specification of the Trading Strategies
It is assumed that all investors are homogeneous with respect to their risk preferences and their
expectation formation. Therefore, the investors’ beliefs about the conditional mean and variance
of the return distribution of the risky asset are formed identically among all investors as proposed
in Eq. (3.19) and Eq. (3.20). Furthermore, the deterministic functions fi and gi (see Eq. (3.6)
and Eq. (3.7)) have to be determined to enable us to perform an analytic and numerical analysis
of the model. Following Chiarella and He (2001), we assume that the common perception of the
distribution of the risky asset can be mathematically expressed as
Et(ρt+1) = r + δ + dρ¯t , (3.27)
20The calculation is relegated to the Appendix A 3.1.
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V art(ρt+1) = σ
2 , (3.28)
where δ ≥ 0 and σ2 > 0 are constants, d ∈ R and
ρ¯t =
1
L
L∑
k=1
ρt−k
with the integer L ≥ 1. In addition, it is supposed that all investors possess the same degree of
risk aversion, i.e., ν ≡ νi for i = 1, . . . , I in their utility function given by Eq. (3.25).
Assumption (3.27) indicates that for d 6= 0 the agents’ common expectation about the return
distribution mainly depends on the moving average over the past L realizations of the return. In
this case the traders are called ‘chartists’. For d > 0 the investors are further classified as ‘trend
followers’, who extrapolate the future return from the past, i.e., they believe that future returns
follow the return trend in the same direction. In contrast, ‘contrarians’ extrapolate in the reverse
direction and are thus characterized by a negative extrapolation parameter (d < 0). For d = 0,
traders are called ‘fundamentalists’. In this case, the moving average term vanishes and the first
and second term of Eq. (3.27) become decisive. Rewriting Eq. (3.27) as
Et(ρt+1)− r = δ , (3.29)
it obviously states that the excess conditional mean from the risk-free rate r is a constant term,
denoted by δ. As the excess return should compensate for the riskiness of realizing losses by
investing in the risky asset, δ is assumed to be positive. Of course, a constant excess return is
a simplified assumption. Nevertheless, the parameter δ can be motivated by a slightly different
interpretation. In principle, the current long-run return of the risky asset, e.g., derived from the
past returns, can serve as a rough estimation for the future long-run return of the asset. Then, δ
can be understood as an estimation value for the difference between the average (long-run) future
return of the risky asset and the risk-free rate of the riskless asset. Therefore, although we do
not totally share the interpretation of the parameter δ as a ‘risk premium’ (see Chiarella and He,
2001, p. 513), we keep its notation the same to avoid awkward and useless confusion. According
to Eq. (3.28), the conditional variance is assumed to be constant, which is also a simplification,
but one again caused by the need for analytical tractability.21
3.4.2 Determination of the Steady States
Under the homogeneous expectations Eq. (3.27) and Eq. (3.28), the corresponding dynamics of
the stationary model is given by Eq. (3.21) and Eq. (3.22). Chiarella and He has shown that,
depending on the extrapolation rate d, the system can have multiple fixed equilibria. Allowing for
one further degree of freedom (namely the risk-aversion coefficient) in my analysis, the following
enriched theorem can be derived, which, of course, contains the findings documented in Chiarella
and He (2001) as a special case:22
21However, note that the following chapter will present a model framework in which a time-dependent market
variance is used to describe the investors’ conditional variance of returns.
22Although the CH model is in all respects the intellectual progenitor of this work, at some marginal points we
find slightly different results as noted in Chiarella and He (2001), e.g., the determination of the upper boundary
doU,1 for d 6= 0. According to the upper and lower boundaries doU,i, doLi see also the remark in Footnote 23.
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Theorem 3.4 Let δ¯ = δ/σ2, d¯ = d/σ2. Assume Eq. (3.27) and Eq. (3.28) hold and αt = α0 > 0,
δ¯ < 1, ν 6= 0, δ¯ 6= ν.
(i) If d = 0, then the system Eq. (3.22) has a steady state
ρ∗0 = r +
α0
1− δ¯/ν (3.30)
which satisfies
(1) ρ∗0 > r + α0 for ν > δ¯ and ρ
∗
0 → +∞ as ν → δ¯+;
(2) ρ∗0 < 0 for δ¯ > ν > ν0 ≡ δ¯/(1 + α0/r) and ρ∗0 → −∞ as ν → δ¯−;
(3) r > ρ∗0 ≥ 0 for ν0 ≥ ν > 0 and ρ∗0 → r as ν → 0+;
(4) r + α0 > ρ
∗
0 > r for ν < 0 and ρ
∗
0 → r as ν → 0−, while ρ∗0 → r + α0 as ν → −∞.
(ii) If d 6= 0, then the system Eq. (3.22) has two steady states
ρ∗± =
1
2

 r + ν − δ¯
d¯
±
√[
r − ν − δ¯
d¯
]2
− 4να0
d¯

 (3.31)
if and only if [
r − ν − δ¯
d¯
]2
≥ 4να0
d¯
. (3.32)
In this case the following subcases have to be considered:
(a) if ν > δ¯ > 0, then condition Eq. (3.32) holds for all d < 0 and the system Eq. (3.22)
has two steady states ρ∗± which satisfy
(1) ρ∗− < 0 and ρ
∗
− is a decreasing function of d¯;
(2) r < ρ∗+ < ρ
∗
0 and ρ
∗
+ is an increasing function of d¯ satisfying ρ
∗
+ → ρ∗0 as d¯→ 0−.
For d > 0 the system Eq. (3.22) has also two steady states ρ∗± if and only if Eq. (3.32)
holds, and whenever they exist, they satisfy
(1) 0 < ρ∗0 < ρ
∗
± for 0 < d¯ < doL,1 ≡ (ν−δ¯)
2
r(ν−δ¯)+2α0ν
and ρ∗− → ρ∗0 as d¯→ 0+;
(2) 0 < ρ∗± < ρ
∗
0 for d¯ > doU,1 ≡ (ν−δ¯)r ;
(3) ρ∗− increases for 0 < d¯ < doL,1 and decreases for d¯ > doU,1;
(4) ρ∗+ decreases for 0 < d¯ < doL,1 and increases for d¯ > doU,1.
(b) if δ¯ > ν > 0, then Eq. (3.32) holds for all d < 0 and the system Eq. (3.22) has two
steady states ρ∗± which satisfy
(1) ρ∗0 < r < ρ
∗
+ and ρ
∗
+ is an increasing function of d¯;
(2) 0 ≤ ρ∗− ≤ ρ∗0 for ν ≤ ν0 and ρ∗− is an increasing function of d¯ satisfying ρ∗− → ρ∗0
as d¯→ 0−;
(3) ρ∗0 < ρ
∗
− < 0 for ν > ν0 and ρ
∗
− is an decreasing function of d¯ satisfying ρ
∗
− → ρ∗0
as d¯→ 0−.
For d > 0 the system Eq. (3.22) has two steady states ρ∗± if and only if Eq. (3.32) holds
and, whenever they exist, they satisfy, for ν ≤ ν0,
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(1) 0 ≤ ρ∗0 < ρ∗+ < r and ρ∗+ is an increasing function of d¯ satisfying ρ∗+ → ρ∗0 as
d¯→ 0+;
(2) ρ∗− < 0 and ρ
∗
− is an increasing function of d¯;
and, for ν > ν0,
(3) ρ∗± < ρ
∗
0 < 0 for 0 < d¯ < doL,2 ≡ (ν−δ¯)
2
r(ν−δ¯)+2α0ν
and ρ∗+ → ρ∗0 as d¯→ 0+;
(4) ρ∗0 < 0 < ρ
∗
± < r for d¯ > doU,2 ≡ − (ν−δ¯)r ;
(5) ρ∗− increases for 0 < d¯ < doL,2 and decreases for d¯ > doU,2;
(6) ρ∗+ decreases for 0 < d¯ < doL,2 and increases for d¯ > doU,2.
(c) if ν < 0 and d < 0, then ρ∗± are also steady states if and only if Eq. (3.32) holds, and
whenever they exist, they satisfy
(1) 0 < ρ∗± < r < ρ
∗
0 for d¯ < doL,3 ≡ (ν−δ¯)r ;
(2) r < ρ∗0 < ρ
∗
± for d¯ > doU,3 ≡ (ν−δ¯)
2
r(ν−δ¯)+2α0ν
and ρ∗− → ρ∗0 as d¯→ 0−;
(3) ρ∗− increases for d¯ < doL,3 and decreases for 0 > d¯ > doU,3;
(4) ρ∗+ decreases for d¯ < doL,3 and increases for 0 > d¯ > doU,3.
For d > 0 condition Eq. (3.32) holds invariably and the system Eq. (3.22) has two steady
states ρ∗± which satisfy
(1) r < ρ∗+ < ρ
∗
0 and ρ
∗
+ is a decreasing function of d¯ satisfying ρ
∗
+ → ρ∗0 as d¯→ 0+;
(2) ρ∗− < 0 and ρ
∗
− is an increasing function of d¯.
Proof: See Appendix A 3.3.
Theorem 3.4 characterizes various market scenarios on the existence of steady states when
the dividend yield is assumed to be a positive constant α0. It also contains many market
situations which are quite unrealistic. Nevertheless, according to the dynamic system (ωt+1, ρt+1)
given by Eq. (3.21) and Eq. (3.22), they do exist analytically.23 Thus the meaningful economic
results have to be selected from the complex appearance of the Theorem 3.4, which I will come
on to shortly. Before I highlight and illustrate the theorem’s main findings, it is necessary to give
several technical remarks:
• Following Chiarella and He (2001) once more, it is more convenient to work with the param-
eters δ¯ and d¯, which measure the extrapolation rate d and the parameter δ per unit of the
variance σ2.
• In the case of fundamentalist investors, the conditional equation of the fixed point is not de-
fined for ν = 0 (no risk aversion) and ν = δ¯. As these cases are generally rather pathological,
they will be mostly excluded from my analysis in the interests of simplicity.
23As the wealth proportion remains at its initial level in the homogeneous case, the dynamic system is solely
described by the return ρt of the risky asset, the optimal investment proportion πt and the exogenous model
parameters. Particularly, the system does not depend on the price pt of the risky asset and the number of risky
assets N that are available in the market as initially proposed by Eq. (3.9). Therefore, considering exclusively
the dynamic system Eq. (3.21) and Eq. (3.22), market situations in which the price for the risky asset becomes
non-positive and/or N becomes negative cannot be detected in this framework.
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• For the risk-aversion coefficient being equal to ν = 1, the power utility function Eq. (3.25)
coincides with the logarithmic utility function and has to be replaced by U(W ) = lnW .
• In the case of chartist investors (d 6= 0), Eq. (3.31) can be written as
ρ∗± =
1
2

 r + 1− δ˘
d˘
±
√√√√[r − 1− δ˘
d˘
]2
− 4α0
d˘

 ,
where δ˘ ≡ δ¯/ν = δ/νσ2 and d˘ ≡ d¯/ν = d/νσ2. Since it is δ˘ < 1 for Subcase (a), i.e., if
the risk-aversion coefficient is higher than δ¯, note that all results from the corresponding
theorem maintained in Chiarella and He (2001, see Proposition 3.1.) can simply be adopted
by substituting δ˘ for δ¯ and d˘ for d¯.
Obviously, the latter remark is of particular interest. However, let us first examine the case where
all investors are fundamentalists.
When the investors are assumed not to extrapolate from the past (d = 0), a unique steady
state ρ∗0 exists for any choice of the risk-aversion coefficient.
24 ρ∗0 is determined by Eq. (3.30) and
can be called the ‘fundamental steady state’. Depending on the risk-aversion coefficient ν, the only
fixed equilibrium can be higher as well as lower than the dividend yield or can even be negative
(which is one of the unrealistic market scenarios already mentioned above). Figure 3.2 illustrates
the outcome of fundamental steady states for different risk preferences when all investors are
fundamentalists. As Eq. (3.30) indicates, only risk preferences that exceed the excess conditional
mean from the risk-free rate, namely δ¯ (measured per units of variance), lead to realistic market
scenarios in which the steady-state return is higher than the risk free rate and the dividend yield.25
In those cases a higher δ¯ causes a higher steady-state return. For risk preferences lower than δ¯,
only unrealistic situations occur. Moreover, for ν < 0, i.e., when the investors are risk lovers, the
corresponding optimal investment proportion π∗ becomes negative, which leads to a non-positive
price process.26
In addition to the analytic form of Eq. (3.30), from which the curve of Figure 3.2 can easily be
understood, an economic explanation for the curve’s qualitative development can also be given. If
the investors are totally risk-averse, they do not invest in the risky asset, i.e., πt is approximately
zero, and therefore the fundamental steady state is simply the risk free rate r plus the guaranteed
dividend yield α0. If the investors become less risk-averse, they start to invest in the risky asset
and, as a consequence, the fundamental return ρ∗0 increases. Otherwise, if the excess conditional
mean from the risk-free rate δ¯ has a higher value than the investors’ risk aversion measured by the
coefficient ν, i.e., if δ¯ > ν, it follows that there is a mismatch between these two parameters since
the expected excess return δ¯ is higher than it has to be with regard to the risk perception of the
investors, which, therefore, has to be compensated by being ρ∗0 < r. In other words, for δ¯ > ν the
24It can be shown that ρ∗0 is locally asymptotically stable for all choices of ν. For details see Corollary 3.6 below.
25This market situation coincides with those considered in Chiarella and He (2001) as for the logarithmic utility
function ν = 1, which is always higher than δ¯ constrained to be smaller than unity.
26In the following, the case ν < 0 will not be considered in detail as it is not in harmony with the assumption
of risk-averse investors, which is a crucial assumption in almost all asset pricing models. Nevertheless, it will be
quoted in some of the following theorems and corollaries for the sake of completeness.
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Figure 3.2: Steady state distribution of the homogeneous model for d = 0. When all investors are fundamentalists
(no extrapolation, d = 0) a unique steady state ρ∗0 exists for all possible risk preferences ν of the investors. Note
that the fixed equilibrium is above the risk-free rate r only for ν > δ¯ and ν < 0, although the latter case leads to
unrealistic market situations. δ¯ is fixed and set to 0.85. Realistic values for the risk free rate r (3.7% p.a.) and the
dividend yield α0 (4.7% p.a.) are chosen to generate this plot.
investors’ expectations about the development of the risky asset and the investors’ basic attitude
towards investing in risky prospects is modeled in the opposite direction. This is an unrealistic
assumption and thus leads to unrealistic market scenarios (see also the summary section below for
a more detailed discussion on this topic).
For d 6= 0, investors are called chartists. When all investors act as contrarians (i.e., d¯ < 0,
while for trend chasers d¯ > 0) they believe that the difference of excess conditional mean and the
parameter δ which is [Et(ρt+1)−r]−δ is negatively (or positively for trend chasers) proportional to
the moving average of returns over the last L time periods. In Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, the existence
of fixed equilibria for the homogeneous model and their stability in terms of the (standardized)
extrapolation rate d¯ is depicted for several risk preference levels. In all cases, two ‘non-fundamental
steady states’ ρ∗+ and ρ
∗
− exist. We will concentrate on two of the three different cases in the
following discussion.
First, if the risk-aversion coefficient ν of the homogeneous investors exceeds the parameter δ¯
(i.e., ν > δ¯), the visual appearance of the fixed equilibria and their stability properties coincides
with the findings outlined in Chiarella and He (2001). When all investors are contrarians, ρ∗+ is the
only positive steady state below the fundamental steady state ρ∗0 (for fixed δ¯). When all investors
are trend chasers both (non-fundamental) steady states are positive. For small extrapolation rates
d¯ > 0, both steady states are above the corresponding fundamental steady state ρ∗0, otherwise both
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(a) rough section: −100 < d¯ < 300
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Figure 3.3: Steady state distribution of the homogeneous model for d 6= 0 and ν = 1. Investors are described by a
logarithmic utility function (ν = 1). Two steady states exist. Stable branches of the fixed equilibria are indicated.
Transitions of regions of stability and instability are indicated by (solid) vertical lines. The plot replicates the
findings in Chiarella and He (2001) and can thus serve as a benchmark for market situations under power utility
risk preferences different from ν = 1. δ¯ is fixed and set to 0.85. Realistic values for the risk free rate r (3.7% p.a.)
and the dividend yield α0 (4.7% p.a.) are chosen to generate these plots.
are below ρ∗0. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 indicate these findings. The left panels show a rough section of
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(b) detailed section: −2 < d¯ < 2
Figure 3.4: Steady state distribution of the homogeneous model for d 6= 0 and ν > δ¯. Stable branches of the fixed
equilibria are indicated. The visual appearance of the steady states and their stability regions coincide with the
visual appearance of steady states and the stability regions in the case of logarithmic preferences (see Figure 3.3).
In this plot ν = 1.4 and δ¯ = 0.85 is chosen. Realistic values for the risk free rate r (3.7% p.a.) and the dividend
yield α0 (4.7% p.a.) are chosen to generate these plots.
the extrapolation rate d¯. Particularly, the upper boundary doU for (positive) large extrapolation
rates is emphasized. The right panels concentrate on the region of small extrapolation rates. They
exhibit the lower boundary doL.
27
27The condition Eq. (3.32) is in general much more restrictive than the boundaries doL,i, doU,i, i = 1, 2, 3 given
in Theorem 3.4. Therefore, the actual boundaries denoted by doL and doU in Figures 3.3–3.5 do not necessarily
coincide with the primary boundaries doL,i, doU,i, i = 1, 2, 3 defined in Theorem 3.4.
3.4 The Model under Homogeneous Expectations: An Analytical Treatment 121
Second, if the risk-aversion coefficient ν is smaller than the parameter δ¯ (i.e., δ¯ > ν > 0), the
visual appearance of the non-fundamental steady states differs from the findings in Chiarella and
He (2001). Figure 3.5 relates to this case. Interestingly, positive (non-fundamental) steady states
occur even in the case where the corresponding fundamental steady state ρ∗0 becomes negative (see
Figure 3.5, right panel). Again, ρ∗+ is above the risk-free rate r for negative extrapolation rates
d¯ (as in the latter case above). Two subcases have to be distinguished. For small risk-aversion
coefficients (i.e., ν < ν0 ≡ δ¯/(1+α0/r)) both non-fundamental steady states ρ∗± exist for any choice
of extrapolation rates d¯. In addition, ρ∗+ exceeds the corresponding fundamental steady state ρ
∗
0
for all d¯. For larger risk-aversion coefficients (i.e., δ¯ > ν > ν0) the visual appearance of the steady
states slightly resembles the findings for large risk-aversion coefficients ν > δ¯ (first case), although
notable differences occur for (positive) small extrapolation rates as the corresponding fundamental
steady state becomes negative.
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(b) δ¯ > ν > ν0
Figure 3.5: Steady state distribution of the homogeneous model for d 6= 0 and δ¯ > ν > 0. Due to the change of
sign of the fundamental steady state in this parameter region, two subcases (small ν, left panel and relatively large
ν, right panel) have to be distinguished. The visual appearance of fixed equilibria differs from the findings exhibited
in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 in both subcases. Nevertheless, relatively high (non-fundamental) fixed equilibrium return
can again be detected when investors extrapolate as contrarians. As in the benchmark model, the stability of the
higher fixed equilibrium is only guaranteed for low and very high extrapolation rates in both subcases. Transitions
of regions of stability and instability are indicated by (solid) vertical lines. In this plot ν = 0.2 and δ¯ = 0.85 (left
panel) and ν = 0.4 and δ¯ = 0.85 (right panel) are chosen. Realistic values for the risk free rate r (3.7% p.a.) and
the dividend yield α0 (4.7% p.a.) are chosen to generate these plots.
The third case, where all investors are risk lovers, is neglected in the discussion as it does not
conform with the generally accepted assumption of risk-averse investors.
Before I investigate the local stability of the steady states, one final remark should be made.
It should again be stressed that I have not distinguished between realistic and unrealistic market
situations in the previous discussion. Obviously, whenever the steady-state return falls below the
risk free rate r, an unrealistic market situation occurs which eventually leads to non-positive prices
and/or unrealistic optimal investment proportions.
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3.4.3 Local Stability of the Steady States
The local stability of the steady states in the homogeneous model is determined by the correspond-
ing characteristic equation. It depends on the lag length L, the risk premium δ, the extrapolation
rate d, the variance σ2 and, in contrast to the CH model, on the risk-aversion coefficient ν. We
find a similar result to that in Chiarella and He (2001):
Lemma 3.5 Let δ¯ = δ/σ2, d¯ = d/σ2. Assume Eq. (3.27) and Eq. (3.28) hold and αt = α0 > 0,
δ¯ < 1 and ν 6= 0. Then the fixed equilibrium return of the homogeneous system Eq. (3.22), say x0,
is locally asymptotically stable if and only if all the eigenvalues λi of the polynomial
ΓL(λ) ≡ λL+1 − d¯
νL
[
(C −A)λL + CλL−1 + CλL−2 + . . .+ Cλ+A] (3.33)
satisfy |λi| < 1 for i = 1, . . . , L+ 1, in which
A =
1 + r
π0(π0 − 1) , C =
α0
(π0 − 1)2 , π0 =
1
ν
(δ¯ + d¯x0) .
Proof: See Appendix A 3.4.
For realistic time lags (e.g., L ≥ 3), the roots of the characteristic equation Eq. (3.33)
cannot be derived analytically. Instead, a numerical approach has to be used to investigate the
stability properties of the fixed equilibria in the homogeneous case. On a visual level the stability
regions of the non-fundamental steady states have already been highlighted in Figures 3.3–3.5
as they have been obtained by numerical simulations. Otherwise, even in the homogeneous
case a rigorous bifurcation analysis with respect to the extrapolation parameter d¯ is already a
quite extensive exercise and, moreover, does not give significantly new qualitative insights into
the behavior of the dynamic system. Nevertheless, it is evident that the results outlined in
the previous subsection can, in principle, be identified with typical forms of bifurcations (see
Appendix A 2.11 for an overview). Let us simply consider the case ν > δ¯ in detail as an example
(see Figures 3.3 and 3.4). In this case a numerical analysis shows that, in the region of negative
large values of d¯, the dynamic system undergoes a supercritical Hopf bifurcation, i.e., a pair of
complex conjugate eigenvalues of the corresponding Jacobian evaluated at the non-fundamental
steady state ρ∗+ has modulus one, whereas for negative sufficiently small values of d¯ a subcritical
flip bifurcation occurs.28 For positive parameter values of d¯ the opposite is true. Hence in the
region of small extrapolation parameters the system undergoes a supercritical Hopf bifurcation if
d¯ becomes sufficiently large, while the ρ∗+ becomes stable again under a subcritical flip bifurcation
for sufficiently large values of d¯. Of course, similar results can be obtained for the second case,
i.e., δ¯ > ν > 0 (see Figure 3.5).29
However, for the fundamental steady states (i.e., d = 0) and for the very restrictive case d 6= 0,
L = 1, the following theoretical result on the local stability of the homogeneous model can be
28The numerical results are obtained by using the algebraic manipulation software Mathematica 4.1.
29For a meaningful economic interpretation the (non-fundamental) steady states also have to be a real number,
which constitutes another constraint to the existence of the steady states. For this reason the bifurcation values
obtained by a numerical analysis do not necessarily coincide with the lower and upper boundaries doL and doU
given in Theorem 3.4 in all cases. Therefore, the (solid) vertical lines in Figures 3.4–3.5 only approximately indicate
the transition from a stable region to an unstable one.
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obtained directly from the previous Lemma 3.5:
Corollary 3.6 Under the assumption of Theorem 3.4,
(i) if d = 0, then the unique steady state ρ∗0 is locally asymptotically stable;
(ii) if d 6= 0 and L = 1, then for ν > 0 the steady state, say x0 is locally asymptotically stable if
−d¯A < 0 , d¯C < ν , d¯(2A− C) < ν (3.34)
and for ν < 0 the steady state, say x0 is locally asymptotically stable if
d¯A < 0 , −d¯C < −ν , d¯(C − 2A) < −ν . (3.35)
Proof: See Appendix A 3.5.
Corollary 3.6 states that the fundamental steady state (i.e., no extrapolation) is locally
asymptotically stable for all choices of the lag length L and the risk-aversion coefficient ν. For
non-zero extrapolation rates, several (sufficient) conditions on the risk-aversion coefficient ν have
to be fulfilled for the steady state being locally asymptotically stable. Corollary 3.6 again seems to
simply enrich the findings of Chiarella and He by one additional parameter, namely ν. However,
a closer study of the conditions in Eq. (3.34) and Eq. (3.35) indicates that this is not the case
since they are drastically more complex, because the parameters A,B,C themselves do depend
on the risk-aversion coefficient ν via the parameter π0. Thus we can conclude that, in contrast
to the findings in Chiarella and He (2001), a theoretical analysis of the stability of steady states
becomes analytical intractable even in the very special and restricted cases.
3.5 The Model under Heterogeneous Expectations: A Numerical
Treatment
In the last section the robustness of the homogeneous stationary CH model with respect to the
investors’ risk preference was investigated. In this section a straightforward generalization of the
homogeneous case, the heterogeneous model with only two different investors in the market, will be
considered, this representing also the most simple case. Since a theoretical treatment of the model
could only be managed with quite complex and exhausting derivations, even in the homogeneous
case, the two-investors model will be investigated by using solely numerical simulations. However,
for logarithmic utility preferences, theoretical results of the heterogeneous model are derived in the
original publication of the CH model.30 Consequently, they will serve as benchmark results for my
own numerically based investigations.
Analogous to Eq. (3.27) and Eq. (3.28) in the homogeneous model, the trading strategies of
the two investors are assumed to be
Ei,t(ρt+1) = r + δi + diρ¯i,t , (3.36)
V ari,t(ρt+1) = σ
2 , (3.37)
30The following discussion about the heterogeneous CH model under power utility preferences is closely related
to the discussion outlined in Chiarella and He (2001).
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where δi ≥ 0 and σ2 > 0 are constants, di ∈ R and
ρ¯i,t =
1
Li
Li∑
k=1
ρt−k
with the integers Li ≥ 1, i = 1, 2. Thus the investors may differ from each other with respect
to their extrapolation rate di for the moving average of the last Li returns of the risky asset,
the window width Li of the moving average procedure and the parameter δi, which measures the
difference between the expected rate of return and the risk-free rate for the fundamentalist strategy.
Using the following notations
δ¯i = δi/σ
2 , d¯i = di/σ
2 i = 1, 2 ,
the optimal investment proportion of investor i can be expressed according to Eq. (3.26) by
πi,t =
1
νi
Ei,t(ρt+1)− r
V ari,t(ρt+1)
=
1
νi
(
δ¯i + d¯iρ¯i,t
)
. (3.38)
In the case of two investors it is convenient to introduce a new state variable
ωt ≡ ω1,t − ω2,t ,
which denotes the difference in the wealth proportions of each investor. Note that from the new
variable ωt the investors’ wealth proportions can still be determined by using the following relations
ω1,t =
1 + ωt
2
, ω2,t =
1− ωt
2
.
Therefore, the dynamic system of the two heterogeneous investors case can be derived in terms of
the state variables ωt+1 and ρt+1 by applying Theorem 3.1 as
ωt+1 = ω1,t+1 − ω2,t+1
=
ω1,t[R + π1,t(ρt+1 − r)] − ω2,t[R + π2,t(ρt+1 − r)]∑2
j=1 ωj,t[R+ πj,t(ρt+1 − r)]
=
1+ωt
2 [R+ π1,t(ρt+1 − r)]− 1−ωt2 [R+ π2,t(ρt+1 − r)]
1+ωt
2 [R+ π1,t(ρt+1 − r)] + 1−ωt2 [R+ π2,t(ρt+1 − r)]
and
ρt+1 = r +
∑2
i=1 ωi,t[(1 + r)(πi,t − πi,t+1)− αt+1πi,t]∑2
i=1 πi,tωi,t(πi,t+1 − 1)
= r +
1+ωt
2 [(1 + r)(π1,t − π1,t+1)− αt+1π1,t] + 1−ωt2 [(1 + r)(π2,t − π2,t+1)− αt+1π2,t]
1+ωt
2 π1,t(π1,t+1 − 1) + 1−ωt2 π2,t(π2,t+1 − 1)
respectively. In sum, the dynamic system (ωt+1, ρt+1) is thus given by
ωt+1 =
(1 + ωt)[R + π1,t(ρt+1 − r)] − (1− ωt)[R + π2,t(ρt+1 − r)]
(1 + ωt)[R + π1,t(ρt+1 − r)] + (1− ωt)[R + π2,t(ρt+1 − r)] (3.39)
ρt+1 = r +
(1 + ωt)[R(π1,t − π1,t+1)− αt+1π1,t] + (1 − ωt)[R(π2,t − π2,t+1)− αt+1π2,t]
(1 + ωt)π1,t(π1,t+1 − 1) + (1 − ωt)π2,t(π2,t+1 − 1) ,
(3.40)
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where R = (1 + r) and πi,t is given by Eq. (3.38) for i = 1, 2. Since the optimal investment
proportions πi,t and πi,t−1 are functions of the lagged values of returns, the dynamic system
Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40) is a nonlinear system of order max(L1, L2) + 2. This means that the
dynamic behavior of the system will become rather complex for realistic time lags (e.g., Li > 1).
However, before I provide a theoretical result for the stability of the heterogeneous model’s steady
states, the following remark confines the possible (realistic) fixed equilibria (ω∗, ρ∗), at least with
respect to the possible outcomes of the state variable ωt in its steady-state level:
Remark 3.7 Assume Eq. (3.36) and Eq. (3.37) hold. Let the dynamics of (ωt+1, ρt+1) be deter-
mined by Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40) with π1,t 6= π2,t for all t. Let αt be a positive constant α0.
Then all steady states of the dynamic system are given by
(ω∗ = ±1 , ρ∗) if and only if ρ∗ 6= r .
Otherwise, if ρ∗ = r is a fixed point of the system, then Eq. (3.39) is valid for any arbitrary value
of ω∗. Nevertheless, according to Eq. (3.40), the fixed point ω∗ has to fulfill the condition
ω∗ = −π
∗
1 + π
∗
2
π∗1 − π∗2
, (3.41)
where π∗i is given by
π∗i =
1
νi
(δ¯i + d¯i r) i = 1, 2 .
Proof: See Appendix A 3.6.
The first part of Remark 3.7 states that, in the case of heterogeneous investors (i.e., when
the optimal investment proportion πi,t of the two investors are different), the wealth proportion
of investors ωi,t either converges to 1 or to 0 in any steady-state situation unless the return of
the risky asset converges to the degenerated steady state ρ∗ = r. In other words, if the dynamic
system (ωt+1, ρt+1) settles down to a stable equilibrium, the total wealth of the market is passed
over to one of the investors.31 In terms of the model behavior this result can be interpreted
in a slightly different way. The heterogeneous model does not provide stable market situations
in which both investors can survive in the long run. Once one investor dominates the market
(measured by his/her wealth proportion ωi,t), there is no counterforce implemented in the model
which can slow down the ruin of the other investor. The second part of the Remark 3.7 is relevant
only because the risk-free rate can, in principle, also become a steady state in the heterogeneous
model. Of course, this situation is an unrealistic market scenario since a risk-averse investor
should gain a higher return from a risky investment in a long-run steady-state situation than from
the risk-free asset. Furthermore, the condition ω∗ ∈ [−1, 1] might be violated in such scenarios,
which means that the wealth proportions of the two investors can become smaller than 0 or larger
than 1. These are unrealistic model outcomes. Nevertheless, the dynamic system Eq. (3.39) and
Eq. (3.40) can mathematically converge to such a degenerated steady state and actually does,
as can be observed when conducting numerical simulations. I will refer to this point in more
31The condition π1,t 6= π2,t is equivalent to (δ1 − δ2) + (d1 ρ¯1,t − d2ρ¯2,t) 6= 0, which is essentially fulfilled if the
investors differ from their extrapolation rates d1 and d2 and/or their choice of the parameter value δ1 and δ2.
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detail when such market scenarios occur in the following discussion, which is outlined in the next
subsections.
According to Remark 3.7, the investigation of the local stability of the heterogeneous model’s
steady states can be restricted to cases with ω∗ = ±1 for realistic market situations. Analogous
to the homogeneous model (see Lemma 3.5), the condition for the local stability of steady states
can be given by the characteristic equation for the linear approximation of the underlying dynamic
system as stated in the following Lemma 3.8:32
Lemma 3.8 Assume Eq. (3.36) and Eq. (3.37) hold. Let L = max(L1, L2) and E(w
∗, ρ∗) be a
fixed equilibrium of the system Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40) with ω∗ = ±1. Then the characteristic
polynomial for the linearized system of Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40) at E(w∗, ρ∗) is given by
(i) ΓL1(λ) if ω
∗ = 1 and
(ii) ΓL2(λ) if ω
∗ = −1,
where
ΓLi(λ) ≡ (λ− βi)λL−Li
{
λLi+1 − d¯i
νiLi
[
(Ci −Ai)λLi + CiλLi−1 + CiλLi−2 + . . .+ Ciλ+Ai
]}
(3.42)
and
Ai =
1 + r
πi,0(πi,0 − 1) , Ci =
α0
(πi,0 − 1)2 , (3.43)
πi,0 =
1
νi
(
δ¯i + d¯iρ
∗
)
, (3.44)
β1 =
(1 + r) + (ρ∗ − r)π2,0
(1 + r) + (ρ∗ − r)π1,0 , β2 =
1
β1
(3.45)
for i = 1, 2.
Proof: See Appendix A 3.7.
Compared to the original publication, the consideration of the investors’ risk-aversion coef-
ficients νi again does not significantly change the stability condition for the steady states from
a visual perspective. The structure of the characteristic equations ΓLi(λ), i = 1, 2 is still almost
the same as in the case of logarithmic risk preferences assumed in Chiarella and He (2001).
Nevertheless, the risk-aversion coefficient νi does influence the stability behavior of the system
Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40) since the characteristic equation Eq. (3.42) depends on νi for any
parameter choice. Note that, even in the case where di = 0, i.e., investor i is assumed to behave
as a fundamentalist, the characteristic equation ΓLi(λ) is a function of νi because βi depends on
νi via the expression of πi,0.
As already mentioned in the homogeneous case, the polynomial cannot easily be solved an-
alytically for time lags Li larger than 1. Therefore, it is generally impossible to obtain explicit
32Remember the general result which states that a system is locally asymptotically stable if and only if its
eigenvalues lie inside of the unit circle, equivalent to the conclusion which states that all the roots of the corresponding
characteristic equation lie inside of the unit circle.
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stability conditions. Instead, numerical tools must be used to investigate the stability region of
the dynamic system. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, apart from the higher dimension
of the resulting characteristic equation, the component of the polynomial in the curly brackets has
the same analytical form as the characteristic equation Eq. (3.33) given in Lemma 3.5 in the homo-
geneous case. In other words, the eigenvalues of the heterogeneous model mirror the eigenvalues
of the corresponding homogeneous model (where both investors follow the same trading strategy
i) and also possesses the eigenvalue βi and (L− Li) eigenvalues equal to zero.
In the following subsections four different market scenarios with two different investors will be
investigated: two fundamentalists with different risk-aversion coefficients, two fundamentalists with
different choices of the parameter δi, fundamentalist versus trend trader and a two trend-trader
scenario. In all model variants a sensitivity analysis with respect to the risk-aversion coefficients
chosen by the investors will be performed, which provides an insight into the qualitative robustness
of the findings from the original CH model.
3.5.1 Fundamentalists with Different Risk Aversion Coefficients
Fundamentalists believe that the conditional expected return of the risky asset is a composition
of the risk-free rate r and the conditional excess return from the risk-free rate measured by the
parameter δi. In this subsection it is assumed that both traders are fundamentalists with the
same view of the conditional excess return from the risk-free rate, i.e., δ1 = δ2 ≡ δ, but who are
characterized by different attitudes towards the inherent risk in the market, specified by different
risk-aversion coefficients νi, i = 1, 2. Thus the conditional expectations about mean and variance
of the risky asset are identical for both investors and simply given by
Ei,t(ρt+1) = r + δ (3.46)
V ari,t(ρt+1) = σ
2 i = 1, 2 , (3.47)
where δ ≥ 0 and r, σ2 > 0 are constants. The heterogeneity of the two investors therefore becomes
apparent by their optimal investment proportions πi,t, which are different for both traders
πi,t =
r + δ − r
νiσ2
=
δ¯
νi
with νi > 0.
33 Under these assumptions, it can be shown that two steady states exist, in which,
according to the previous Remark 3.7, the total wealth of the market is concentrated on either of
the single investors. Furthermore, the lower the risk-aversion coefficient νi chosen by investor i, the
higher the (fundamental) steady-state return ρ∗0,i. The findings are summarized in the following
theorem:
Theorem 3.9 Assume Eq. (3.46) and Eq. (3.47) hold and αt = α0 > 0, δ¯ < 1 and νi > 0 for
i = 1, 2. Furthermore, neglect the case ρ∗ = r. The system Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40) has two
steady states Ei(ω
∗
i , ρ
∗
0,i) for i = 1, 2 with
ω∗1 = 1 , ω
∗
2 = −1 ,
33In the following discussion I restrict the risk-aversion coefficient to being positive, which is in harmony with
the assumption of risk-averse market participants. Otherwise, the optimal demand function of the investor would
become negative, which could lead to non-positive prices pt for the risky asset according to Eq. (3.9).
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and
ρ∗0,i = r +
α0
1− δ¯/νi . (3.48)
If ν1 = ν2, then the system reduces to the homogeneous case with a steady state E3(ω
∗
3 , ρ
∗
3), where ρ
∗
3
is given by Eq. (3.30) and ω∗3 = ω1,0−ω2,0 (which is the difference in the initial wealth proportions).
Proof: See Appendix A 3.8.
Applying Lemma 3.8 to the model of two fundamentalists with different risk-aversion coef-
ficients but homogeneous perceptions of the conditional excess return from the risk-free rate, the
following result for the stability behavior of the dynamic system Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40) can be
obtained:
Corollary 3.10 Define ǫ ≡ α0/(1+r) and νo,2 ≡ −(α0δ¯ν1)/[2(1+r)(ν1− δ¯)+α0δ¯]. Furthermore,
let ν1 /∈ [δ¯(1 − ǫ), δ¯]. Under the assumption of Theorem 3.9, a necessary and sufficient condition
for E1 to be locally asymptotically stable is
(i) ν1 < ν2 (which is equivalent to ρ
∗
0,1 > ρ
∗
0,2) for νi > δ¯ > 0, i = 1, 2
and
(ii)
{
ν1 > ν2 (which is equivalent to ρ
∗
0,1 < ρ
∗
0,2)
∧ ν2 > νo,2 > 0
}
for δ¯ > νi > 0, i = 1, 2.
Otherwise, if
(iii) νi1 > δ¯ > νi2 > 0, ij = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
then E1 is not locally asymptotically stable (and nor is E2).
Proof: See Appendix A 3.9.
Corollary 3.10 distinguishes between three different market scenarios. In Case (i) which is
the simplest case, the risk-aversion coefficients of both investors are higher than the parameter δ¯,
which is measured per unit of variance. In this case Investor 1 prevails over Investor 2 if and only
if he/she chooses a lower risk-aversion coefficient than his/her counterpart, which, in turn, means
that he/she chooses a higher investment proportion πi for the risky asset in the long run. Note
that the resulting fixed equilibrium ρ0,1 is then also higher than the steady state ρ0,2. This result
can be described as a ‘market selection principle’, which states that the investor with the lower
risk-aversion coefficient will be the winner, which coincides with an equilibrium E1 in which the
long-term return of the market is higher than in the other existing steady state E2.
34 Otherwise,
34A different term was originally used for this result in Chiarella and He (2001), where the authors named it
‘optimal selection principle’. However, the term ‘market selection principle’, which is well established and is mainly
identified with Blume and Easley (1992), might be slightly more appropriate since Blume and Easley (1992) show
that fitter investment rules survive in the market at the expense of the less fit rules, where the fitness criterion
is expected growth rates of wealth share accumulation. Thus market forces favor the survival of investors whose
decisions are more optimal than those of other investors. Because of a certain similarity between this statement and
our findings, this term is borrowed for our modified CH model version. For further publications that build on the
paper by Blume and Easley (1992), see Evstigneev, Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2002) and Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´
(2005).
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if the market return ρ0,2 of E2 becomes higher than ρ0,1 (e.g., by leaving ν1 fixed and decreasing
the parameter ν2), the situation changes. Now E2 becomes locally asymptotically stable. Figure
3.6 illustrates this phenomenon for a fixed ν1 (left panel).
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Figure 3.6: Stability properties of the two-fundamentalist model with different risk-aversion coefficients. The solid
curve indicates a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium and the dotted curve indicates an unstable steady state.
In the left panel the ‘market selection principle’ holds. The middle and the right panel exhibits unrealistic market
scenarios. In all three cases ν1 is fixed and set to 1.2 (left panel) and 0.2 (middle and right panel). Furthermore, it
is δ¯ = 0.85.
If both risk-aversion coefficients are lower than δ¯, the ‘market selection principle’ no longer
holds. The fixed equilibrium E1 now becomes locally asymptotically stable if and only if the
corresponding return ρ0,1 is lower than the return of the second steady state E2 and vice versa
(middle panel). Furthermore, these long-run returns are always below the risk-free rate r or even
become negative, as already mentioned in the discussion of the homogeneous case. Therefore, it
also describes an unrealistic market situation. Nevertheless, note that the conditions for ν1 and
ν2 are rather unrestrictive in this case. They simply define a parameter space in which the result
can be proved in a mathematically correct way while still giving a realistic range to the parameter
values. To illustrate this fact we can consider the following example. Assume that the parameters
are
r = 0.037 (i.e., 3.7% p.a.) , α0 = 0.047 (i.e., 4.7% p.a.) , δ¯ = 0.85 ,
which is of a realistic magnitude on an annual basis.35 It then follows that ǫ = 0.045.36 According
to the assumptions in Corollary 3.10, ν1 has to be smaller than (1−0.045) ·0.85 = 0.81, which does
not dramatically restrict the choice of ν1. It only states that ν1 must not be chosen very close to
the fixed exogenous parameter δ¯. For instance, let ν1 = 0.2 so that ρ0,1 is (at least) positive. Then
ν0,2 = 0.006, which means in principle, that the lower boundary for ν2 coincides with the overall
restriction ν2 > 0.
Finally, if one of the risk-aversion coefficients is above δ¯ and the other one below δ¯, neither E1
nor E2 is locally asymptotically stable for any market situation (right panel). Instead, numerical
simulation shows that the dynamic system Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40) converges to the risk-free rate
r and to ω∗ given as proposed in Eq. (3.41). Note that this case is explicitly excluded in Theorem
35Note that δ¯ = δ/σ2=0.85 can be split, for instance into δ=0.034 and σ = 0.2, which is a quite realistic assumption
on an annual basis. Similar splits can always be performed whenever certain parameter values are chosen for the
parameter δ¯ (and, analogously, for the parameter d¯) in the following.
36Remember that ǫ is defined in Corollary 3.10 as α0/(1 + r).
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3.9, because it would again lead to an unrealistic market situation.37 Nevertheless, simulation
results confirm that this fixed equilibrium seems to be locally asymptotically stable under the
assumptions given in Case (iii).
In conclusion, this subsection shows that only situations in which the risk-aversion coefficients
νi are larger than δ¯ lead to realistic market situations. The ‘market selection principle’ then holds
and the steady-state return of the risk-aversion coefficient is higher than the risk-free rate r.
3.5.2 Fundamentalists with Different Choices of the Parameter δ
In this subsection we assume that the two fundamentalists differ only in terms of their perception
of the conditional excess return of the risky asset from the risk-free rate, which they measure by
the parameter δi. Hence Eq. (3.36) and Eq. (3.37) can be simplified as
Ei,t(ρt+1) = r + δi (3.49)
V ari,t(ρt+1) = σ
2 i = 1, 2 , (3.50)
where δ ≥ 0 and r, σ2 > 0 are constants. The risk-aversion coefficient is assumed to be the same
for both investors. The optimal investment proportions of the two investors are then given by
πi,t =
δ¯i
ν
with ν > 0. Similar to the market scenario outlined in the last subsection, multiple steady states
exist which are summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 3.11 Assume Eq. (3.49) and Eq. (3.50) hold and αt = α0 > 0, δ¯i < 1 and > 0 for
i = 1, 2. Furthermore, neglect the case ρ∗ = r. Then the system Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40) has two
steady states Ei(ω
∗
i , ρ
∗
0,i) for i = 1, 2 with
ω∗1 = 1 , ω
∗
2 = −1 ,
and
ρ∗0,i = r +
α0
1− δ¯i/ν . (3.51)
In particular, if δ¯1 = δ¯2, then the system reduces to the homogeneous case with a steady state
E3(ω
∗
3 , ρ
∗
3), where ρ
∗
3 is given in Eq. (3.30) and ω
∗
3 = ω1,0 − ω2,0 (which is the difference in the
initial wealth proportions).
Proof: The proof can be conducted analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.9.
As in the previous subsection, different stability results for different choices of the risk-aversion
coefficient ν can be obtained according to Lemma 3.8:
Corollary 3.12 Define ǫ ≡ α0/(1+ r) and δ¯o,2 ≡ 1/ǫ · (δ¯1− ν). Furthermore, let δ¯1 /∈ [ν, ν(1+ ǫ)].
Under the assumption of Theorem 3.11, a necessary and sufficient condition for E1 to be locally
asymptotically stable is
37Some remarks are also given on that discussion in the proof of Theorem 3.9 in Appendix A 3.8.
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(i) δ¯1 > δ¯2 (which is equivalent to ρ
∗
0,1 > ρ
∗
0,2) for ν > δ¯i > 0, i = 1, 2
and
(ii)
{
δ¯1 < δ¯2 (which is equivalent to ρ
∗
0,1 < ρ
∗
0,2)
∧ δ¯2 < δ¯0,2
}
for δ¯i > ν > 0, i = 1, 2.
Otherwise, if
(iii) δ¯i1 > ν > δ¯i2 > 0, ij = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, then E1 is not locally asymptotically stable (nor
E2).
Proof: See Appendix A 3.10.
Corollary 3.12 can be interpreted in a similar way as Corollary 3.10. As in the previous
corollary, the constraints on the variables δ¯1 and δ¯2, which have to be done in some cases, are
not as restrictive.38 Figure 3.7 illustrates the results for a fixed δ¯1 for different values of the
risk-aversion coefficient. Whenever the risk-aversion coefficient is higher than the difference
between the expected rate of return and the risk-free rate, the ‘market selection principle’ holds.
The investor who chooses a higher value for δ¯i will accumulate the total wealth of the market. In
this situation the dynamic system converges to that fixed equilibrium in which the steady-state
return ρ∗0,i of the risky asset is higher than its counterpart. This result confirms the findings in
Chiarella and He (2001), where the risk-aversion coefficient was restricted to being equal to 1.
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Figure 3.7: Stability properties of the two-fundamentalist model with different risk premia. The solid curve
indicates a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium and the dotted curve indicates an unstable steady state. In
the left panel the ‘market selection principle’ holds. The middle and the right panel exhibits unrealistic market
scenarios. In all three cases δ¯1 is fixed and set to 0.85. Risk-aversion coefficients are chosen to be 1.2 (left panel)
and 0.2 (middle and right panel).
Contrastingly, when the risk-aversion coefficient ν falls at least below one of the parameters δ¯i,
the ‘market selection principle’ is violated. Either the system settles down to steady state which
comes along with a relatively low return ρ0,i ( see Case (ii)) or even neither of the fixed equilibria
determined in Theorem 3.11 is locally asymptotically stable (see Case (iii)). Then, as already
38For instance, the second condition in Case (ii) basically states that δ¯2 must not be chosen too exceedingly far
away from the parameter δ¯1. But this can be motivated by the fact that the parameters δ¯i, i = 1, 2 are assumed to
be determined mainly through an estimation of the risky asset’s past returns. Therefore, the investors’ estimations
of this parameter should not deviate dramatically from each other.
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observed in the previous subsection, the return ρt of the risky asset converges to the risk-free rate
r, which leads to an degenerated fixed equilibrium of the dynamic system Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40).
So far, it has been shown that the findings on the CH model seem to indicate that the model
framework is not robust against the newly introduced parameter, which measures the level of risk
aversion in their utility function. If the risk-aversion coefficients of the two fundamentalists (i.e.,
di = 0) is higher than the excess return of the risky asset from the risk-free rate, similar results
can be found to those in the original publication. In all other cases the model behavior does not
exhibit realistic and desired market outcomes. In other words, the investors’ risk aversion has to
be sufficiently high in order to generate a realistic level of steady-state returns. If such a situation
is guaranteed, the model is robust against changes in the risk-aversion preferences of the investors.
3.5.3 Fundamentalist versus Trend Trader
In the following discussion the two investors are allowed to incorporate the history of past observed
returns in their trading strategies. More precisely, the trading strategies of the two investors are
given by Eq. (3.36) and Eq. (3.37) where d¯i 6= 0 for at least one i = 1, 2. While this subsection
concentrates on the case with one fundamentalist (d¯1 = 0) and one trend-trader (d¯2 6= 0), the
next subsection deals with the case where both investors are assumed to extrapolate the excess
return of the risky asset from the risk-free rate r by using a moving average over the current past
returns. We can see from the previous discussion that analytical results can hardly be obtained
for this model variant. Instead, numerical simulation has to be conducted to investigate the
behavior of this complex two-investors model. Nevertheless, Remark 3.7 and the findings in the
previous subsections have already indicated that (desired) fixed equilibria are characterized by
the fact that only one investor survives in the artificial market. Furthermore, it can already be
conjectured that, in such steady states, the equilibrium return of the dynamic system is given
simply by the corresponding analogous steady state of the homogeneous model, where only the
dominating investor acts on the market.39 Indeed, such results have already been derived in the
original publication under the assumption of logarithmic utility preferences for the investors (see
Chiarella and He, 2001).
The procedure of the analysis is as follows. Using the theoretical results proposed by Chiarella
and He as a benchmark, comprehensive numerical experiments are conducted which involve a
systematic analysis of how the local stability of the fixed equilibria is influenced by different levels
of the investors’ risk aversion. For this purpose, experiments with three different designs are
performed for every investor trading strategy combination, which are then enumerated in the
following discussion by #1, #2 and #3. As a first experimental setup δ¯1 = δ¯2 = 0.85 is chosen,
which means that both investors are identical in their perception of the constant part of the excess
rate of return from the risk-free asset r. In Experiment #2 and #3 both investors slightly deviate
from each other in this respect. While in the second experiment Investor 1 is characterized by a
relatively higher choice of the parameter δ¯1, in the third experiment the exact opposite assumption
is made. In each experiment d¯1 is fixed at a representative value, while d¯2 varies from -4.0 to 0.0
39For instance compare Eq. (3.48) and Eq. (3.51) of the heterogeneous model with Eq. (3.30) of the homogeneous
model.
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(from 0.0 to 4.0) by using steps of with a width of 0.1 in the case of contrarians (trend followers).
Each of these runs are performed for 5 different levels of investors’ risk aversion (including the
benchmark level) for each single experiment. All the results are summarized in Tables 3.1–3.5. For
the remainder of this section the parameter set is given by
r = 0.037 , α0 = 0.047 , ω0 = 0.00 , Li = 15 with i = 1, 2
if not otherwise stated.
Fundamentalist versus Contrarian
Let us first consider the case of one fundamentalist-trader versus one contrarian-trader. In this
case it is assumed that
d¯1 = 0 and d¯2 < 0 .
In accordance with theoretical results of the CH model outlined in Chiarella and He (2001), three
fixed equilibria exist40, which are given by
E1(ω
∗
1 , ρ
∗
1) , E2,±(ω
∗
2 , ρ
∗
2,±) ,
where
ω∗1 = 1 , ρ
∗
1 = r +
α0
1− δ¯1/ν (3.52)
and
ω∗2 = −1 , ρ2,± =
1
2

 r + ν − δ¯2
d¯2
±
√[
r − ν − δ¯2
d¯2
]2
− 4να0
d¯2

 . (3.53)
Note that, in contrast to Chiarella and He (2001), both the fundamental steady state E1 as well as
the non-fundamental steady states E2,± depend on the risk-aversion coefficient ν. Two of them are
positive and one of them might be negative.41 As already mentioned before, they have the same
analytical structure as in the homogeneous model, in which only the dominating investor acts in
the market. Table 3.1 shows the overall results for this case. Simulation runs in which the ‘market
selection principle’ holds are marked by bold type. The results are again in harmony with the earlier
findings outlined in the previous subsection and the subsection before that. Whenever the risk-
aversion coefficient ν exceeds both δ¯1 and δ¯2, the ‘market selection principle’ holds, i.e., E1 (E2,±)
is locally asymptotically stable if and only if ρ∗1 ≥ ρ∗2,+ (ρ∗1 ≤ ρ∗2,+). Then, for Experiment #1 and
#2 the fundamental steady state is locally asymptotically stable for any choice of extrapolation
rate d2 of the contrarian within the assumed range of the parameter value. For Experiment #3
the fundamental steady state becomes unstable for relatively low extrapolation rates (measured
in absolute values). In this case the risk-aversion coefficient influences the stability property of
the system. The lower the risk-aversion coefficient is chosen the smaller the stability region of the
(positive) non-fundamental steady state E2,+ will be.
40For the sake of precision note that from the theoretical analysis an additional steady state E4(ω∗4 , ρ
∗
4) exists
under quite restrictive conditions. More precisely, if (ν2δ¯1/ν1 − δ¯2)/d¯2 = r + α0/(1 − δ¯1/ν1) holds, E4 is given
by ω∗4 = ω1,0 − ω2,0 (which is the difference in the initial wealth proportions) and ρ∗4 = (ν2δ¯1/ν1 − δ¯2)/d¯2. Since
in almost all cases it would lead to a degenerated fixed equilibrium anyway, it will be neglected in the following
discussion. For details consult Chiarella and He (2001).
41Note that ρ∗2,− can become positive for certain settings of parameters in this enlarged CH model.
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Fundamentalist vs. Contrarian Model
Results of the Simulation Experiments
Experiment #1 Experiment #2 Experiment #3
(δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.85, 0.85) (δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.5, 0.4) (δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.5, 0.6)
stable stable stable
risk avers. fixed fixed fixed
coeff.
d¯2 ∈
point
d¯2 ∈
point
d¯2 ∈
point
(−4.0, 0) E1 (−4.0, 0) E1 (−4.0,−1.0] E1
ν = 1.4
[−0.9, 0) E2,+
ν = 1 (−4.0, 0) E1 (−4.0, 0) E1 (−4.0,−0.8] E1
(benchmark) [−0.7, 0) E2,+
(−4.0, 0) E1 < 0† (−4.0, 0) E1 (−4.0,−0.5] E1
ν = 0.7
[−0.4, 0) E2,+
(−4.0, 0) E1 < 0† (−4.0,−0.7] E1 < 0† (−4.0, 0) E1 < 0†
ν = 0.4
[−0.6, 0) E2,− < 0§
(−4.0, 0) E ‡2,− (−4.0,−3.4] all unstable (−4.0, 0) E ††1
ν = 0.2
[−3.3, 0) E2,− < 0¶
† In this case ρ∗1 < ρ
∗
2,− < 0 < ρ
∗
2,+.
¶ In this case ρ∗2,− < 0 < ρ
∗
1 < ρ
∗
2,+.
‡ In this case 0 < ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
1 < ρ
∗
2,+.
†† In this case 0 < ρ∗1 < ρ
∗
2,− < ρ
∗
2,+.
§ In this case ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
1 < 0 < ρ
∗
2,+.
Table 3.1: Stability properties of the fundamentalist vs. contrarian model. Three qualitatively different scenarios
in terms of the pair (δ¯1, δ¯2) are considered. Such cases in which the ‘market selection principle’ holds are indicated
by bold type. The steady states which have a negative value are also indicated. Fixed points without any visual
highlighting are positive but do not fulfill the ‘market selection principle’.
In all other cases the dynamic system Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40) converges to degenerated fixed
equilibria. Sometimes the steady-state return even becomes negative. Otherwise, the steady-state
return is lower than the risk-free rate r. It thus leads to totally unrealistic market situations in
any case.
Fundamentalist versus Trend Follower
Now we assume that the trend trader extrapolates positively from the current past returns of the
risky asset, i.e.,
d¯1 = 0 , and d¯2 > 0 .
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Then one fundamental steady state E1(ω
∗
1 , ρ
∗
1) and two non-fundamental steady states E2(ω
∗
2 , ρ
∗
2,±)
again exist and are given by Eq. (3.52) and Eq. (3.53) if they do exist.42 Numerical experiments
on stability indicate that the system becomes unstable for relatively high extrapolation rates d¯2
in almost all cases (see Table 3.2). Furthermore, E2,+ is never locally asymptotically stable as
already proposed in Chiarella and He (2001).43 According to Experiment #3 a lower risk-aversion
coefficient seems to destabilize the system in any case if ν > δ¯i, i = 1, 2 since the stability
region decreases dramatically when lowering the parameter ν. Concerning the robustness of the
original CH model’s findings, this market scenario does not show different results from the previous
discussions. Since E2,+ is always unstable, the stability switching follows a ‘(quasi-)market selection
principle’, i.e., E1 (E2,−) is locally asymptotically stable whenever ρ
∗
1 > (<) ρ
∗
2,− for sufficiently
high levels of risk aversion. If the risk-aversion coefficient is lower than (at least) one δ¯i, degenerated
steady states are reached, as could already be expected. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that
the ‘(quasi-)market selection principle’ does hold for ν = 0.2 if δ¯1 ≤ δ¯2, although in this case the
steady-state return does not exceeds the risk-free return r.
3.5.4 Two Trend-Traders
The experiment design for the two trend-trader case is identical to the previous experiments.
While the extrapolation rate d¯1 6= 0 of Trader 1 is fixed for the whole experiment procedure, the
extrapolation rate d¯2 of Trader 2 varies during the experiments. In general, three different subcases
are considered:
d¯i < 0 for i = 1, 2 , d¯i > 0 for i = 1, 2 and d¯1 < 0 , d¯2 > 0 .
It can be shown that four steady states exist, which are denoted by Ei(ω
∗
i , ρ
∗
i,±), i = 1, 2.
44 They
are given by
ω∗1 = 1 , ω
∗
2 = −1 ,
ρi,± =
1
2

 r + ν − δ¯i
d¯i
±
√[
r − ν − δ¯i
d¯i
]2
− 4να0
d¯i

 .
So as not to overburden the reader, I will shorten the discussion as much as possible and refer
mainly to the Tables 3.3–3.5 for the detailed results. Therefore, only some selected important facts
are stressed in the following subsubsections.
42A further steady state E4(ω∗4 , ρ
∗
4) is again neglected in the following discussion for the same reason as in the
subsubsection before. See also Footnote 40 for an explicit expression for E4.
43More precisely, this is true at least as long as ρ∗2,+ exceeds both ρ
∗
1 and ρ
∗
2,−.
44Chiarella and He (2001) show that, under quite limiting conditions, one further steady state E3(ω∗3 , ρ
∗
3) once
again exists. More precisely, the steady state E3 is given by ω∗3 = ω1,0 − ω2,0 (which is the difference in the
initial wealth proportions) and ρ∗3 = ∆, where ∆ ≡ (δ¯1/ν1 − δ¯2/ν2)/(d¯2/ν2 − d¯1/ν1) has to fulfill the condition
(r −∆)(1 − δ¯1/ν1 − d¯1∆/ν1) + α0 = 0. This steady state can again be neglected.
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Fundamentalist vs. Trend-Follower Model
Results of the Simulation Experiments
Experiment #1 Experiment #2 Experiment #3
(δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.85, 0.85) (δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.5, 0.4) (δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.5, 0.6)
stable stable stable
risk avers. fixed fixed fixed
coeff.
d¯2 ∈
point
d¯2 ∈
point
d¯2 ∈
point
(0.0, 0.9] E2,− (0.0, 0.9] E1 (0.0, 2.0] E2,−
ν = 1.4 [1.0, 4.0) all unstable [1.0, 2.5] E2,− [2.1, 4.0) all unstable
[2.6, 4.0) all unstable
ν = 1
(0.0, 0.1] E2,− (0.0, 0.7] E1 (0.0, 0.7] E2,−
[0.2, 4.0) all unstable [0.8, 1.5] E2,− [0.8, 4.0) all unstable
(benchmark)
[1.6, 4.0) all unstable
(0.0, 0.1] E2,+ < 0
† (0.0, 0.4] E1 (0.0, 0.07] E2,−
ν = 0.7 [0.2, 4.0) all unstable {0.5} E2,− [0.08, 4.0) all unstable
[0.6, 4.0) all unstable
(0.0, 4.0) E2,+ < 0
† (0.0, 0.5] 0.037§ (0.0, 0.6] E1 < 0
‡
ν = 0.4 [0.6, 4.0) all unstable [0.7, 2.2] 0.037§
[2.3, 4.0) all unstable
(0.0, 4.0) E1
¶ (0.0, 1.9] E2,+ < 0
†† (0.0, 4.0) E1
¶
ν = 0.2
[2.0, 4.0) all unstable
† In this case ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
2,+ < ρ
∗
1 < 0.
¶ In this case ρ∗1 < r.
‡ In this case ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
1 < ρ
∗
2,+ < 0.
†† In this case ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
2,+ < 0 < ρ
∗
1.
§ In this case ρ∗2,± becomes complex.
Table 3.2: Stability properties of the fundamentalist vs. trend-follower model. Three qualitatively different scenar-
ios in terms of the pair (δ¯1, δ¯2) are considered. Such cases in which the ‘(quasi-)market selection principle’ holds are
indicated by bold type. Those steady states which have a negative value are also indicated. Fixed points without
any visual highlighting are positive but do not fulfill the ‘(quasi-)market selection principle’.
Two Contrarians
For this market scenario we assume that Trader 1 extrapolates moderately. More precisely, it is
assumed that
d¯1 = −1 , and d¯2 ∈ [−0.4, 0.0) .
While for less risk-averse investors the dynamic system does not exhibit realistic market behavior,
the stability properties for sufficiently high levels of risk aversion are in harmony with the ‘market
selection principle’. If the risk-aversion coefficient decreases, unstable regions might be generated
at some parameter settings (see Experiment #3 for ν = 0.7). Furthermore, an increase in the
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risk-aversion coefficient leads to indifferent results. While for Experiment #3 an increase in ν
seems to increase the range of parameter values in which the non-fundamental steady state E2,+
is locally asymptotically stable, exactly the opposite is true for Experiment #2. All the results are
summarized in Table 3.3.
Two-Contrarian Model
Results of the Simulation Experiments
Experiment #1 Experiment #2 Experiment #3
(δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.85, 0.85) (δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.5, 0.4) (δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.5, 0.6)
stable stable stable
risk avers. fixed fixed fixed
coeff.
d¯2 ∈
point
d¯2 ∈
point
d¯2 ∈
point
(−4.0,−1.0) E1,+ (−4.0, 0.0) E1,+ (−4.0,−2.0] E1,+
ν = 1.4
(−1.0, 0) E2,+ [−1.9, 0.0) E2,+
ν = 1 (−4.0,−1.0) E1,+ (−4.0,−0.2] E1,+ (−4.0,−1.9] E1,+
(benchmark) (−1.0, 0) E2,+ [−0.1, 0.0) E2,+ [−1.8, 0.0) E2,+
(−4.0,−1.0) E1,− < 0† (−4.0,−0.3] E1,+ (−4.0,−1.8] E1,+
ν = 0.7 (−1.0, 0.0) E2,− < 0‡ [−0.2, 0.0) E2,+ [−1.7,−1.2] all unstable§
[−1.1, 0) E2,+
(−4.0,−1.0) E1,− < 0† (−4.0,−1.2] all unstable§ (−4.0, 0.0) E1,− < 0†
ν = 0.4
(−1.0, 0.0) E2,− < 0‡ [−1.1, 0) E2,− < 0¶
(−4.0,−1.0) E ‡‡2,− (−4.0,−3.3] all unstable (−4.0, 0.0) E ††1,−
ν = 0.2
(−1.0, 0.0) E ††1,− [3.2, 0.0) E2,− < 0‖
† In this case ρ∗1,− < ρ
∗
2,− < 0 < ρ
∗
2,+ < ρ
∗
1,+.
¶ In this case ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
1,− < 0 < ρ
∗
1 < ρ
∗
2,+.
‡ In this case ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
1,− < 0 < ρ
∗
1,+ < ρ
∗
2,+.
†† In this case 0 < ρ∗1,− < ρ
∗
2,− < ρ
∗
2,+ < ρ
∗
1,+.
‡‡ In this case 0 < ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
1,− < ρ
∗
2,+ < ρ
∗
1,+.
‖ In this case ρ∗2,− < 0 < ρ
∗
1,− < ρ
∗
2,+ < ρ
∗
1,+
§ Sometimes ρt converges to the risk free rate r (e.g., for d2 = 1.5, 1.6).
Table 3.3: Stability properties of the two-contrarian model. The table can be read in the same way as the previous
ones. Note that in Experiment #1 the case d¯2 = −1 is not considered since it would lead to the homogeneous case.
Two Trend-Followers
Now the opposite market situation is considered. Both trend traders act as trend followers, i.e.,
d¯1 = 1 and d¯2 ∈ (0.0, 4.0] .
All the results for this case can be found in Table 3.4. The stability behavior is now mainly
characterized by unstable situations. As in the homogeneous case, Ei,+ are unstable for any
reasonably chosen positive extrapolation rates d¯i. Meanwhile the steady states Ei,− are locally
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asymptotically stable for certain choices of parameters (see Experiment #2 and #3). Thus the
‘(quasi-)market selection principle’ holds in these situations, as already observed in the similar
case with one fundamentalist and one trend-follower. Furthermore, an increase in the risk-aversion
coefficient seems to increase the stability region of E2,− (see Experiment #2 and #3).
Two Trend-Follower Model
Results of the Simulation Experiments
Experiment #1 Experiment #2 Experiment #3
(δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.85, 0.85) (δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.5, 0.4) (δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.5, 0.6)
stable stable stable
risk avers. fixed fixed fixed
coeff.
d¯2 ∈
point
d¯2 ∈
point
d¯2 ∈
point
(0.0, 1.0] all unstable§ (0.0, 1.8] E1,− (0.0, 0.1] E1,−
ν = 1.4 [0.9, 0.0) all unstable¶ [1.9, 2.7] E2,− [0.2, 2.0] E2,−
[2.8, 4.0) all unstable [2.1, 4.0) all unstable‖
ν = 1
(0.0, 4.0) all unstable§ (0.0, 1.5] E1,− (0.0, 0.4] E1,−
[1.6, 4.0) all unstable‖ [0.5, 0.7) E2,−
(benchmark)
[0.8, 4.0) all unstable‖
(0.0, 0.1] all unstable¶ (0.0, 0.5] all unstable¶ (0.0, 0.5] all unstable§
[0.2, 4.0) all unstable§ [0.6, 4.0) all unstable§ [0.6, 2.3] 0.037§
ν = 0.7
[2.4, 4.0) all unstable§
(0.0, 1.0) E1,+ < 0
† (0.0, 1.5] 0.037§ (0.0, 0.6] all unstable¶
ν = 0.4
(1.0, 4.0) E2,+ < 0
‡ [1.6, 4.0) all unstable§ [0.7, 4.0) all unstable§
(0.0, 1.0) E ††2,+ (0.0, 2.0] all unstable
‖ (0.0, 4.0) E ≀≀1,+
ν = 0.2
(1.0, 4.0) E ‡‡1,+ [1.9, 4.0) E2,+ < 0
\\
† In this case ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
1,− < ρ
∗
1,+ < ρ
∗
2,+ < 0.
‡ In this case ρ∗1,− < ρ
∗
2,− < ρ
∗
2,+ < ρ
∗
1,+ < 0
†† In this case ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
1,− < 0 < ρ
∗
2,+ < ρ
∗
1,+.
‡‡ In this case ρ∗1,− < ρ
∗
2,− < 0 < ρ
∗
1,+ < ρ
∗
2,+.
≀≀ In this case 0 < ρ∗1,+ < ρ
∗
2,+.
\\ In this case 0 < ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
1,− < ρ
∗
2,+ < 0 < ρ
∗
1,+.
§ In this case ρ∗1,± and ρ
∗
2,± become complex.
¶ In this case only ρ∗1,± becomes complex.
‖ In this case only ρ∗2,± becomes complex.
Table 3.4: Stability properties of the two trend-follower model. The table can be read in the same way as the
previous ones. Note that in Experiment #1 the case d¯2 = 1 is not considered since it would lead to the homogeneous
case.
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Contrarian and Trend Follower
As a last case one contrarian and one trend-follower is assumed
d¯1 = −0.6 and d¯2 ∈ (0.0, 4.0] .
As in the case of the homogeneous model E2,+ is always unstable for realistic market situations. As
proposed in Chiarella and He (2001), the local stability switches between E1,+ and E2,− for small
extrapolation rates d¯i and follows the ‘(quasi-)market selection principle’. An increase in the risk-
aversion coefficient ν increases (see Experiments #1–#3) and shifts (see Experiment #2) the range
of d¯2, in which the second non-fundamental steady state E2,− becomes stable. In addition, the
stability region of E1,+ also slightly increases in this case. Otherwise, whenever the risk-aversion
coefficient ν is too low (lower than δ¯i), unrealistic market situations occur immediately (see Table
3.5 for details).
3.6 Numerical Simulations with a Noise Term
The previous sections have shown a purely deterministic model. This allowed me to apply standard
methods from the tool box of nonlinear dynamics to give a precise description of the main model
characteristics, like the existence of fixed points and their local stability properties. In this section
I will briefly give some few examples in which I investigate through numerical simulations how
the model behavior is influenced by introducing a noise term into the system. Noise will be
implemented in two ways into the model framework. First I will follow Chiarella and He and
assume a stochastic dividend yield αt. Note that, according to Eq. (3.18), the dividend yield is
defined as αt = dt/pt−1, which is generally non-negative and depends on the current realization of
the dividend and the preceding stock price. Hence the noise dividend yield process is assumed to
be normally distributed around its mean α0, i.e.,
αt − α0
q
∼ N (0, 1) ,
where N (0, 1) denotes the standard normal distribution and q > 0 is a parameter that controls the
standard deviation of the dividend yield process.
In the second step an additional noise term will be introduced. Following the lines of Levy, Levy
and Solomon in their LLS model (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3), the investors’ optimal investment
proportion will be perturbated by a random term, i.e.,
π˜i,t = πi,t + ǫi,t , i = 1, 2 ,
where ǫi,t/b ∼ N (0, 1) with b > 0 is a constant. Note that ǫi,t is drawn separately for each investor.
From an economic point of view, the deviation from the investors’ optimal investment proportion
can be justified by assuming that, in each trading period, the traders’ investment decision is
partly determined by an ’irrational’ or psychological component or simply by a slightly erroneous
perception of the market situation or of their trading strategy.
The numerical simulations are based on two different trading periods. In the first numerical
experiment the time period between each trade is one year, as assumed in the previous sections and
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Contrarian vs. Trend-Follower Model
Results of the Simulation Experiments
Experiment #1 Experiment #2 Experiment #3
(δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.85, 0.85) (δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.5, 0.4) (δ¯1, δ¯2) = (0.5, 0.6)
stable stable stable
risk avers. fixed fixed fixed
coeff.
d¯2 ∈
point
d¯2 ∈
point
d¯2 ∈
point
(0.0, 0.9] E2,− (0.0, 0.3] E1,+ (0.0, 2.0] E2,−
ν = 1.4 [1.0, 4.0) all unstable§ [0.4, 2.7] E2,− [2.1, 4.0) all unstable
§
[2.8, 4.0) all unstable
ν = 1
(0.0, 0.1] E2,− (0.0, 0.2] E1,+ (0.0, 0.7] E2,−
[0.2, 4.0] all unstable§ [0.3, 1.5] E2,− [0.8, 4.0) all unstable
§
(benchmark)
[1.6, 4.0) all unstable§
(0.0, 0.1] E2,+ < 0
† (0.0, 0.5] E2,− (0.0, 4.0) all unstable
§
ν = 0.7
[0.2, 4.0) all unstable§ [0.6, 4.0) all unstable§
(0.0, 4.0) E2,+ < 0
† (0.0, 4.0) all unstable§ (0.0, 0.5] E1,− < 0
‡
ν = 0.4 {0.6} E2,+ < 0†
[0.7, 4.0) all unstable‖
(0.0, 4.0) E ††1,− (0.0, 1.9] E2,+ < 0
‡‡ (0.0, 4.0) E ††1,−
ν = 0.2
[2.0, 4.0) all unstable§
† In this case ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
2,+ < ρ
∗
1,− < 0 < ρ
∗
1,+.
†† In this case ρ∗2,− < 0 < ρ
∗
1,− < ρ
∗
2,+ < ρ
∗
1,+.
‡ In this case 0 < ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
1,− < ρ
∗
2,+ < 0 < E1,+.
‡‡ In this case ρ∗2,− < ρ
∗
2,+ < 0 < ρ
∗
1,− < ρ
∗
1,+.
§ In this case ρ∗2,± become complex.
¶ In almost all cases ρ∗2,± is complex.
‖ In this case ρ∗2,± become complex. Sometimes it converges to the risk free rate r.
Table 3.5: Stability properties for the contrarian vs. trend-follower model. The table can be read in the same way
as the previous ones.
in the LLS model (see Levy et al., 1994, 1995; Levy and Levy, 1996). Of course, simulation runs over
5000 trading rounds then seems to be a quite unrealistic idea. However, it brings the behavior of
the stochastic nonlinear dynamic system in line with the results of the purely deterministic system
investigated before. In the second experiment the time period is one day. It is here assumed that
the number of trading days per year is 250. The simulations are conducted over twenty years.
Obviously, for this scenario some parameters of the dynamic system have to be rescaled on a daily
basis to obtain realistic values for the return and the price time series of the risky asset. Using the
standard analytic manipulation rule for sums of i.i.d. normally distributed random variables, the
annual parameters are thus rescaled according to
rdaily = r/td , α0,daily = α0/td , δ¯i,daily = δ¯i/td , qdaily = q/
√
td , (3.54)
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where td denotes the trading days per year.
In the first experiment a two-contrarian model on an annual basis (td = 1) is considered. This
experiment investigates how the model is influenced by introducing three different levels of noise
into the model framework. As already explained above, noise is implemented in two different
ways. In the first and second investigation a dividend yield process with a lower and a higher
noise level is assumed. Then, in the third investigation, an additional random term is added to
the optimal investment proportion of each investor in the case of the higher noise dividend yield
process. In other words, the noise level will be systematically increased in a quantitative as well
as in a qualitative way. For the whole experiment the parameter set is assumed to be
r = 0.037 , α0 = 0.047 , L1 = L2 = 15 , ω0 = 0.00 , td = 1 ,
d¯1 = −0.7 , d¯2 = −1.0 , δ¯1 = δ¯2 = 0.4 , ν1 = 1.2 .
Thus the second investor extrapolates stronger than his/her counterpart. The risk-aversion coeffi-
cient of Investor 1 is fixed at ν1 = 1.2 while the risk preference of Investor 2 changes during each
investigation from ν2 = 1.2 to ν2 = 1.1 and then to ν2 = 1.125. Figure 3.8 shows the results from
the first experiment. The three horizontal rows correspond to the three different investigations, in
which the noise level is successively increased. From the left to the right panels the risk-aversion
coefficient of Investor 2 changes. All plots show the difference in the wealth proportion of the two
investors over time, i.e., ωt = ω1,t − ω2,t.
Let us first consider the case with a low noise level of the dividend yield process in the model.
According to Table 3.3 (see Subsection 3.5.4, Experiment #1), in the deterministic model Investor
1 will dominate the market if d¯1 > d¯2 and both investors are described by the same risk preference
(ν1 = ν2 > δ¯i, i = 1, 2). It is thus obvious to presume that this result still holds whenever the
noise level is modest (q = 0.05). The conjecture is confirmed by the first plot of Figure 3.8 (a).
Interestingly, if the risk aversion of Investor 2 falls below a certain threshold, the situation totally
changes immediately. As a lower risk-aversion coefficient implies a higher investment proportion
invested in the risky asset (see Eq. (3.38))45, Investor 2 now accumulates more wealth than Investor
1. Hence the wealth proportion of Investor 1 vanishes in the long run (see Figure 3.8 (b)). Of
course, parameter settings can be found in which both effects which act in the opposite direction
are balanced. On average, both investors then stay at their initial wealth level.46 Figure 3.8 (c) is
related to this case.
When the noise level is increased, the behavior of the model partly sees a qualitative change.
Figure 3.8 (d)–(f) shows the results for a standard deviation of 12% in the dividend yield process
45This phenomenon holds for the deterministic model in particular. Although these results are here not reported
in detail, numerical simulations indicate that this effect can be observed in general. In market situations in which
the investors’ risk-aversion coefficients νi (which have to exceed δ¯i) deviate from each other sufficiently, the investor
with the lower νi always prevails. However, this result might be rather unsurprising because the proposed model
framework does not take the second moment of the risky-asset return dynamics into account. Obviously, this leads
to the conclusion that taking higher risk (via a higher investment proportion πi,t) implies higher gains as a rule.
46The parameters have to be chosen very specifically to generate such ’balanced’ market situations. Hence this
situation seems quite artificial and hardly realistic.
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(a) ν1 = ν2 = 1.2, low noise level
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(d) ν1 = ν2 = 1.2, high noise level
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Figure 3.8: Influence of different risk preferences in a two-contrarian model with noise. All plots show the difference
in the wealth proportions of the two investors on an annual basis. Investor 2 extrapolates more strongly than Investor
1. The left panels exhibit the benchmark situation, in which both investors are assumed to have the same risk-
aversion coefficient. In the middle and right panels Investor 1 is assumed to be more risk-averse. Furthermore, the
noise is increased from the upper panels to the lower panels. The upper panels show a market situation in which
the noise level of the dividend yield is low (q = 0.05). In the middle panels the noise of the dividend yield process
is higher (q = 0.12). In the lower panels the same dividend yield process (q = 0.12) is combined with a second
noise term in the optimal investment proportion (b = 0.04). The parameters are td = 1, d¯1 = −0.7, d¯2 = −1.0,
δ¯1 = δ¯2 = 0.85, ω0 = 0.00, L1 = L2 = 15.
and the remaining parameters as before. In the case of homogeneous risk preferences, a higher
noise level simply leads to a slightly less smooth transition of ωt to its steady-state value of
the deterministic model, which is eventually still +1 (see Figure 3.8 (d)). For heterogeneous risk
preferences Investor 2 does not dominate the market, either for assuming ν2 = 1.1 or for ν2 = 1.125
(see Figure 3.8 (e) and (f)). Instead, both investors stay more or less at their initial wealth level
for ν2 = 1.1 and Investor 1 dominates the market in the long run for ν2 = 1.125. Thus a higher
noise level in the model seems to lead to a stabilization of Investor 1’s strategy , or, in other words,
Investor 2 has to choose a risk-aversion coefficient ν2 that is lower than would be necessary in the
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case of a lower noise level. To sum up, a higher noise level of the dividend yield process increases
the range in which Investor 1 dominates the market and, therefore, his/her counterpart has to
become less risk-averse than in the previous scenario to overcome his/her inferiority.
The lower panels concentrate on the case where the dividend yield process has a high standard
deviation of 12% and, in addition, the optimal investment proportions of the two investors are
slightly perturbed by a random term with a standard deviation of 4%. Figure 3.8 (g)–(i) clearly
indicates that the appearance of the deterministic model’s time series is superposed by the incor-
porated second noise term noise. While in the previous scenarios one investor eventually dominates
the market in nearly all cases, the investors’ wealth proportions now fluctuates around its initial
value. None of the investors can take over the total market power. Nevertheless, looking at the
simulation data it can be detected that the lower the assumed risk aversion of Investor 2, the better
he/she performs. In other words, the behavior of the deterministic model can still be observed
in the noisy model. However, this effect is hardly visible in Figure 3.8 (g)–(i) and less distinctive
than in the upper and middle panels. One last remark is in order. From the last investigation
it once again seems obvious that the investment proportion of the investors is a decisive determi-
nant of the CH model. While implementing noise in the dividend yield process merely leads to a
shift in the turning point at which the investors change their superiority, introducing noise in the
investors’ optimal investment proportion has a direct impact on the qualitative model outcome.
Hence the optimal investment proportion πi is an extremely important variable in the conditional
equations of the deterministic dynamic system and crucially influences the overall dynamics. If
such a variable undergoes a perturbation, the dynamic system will behave in a totally different
way as observed by comparing the upper and middle panels with the lower panels of Figure 3.8.
Although the previous discussion only considers an experiment with one specific parameter set,
the results outlined above appear to be quite general. Indeed, further numerical simulations with
different parameter sets (not reported here) show that the model performs in a similar way for
a wide range of parameters and also for different trading strategies. In this sense, the findings
represent the typical model behavior.
Before I close this section, a second experiment will briefly be considered. As a time series of
5000 time steps on an annual basis describes a rather unrealistic market situation, I will attempt
to scale the model on a daily basis according to Eq. (3.54). The results obtained in this experiment
can again be generalized to other market scenarios. The parameter set for the second experiment
is assumed to be
r = 0.037 , α0 = 0.047 , td = 250 , ω0 = 0.00 , L1 = L2 = 15 , p0 = 10 ,
d¯1 = −1.6 , d¯2 = 1.4 , δ¯1 = 0.95 , δ¯2 = 0.87 , ν1 = ν2 = 1.2 ,
which describes a contrarian versus trend-follower model with investors who are characterized by
the same risk-aversion coefficient. Numerical simulations reveal some limitations in the CH model.
When the model parameters are scaled on a daily level (td = 250) the dynamic system eventually
explodes in almost all cases. No realistic market dynamics can be obtained. Although numerical
results on a daily basis are presented for the homogeneous and heterogeneous case in Chiarella and
3.6 Numerical Simulations with a Noise Term 144
He (2001), these findings are still in harmony with the original publication, because Chiarella and
He did not rescale the parameter δ¯i. However, since δi is the excess return of the risky asset from
the risk-free rate r (see Eq. (3.29)), this might be rather inconsistent.47 Instead, δi (or δ¯i) should
also be rescaled on a daily basis as proposed in Eq. (3.54). As the dynamics of the model in this
case does not behave in a reasonable way, or even leads to explosions of the time series of returns,
the scaling factor of δi is chosen differently. Figure 3.9 shows the result for δi being rescaled by a
factor 100, 10 and not being rescaled.
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Figure 3.9: Contrarian vs. trend-follower model with noise on a daily level. Time series of prices (upper panels) and
difference in the wealth proportion of investors (lower panels) are depicted for differently rescaled model parameters
δ¯i, i = 1, 2. Parameters are r = 0.037, α0 = 0.047, td = 250, ω0 = 0.00; L1 = L2 = 15, p0 = 10, d¯1 = −1.6,
d¯2 = 1.4, δ¯1 = 0.95, δ¯2 = 0.87, ν1 = ν2 = 1.2.
If the model parameter δi, i = 1, 2 stays at its annual level (right panels), the time series of
prices qualitatively resemble realistic time series from real data from a visual perspective (upper
right panel). Over 20 years the price of the risky asset has risen from its initial value 10 up
to its highest value of about 120. Furthermore, the growing price trend can easily be detected
and is accompanied by local deviations from the overall growing process since higher-than-average
increases and declines of the asset price are also visible in the time series. The corresponding lower
time series (see Figure 3.9 (f)) shows the difference of investors’ wealth proportions ωt. It is quite
obvious that, on a daily level of returns, the dominance of one investor over the other on an annual
basis is not as distinct as in the preceding first experiment. Hence Investor 1 accumulates at best
4% more wealth than his/her counterpart.
Contrastingly, if the parameter δi is rescaled by a factor 10 (middle panels) or a factor 100
(left panels) the realistic appearance of the time series of asset prices vanishes and the model
47However, that rescaling the parameters δi leads to rather small and unrealistic optimal investment proportions
πi. Therefore, it can be argued that δi should stay at its original level as proposed in Chiarella and He (2001).
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outcome becomes more insubstantial. The price development is simply characterized by the growing
dividend process without any significant deviation from the overall price trend (see Figure 3.9 (a)
and (b)). Interestingly, rescaling δi leads to a shift in the dominance of investors (compare Figure
3.9 (d) and Figure 3.9 (f)), which is caused by the fact that a rescaled δi directly influences the
investors’ trading strategies and thus also their optimal investment proportion. It can again be
observed that a higher investment proportion invested in the risky asset leads to a dominance in
the market in all numerical experiments.
3.7 The CH Model under LLS-like Assumptions
Before I close this chapter I will investigate the CH model under the assumption that the investors’
optimal investment proportions are bounded within an interval slightly smaller than 0 and 1 so
that short selling is forbidden in every trading period. Here, I will mainly concentrate on whether
the typical results of the LLS model, such as periodic booms and crashes and certain behavior of
the cycle length depending on the investors’ memory length (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3 for details),
are reproduced by the CH model, or whether more realistic time series of prices and returns can
be generated by such a modified CH model. For this reason some further model assumptions of
the original CH model must be adjusted to get a model design for the CH model which more
closely resembles the LLS model. As a direct consequence, the analysis of the dynamics is based
exclusively on numerical simulations, as is the case for the LLS model.
To make the results of the CH model comparable with the results of the original LLS model, the
CH model design is modified as follows. In both model frameworks the investors are myopic utility
maximizers using a CRRA utility function for their portfolio maximization procedure. Remember
that in the case of the CH model the optimal investment proportion πi,t of investor i at time t is
given by
πi,t =
1
νi
Ei,t(ρt+1)− r
V ari,t(ρt+1)
, (3.55)
where heterogeneous beliefs can be introduced by specifying Ei,t(ρt+1) and V ari,t(ρt+1) as already
outlined in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Furthermore, we have seen that the wealth proportions of the
investors evolve according to Eq. (3.16):
ωi,t+1 =
ωi,t[R+ πi,t(ρt+1 − r)]∑I
j=1 ωj,t[R+ πj,t(ρt+1 − r)]
, i = 1, . . . , I ,
where the return ρt+1 is given by Eq. (3.17):
ρt+1 = r +
∑I
i=1 ωi,t[(1 + r)(πi,t − πi,t+1)− αt+1πi,t]∑I
i=1 πi,tωi,t(πi,t+1 − 1)
(3.56)
with αt+1 = dt+1/pt being the dividend yield. As in the LLS model, we assume that our artifi-
cial market consists of I different investors with the belief of each investor being mathematically
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expressed by48
Ei,t(ρt+1) = ρ¯i,t , (3.57)
V ari,t(ρt+1) = σ
2 + ησ¯2i,t , (3.58)
where σ2 > 0 and η ≥ 0 are constants and
ρ¯i,t =
1
Li
Li∑
k=1
ρt−k and σ¯i,t =
√√√√ 1
Li − 1
Li∑
k=1
(ρt−k − ρ¯i,t)2 (3.59)
with integers Li ≥ 1, i = 1, . . . , I. Note that while the CH model framework uses a slightly different
approach to the LLS framework to determine the optimal investment proportion πi,t, the investors’
beliefs about the next period’s price (or return) are still economically formulated in as similar a
fashion as possible. As in the case of the LLS model, all investors only use the last few returns
of the risky asset to form their beliefs and weight each of them uniformly to reappear in the next
trading period. Note that the parameter Li in Eq. (3.59) corresponds to the memory span k used
in the LLS model.
One of the main building blocks of the LLS model is the manipulation of the investors’ optimal
investment proportion; there will now be an additional random term which is restricted between
some lower and upper boundary bl and bu. This is implemented in the following way. As already
considered in the previous section, the investors’ optimal investment proportion is first perturbated
by a random term via
π˜i,t = πi,t + ǫi,t , i = 1, . . . , I ,
where ǫi,t is drawn separately for each investor from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and standard deviation σǫ. Then, we must check if every single investor’s individual investment
proportion π˜i,t fulfills the constraint
bl ≤ π˜i,t ≤ bu . (3.60)
Where this is not the case, new random terms ǫi,t are drawn for the relevant investors. This
procedure may be repeated until the restriction Eq. (3.60) holds for all investors.
Following the line of investigation proposed by the authors of the LLS model, two different model
versions are considered in the next two subsections: a homogeneous version where all investors
use the same trading strategy, and, in the second subsection, a heterogeneous version where the
investors can be subdivided into two groups by their pursuing different trading strategies.
3.7.1 Numerical Results for the Homogeneous Model Version
In the homogeneous model version all the investors only deviate from each other by their different
random factor ǫi,t added to the optimal diversification proportion πt, the latter being identical for
every investor.49 To get some comparable numerical results for this scenario, all model parameters
48There is also a technical reason for the specific choice of the conditional variance V ari,t(ρt+1) in Eq. (3.58).
Since the random sampling variance σ¯2i,t might in principle become zero, for which πi,t is not defined, e.g., in the
case where the system converges to a locally stable steady state, an additional non-zero fixed variance term σ2 is
added.
49For convenience, the index i labelling the single investor is omitted for the homogeneous model.
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have to be specified in a similar way to in the original publications of the LLS model. Hence we
assume that 100 investors are in the market and that all use a memory span of 15 time lags to
determine their optimal investment proportion πt. The lower and upper boundaries for the optimal
investment proportions of the investors are chosen as 0.1 and 0.9 respectively. Furthermore, the
trading period between two time steps is assumed to be one year. For the first experiment the
parameter set of the homogeneous CH model is chosen as
r = 0.03 , α0 = 0.03 , L1 = L2 = 15 , I = 100 , td = 1 ,
bl = 0.1 , bu = 0.9 , ν1 = ν2 = 1.0 , σ = 0.4 , p0 = 10 ,
whereas the parameters σǫ and η are varied during the simulation experiment.
Figure 3.10 shows the results. It presents typical time series of prices together with the cor-
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Figure 3.10: CH model with bounded optimal investment proportions (homogeneous case). Time series of prices
(upper panels) and bounded optimal investment proportions (lower panels) are shown for different choices of σǫ
and η if only one investor group is in the market. In the case of no noise (σǫ = 0.0), the stock price simply grows
exponentially. In the case of a noisy demand (σǫ = 0.2), the time series of prices exhibits periodic behavior (upper
middle and upper right panel) caused by the constraints imposed for the investors’ optimal investment proportions.
The remaining parameters are chosen as r = 0.03, α0 = 0.03, L1 = L2 = 15, I = 100, td = 1, bl = 0.1, bu = 0.9,
ν1 = ν2 = 1.0, σ = 0.4, p0 = 10.
responding time series of the optimal investment proportions πt of the investor group for the
homogeneous model. In the no-noise case (i.e., σǫ = 0.0) the prices of the risky asset simply
grow exponentially due to an identical demand function for all investors, which thus leads to a
no-trade situation (see Figure 3.10 (a)). In such a situation all investors want to invest as much
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as possible in the risky stock, which is restricted to 90% of their total wealth in our experimental
setup. Therefore, the time series of the optimal investment proportion rapidly converges to the
upper bound bu = 0.9 after passing through a short transient period (see Figure 3.10 (d)). Of
course, such market behavior is identical to the findings in the original LLS model (see Figure 2.16
in Chapter 2). Nevertheless, note that the constant growth rates of prices are different in both
models for this pathological case. While in the LLS model the growth rate is simply determined
by the chosen level of dividends, the growth rate of the price level is significantly higher in the CH
model. This can be explained by the different model frameworks. In the case of the CH model the
dynamic system is formulated in terms of the return of the risky asset, from which the asset price
can be determined afterwards via Eq. (3.1). In the homogeneous no-noise case the asset return
converges to a steady state according to Eq. (3.56) with π∗ = 0.9, which leads to a relatively high
fixed return and thus to a asset prices with a higher growth rate than in the LLS model framework.
However, if an individual noise term is introduced into the investors’ demand functions, the
stock price starts to fluctuate around the exponential price trend. While Figure 3.10 (b) and (e)
exhibits a simulation run for the case where all investors use the same constant perception of the
conditional variance of the risky-asset return, Figure 3.10 (c) and (f) presents results for a time-
dependent case of the variance term (see Eq. (3.58)). Interestingly, the widely known and ‘noted’
periodic booms and crashes in the stock price for almost all model variants generated by the LLS
model also occur for certain parameter settings in our modified CH model version. An explanation
for this phenomenon is similar to the LLS case and, therefore, straightforward. If prices rise, the
investors will become increasingly bullish until all of them invest as much as possible in the stock.
A small number of ‘outliers’ in the investors’ noise term, who are almost homogeneous in this
market situation, can cause a drastic change in the investor’s individual investment proportion,
leading to a market crash from which all investors will recover step by step so that the market can
become bullish again. This ‘discontinuity property’ (see Levy et al. (1995)) can be immediately
detected by looking at the time series of the (homogeneous) optimal investment proportions πt,
where dramatic changes can be observed, as already seen in the LLS model.
Nevertheless, further simulation experiments indicate that those LLS-like results are not as
robust against changes in the parameters as in the original LLS model. The main reason for this
fact might be the analytic form of the optimal investment proportion πt given in Eq. (3.55). Beside
the numerator, in which the (the first moment of the) trading strategy is defined, it is obvious that
the time-depend realization of πt also crucially depends on the denominator, which can be adjusted
particularly by the parameters σ and η. It is evident that an increase in the denominator leads to
a lower optimal investment proportion (see Figure 3.10 (f)) while choosing the conditional variance
of the risky-asset return too small is associated with πt values near or even at the upper boundary
bu, which directly leads to exponentially growing stock prices.
Figure 3.11 exhibits the results for σ = 0 and η = 1 (and σǫ = 0.2 as before), i.e., all investors
simply using the purely random sampling variance σ¯t for the determination of their optimal in-
vestment proportion. Again, periodic price patterns can be detected where market crashes directly
occur one trading period after one single day of a market boom. Since in this market scenario the
model assumptions are adjusted to the LLS case to the highest possible degree, these results can
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be seen as the corresponding CH-results to the LLS model assumptions.
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Figure 3.11: CH model with most possible LLS-like assumptions (homogeneous case). Time series of prices (left
panel) and corresponding bounded optimal investment proportions (right panel) are shown for σ = 0.0 and η = 1.0
if only one investor group is in the market. The stock price grows exponentially with periodic booms, each of them
immediately followed by a commensurate market crash in the next trading period. The remaining parameters are
chosen as r = 0.03, α0 = 0.03, L1 = L2 = 15, I = 100, td = 1, bl = 0.1, bu = 0.9, ν1 = ν2 = 1.0, σǫ = 0.2, p0 = 10.
As already stated above, further simulation runs indicate a certain sensitivity of the model
dynamics with respect to the parameter values. (These are not presented in detail here.) For
instance, an increase in the dividend yield α0 as well as an expansion of the lower and upper
boundaries bl and bu leads to a tendency of higher optimal investment proportions and exponen-
tially growing stock prices. Nevertheless, one further accordance with the LLS model should be
remarked. As already known from the LLS model framework, the cycle length of the stock price’s
periodic behavior crucially depends on the investors’ memory span.
3.7.2 Numerical Results for the Heterogeneous Model Version
In the heterogeneous model version we mainly concentrate on a model structure with two investor
types in the market each type using different memory spans Li, i = 1, 2 to form their expectations.
The investors are assumed to be evenly distributed among the two groups. Now three different
experiments will be considered.
Similar to the initial experiment for the homogeneous model, in the first experiment the pa-
rameter set is chosen as
r = 0.03 , α0 = 0.03 , L1 = 5 , L2 = 8 , I = 100 , td = 1 ,
bl = 0.1 , bu = 0.9 , ν1 = 1.0 , ν2 = 1.0 , p0 = 10 , σǫ = 0.2 ,
whereas the parameters σ and η are varied during the experiment. It describes a market where
investors can be grouped into investor types with memory span L1 = 5 and L2 = 8. The results of
the simulation runs are summarized in Figure 3.12. The upper left and upper middle panel shows
that the market price becomes slightly more irregular in the heterogeneous model. Nevertheless, the
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Figure 3.12: CH model with bounded optimal investment proportions (heterogeneous case). Time series of prices
(upper panels) and time series of average wealth proportion (lower panels) are shown in a two investor-group model
with memory spans Li = 5, 8 for different choices of the parameters σ and η. The remaining parameters are r = 0.03,
α0 = 0.03, L1 = 5, L2 = 8, I = 100, td = 1, bl = 0.1, bu = 0.9, ν1 = 1.0, ν2 = 1.0, p0 = 10, σǫ = 0.2.
price patterns are still rather predictable. These findings are shared with the original LLS model
(see Figure 2.17 in Chapter 2, Section 2.3). The lower panels exhibit the average wealth proportion
of the investor group using the smaller memory span L1 = 5. Obviously, if the parameters are
chosen in such a way that periodic booms and crashes are generated by our modified CH model, the
behavior of the wealth share of investors will behave in the same way as stated in the publications of
the original LLS model: the population with the smaller memory span will eventually dominate the
market (see Chapter 2, Subsection 2.3.2). Otherwise, if the denominator of the optimal investment
proportion is increased (i.e., for η = 5.0), which makes the market crashes follow immediately
in the subsequent trading periods, this phenomenon becomes less strong since the investor group
with memory span 5 cannot exploit their dominating trading strategy as strongly. Finally, if the
‘most LLS-like’ assumptions are assumed (i.e., σ = 0.0, η = 1.0), the stock price simply grows
exponentially and, therefore, no trading group can prevail over the other.
The second experiment investigates the influence of the memory spans for a parameter set
which generates LLS-like booms and crashes as shown in Figure 3.12 (a). Hence the parameter set
is assumed to be
r = 0.03 , α0 = 0.03 , I = 100 , td = 1 , σ = 0.4 , η = 0.0 ,
bl = 0.1 , bu = 0.9 , ν1 = 1.0 , ν2 = 1.0 , p0 = 10 , σǫ = 0.2 .
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Figure 3.13 shows results for three scenarios, namely Li = 5, 9, Li = 5, 14 and Li = 5, 18 with
i = 1, 2. While investor groups with slightly larger memory spans than their counterpart lose all
the wealth to the other group with a smaller memory span (see Figure 3.13 (a)), they start to
perform better or even dominate the market most of the time when they increase their memory
span (see Figure 3.13 (b) and (c)). This result slightly deviates from the findings reported in Levy
et al. (1996, p. 103).50
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Figure 3.13: Time series of wealth share with two investor-groups and a constant variance term. The three panels
show a CH model with two investor-groups acting in the market and bounded optimal investment proportions. The
investor group with a memory span of 5 time lags quite quickly prevails over the investor group using a moderately
higher memory span, e.g., L2 = 9 (left panel). However, if the second investor group increases their memory span
slightly, e.g., L2 = 14, they perform better (middle panel). If the second investor group increases their memory
span slightly more, e.g., L2 = 18, they even become able to dominate the market (right panel). The remaining
parameters are r = 0.03, α0 = 0.03, I = 100, td = 1, σ = 0.4, η = 0.0, bl = 0.1, bu = 0.9, ν1 = 1.0, ν2 = 1.0,
p0 = 10, σǫ = 0.2.
In the final experiment the same investigation is repeated for the ‘most LLS-like’ assumptions,
i.e., σ = 0.0 and η = 1.0. Consequently, the parameter set is chosen as follows:
r = 0.03 , α0 = 0.03 , I = 100 , td = 1 , σ = 0.0 , η = 1.0 ,
bl = 0.1 , bu = 0.9 , ν1 = 1.0 , ν2 = 1.0 , p0 = 10 , σǫ = 0.2 .
The overall results are straightforward. Since in this scenario the stock price simply grows exponen-
tially (see Figure 3.12 (c)), the influence of differently chosen memory spans is almost insignificant.
Nevertheless, the results of the previous experiment can be confirmed at least on a qualitative level.
While investors types with slightly lower memory spans (i.e., L1 = 5 vs L2 = 9) again dominate
the market by holding no more than 60% of the total wealth of the market at its maximum, the
second investor group can improve their performance by using an increased memory span (see
Figure 3.14).
Furthermore, it can be shown in this scenario that investors who decrease their risk-aversion
coefficient νi prevail over the other investors. This can be simply explained by the fact that a
lower risk-aversion coefficient leads to a higher demand function for the risky asset, which, in turn,
directly results in a better performance if the stock price grows without any significant booms and
crashes. (These results are not shown here in details.)
50See also Chapter 2, Subsection 2.3.2 for details.
3.8 Summary 152
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  500  1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
W
ea
lth
 P
ro
po
rti
on
 fo
r I
nv
es
to
rs
Time
wealth share L1=5
(a) Li = 5, 9
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  500  1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
W
ea
lth
 P
ro
po
rti
on
 fo
r I
nv
es
to
rs
Time
wealth share L1=5
(b) Li = 5, 17
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  500  1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
W
ea
lth
 P
ro
po
rti
on
 fo
r I
nv
es
to
rs
Time
wealth share L1=5
(c) Li = 5, 26
Figure 3.14: Time series of wealth share with two investor-groups and a time-dependent variance. In the case of
strict LLS-like assumptions, i.e., σ = 0.0 and η = 1.0, the characteristics of the findings from the second experiment
(see Figure 3.13) are minor apparent although their qualitative tendencies can still be detected. The remaining
parameters are r = 0.03, α0 = 0.03, I = 100, td = 1, σ = 0.0, η = 1.0, bl = 0.1, bu = 0.9, ν1 = 1.0, ν2 = 1.0,
p0 = 10, σǫ = 0.2.
3.8 Summary
This chapter adopts the framework developed by Chiarella and He (2001) as a starting point and
incorporates a measure of investors’ risk aversion in a growth model of both the asset price and
total wealth of investors with heterogeneous expectations. Following the line of research proposed
by Chiarella and He (2001), I reformulate the growth model in terms of the return of the risky
asset and the wealth proportion of heterogeneous investors, which makes the model stationary
as well as analytically tractable. Replacing the originally assumed logarithmic utility function
with a more general power utility function which accounts for differing risk aversion, this chapter
provides an explicit study of how the Chiarella-He (CH) model is affected by different types of
investors having different risk attitudes. As in almost all other behavioral models of financial
markets, two ‘prototypes’ of investors are considered: fundamentalists and chartists, with the latter
investor group being again subdivided in two trader types, namely trend followers and contrarians.
An extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the risk-aversion coefficient in the power utility
function of both investor types was performed in both a homogeneous and heterogeneous model
version. We might summarize the results of this chapter as follows:
• The dynamics of the system is affected by the investors’ risk attitudes (measured by the
risk-aversion coefficient of the underlying utility function) and shows a striking dependence
on the ratio of the risk-aversion coefficient and the excess conditional mean from the risk-free
rate in the homogeneous model as well in the case of two investor-groups. In general, if the
risk-aversion coefficients are above the excess conditional mean from the risk-free rate (i.e.,
ratio > 1), all the results found by Chiarella and He can be confirmed in the enriched version
of the CH model. Otherwise, if the risk-aversion coefficient is below the excess conditional
mean from the risk-free rate (ratio < 1), the return and wealth proportion dynamics becomes
either unstable or leads to degenerated fixed equilibria in most cases.
• Whenever the ratio > 1, the fundamentalist who is less risk-averse than his/her fundamental
counterpart dominates the market in the long run, i.e., he/she accumulates all the wealth of
the market (measured in terms of wealth proportion of investors), which also comes along
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with a relatively higher long-term return of the market compared to the long-term return
should the more risk-averse fundamentalist have dominated the market. Instead, for ratio
< 1 this ‘market selection principle’ does not hold in any model variants for these cases.
• With the analytically manageable size of the homogeneous model version, some slightly
inconsistent model assumptions (or at least crucially limiting model assumptions) become
obvious. Although these are already incorporated in the original model design, they become
particularly evident when studying the influence of risk on the return and wealth proportion
dynamics of the CH model. First, the assumption of a constant excess conditional mean from
the risk-free rate might be too restrictive because market scenarios can be generated in which
the investors’ expectations about the development of the risky asset and about the investors’
basic attitude towards investing in risky prospects are modeled in the opposite way, which
leads to the model exhibiting absurd market behavior. Second, the expectations about the
development of the return of the risky asset that are formed by the different investor groups
will never be fulfilled even if the dynamic system reaches one of its fixed equilibria, which
also represents a rather unsatisfying model characteristic.
• In the heterogeneous two-investors model with different combinations of fundamentalist and
chartist investors, the ‘market selection principle’ is only valid if the investors’ attitude to-
wards risk (measured by their risk-aversion coefficient in their utility function) is higher than
the investors’ expectations about the excess return of the risky asset (measured by the excess
conditional mean from the risk-free rate).
• Introducing external noise to the dynamic system leads to partly qualitative changes in the
model behavior. For heterogeneous risk preferences of investors, the dominating investor (in
terms of accumulated wealth proportion) in the deterministic case becomes less dominating
when a sufficiently high noise level is switched on. Thus introducing noise to the model has
a stabilizing effect to the inferior investor.
• The attempt to scale the enriched CH model on a daily level (250 trading days per year) leads
mostly to explosive price paths and unrealistic market behavior. Such limitation with regard
to the calibration of the model parameters is quite common in artificial financial markets
and is thus shared by many other behavioral models of this type.51
• For a noisy multi-investors version of the CH model with 100 investors acting in the mar-
ket in which short selling is suppressed by appropriate lower and upper boundaries for the
investment proportions, periodic booms and crashes can be generated for specific choices of
the parameter set as already observed in a similar model framework proposed by Levy et al.
(1994, 1995, 1996). Nevertheless, these LLS-like results are not as robust against changes in
the parameters as in the original LLS model.
In summary, the study provides further insights into the dynamic behavior of the CH model. The
overall result of our investigation of an enriched version of the original model is that the only
feasible parameter space is restricted to market situations in which the investors’ risk-aversion
51For some more general remarks on this discussion, see LeBaron (2000).
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coefficient is assumed to be sufficiently high compared to the expected excess return of the risky
asset. Furthermore, the explicit incorporation of risk into the CH model reveals some limitations
and inconsistencies in the main building blocks of the model.
Finally, one further assumption in the CH model might be doubtful. A normally distributed
or even constant dividend yield (originally defined as αt ≡ dt+1/pt in the CH model) implies that
price variations (e.g., caused by speculative activities of the investors) are directly compensated by
opposite dividend variations. This is not only an unrealistic assumption but also counter-intuitive,
since investigating speculative activities which may arise, generated by certain trading strategies
of the investors, are of special interest in this kind of behavioral models and, therefore, should not
be automatically smoothed away by the model framework.
As a consequence, the procedure that follows is straightforward. We have seen an interesting
asset pricing model which still requires some improvements in its own model structure, and now
we want to know if we can find some modifications of the model’s main building blocks which still
leads us to an analytically and numerically manageable dynamic system, but which also makes
some more realistic and reasonable assumptions about the economic intuition behind the technical
model framework. Such a model framework will be proposed in the last part of this thesis.
Appendix to Chapter 3
A 3.1 Heuristic Explanation for Formula (3.26)
Let Wt be the wealth of an investor at time t and assume he/she is a (myopic) expected utility of wealth
maximizer, which means that he/she solves the maximization problem EtU(Wt+1) in every time period
t.52 Due to the fact that in most cases the expectation value cannot be derived analytically, a Taylor
expansion for Wt+1 around c ·Wt up to the second order is considered, which is given by
53
U(Wt+1) = U(cWt) + U
′(cWt)(Wt+1 − cWt) +
U ′′(cWt)
2
(Wt+1 − cWt)
2 +O(W 3t+1) .
Then, the expected utility can (approximately) be derived by
Et[U(Wt+1)] = U(cWt) + U
′(cWt)(Et(Wt+1)− cWt) +
U ′′(cWt)
2
V art(Wt+1) , (A 3.1)
where E[(Wt+1 − cWt)
2] ≈ V art(Wt+1) is used apart from the Taylor approximation. As expected utility
preferences are invariant under linear transformations, Eq. (A 3.1) can be rewritten as
Et[U(Wt+1)] ≈ U(Wt) + U
′(Wt)(Et(Wt+1)−Wt) +
U ′′(Wt)
2
V art(Wt+1) .
From Eq. (3.3) and Eq. (3.4) it follows that
Et[U(Wt+1)] ≈ U(Wt) + U
′(Wt) {Wt[R+ πt(Et(ρt+1)− r)]−Wt}+
+
U ′′(Wt)
2
W 2t π
2
tV art(ρt+1)
=
˘
U(Wt) + U
′(Wt)Wtr
¯
+
˘
U ′(Wt)Wt(Et(ρt+1)− r)
¯
πt +
+

1
2
U ′′(Wt)W
2
t V art(ρt+1)
ﬀ
π2t .
52For the sake of convenience, the index i which labels the single investor is omitted here.
53From (Eq. (3.2)) Wt+1 should be (approximately) distributed around c ·Wt, where c is assumed to be deter-
ministic.
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Hence the maximization problem maxπt Et[U(Wt+1)] can be solved by using the first-order condition,
which leads to the (approximately) optimal solution
πt = −
U ′(Wt)
WtU
′′(Wt)
Et(ρt+1)− r
V art(ρt+1)
.
Applying Eq. (A 3.1) to U(W ) = ln(W ), the optimal investment proportion for an investor preferring a
logarithmic utility function is given by
πt =
Et(ρt+1)− r
V art(ρt+1)
as claimed in Eq. (3.5). Assuming a (standard) power utility function instead, that is
U(W ) =
W 1−ν
1− ν
,
leads to
πt =
1
ν
Et(ρt+1)− r
V art(ρt+1)
,
which is in harmony with Eq. (3.26).
A 3.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is totally analogous to the derivation of Theorem 3.1 and can be simply obtained
by replacing the variables therein by the newly introduced variables provided with a bar. In addition, the
sums have to be adapted. Thus,
ω¯j,t+1 =
W¯j,t+1
W¯t+1
=
W¯j,t[R+ π¯j,t(ρt+1 − r)]
W¯t+1
=
ω¯j,t[R+ π¯j,t(ρt+1 − r)]
W¯t+1/W¯t
, (A 3.2)
where again the denominator can be rewritten by
W¯t+1
W¯t
=
Ph
ℓ=1 W¯ℓ,t[R+ π¯ℓ,t(ρt+1 − r)]
W¯t
=
hX
ℓ=1
ω¯ℓ,t[R+ π¯ℓ,t(ρt+1 − r)] . (A 3.3)
Combining Eq. (A 3.2) and Eq. (A 3.3) directly leads to Eq. (3.23).
Noting that nj · I is the number of investors in trading group j, the market clearing equilibrium can
be written as
Npt =
IX
i=1
πi,tWi,t =
hX
j=1
(njI) · π¯j,tW¯j,t ,
which leads to an expression similar to Eq. (3.12), that is
Npt
I
=
hX
j=1
nj π¯j,tW¯j,t = W¯t
hX
j=1
nj π¯j,tω¯j,t . (A 3.4)
Replacing t with t+ 1 in Eq. (A 3.4) and dividing the result by Eq. (A 3.4) gives
W¯t+1
W¯t
Ph
j=1 nj π¯j,t+1ω¯j,t+1Ph
j=1 nj π¯j,tω¯j,t
=
pt+1
pt
,
which can also be written as
hX
ℓ=1
ω¯ℓ,t[R+ π¯ℓ,t(ρt+1 − r)]
Ph
j=1 nj π¯j,t+1ω¯j,t+1Ph
j=1 nj π¯j,tω¯j,t
= 1 + ρt+1 − αt+1 (A 3.5)
using αt+1 = dt+1/pt. Note that from Eq. (3.23) the enumerator on the left-hand side is given by
hX
j=1
nj π¯j,t+1ω¯j,t+1 =
hX
j=1
njπ¯j,t+1
(
ω¯j,t[R+ π¯j,t(ρt+1 − r)]Ph
ℓ=1 ω¯ℓ,t[R+ π¯ℓ,t(ρt+1 − r)]
)
. (A 3.6)
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Substitution of Eq. (A 3.6) into Eq. (A 3.5) and simplification of the corresponding expression leads to the
equation
hX
j=1
nj π¯j,t+1ω¯j,t[R+ π¯j,t(ρt+1 − r)] = (1 + ρt+1 − αt+1)
 
hX
j=1
njπ¯j,tω¯j,t
!
,
from which Eq. (3.24) can directly be determined.
A 3.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4
It follows from Eq. (3.22) and Eq. (3.21) that the fixed point ρ∗ satisfies
(ρ∗ − r)(1− π∗) = α0 ,
where π∗ = 1
ν
(δ¯ + d¯ρ∗). If d = 0, then ρ∗0 = r +
α0
1−δ¯/ν
. Let A = α0
1−δ¯/ν
. Then A < −r if and only if
δ¯ > ν > ν0 ≡ δ¯/(1 + α0/r) and −r ≤ A < 0 if and only if ν0 ≥ ν > 0. Furthermore it is 0 < A < α0 if
and only if ν < 0 and A > α0 if and only if ν > δ¯. Let f(ν) = ρ
∗
0. It can be verified that f(ν) → +∞ as
ν → δ¯+, f(ν)→ −∞ as ν → δ¯−, f(ν)→ r as ν → 0, and f(ν)→ r + α0 as ν → −∞.
For d 6= 0, ρ∗ fulfills
(ρ∗ − r)
»
1−
1
ν
(δ¯ + d¯ρ∗)
–
− α0 = 0 ,
which has two solutions given by Eq. (3.31). Define D ≡ [r − ν−δ¯
d¯
]2 − 4να0
d¯
. Then ρ∗± ∈ R if and only if
D ≥ 0.
Now, consider the Subcases (a)–(c). Firstly, if ν > δ¯ > 0, for d < 0 it isD ≥ 0, so ρ∗± ∈ R. Furthermore,
ρ∗− <
1
2
»
r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
−
˛˛˛
˛r − ν − δ¯d¯
˛˛˛
˛
–
=
1
2
»
r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
− r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
–
=
ν − δ¯
d¯
< 0 ,
as well as,
ρ∗+ >
1
2
»
r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
+
˛˛˛
˛r − ν − δ¯d¯
˛˛˛
˛
–
=
1
2
»
r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
+ r −
ν − δ¯
d¯
–
= r .
It can also be verified that ρ∗+ < ρ
∗
0 if d < 0. Assume now d > 0 and Eq. (3.32) holds. Then ρ
∗
± ∈ R and
we can verify that ρ∗0 < ρ
∗
− if and only if (ν − δ¯)/d¯ > r + 2α0ν/(ν − δ¯), which is, d¯ < doL,1. ρ
∗
+ < ρ
∗
0 if
and only if r − (ν − δ¯)/d¯ > 0, which is, d¯ > doU,1. Let g(d¯) = ρ
∗
+ and h(d¯) = ρ
∗
−. Then we can check that
g(d¯)→ ρ∗0 as d¯→ 0
− for d < 0, while for d > 0, h(d¯)→ ρ∗0 as d¯→ 0
+.
Secondly, assume δ¯ > ν > 0 and d < 0. Then D ≥ 0, so that ρ∗± ∈ R. Furthermore,
ρ∗+ >
1
2
»
r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
+
˛˛˛
˛r − ν − δ¯d¯
˛˛˛
˛
–
=
(
r if d¯ ≤ ν−δ¯
r
ν−δ¯
d¯
> r if d¯ > ν−δ¯
r
and ρ∗0 < r, i.e., ρ
∗
+ > r > ρ
∗
0. It can also be verified that ρ
∗
− ≤ ρ
∗
0 if and only if ρ
∗
0 ≥ 0, which is ν ≤ ν0.
ρ∗− > ρ
∗
0 if and only if ρ
∗
0 < 0, which is, ν > ν0. Assume now d > 0 and Eq. (3.32) holds. Then ρ
∗
± ∈ R.
For ν ≤ ν0, it is
ρ∗+ <
1
2
»
r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
+
˛˛˛
˛r − ν − δ¯d¯
˛˛˛
˛
–
=
1
2
»
r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
+ r −
ν − δ¯
d¯
–
= r . (A 3.7)
We can also verify that ρ∗+ > ρ
∗
0 and ρ
∗
− < 0 when d > 0 and ν ≤ ν0. If for d > 0, ν > ν0 Eq. (A 3.7)
still holds, but we can check that ρ∗+ < ρ
∗
0 if and only if r + 2α0ν/(ν − δ¯) > (ν − δ¯)/d¯, which is d¯ < doL,2.
ρ∗− > 0 if and only if r + (ν − δ¯)/d¯ > 0, which is d¯ > doU,2. Furthermore, it is h(d¯) → ρ
∗
0 as d¯ → 0
− for
d < 0, while for d > 0, g(d¯)→ ρ∗0 as d¯→ 0
+.
Finally, assume ν < 0. Then r < ρ∗0. With d < 0 and if Eq. (3.32) holds, it is
ρ∗+ <
1
2
»
r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
+
˛˛˛
˛r − ν − δ¯d¯
˛˛˛
˛
–
= r if and only if r >
ν − δ¯
d¯
,
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that is d¯ < doL,3. It can also be verified that ρ
∗
− > ρ
∗
0 if and only if −r− 2α0ν/(ν − δ¯) > −(ν − δ¯)/d¯, that
is d¯ > doU,3. Suppose now d > 0. Then D ≥ 0 and ρ
∗
± ∈ R. Also,
ρ∗+ >
1
2
»
r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
+
˛˛˛
˛r − ν − δ¯d¯
˛˛˛
˛
–
=
1
2
»
r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
+ r −
ν − δ¯
d¯
–
= r
and
ρ∗− <
1
2
»
r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
−
˛˛˛
˛r − ν − δ¯d¯
˛˛˛
˛
–
=
1
2
»
r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
− r +
ν − δ¯
d¯
–
=
ν − δ¯
d¯
< 0 .
After this, it can be verified that ρ∗+ < ρ
∗
0 when d > 0. It is h(d¯)→ ρ
∗
0 as d¯→ 0
− for d < 0 and g(d¯)→ ρ∗0
as d¯→ 0+ for d > 0.
All the results referring to the behavior of monotony can be evidenced by deriving g′(d¯) and h′(d¯) and
checking in which case g′(d¯) ≷ 0 and h′(d¯) ≷ 0. This completes the proof.
A 3.4 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Rewrite Eq. (3.22) in the form
ρt = F (πt, πt−1) ,
where αt = α0 and
F (u, v) ≡ r +
(1 + r)(v − u)− α0v
v(u− 1)
.
Note F (πt, πt−1) = fct.(ρt−1, . . . , ρt−L, ρt−L−1). For a fixed time lag L, introduce a new set of variables:
x1,t = ρt , x2,t = x1,t−1 = ρt−1 , . . . , xL+1,t = xL,t−1 = ρt−L ,
and Eq. (3.22) can be reformulated as an L+ 1-dimensional system:8>>>><
>>>:
x1,t+1 = F (πt+1, πt) ,
x2,t+1 = x1,t ,
...
xL+1,t+1 = xL,t .
As
πt =
1
ν
˘
δ¯ + d¯ρ¯t
¯
=
1
ν
˘
δ¯ + (d¯/L)[x2,t + x3,t + . . .+ xL+1,t]
¯
, (A 3.8)
and thus
πt+1 =
1
ν
˘
δ¯ + (d¯/L)[x1,t + x2,t + . . .+ xL,t]
¯
, (A 3.9)
it is
∂πt
∂x1,t
= 0 and
∂πt
∂xi,t
=
d¯
νL
for i = 2, . . . , L + 1 ,
∂πt+1
∂xL+1,t
= 0 and
∂πt+1
∂xj,t
=
d¯
νL
for j = 1, . . . , L .
Let x0 be the steady state of Eq. (3.22). Then, it can be verified that at the fixed equilibrium
∂F
∂πt
= A and
∂F
∂πt+1
= C −A
with A and C as defined in Eq. (3.5). Now set
ai ≡
„
∂F
∂xi,t
«
|(x0,...,x0)
for i = 1, . . . , L + 1 .
and note that „
∂F
∂xi,t
«
|(x0...,x0)
=
„
∂F
∂u
∂u
∂xi,t
+
∂F
∂v
∂v
∂xi,t
«
|(x0...,x0)
,
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since F depends on u(xi,t) and v(xi,t). Then we can obtain
a1 = (C − A)
d¯
νL
, a2 = . . . = aL = C
d¯
νL
and
aL+1 = A
d¯
νL
.
The Jacobian matrix of the system evaluated at the steady state x0 is
J =
0
BBBBBBBB@
a1 a2 . . . aL aL+1
1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 0
1
CCCCCCCCA
from which the characteristic polynomial can be derived as
det(λI− J) = λL+1 − {a1λ
L + a2λ
L−1 + . . .+ aLλ+ aL+1}
by induction. This completes the proof.
A 3.5 Proof of Corollary 3.6
For d = 0, the verification is trivial as ΓL(λ) = λ
L+1. Now, suppose d 6= 0 and L = 1. Then,
Γ1(λ) = λ
2 −
d¯
ν
[(C − A)λ+ A] ,
and the eigenvalues satisfy
λ± =
1
2ν

d¯(C − A)±
q
d¯2(C − A)2 + 4νd¯A
ﬀ
.
Consider ν > 0 first. Then λ± ∈ R if d¯A > 0. Furthermore,q
d¯2(C −A)2 + 4νd¯A > |d¯(C − A)| = | − d¯(C − A)| ≥ d¯(C − A) ,
so that λ+ > 0 and λ− < 0. We can verify that λ+ < 1 if d¯C < ν and −d¯A < ν. In addition, −λ− < 1
if −d¯(C − 2A) < ν and −d¯A < ν. Summarizing all assumptions, |λ±| < 1 if −d¯A < 0, d¯C < ν and
d¯(2A− C) < ν.
Analogously, for ν < 0, λ± ∈ R if d¯A < 0. But now, λ+ < 0 and λ− > 0 for all d 6= 0. Verifying λ− < 1
if d¯C > ν, d¯A < −ν hold, and −λ+ < 1 if −d¯(C − 2A) > ν, d¯A < −ν hold, we end up with |λ±| < 1 if
d¯A < 0, −d¯C < −ν and d¯(C − 2A) < −ν. This completes the proof.
A 3.6 Proof of Remark 3.7
The first assertion can be simply proved by investigating the structure of Eq. (3.39) at the fixed point
(ω∗, ρ∗). Denote
y1 ≡ [R+ π1,t(ρ
∗ − r)] , y2 ≡ [R+ π2,t(ρ
∗ − r)] . (A 3.10)
Then, Eq. (3.39) can be rewritten as
ω∗ =
(1 + ω∗)y1 − (1− ω
∗)y2
(1 + ω∗)y1 + (1− ω∗)y2
(A 3.11)
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from which it is obvious that ω∗ = ±1 solves the equation. Now assume that ω∗ 6= ±1. Then, Eq. (A 3.11)
can be simplified as
ω∗[(1 + ω∗)y1 + (1− ω
∗)y2] = (1 + ω
∗)y1 − (1− ω
∗)y2
ω∗(1 + ω∗)y1 + ω
∗(1− ω∗)y2 = (1 + ω
∗)y1 − (1− ω
∗)y2
(1− ω∗)(1 + ω∗)y1 = (1 + ω
∗)(1− ω∗)y2 .
As ω∗ 6= ±1 is assumed, it follows that y1 = y2, which is only fulfilled if ρ
∗ = r or π1,t = π2,t.
Now assume that ρ∗ = r. Obviously, then y1 = y2 = R and Eq. (A 3.10) leads to a universal equation.
Furthermore, at the steady state with ρ∗ = r, the enumerator of Eq. (3.40) has to vanish, and this is
only fulfilled if −α0{(1 + ω
∗)π∗1 + (1− ω
∗)π∗2} = 0, which directly leads to the condition Eq. (3.41). This
completes the proof.
A 3.7 Proof of Lemma 3.8
As the proof of Lemma 3.5 can be almost assigned to the two heterogenous investor case described in
Lemma 3.8, only the main steps are sketched out here.
Reformulate the system Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40) as
ρt = F (π1,t, π1,t−1, π2,t, π2,t−1;ωt−1)
ωt = G(π1,t, π1,t−1, π2,t, π2,t−1;ωt−1) ,
where F = F (u, v,m,n, o) and G = G(u, v,m,n, o) are defined in an appropriate way as in Lemma 3.5.
Let us restrict to the steady state E(ω∗, ρ∗) with ω∗ = 1. Introduce a new set of variables:
x1,t = ρt , x2,t = ρt−1 , . . . , xL+1,t = ρt−L , xL+2,t = ωt .
where L ≡ max(L1, L2). Thus the system Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.40) can be rewritten as an (L + 2)-
dimensional system: 8>>>>><
>>>>>:
x1,t+1 = F (π1,t+1, π1,t, π2,t+1, π2,t;ωt) ,
x2,t+1 = x1,t ,
...
xL+1,t+1 = xL,t ,
xL+2,t+1 = G(π1,t+1, π1,t, π2,t+1, π2,t;ωt) .
Set
fi(πi,t+1, πi,t) ≡ r +
(1 + r)(πi,t − πi,t+1)− α0πi,t
πi,t(πi,t+1 − 1)
.
Analogously to Lemma 3.5 one can obtain
∂π1,t
∂xi,t
= 0 for i = 1, L1 + 2 . . . , L+ 2 and
∂π1,t
∂xi,t
=
d¯
ν1L1
for i = 2, . . . , L1 + 1 ,
∂π1,t+1
∂xL+1,t
= 0 for i = L1 + 1, . . . , L+ 2 and
∂π1,t+1
∂xj,t
=
d¯
ν1L1
for j = 1, . . . , L1 ,
∂π2,t
∂xi,t
= 0 for i = 1, L2 + 2 . . . , L+ 2 and
∂π2,t
∂xi,t
=
d¯
ν2L2
for i = 2, . . . , L2 + 1 ,
∂π2,t+1
∂xL+1,t
= 0 for i = L2 + 1, . . . , L+ 2 and
∂π2,t+1
∂xj,t
=
d¯
ν2L2
for j = 1, . . . , L2 .
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Furthermore, at the fixed equilibrium (ω∗ = 1, ρ∗) we can be calculate
F
∂π1,t
=
∂f1
∂π1,t
= A1 and
F
∂π1,t+1
=
∂f1
∂π1,t+1
= C1 −A1 ,
F
∂π2,t
=
F
∂π2,t+1
= 0 and
F
∂ωt
=
α0π2,0(π1,0 − π2,0)
2π1,0(π1,0−1)2
,
G
∂π1,t
=
G
∂π1,t+1
=
G
∂π2,t
=
G
∂π2,t+1
= 0 and
G
∂ωt
= β1 .
with αt = α0 and A1, C1 and β1 defined in Lemma 3.8. Now define
ai ≡
„
∂F
∂xi,t
«
|E(ω∗=1,ρ∗)
and bi ≡
„
∂G
∂xi,t
«
|E(ω∗=1,ρ∗)
for i = 1, . . . , L+ 2 .
Based on the calculation in Lemma 3.5 it can be verified that
a1 =
d¯
ν1L1
(C1 − A1) and a2 = . . . = aL1 =
d¯
ν1L1
(A1 + (C1 − A1)) =
d¯
ν1L1
C1 ,
aL1+1 =
d¯
ν1L1
A1 and aL1+2 = . . . = aL+1 = 0 , aL+2 =
α0π2,0(π1,0 − π2,0)
2π1,0(π1,0 − 1)2
,
b1 = . . . = bL+1 = 0 and bL+2 = β1 .
Then, the Jacobian matrix of the system evaluated at the steady state (ω∗ = 1, ρ∗) is
J1 =
0
BBBBBBBBBB@
a1 a2 . . . aL1 aL1+1 aL1+2 . . . aL+2
1 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
0 1 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
... 0
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 1 0 0 . . . 0
b1 b2 . . . bL1 bL1+1 bL1+2 . . . bL+2
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
=
0
BBBBBBBBBB@
a1 a2 . . . aL1 aL1+1 0 . . . aL+2
1 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
0 1 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 1 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . β1
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
from which the characteristic polynomial can be derived using Laplace’s expansion rule and Lemma 3.5 as
det(λI− J1) = (−1)
2(L+2)(λ− β1) det
`
(J ′1)L+2,L+2
´
= (λ− β1)
n
λL−L1 [λL1+1 − {a1λ
L1 + a2λ
L1−1 + . . .+ aL1λ+ aL1+1}]
o
= (λ− β1)λ
L−L1 [λL1+1 − a1λ
L1 − a2λ
L1−1 − . . .− aL1λ+ aL1+1] ,
where J ′i,j is the matrix in which the ith row and jth column is deleted. The case where ω
∗ = −1 can be
derived analogously. This completes the proof.
A 3.8 Proof of Theorem 3.9
Using Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.13) instead of Eq. (3.40), the dynamic system can be written at the fixed point
(ω∗, ρ∗) by
ω∗ =
[1 + ω∗][R+ π∗1(ρ
∗ − r)]− [1− ω∗][R+ π∗2(ρ
∗ − r)]
[1 + ω∗][R+ π∗1(ρ
∗ − r)] + [1− ω∗][R+ π∗2(ρ
∗ − r)]
, (A 3.12)
ρ∗ = r +
α0
1−
P2
k=1 π
∗
jω
∗
j
, (A 3.13)
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where ω∗1 = (1 + ω
∗)/2 and ω∗2 = (1 − ω
∗)/2. Note that Eq. (A 3.13) directly follows from Eq. (3.13) ifP2
i=1 π
∗
i ω
∗
i 6= 0 and αt = α0 > 0 is assumed. Hence the assertion can be concluded directly from Remark
3.7.
It is necessary to make one last remark in order to understand why the case ρ∗ = r is neglected in the
theorem. Note that using Eq. (3.13) instead of Eq. (3.40) implies that ρ∗ = r as a fixed point is excluded
in Eq. (A 3.13) since α0 is assumed to be strictly positive. But this reasoning depends crucially on the
value of the sum
P2
i=1 π
∗
i ω
∗
i . Note if, in turn,
P2
i=1 π
∗
i ω
∗
i = 0 then Eq. (3.13) is not defined at the fixed
point. Therefore, this case demands that the original dynamic equation Eq. (3.40) be used (instead of
Eq. (3.13)), which has been shown to be equivalent to Eq. (3.17) in Theorem 3.1 for I = 2. From this
equation, it can again easily be seen that it is ρ∗ = r at the fixed point if it is
P2
i=1 π
∗
i ω
∗
i = 0 and α0 > 0.
This completes the proof.
A 3.9 Proof of Corollary 3.10
Consider the following 3 cases
(i) νi > δ¯ > 0, (ii) δ¯ > νi > 0, i = 1, 2
(iii) νi1 > δ¯ > νi2 > 0, ij = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
and note that according to Eq. (3.48) for Case (i) and Case (ii)
ρ∗0,1 > ρ
∗
0,2 if and only if ν2 > ν1 (A 3.14)
and for Case (iii)
ρ∗0,1 > ρ
∗
0,2 if and only if ν2 < ν1 . (A 3.15)
Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.9 the characteristic polynomial Eq. (3.42) from Lemma 3.8 is given
by
ΓLi(λ) = (λ− βi)λ
L+1 .
Hence, E1 is locally asymptotically stable if and only if |β1| < 1 with β1 given in Eq. (3.45), which is
equivalent to ˛˛˛
˛(1 + r) + (ρ∗0,1 − r) δ¯ν2
˛˛˛
˛ <
˛˛˛
˛(1 + r) + (ρ∗0,1 − r) δ¯ν1
˛˛˛
˛
and finally ˛˛˛
˛(1 + r) + α0δ¯ν1(ν1 − δ¯)ν2
˛˛˛
˛ <
˛˛˛
˛(1 + r) + α0δ¯(ν1 − δ¯)
˛˛˛
˛ . (A 3.16)
Note that the right-hand side is strictly positive for all Cases (i)–(iii) if ν1 < δ¯(1− ǫ) or ν1 > δ¯. Then the
result can be obtained simply for (i) by solving for the norm and using Eq. (A 3.14).
Now assume that δ¯ > νi > 0 and E1 is locally asymptotically stable. The left-hand side is either
positive, which leads to the conditions ν1 > ν2 and ν2 > ǫ(δ¯ν1)/(δ¯ − ν1), or the left-hand side becomes
negative, which implies the conditions ν2 > ν0,2 and ν2 < ǫ(δ¯ν1)/(δ¯−ν1). Summarizing these two subcases
leads to the desired result.
Finally, consider the Case (iii). For both assumptions ν2 > δ¯ > ν1 and ν1 > δ¯ > ν2, the condition
Eq. (A 3.16) leads to a contradiction. Thus E1 is not locally asymptotically stable. This completes the
proof.
A 3.10 Proof of Corollary 3.12
The proof is similar to the proof of Corollary 3.10. Again, three cases have to be considered:
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(i) ν > δ¯i > 0, (ii) δ¯i > ν > 0, i = 1, 2
(iii) δ¯i1 > ν > δ¯i2 > 0, ij = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, i 6= j .
Assume Case (i) or Case (ii) holds. From Eq. (3.51) it can be derived that
ρ∗0,1 > ρ
∗
0,2 if and only if δ¯1 > δ¯2 .
Otherwise, if Case (iii) is fulfilled
ρ∗0,1 > ρ
∗
0,2 if and only if δ¯1 < δ¯2 .
From Eq. (3.45) it can be verified, that |β1| < 1 if and only if˛˛˛
˛(1 + r) + α0δ¯2ν − δ¯1
˛˛˛
˛ =
˛˛˛
˛(1 + r) + α0δ¯1ν − δ¯1
˛˛˛
˛ .
If we suppose that the arguments of the left-hand side and right-hand side are positive, all results can be
obtained in a similar way to Corollary 3.10. Note that the argument of the right-hand side is positive for
Case (ii) if and only if ν < δ¯1(1 − ǫ) with ǫ ≡ α0/(1 + r), which is approximately ν(1 + ǫ) < δ¯1. In the
same way, it can be argued that the left-hand side is positive if and only if δ¯2 < δ¯0,2 with δ¯0,2 defined as in
the corollary. Furthermore, if Case (iii) holds, it can be shown that |β1| > 1 for all choice of δ¯i > 0. This
completes the proof.
Chapter 4
Asset Price and Wealth Dynamics under a Market Maker
Scenario
4.1 Introduction
In recent years a broad and growing strand of literature addressing price dynamics in financial
markets has arisen, which is based on observations that indicate selective departures from the
standard assumptions of unbounded rationality in market participants. The work is motivated by
the accordance, or common view, that phenomena such as excess volatility, mean-reversion and
other universal properties of speculative prices (now widely known as ‘stylized facts’) cannot be
fully explained by the traditional theory of finance. While the efficient market hypothesis (see
Fama, 1970) assumes that speculative prices always reflect the fundamental value, diverse and
detailed observations across many markets, instruments and time periods show many noticeable
deviations from fundamental values. A great deal of this research uses a chartist-fundamentalist
framework in which two (or even more) trader types coexist in the artificial market and where
each trader type pursues a distinctly different trading strategy. Examples of important work
related to this topic are Beja and Goldman (1980); Frankel and Froot (1986); Day and Huang
(1990); De Long et al. (1990); Kirman (1991); Chiarella (1992); Brock and Hommes (1997b,a,
1998); Franke and Sethi (1998); Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000); Chiarella et al. (2002); Westerhoff
(2003). While fundamentalists (or informed traders) are mostly assumed to react to the current
price deviating from its fundamental value, chartists (or noise traders) extrapolate expected future
price movements from their observations of historical time series data. Interestingly, empirical work
also supports this approach, as shown in the classic survey studies by Allen and Taylor (1990);
Taylor and Allen (1992) in which traders from the London Foreign Exchange Market admit to
using technical analysis and trend-following strategies for short-term speculative trading.
Due to these findings one strand of literature describes financial markets as nonlinear structural
agents models that emphasize heterogeneity in allowing agents to have different beliefs, different
endowments or different market attitudes, for example towards risk. In these multi-agents sys-
tems, financial markets are considered to be complex evolutionary systems between competing
boundedly-rational trading strategies.1 Following this line of research, my approach involves a
simple nonlinear market fraction model with heterogeneous traders, fundamentalists and chartists,
who all have different trading strategies and expectations about future prices and dividends of a
1See Hommes (2001) for an overview about related literature.
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risky asset. My model mainly builds on the work by Brock and Hommes (1997b,a, 1998, 1999),
who propose to model economic markets as an ‘Adaptive Belief System’ (ABS), but assumes a
more realistic framework where the agents’ demand depends on their current wealth level (as a
result of the underlying CRRA utility) as proposed by Chiarella and He (2001) and Chiarella et al.
(2006). As in these two cited papers, I also assume a growing dividend process and a trend in
the fundamental price of the risky asset leading to a growth model in both risky-asset prices and
agents’ wealth. However, the chapter aims to contribute to the development and analysis of such
models by proposing a slightly different and, arguably, a slightly more realistic model structure
which explicitly takes into account the risky-asset supply side. This extension in the model struc-
ture allows me to model the risk premium demanded by the market participants for taking market
risk, which appears to be endogenously driven by the market over time. The analysis of the result-
ing dynamics of asset price and agents’ wealth within this quite advanced chartist-fundamentalist
framework is very similar to the methods used for the models developed by Chiarella and He
(2001) and Chiarella et al. (2006). Indeed, we are also able to characterize the equilibria and the
other kinds of asymptotic behavior in terms of the long-run evolution of wealth proportions and
risky-asset returns, as was done in these two papers.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic ideas and main building
blocks of the proposed model and then the following three sections outline a comprehensive study
of different model variants. This includes both homogeneous and heterogeneous expectations of
investors with adaptive and non-adaptive expectation formation rules, different time scales for the
underlying trading processes and finally a simple stochastic model version. All the model variants
are investigated by starting with an analytical treatment and continuing with the performance of
extensive numerical simulations. The chapter concludes by summarizing the results of the analysis,
while proofs and more technical remarks are relegated to the appendix.
4.2 Model Description
This section outlines the model framework of an asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents
using CRRA utility for their portfolio optimization problem under a market maker scenario in
discrete time2, where heterogeneity among investors is established by assuming them to use different
and competing trading strategies. The model shares some basic ideas with the CH model (see
Chiarella and He, 2001), which was introduced in the previous part of this thesis. In addition,
some ideas are adopted from Chiarella et al. (2006). Therefore, it can be seen as a continuative
development in this specific way of modeling financial markets. For instance, my presentation
will see a nonlinear stationary model being derived in the same way as in the CH model, i.e., by
expressing the dynamics of the market model in terms of the return of the risky asset and the
wealth proportion among the heterogeneous investor groups instead of describing it in terms of the
asset price and the total wealth of investors. However, with respect to the main building blocks
of the model framework, my model sometimes differs crucially from the original CH model and
from the publication by Chiarella et al. (2006). For this reason, we will see the asset return and
wealth dynamics displaying different behavior; this will become evident in the following discussion
2For an example of a continuous-time model with heterogeneous beliefs see Cabrales and Hoshi (1996).
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outlined in the remainder of this chapter.
4.2.1 Notations and Portfolio Optimization
Our hypothetical financial market is based on a simple discrete asset pricing model and contains
two investment choices: a stock (or index of stocks) and a bond. The bond is assumed to be a
risk-free asset and to be perfectly elastically supplied and the stock is a risky asset. Let rf be
the risk-free rate per trading period, I be the total number of investors in the market, and Wi,0
be the initial wealth of agent i. At time t, denote by pt the price (ex dividend) per share of the
risky asset, dt the dividend and Wi,t the wealth of agent i for i = 1, 2, . . . , I. It is assumed that
all agents are myopic and are using a power utility function with different risk-aversion coefficients
νi, which is
Ui(W ) =
W 1−νi − 1
1− νi , νi > 0 . (4.1)
The return of the risky asset at period t is defined by
ρt =
pt − pt−1 + dt
pt−1
= rt +
dt
pt−1
(4.2)
where
rt =
pt − pt−1
pt−1
(4.3)
denotes the return of the stock (ex dividend), while the last summand in Eq. (4.2) denotes the
dividend yield.
Following the standard portfolio approach, the wealth of agent (or investor) i at time period
t+ 1 is given by3
Wi,t+1 =Wi,t [1 + rf + πi,t(ρt+1 − rf )] , (4.4)
where πi,t is the wealth proportion of agent i invested in the risky asset. Given the information
set It at time t, let
Ei,t(ρt+1) and σ
2
i,t = V ari,t(ρt+1)
be the ‘beliefs’ of investor i about the conditional expectation of the mean and variance of the
return ρt+1. For the given power utility function, the optimum investment proportion at time t,
πi,t is given by
4
πi,t =
Ei,t(ρt+1)− rf
νiσ2i,t
. (4.5)
Finally, let βi,t be the growth rate of wealth of agent i. Then, it follows from Eq. (4.4) that the
wealth dynamics of each single investor evolves according to
Wi,t+1 = (1 + βi,t+1)Wi,t , (4.6)
where the growth rate of wealth is determined by
βi,t+1 = rf + πi,t(ρt+1 − rf ) . (4.7)
3See also Eq. (3.2) in Chapter 3, Section 3.2 for more details.
4See also remarks in the previous chapter on Eq. (3.5) and Eq. (3.26) for further details.
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4.2.2 Excess Demand
It follows from Eq. (4.5) that the optimal wealth of investor i invested in the risky asset is given
by
ζi,t = πi,tWi,t =
Ei,t(ρt+1)− rf
νiσ2i,t
Wi,t . (4.8)
Given the growth rate of wealth at time t, the individual excess demand on the wealth invested in
the risky asset by investor i can be written as
ζ˜i,t = ζi,t − (1 + rt)ζi,t−1 . (4.9)
Note that the subtrahend on the right-hand side of Eq. (4.9) considers that the wealth share
invested in the risky asset in the previous period grows by the return on the risky asset (ex
dividend) at period t according to Eq. (4.3), as no retention of the dividends is assumed here. In
other words this term represents the investor’s current wealth share invested in the risky asset at
time t resulting from his/her investment decision made in period t−1, while the minuend represents
his/her (nominal) risky-asset demand5 calculated from the myopic utility maximizing scheme at
time t. Obviously, the difference between minuend and subtrahend defines the individual excess
demand of each investor for the period t. Note also that the investors’ (nominal) demand for the
risky asset depends on their current wealth level; this dependence is a direct consequence of the
assumption of a CRRA utility function given in Eq. (4.1).6 Because of the underlying CRRA
utility function, each investor will invest the same proportion of his/her wealth in the risky asset
in each trading period while the individual wealth level Wi,t is principally a growing process over
time. Thus the investor’s (nominal) demand for the risky asset grows with his/her growth rate of
individual wealth, which is βi,t. Using Eq. (4.6) and Eq. (4.8), Eq. (4.9) can be written as follows:
ζ˜i,t = πi,tWi,t − (1 + rt)πi,t−1Wi,t−1 =Wi,t−1 [πi,t(1 + βi,t)− πi,t−1(1 + rt)] .
The investors’ aggregate excess demand in wealth units denoted by ζ˜t is simply the sum of all
individual investors’ excess demands and is therefore given by
ζ˜t =
I∑
i=1
ζ˜i,t =
I∑
i=1
Wi,t−1 [πi,t(1 + βi,t)− πi,t−1(1 + rt)] . (4.10)
Let Ht be the total (nominal) risky-asset supply at time t, which is determined by
Ht = N
s
t pt , (4.11)
where Nst denotes the number of outstanding risky assets at time period t. It is assumed that N
s
t
is subject to a linearly growing process over time, which means that the number of outstanding
risky assets increases by a fixed quantity in each trading period. Although it is quite evident that
the assumption of an increasing number of outstanding risky assets is made simply to balance the
growing investors’ aggregate excess demand for risky assets, a more detailed motivation for this
5The investor’s asset demand (as well as his/her asset supply) will be described for the most part of the model
framework in wealth shares (i.e., measured in wealth units) instead of wealth proportions. This will then be denoted
by ‘nominal’ asset demand (or supply) in the following discussion.
6See also Appendix A 1.3 in Chapter 1 for details of different types of utility functions.
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assumption will be given in the following subsections. However, this assumption implies that the
total (nominal) risky-asset supply Ht will also be a process growing over time, because pt will in
general also grow over time (see Eq. (4.11)). Hence the overall market excess demand ζˇt in our
artificial financial market is determined by
ζˇt = ζ˜t − [Ht − (1 + rt)Ht−1] , (4.12)
where the term in the square brackets can be explained as follows. As already stated, Ht is the
current (nominal) risky-asset supply in the market while Ht−1 is the (nominal) risky-asset supply
of the preceding trading period. During the trading period t the (nominal) risky-asset supply Ht−1
already existing obviously grows by the return of the risky asset (ex dividends), which implies that
the difference of Ht and (1 + rt)Ht−1 is exactly the (nominal) amount of risky assets (and not
the number of risky assets) exogenously fed into the market system (by increasing N st−1 to N
s
t
during the time period t) to meet the assumption of having a (nominal) risky-asset supply of
Ht. Consequently, this (nominal) amount of risky assets has to be subtracted from the investors’
aggregated excess demand in order to determine the market excess demand, i.e., the (nominal)
risky asset amount desired by the investors but not supplied by the market condition, which is
here denoted by ζˇt.
7
Finally, let Wt be the total wealth of all investors at time t, which is
Wt =
I∑
i=1
Wi,t . (4.13)
Then it follows from Eq. (4.6) and Eq. (4.13) that the total wealth Wt can be expressed by the
investors’ individual wealth levels, namely
Wt =
I∑
i=1
(1 + βi,t)Wi,t−1 . (4.14)
In the remainder of this chapter we will concentrate on the special case with two investor-
groups acting in the market. Suppose that all investors can be subdivided into two groups with
N1 investors in the first group and N2 in the second group. Within each group, agents are het-
erogeneous in their wealth but homogeneous in their risk-aversion coefficients and beliefs in terms
of the conditional mean and variance of the return ρt+1. Under these assumptions the investors’
aggregate excess demand in wealth is given by
ζ˜t = [(1 + β1,t)π1,t − (1 + rt)π1,t−1]W1,t−1 + [(1 + β2,t)π2,t − (1 + rt)π2,t−1]W2,t−1 , (4.15)
7Of course, the term in the square brackets of Eq. (4.12) can also be explained in terms of outstanding
risky assets. Let us assume that the number of outstanding risky assets grows linearly over time according
to Nst = (1 + n
s)Nst−1. Then, the term in the square brackets can be written as [Ht − (1 + rt)Ht−1] =ˆ
(1 + ns)Nst−1pt − (1 + rt)Nst−1pt−1
˜
=
ˆ
(1 + ns)Nst−1pt −Nst−1pt
˜
= nsNst−1pt by using Eq. (4.11). Hence the
term in the square brackets is simply the supplemental number of risky assets which are newly available in the
market system at time period t multiplied by the current price level of risky assets. Thus this expression is in total
a nominal value, namely the newly additional risky-asset supply generated by the increased number of risky assets
which has to be subtracted from the investors’ aggregated excess demand ζ˜t to obtain the market excess demand
in the model as already stated above.
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where W1,t and W2,t are respectively the total wealth of Groups 1 and 2 at time t. Using the same
notation as proposed by Chiarella and He (2001) (and as already seen in the previous chapter of
this thesis) I will now denote W¯1,t, W¯2,t as the average wealth of agents within Groups 1 and 2
respectively and ω¯1,t, ω¯2,t as the average wealth proportions of the corresponding group. Then it
is
W1,t = N1W¯1,t , W2,t = N2W¯2,t (4.16)
and
ω¯i,t =
W¯i,t
W¯t
with W¯t = W¯1,t + W¯2,t , i = 1, 2 . (4.17)
Note that
Wt = N1W¯1,t +N2W¯2,t . (4.18)
Furthermore let ni be the fixed proportion of the number of investors in group i relative to the
total number of investors I, i.e.,
n1 =
N1
I
and n2 =
N2
I
(4.19)
with I = N1 +N2. Finally, by defining qt as the market excess demand proportional to the total
wealth at time t as
qt ≡ ζˇt
Wt
, (4.20)
it follows from Eq. (4.15)–Eq. (4.20) that the market excess demand proportion qt satisfies
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qt =
∑2
i=1[(1 + βi,t)πi,t − (1 + rt)πi,t−1]niω¯i,t−1 − [Ht − (1 + rt)Ht−1] /(W¯t−1I)∑2
i=1(1 + βi,t)niω¯i,t−1
, (4.21)
while the average wealth proportions of investor group i at time t+ 1 are given by
ω¯i,t+1 =
ω¯i,t(1 + βi,t+1)
ω¯1,t(1 + β1,t+1) + ω¯2,t(1 + β2,t+1)
, i = 1, 2 . (4.22)
Similar to the CH model outlined in Chapter 3, it is convenient to introduce new variables
ω¯t ≡ ω¯1,t − ω¯2,t and n¯ ≡ n1 − n2 (4.23)
in the case of a two investor-groups model. While the state variable ω¯t denotes the difference in the
average wealth proportions of Investor Groups 1 and 2, the variable n¯ accounts for the difference in
the fixed population proportion of the two investor groups. Of course, the investors groups’ average
wealth proportions and the corresponding population proportions can still be re-determined from
the new variables ω¯t and n¯ using the relations
ω¯1,t =
1 + ω¯t
2
, ω¯2,t =
1− ω¯t
2
, n1 =
1 + n¯
2
, and n2 =
1− n¯
2
.
Thus the time evolution of the market excess demand proportion qt and the average wealth pro-
portions ω¯i,t can be written in terms of the newly introduced variables ω¯t and n¯t as
qt =
[(1 + β1,t)π1,t − (1 + rt)π1,t−1] (1 + n¯) [1 + ω¯t−1]
(1 + β1,t)(1 + n¯) [1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + β2,t)(1− n¯) [1− ω¯t−1]
+
[(1 + β2,t)π2,t − (1 + rt)π2,t−1] (1− n¯) [1− ω¯t−1]− 4 [Ht − (1 + rt)Ht−1] /(W¯t−1I)
(1 + β1,t)(1 + n¯) [1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + β2,t)(1− n¯) [1− ω¯t−1]
(4.24)
8The calculations of Eq. (4.21) and Eq. (4.22) are relegated to the Appendix A 4.1.
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and
ω¯t+1 =
[1 + ω¯t](1 + β1,t+1)− [1− ω¯t](1 + β2,t+1)
[1 + ω¯t](1 + β1,t+1) + [1− ω¯t](1 + β2,t+1)
respectively.
One further remark on this notation should be added at this point. In the two investor-groups
model, note that the optimal investment proportions πi,t of group i (and thus also the growth rate
of wealth βi,t, i = 1, 2) should be provided with a bar to emphasize that these are the (average)
optimal investment proportions of the investor group i.9 Nevertheless, since the optimum demands
for wealth proportions to be in invested in the risky asset are the same for each investor within
each group i, the bar is omitted to avoid superfluous notation.10
4.2.3 Fundamental Price and Return
One crucial goal in my model framework is to incorporate the fundamental pricing benchmark as
a special case of my more general heterogeneous multi-agents model.11 For this reason, the model
will first be elaborated on the fundamental price path. Let us start with the dividend process. In
the most general case, the growth rate of dividends gt is assumed to be time-dependent, so that dt
is specified by
dt+1 = (1 + gt+1)dt . (4.25)
In the remainder of the chapter it will be assumed that agents are homogeneous in their beliefs
about the dividend process, but that they are heterogeneous with respect to the price component
of the risky asset. To obtain the fundamental price path for the fundamental price p∗t , we assume
that the dividends evolve in a deterministic way (‘deterministic skeleton’), i.e., gt = g with g < rf .
To determine the equilibrium condition in our model framework, asset demand has to be equal
to asset supply. According to Eq. (4.8) investor i’s (nominal) demand for risky assets at time t
can be written as
ζi,t = πi,tWi,t =
Ei,t(ρt+1)− rf
νiσ2i,t
Wi,t ,
where πi,t is the optimum investment proportion given by Eq. (4.5) and Wi,t is the wealth of
investor i at time t. Remember that Ei,t(ρt+1) and σ
2
i,t denote the beliefs of investor i about the
conditional expectation of the mean and variance of the risky-asset return ρt+1 respectively. It
follows that
ζi,t =
Ei,t(ρt+1)− rf
νiσ2i,t
Wi,t
=
Ei,t(pt+1 + dt+1)− (1 + rf )pt
νiσ2i,t
Wi,t
pt
, (4.26)
where ρt+1 = (pt+1 + dt+1 − pt)/pt is used. Now, denoting Ht as the positive (nominal) supply of
risky assets in our artificial market and equalizing agents’ demand on risky assets to the supply of
9This notation has already been used in Theorem 3.3 in Chapter 3.
10An identical optimum demand πi,t for each investor within each group i implies that the wealth evolution (or
monetary gain) is also identical within each investor group (see Eq. (4.7)). This will be often used as a crucial fact
in the following discussion and investigation of this model framework.
11See also the BH model framework presented in Chapter 2, Section 2.1 for a similar approach.
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risky assets leads to
Ht =
I∑
i=1
ζi,t , (4.27)
where the right-hand side denotes the aggregated demand for risky assets at time t. Combining
Eq. (4.27) with Eq. (4.26) yields
Ht =
I∑
i=1
Ei,t(pt+1 + dt+1)− (1 + rf )pt
νiσ2i,t pt
Wi,t , (4.28)
which describes the market equilibrium of our artificial market.
Let us assume for a moment that all investors form correct (and thus homogeneous) expectations
as reasonably hypothesized on the fundamental price level p∗t . In this case it is
Ht = [Et(pt+1 + dt+1 − (1 + rf )pt)] 1
pt
I∑
i=1
Wi,t
νiσ2i,t
. (4.29)
Rewriting Eq. (4.29), it follows that
Et(pt+1 + dt+1) = pt

1 + rf +Ht
[
I∑
i=1
Wi,t
νiσ2i,t
]−1
 . (4.30)
Assuming also a homogeneous perception of the risk-aversion coefficient and constant expectations
of the variance of the return of the risky asset, Eq. (4.30) reads
pt =
1
1 + rf +
Ht
Wt
νσ2
Et(pt+1 + dt+1) , (4.31)
where Wt =
∑I
i=1Wi,t denotes the total wealth of all investors in the market. Thus Eq. (4.31)
describes the evolution of the fundamental price p∗t in our model framework, taking into account the
simplified assumptions made above. Comparing this result with the fundamental pricing formula
often cited by academics12, which is
pt = Et
[
pt+1 + dt+1
1 + ̺t+1
]
, (4.32)
with ̺t being the one-period holding period return of the risky asset in the discounting factor,
we can conclude that the fundamental pricing benchmark is now embedded in our model outline.
Referring to Eq. (4.31), today’s price is calculated by adding the conditional expected dividend
yield to the conditional expected price of tomorrow and then discounting this by a factor, which
is here the sum of the risk-free rate and a ‘risk premium’ given by
RPt ≡ Ht
Wt
νσ2 . (4.33)
Obviously, RPt depends on the outstanding (nominal) supply of risky assets, the total wealth in
the market as well as the agents’ risk-aversion coefficient ν defined in their utility function and the
agents’ (constant) perception of the variance of the risky-asset return, namely σ2 ≡ σ2i,t. The risk
premium is time-dependent in this case.
12See Cuthbertson (1996, Chapter 4). See also Eq. (1.7) in Subsection 1.3 of Chapter 1.
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Conversely, if we assume a zero supply of outside stocks (as in the BH model in Subsection
2.1.1 of Chapter 2)13, i.e., Ht = 0, the risk premium RPt collapses to zero and Eq. (4.31) simplifies
to
pt =
1
1 + rf
Et(pt+1 + dt+1) . (4.34)
Then the fundamental price is determined by14
p∗t = mdt , (4.35)
where m is given by
m =
1 + g
rf − g .
Hence the fundamental stock price at time t is given in this simplified case by the cash flow
generated by the dividends at time t multiplied by a factor that depends on the ex-ante rate of
return and the growth rate of dividends.15 From Eq. (4.35) it follows that
p∗t+1 = (1 + g)p
∗
t , (4.36)
which states that the fundamental price p∗t grows with the (deterministic) growth rate of dividends.
The fundamental return (ex and including dividends) as well as the dividend yield can be calculated
in a similar way. Hence it is
r∗ ≡ r∗t+1 =
p∗t+1 − p∗t
p∗t
=
mdt+1 −mdt
mdt
=
(1 + g)dt − dt
dt
= g ,
ρ∗ ≡ ρ∗t+1 =
p∗t+1 + dt+1 − p∗t
p∗t
=
p∗t+1 − p∗t
p∗t
+
(1 + g)dt
mdt
= g + (1 + g)
rf − g
1 + g
= rf
and
dt+1
p∗t
= (1 + g)
rf − g
1 + g
= rf − g .
In this case the optimal demand proportion π∗ ≡ π∗i,t is given by
π∗ =
rf − rf
νσ2
= 0 , (4.37)
which is a straightforward result for the following reason. If all investors are homogeneous in their
expectations and no risky assets are supplied in our artificial market, it follows from Eq. (4.27)
and Eq. (4.8) that
πi,tWi,t = 0
for each investor i and thus, with the evident assumption Wi,t 6= 0, it is
Ei,t(ρt+1) = rf
for each investor i.16 To sum up the above analysis, the equilibrium price of our market model
for the simple case of homogeneous agents and zero asset supply coincides with the fundamental
13See also Chiarella et al. (2006).
14The derivation of Eq. (4.35) is straightforward and relegated to the Appendix A 4.2.
15This model is also known as the static Gordon model. See Gordon (1962, Chapter 4).
16Note that Eq. (4.37) as well as Eq. (4.31) contains the assumption that σ2i,t = V ari,t(ρt+1) is equal to a constant
value σ for market situations in which the fundamental price path is hit. See also Section 4.3 for further details on
the investors’ beliefs about the conditional expectation of the variance of the return ρt+1 in our market model.
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price p∗t given as a solution of Eq. (4.34) with p
∗
t increasing with the dividend’s growth rate g.
As a consequence, the fundamental return (ex dividends) r∗ is equal to this growth rate and the
fundamental return ρ∗ is given by the of the risk-free asset return rf .
From this straightforward result we have to come back to the more sophisticated case where the
risky-asset supply is positiv, i.e., Ht > 0 (see Eq. (4.31)). Note that we still assume an identical
risk-aversion coefficient and a constant expectation of the risky asset’s variance. We define
rRPt ≡ rf +RPt = rf +
Ht
Wt
νσ2 , (4.38)
so Eq. (4.31) leads to
pt =
1
1 + rRPt
Et(pt+1 + dt+1) . (4.39)
By iterated substitution we obtain17
pt = Et

 k∑
j=1
(
j−1∏
i=0
1
1 + rRPt+i
)
dt+j

+ Et
[(
k∏
i=1
1
1 + rRPt+i−1
)
pt+k
]
. (4.40)
Assuming that the transversality condition
lim
k→∞
Et
[(
k∏
i=1
1
1 + rRPt+i−1
)
pt+k
]
= 0
holds Eq. (4.40) yields
pt = Et

 ∞∑
j=1
(
j−1∏
i=0
1
1 + rRPt+i
)
dt+j

 , (4.41)
which is generally an analytically non-tractable expression. Eq. (4.41) states that the current stock
price depends on the expectations of all time-dependent discount rates 1/(1 + rRPt+i) in the future
and all future expected dividends. Since it follows that no fundamental price can be calculated in a
closed form, we need some additional hypotheses about investors’ forecasts of dividends and about
the discount rate in order to to simplify this problem. One possible simplification is to assume
that the agents form the same expectations (or ‘beliefs’) about the risk premium rRPt for all time
periods t, but to revise the estimates of rRPt at each point in time.
18 Allowing this assumption,
we end up with the fundamental solution for Eq. (4.39), which is then given by
p∗t =
∞∑
j=1
(
1
1 + rRPt
)j
Et(dt+j) .
Applying the same calculation as outlined for Eq. (4.35) in Appendix A 4.2 to the equation above
leads to
p∗t =
1 + g
rRPt − g
dt , (4.42)
from which it directly follows that
p∗t+1 = (1 + g)p
∗
t
rRPt − g
rRPt+1 − g
, (4.43)
17For further details on this technique, see also the discussion on Eq. (2.8) and Appendix A 2.2 in Chapter 2.
18This idea is adopted from a publication relating to this discussion which appeared in a working paper version
of Chiarella et al. (2006).
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where dt+1 = (1 + g)dt is used. Obviously, Eq. (4.42) and Eq. (4.43) account for the fact that the
risk premium rRPt is time-dependent and thus not necessarily the same for different time periods.
Therefore, the investors revise their perception of the risk premium in every time step if necessary.
Otherwise, if the risk premium is constant over time, i.e., it is rRPt+1 = r
RP
t for all t, as it is in a
steady-state situation, the fundamental price p∗t evolves over time in the same way as for Ht = 0
(see Eq. (4.36)) and increases with the (deterministic) growth rate of dividends g.
Although Subsection 4.2.2 contains the assumption that only two investor-groups act in our
artificial market, our discussion has not yet taken this fact into account. To remedy this, Eq. (4.30)
has to be slightly revised. Following the notation outlined in Subsection 4.2.2, the total wealth of
Investor Groups 1 and 2 at time t is denoted by W1,t and W2,t respectively. Thus, Eq. (4.30) has
to be rewritten as
Et(pt+1 + dt+1) = pt

1 + rf +Ht
[
2∑
i=1
Wi,t
νiσ2i,t
]−1
 ,
where it is worth remarking that the variable Wi,t has a different meaning in the sum of both
equations. Using the notations Eq. (4.16)–Eq. (4.19) as well as the variables ω¯t and n¯t defined in
Eq. (4.23) leads to
Et(pt+1 + dt+1) = pt

1 + rf +Ht
[
2∑
i=1
Wi,t
νiσ2i,t
]−1

= pt

1 + rf +Ht
[
2∑
i=1
NiW¯i,t
νiσ2i,t
]−1

= pt

1 + rf + HtW¯tI
[
2∑
i=1
niω¯i,t
νiσ2i,t
]−1

= pt

1 + rf + HtW¯tI
[
(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t]
4ν1σ21,t
+
(1− n¯)[1− ω¯t]
4ν2σ22,t
]−1
 . (4.44)
The risk premium is therefore given by
RPt =
Ht
W¯tI
[
(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t]
4ν1σ21,t
+
(1− n¯)[1− ω¯t]
4ν2σ22,t
]−1
,
where in contrast to Eq. (4.33) the total wealth Wt is replaced by the less intuitive variable W¯t
multiplied by the number of investors in the market denoted by I.
4.2.4 Risk Premium
According to the market equilibrium equation for the fundamental price path given by Eq. (4.31),
the investors’ expectation of the risky-asset return is determined by
Et(ρt+1) =
Ht
Wt
νσ2 + rf , (4.45)
which merely describes the fact that investors want to be compensated for taking risk by the
(time-dependent) risk premium given by
RPt =
Ht
Wt
νσ2 . (4.46)
4.2 Model Description 174
In the following discussion I want to constitute some further assumptions on this specific risk-
premium term, particularly with regard to the (nominal) risky-asset supply Ht. It is again assumed
that all investors form ‘correct’ expectations of the fundamental price path, i.e., their expectations
of the return and variance of the risky asset, in particular, are homogeneous in such a market
equilibrium (or fundamental steady state) as already presumed by Eq. (4.45). Furthermore, it is
here assumed that all investors use the same risk-aversion coefficient ν and a constant σ2 in order
to to avoid an overly laborious notation.
As already outlined in the previous subsection, the risk premium RPt vanishes for Ht = 0,
i.e., for a zero supply of risky assets. Otherwise, if Ht is assumed to be positive, the dynamics of
RPt can vary quite considerably depending on the assumption made about the dynamic behavior
of Ht. Therefore, let us briefly consider which assumptions about the dynamics of Ht might be
the most sensible. For instance, assuming Ht to be a constant would lead to RPt decreasing over
time (even on the fundamental price path), since the total wealth in the market will increase (at
least under ordinary market behavior) because of the chosen CRRA power utility function used
by the investors. Moreover, a constant (nominal) risky-asset supply does not perfectly fit to the
increasing (nominal) risky-asset demand established in our model framework. Letting Ht grow
linearly over time will also lead to problems, since Ht is the nominal risky-asset supply, meaning
that Ht incorporates the current price level of the risky assets. Thus the assumption of a linear
growth of Ht would in some respects foil the speculative price movements that might emerge in
our financial market, induced by the trading activities of the different investor types.19 To avoid
this problem in general, I uncouple quantity and price level within this variable and replace the
fraction Ht/Wt in the risk-premium term with the expression
Nst pt
Wt
, (4.47)
where Nst > 0 is the number of outstanding risky assets at time period t. While N
s
t = 0 again
directly leads to a vanishing risk premium, the assumption of a constant Nst for all t is also not a
realistic assumption.20 Instead, we assume that Nst is linearly growing over time, i.e.,
Nst+1 = (1 + n
s)Nst . (4.48)
As a consequence, the (nominal) risky-asset supply Ht will increase over time for this model
specification where the growth of the (nominal) risky-asset supply is based on the increasing number
of risky assets via the Nst process and the evolution of the risky asset’s price level pt, which is
determined by the investors’ trading activities but which should also be a growing process in
general. Hence both (nominal) demand for risky assets as well as (nominal) supply of risky assets
are growing processes over time in the model framework that will now be proposed.
Concurrently, we assume that the risk premium RPt should be a constant on the fundamental
price path, which seems appropriate since the investors should expect a constant return of the risky
asset in these ‘stable’ and ‘predictable’ market situations, provided that they form ‘correct’ (or
19This effect would be quite similar to the problem with the α-term used in the CH model (see Eq. (3.13), Theorems
3.1 and 3.4 as well as, in particular, the penultimate paragraph in the summarizing Section 3.8 of Chapter 3).
20For details on the inappropriateness of this assumption see the calculations outlined below, first of all Eq. (4.55)
and the subsequent explanation.
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consistent) expectations of the risky asset’s return evolution.21 The latter assumption implies that
the fractionHt/Wt = N
s
t pt/Wt is constant for those market states, which means that the (nominal)
risky-asset supply Ht is growing similarly to the total wealth Wt.
22 For better readability,
RP ∗ ≡ RPt|fund. price path and z∗ ≡ Nst pt/Wt|fund. price path (4.49)
denote the constant risk premium RPt and the constant fraction Ht/Wt = N
s
t pt/Wt on the fun-
damental price path. This implies that
RP
∗
= z∗νσ2 (4.50)
(see Eq. (4.38)) and
ρ∗ = rf +RP
∗
. (4.51)
Using this notation, it follows that the (nominal) investors’ aggregated risky-asset demand generally
given by
I∑
i=1
ζi,t =
I∑
i=1
πi,tWi,t =
I∑
i=1
Ei,t(ρt+1)− rf
νiσ2i,t
Wi,t
(see Eq. (4.8)) can be simplified to
I∑
i=1
ζi,t
|fund. price path
= z∗
I∑
i=1
Wi,t = z
∗Wt ,
where Eq. (4.45) is used.23 Obviously, this equation states that the (nominal) aggregated risky-
asset demand grows with the growth rate of total wealth on the fundamental price path.24 This
growth rate can be determined according to Eq. (4.7) together with Eq. (4.50) and Eq. (4.51) by
β∗ = rf + z
∗(ρ∗ − rf ) = rf + z∗
(
[rf + z
∗νσ2]− rf
)
= rf + (z
∗)2νσ2 . (4.52)
In other words, this expression gives us the growth rate for the denominator of the risk-premium
term Eq. (4.46) on the fundamental price path. Now let us consider the nominator of this term.
Using Eq. (4.47) and Eq. (4.48) as well as Eq. (4.43), the time evolution of the (nominal) risky-asset
supply Ht can be determined by
Ht+1 = N
s
t+1p
∗
t+1
= (1 + ns)Nst · (1 + g)p∗t
≈ (1 + ns + g)Nst p∗t = (1 + ns + g)Ht , (4.53)
where ns · g ≪ 1 is assumed. According to the assumption of a constant risk premium on the
fundamental price path, i.e., Ht/Wt is constant for all t, the growth rate of investors’ total wealth
21Due to our specific choice concerning the investors’ belief about the conditional variance of risky-asset return,
the variance σ2i,t is also constant on the fundamental price path (see Eq. (4.38)). See also Section 4.3 for details.
22A growing supply of risky assets can be associated with the idea of a company raising capital in order to increase
its productivity or market power, which might be a reasonable assumption in my growing economy model design.
Instead, the assumed growing dividend process refers then to investors’ revenues (or gains) that are siphoned off
from the firm’s wealth.
23It is also πi,t
|fund. price path
= z∗.
24This result is rather unsurprising because of the underlying CRRA power utility function used by the investors.
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β∗ given by Eq. (4.52), which is the growth rate of the aggregated demand function, should be
equal to the growth rate of the risky-asset supply, which is ns + g, in accordance with Eq. (4.53).
From this it can be concluded that
β∗ = ns + g , (4.54)
which leads to
ns = (rf − g) + (RP
∗
)2
νσ2
, (4.55)
where Eq. (4.50) is used. Obviously, the growth rate of risky-asset supply ns has to be positive since
rf > g and RP
∗ > 0, where the latter assumption directly follows from Ht > 0.
25 Furthermore, if
ns is fixed, the constant RP ∗ on the equilibrium path can be determined by
RP ∗ = ±
√
[ns − (rf − g)] νσ2 ,
where only the positive solution is economically reasonable. Furthermore, the relation
ns ≥ (rf − g) (4.56)
has to be fulfilled, which makes perfect sense, since Eq. (4.52) states that the growth rate of
risky-asset demand β∗ exceeds rf . Thus the assertion directly follows from Eq. (4.54), as rf > g
was also assumed previously. From an economic point of view, Eq. (4.56) is also reasonable
because the supply of risky assets, or better its growth rate ns, has to be the higher the larger the
difference between the return of the risk-free asset and the dividends’ growth rate. This is simply
because a higher growth rate ns makes an investment in the risky assets more attractive (since its
price decreases relatively) and a larger difference between the return of the risk-free asset and the
dividends’ growth rate increases the attractiveness of an investment in the bond.
Concluding the procedure to this point, I have established a market equilibrium for my asset
pricing model with a non-zero asset supply where the following assumptions have been made on
its fundamental price path:
• All investors (i.e., both investor groups) form the same rational expectations of the con-
ditional mean and variance of the risky asset and thus derive the same risk premium for
investing in the risky prospect.
• The resulting non-zero risk premium is assumed to be constant, which implies that the
(nominal) risky-asset supply grows in the same manner as the investors’ total wealth in the
market. Since the growth rate of total wealth naturally coincides with the growth rate of the
aggregated investors’ demand for risky assets, the growth rate of (nominal) risky-asset supply
also equals the growth rate of (nominal) risky-asset demand, which seems an appropriate and
reasonable assumption.
• The supplied number of risky assets increases linearly over time, where the growth rate has
to be chosen exogenously, but also has to be sufficiently high.
With these three bullet points I want to close my explanations of the risk premium and continue
with the implementation of a market maker scenario.
25Remember that for Ht = 0 it is β∗t = rf and thus RP
∗ would collapse to zero.
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4.2.5 Market Maker Equilibrium
In the last step the market clearing procedure has to be specified. In contrast to the CH model
outlined in the previous chapter we assume a market maker scenario in which a ‘market maker’
changes the price of the risky asset according to the observed excess demand. More precisely,
the market maker is to take an offsetting long (short) position if the excess demand is negative
(positive) to clear the market. At the end of each trading period t, after the market maker has
carried out all transactions, he/she adjusts the price for the next trading period in the direction
of the overall observed excess demand. Assuming a constant growth rate of the dividend (i.e.,
deterministic skeleton), which is
dt+1 = (1 + g)dt ,
the return of the risky asset at period t can be rewritten as
ρt+1 =
pt+1 − pt + dt+1
pt
= rt+1 +
(1 + g)dt
pt
= rt+1 + (r
RP
t − g)
p∗t
pt
. (4.57)
Now, we introduce a new state variable yt by
yt ≡ p
∗
t
pt
,
which is the ‘fundamental/price ratio’ and evolves according to26
yt+1 =
p∗t+1
(ρt+1 + 1− dt+1/pt)pt =
(1 + g)
rRPt −g
rRPt+1−g
p∗t
(1 + rt+1)pt
=
1 + g
1 + rt+1
rRPt − g
rRPt+1 − g
yt .
Note that, according to Eq. (4.7) and Eq. (4.57), the agent i’s growth rate of wealth can now be
written as
βi,t+1 = rf + πi,t[rt+1 − rf + (rRPt − g)yt] .
We assume that the price of the risky asset is adjusted by a market maker as follows:
pt+1 = pt [(1 + g) + λ(qt + ǫt)] + α(p
∗
t − pt) , (4.58)
where λ ≥ 0 is a constant, measuring the speed of the price adjustment from the market maker,
and ǫt stands for noisy excess demand (proportional to the current total wealth in the market).
The last term can be interpreted as a ‘stabilizing term’, which prevents the current price moving
too far away from its fundamental value. Indeed, this assumption is equivalent to
rt+1 =
pt+1 − pt
pt
= g + λ(qt + ǫt) + α(yt − 1) , (4.59)
implying that the market maker adjusts the relative return of the risky asset according to the
return of dividend (i.e., its growth rate g), the overall aggregate excess demand proportion qt, the
noisy demand proportion ǫt at time t and a correction term depending on the deviation of the
current price of the risky asset from the underlying fundamental price. Note that, in the case of
neither excess nor noisy demand (i.e., qt = ǫt = 0), the return of the risky asset is a constant and
coincides with the fundamental return (ex dividends) r∗t+1 which is equal to the growth rate of
dividends g.
26This approach is adopted from a quite similar contribution to this discussion from Chiarella et al. (2006).
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4.2.6 Summary of the Stationary Model in its State Variables (Simplified Version)
So far, an artificial financial market model under a market maker scenario has been proposed,
where asset prices and investors’ wealth levels are growing processes over time. Concentrating in
the first instance on the simplified model version in the subsequent two sections, where zero supply
of outside stocks (i.e., Ht = 0, risk premium RPt = 0) is assumed, it has been shown that the
growth model can be reformulated as a stationary model in three state variables, namely the return
rt, the fundamental/price ratio yt and the difference in the wealth proportions ω¯t. This result is
resumed in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1 The fundamental/price ratio evolves according to
yt+1 =
1 + g
1 + rt+1
yt , (4.60)
where the return (ex dividends) of the risky asset is given by
rt+1 = g + λqt + α(yt − 1) (4.61)
with
qt =
[(1 + β1,t)π1,t − (1 + rt)π1,t−1](1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1]
(1 + β1,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + β2,t)(1 − n¯)[1− ω¯t−1]
+
[(1 + β2,t)π2,t − (1 + rt)π2,t−1](1− n¯)[1− ω¯t−1]
(1 + β1,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + β2,t)(1− n¯)[1 − ω¯t−1]
and
βi,t+1 = rf + πi,t[rt+1 − rf + (rf − g)yt] ,
πi,t =
Ei,t(rt+1) + (rf − g)yt − rf
νiσ2i,t
, i = 1, 2 .
The difference in the average wealth proportions of the two investor groups evolves according to
ω¯t+1 =
[1 + ω¯t](1 + β1,t+1)− [1− ω¯t](1 + β2,t+1)
[1 + ω¯t](1 + β1,t+1) + [1− ω¯t](1 + β2,t+1) . (4.62)
The system Eq. (4.60)–Eq. (4.62) forms a stationary model in three state variables, namely the
fundamental/price ratio, the return (ex dividends) of the risky asset and the difference in the
average wealth proportions of the two investor groups.
To conclude this section, the model time line depicted in Figure 4.1 summarizes the main
aspects of the market maker model outlined above for the Ht = 0 case. Although the time flow
of the trading activities seems visually quite similar to that of the Walrasian scenario proposed
in the CH model (see Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3), some crucial differences have to be noted. In a
Walrasian scenario the equilibrium price and the investors’ wealth are determined simultaneously,
implying that the information set It used by the investors for their optimal investment proportion
at time t does not include the current equilibrium price pt. In a market maker scenario, however,
the information set It does include the price at the current time period t since the price adjustment
rule applied by the market maker is publicly known to all market participants.
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t t+ 1
?
ω¯t
6
dividends dt+1
?
yt
6
trade ⇒ rt (⇒ ρt)
?
yt+1
6
trade ⇒ rt+1 (⇒ ρt+1)
?
maxπi,t E[U(Wi,t+1) | It]†
⇒ πi,t
⇒ ζ˜i,t
}
⇒ qt
?
ω¯t+1
?
. . .
†It = {pt, dt, ωi,t; pt−1, dt−1, . . .}
Figure 4.1: Model time line for the asset price model under a market maker scenario (Ht = 0 case). Although
the diagram seems to be almost identical to the time line of the CH model (see Figure 3.1, Chapter 3) small but
important differences can be noticed. The horizontal brackets indicate that the state variables are determined at
the same point in model time. The small shifts in the state variables within the brackets should simply give the
reader an idea of the order in which the state variables are calculated in the simulation program.
4.3 Market Maker Model with Fundamentalists and Chartists
In this section I will consider one homogeneous and two heterogeneous beliefs model with a market
maker. As already mentioned above, a zero supply of outside stocks is proposed. It is assumed
that the market contains two different groups of investors following different trading strategies,
namely ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘chartists’. Both groups of traders know about the dividend growth
process but form different beliefs about the price evolution over time:
• Fundamentalists believe that the returns (ex dividends) of the risky asset will eventually move
back to the relative price change of the fundamental price, i.e., r∗ = g. The fundamentalists’
expectations about the conditional mean of the return rt are mathematically expressed by
Ef,t(rt+1) = g − β1(rt − g) , β1 ∈ [0, 1] . (4.63)
Furthermore, it is assumed that fundamentalists have constant beliefs about the variance
of the return. Therefore, according to Eq. (4.57), the fundamentalists’ beliefs about the
conditional mean and variance of risky-asset return including dividends is given by
Ef,t(ρt+1) = g − β1(rt − g) + (rf − g)yt
σ2f,t ≡ V arf,t(ρt+1) = σ2 ,
where β1 and σ
2 > 0 are constants.
• Chartists extrapolate the future return from the last two realized returns of the risky asset
via
Ec,t(rt+1) = β2rt + (1 − β2)rt−1 , β2 ∈ [0, 1] , (4.64)
which leads to
Ec,t(ρt+1) = β2rt + (1− β2)rt−1 + (rf − g)yt
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for the chartists’ expectations about the mean of the return ρt+1. The chartists’ beliefs about
the conditional variances of returns is assumed to be
σ2c,t ≡ V arc,t(ρt+1) = σ2 + β3σ¯2c,t
with
σ¯2c,t ≡ [Ec,t(ρt+1)− rf ]2 = [β2rt + (1 − β2)rt−1 + (rf − g)yt − rf ]2 , (4.65)
where β2 and β3 ≥ 0 are constants. Hence the chartists believe that the variance of the returns
consists of two components, a constant part (as used for the fundamentalists) and a time-
dependent part. The time-dependent part becomes relevant when the current belief about the
mean of the next period’s return deviates from the fundamental return (including dividends),
which is rf . Thus it accounts for higher-volatility market periods in which the current return
of the risky asset may significantly move away from the fundamental price level. In these
market situations the chartists become more careful about their investments and, therefore,
are not willing to invest to much of their wealth in the risky prospect. The parameter β3 is
a weighting factor with which chartists can adjust the time-dependent component of their
conditional variance to their overall perception of the variance of returns.
Note that it can be simply verified that both trading strategies are consistent with the model
framework proposed in the previous section since both the fundamentalists and the chartists always
form the correct expectations at the fundamental price level p∗t . This means that both trading
strategies evaluated at the fundamental price p∗t give consistent expectations with respect to the
classical finance theory of fundamental pricing nested in our model framework.
4.3.1 Homogeneous Beliefs – Fundamentalists
In this subsection I will investigate the homogeneous beliefs model with only fundamentalists acting
in the market. Hence summing up all relevant equations for the deterministic case (with ν ≡ νf ),
namely
rt+1 = g + λqt + α(yt − 1) , (4.66)
yt+1 =
1 + g
1 + rt+1
yt , (4.67)
where
qt =
(1 + βf,t)πf,t − (1 + rt)πf,t−1
1 + βf,t
, (4.68)
βf,t+1 = rf + πf,t [rt+1 − rf + (rf − g)yt] , (4.69)
πf,t =
1
νσ2
[(g − rf )− β1(rt − g) + (rf − g)yt] (4.70)
leads to a four-dimensional nonlinear system. Due to this most simple market scenario, the fol-
lowing theorem relating to the existence of steady state can be obtained:
Theorem 4.2 Let g, rf , λ, α, ν, σ
2 > 0 and g < rf . Furthermore, assume that 0 ≤ β1 ≤ 1 and
Eq. (4.68)–Eq. (4.70) hold. Then the system Eq. (4.66)–Eq. (4.67) has a fundamental steady state
E1 given by
r∗ = g ∧ y∗ = 1 . (4.71)
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Proof: See Appendix A 4.3.
Theorem 4.2 states that one economically reasonable steady state exists for the homoge-
neous fundamental-belief model.27 The fundamental steady state E1 corresponds to a market
scenario in which the return (ex dividends) of the risky asset equals the growth rate of dividends,
i.e., r∗ = g and so the price of the risky asset increases pursuant to its fundamental value p∗t for
all time periods, i.e., y∗ = 1. In such a market situation the optimal investment proportion π∗f of
the investors for investing in the risky asset is determined by
π∗f =
Ef,t(ρ
∗)− rf
νσ2
=
Ef,t(r
∗) + (rf − g)y∗ − rf
νσ2
=
g + (rf − g)− rf
νσ2
= 0 ,
which is in total accordance with the request of a consistent model framework.28 This is summa-
rized in the following remark:
Remark 4.3 Note that the total agent’s demand at the fundamental steady state is exactly equal
to the total supply (which is assumed to be zero), i.e., π∗f = 0.
The next theorem characterizes the local stability properties of the steady state E1:
Theorem 4.4 Let g, rf , λ, α, ν, σ
2 > 0, g < rf and 0 ≤ β1 ≤ 1. Then, the fundamental steady
state E1 = (g, g, 1, 1) of the system Eq. (4.66)–Eq. (4.67) is locally asymptotically stable if and
only if all the eigenvalues ξi of the polynomial
Γ1(ξ) =
ξ
νσ2GF
{
νσ2GFξ3+
[
λF (β1G+∆) + νσ
2F (α−G)] ξ2−λG [β1(G+ F ) + ∆] ξ+β1λG2}
(4.72)
satisfy |ξi| < 1 for i = 1, . . . , 4, in which
G = 1 + g , F = 1 + rf , and ∆ = rf − g .
Proof: See Appendix A 4.4.
The local stability of the fundamental steady state of the homogeneous fundamental-belief
model is determined by the corresponding characteristic equation, which obviously depends on
all the model parameters, i.e., the growth rate of dividends g, the risk-aversion coefficient ν, the
variance σ2, the speed of price adjustment of the market maker λ, the strength of the stabilizing
force term α, the ‘risk adjusted’ discounting factor rf (which is the risk-free rate in this simplified
model version) and the extrapolation rate of the fundamentalists β1. Since Γ1(ξ) is a polynomial
of order four, or an ordinary polynomial of order three if we ignore the trivial eigenvalue ξ1 = 0, it
is almost impossible to calculate its roots analytically. Hence numerical simulations are performed
27From a purely mathematical point of view three further steady states with y∗ = 0, i.e., limt→∞
p∗t
pt
= 0 can
be derived. However, a numerical analysis indicates that, for a very wide range of reasonable parameter sets, these
non-fundamental steady states do not represent economically reasonable results (see the proof of Theorem 4.2 in
Appendix A 4.3 for details). In this respect the fundamental steady state is ‘quasi’ unique. Note further, that
although our model framework has some similarities to the model framework proposed by Chiarella et al. (2006)
the (‘quasi’) uniqueness of the fundamental steady state is different from the results outlined in the cited literature.
28See also Eq. (4.37) and the brief discussion thereafter.
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instead. These simulations show that E1 is locally asymptotically stable for a wide range of
parameters if the extrapolation rate β1 is chosen sufficiently small. Contrastingly, a sufficient
raising of β1 leads to a flip bifurcation where the bifurcation value increases if the risk-aversion
coefficient ν increases or if the speed of price adjustment λ decreases. The overall result of the
primary bifurcation of the fundamental steady state is summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.5 Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.4 the fundamental steady state E1 =
(g, g, 1, 1) of the system Eq. (4.66)–Eq. (4.67) undergoes a flip bifurcation at
β∗1 =
νσ2(1 + rf ) [2(1 + g)− α]− λ(rf − g)(2 + rf + g)
2λ(1 + g)(2 + rf + g)
. (4.73)
Proof: See Appendix A 4.5.
Obviously, the results stated in the previous two theorems correspond to economic intu-
ition. If fundamentalists are alone in the market, the market dynamics only temporary moves
away from the fundamental price and eventually converges to its fundamental value if the
fundamentalists do not extrapolate too strongly, but rather align their beliefs to fundamentals.
Looking at Eq. (4.73), a high investors’ risk-aversion coefficient as well as a low price adjustment
speed of the market maker stabilize the system. Instead, an increase in the risk-free rate makes
an investment in the risky asset less attractive and thus the system is destabilized even for a
lower extrapolation rate β1 of the fundamentalists. Interestingly, a relatively high strength of
the stabilizing force term leads to a more unstable market dynamics.29 Figure 4.2 (a) exhibits
a section from a representative time series of the risky-asset return (ex dividends) rt for the
extrapolation parameter β1 exceeding the bifurcation value β
∗
1 of the primary flip bifurcation. The
2-cycle characteristic of the time series of the risky-asset return can clearly be detected visually.
Figure 4.2 (b) shows the corresponding bifurcation diagram with respect to the fundamentalists’
extrapolation parameter β1. While the flip bifurcation point lies at about β
∗
1 = 0.36 for the
specific parameter set used in this figure, it can also clearly be seen that the dynamic system
shows diffuse behavior for β1 being between 0.5 and 0.8 as well as a tendency to explode for β1
being sufficiently close to 1.
The following subsection concentrates on the other case of a homogeneous beliefs model where
all investors use chartist trading strategies in the market.
4.3.2 Homogeneous Beliefs – Chartists
For the homogeneous beliefs model with only chartists in the market, the resulting dynamic system
is given by
rt+1 = g + λqt + α(yt − 1) , (4.74)
yt+1 =
1 + g
1 + rt+1
yt , (4.75)
29This result is somehow puzzling, though there is a possible explanation. On the one hand, it is obvious from
Eq. (4.58) that the α-term can stabilize the price evolution within the price-setting rule whenever the current price
is too far away from the fundamental price level. On the other hand, for certain market situations, the α-term can
also disturb the convergence of the dynamic system to its fundamental steady state. Therefore, the value of α in
the stabilizing force term has to be chosen moderately.
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Figure 4.2: Market maker model with only fundamentalists in the market. For β1 > β∗1 , a flip bifurcation occurs,
leading to 2-cycles in the time series of risky-asset returns (left panel). The right panel shows a bifurcation diagram
with respect to the fundamentalists’ extrapolation parameter β1. For β1 being beyond β∗1 , a flip bifurcation occurs.
100,000 experiments with different values of β1 (between 0.3 and 1.0) are conducted for this plot, with 5,000 iterations
being performed in each experiment. The initial conditions for the dynamic variables are chosen randomly for each
experiment. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, λ = 0.05 and α = 0.5.
where
qt =
(1 + βc,t)πc,t − (1 + rt)πc,t−1
1 + βc,t
, (4.76)
βc,t+1 = rf + πf,t [rt+1 − rf + (rf − g)yt] , (4.77)
πc,t =
β2rt + (1− β2)rt−1 + (rf − g)yt − rf
ν
[
σ2 + β3σ¯2c,t
] , (4.78)
σ¯2c,t = [β2rt + (1− β2)rt−1 + (rf − g)yt − rf ]2 (4.79)
and ν ≡ νc. Obviously, the system Eq. (4.74)–Eq. (4.75) is a five dimensional system (compared to
four dimensions in the homogeneous fundamentalists model), which is caused by the fact that the
chartists extrapolate the next period’s asset return from the last two observable return values of the
risky asset. Again, it can easily be verified that the fundamental steady state E1 = (g, g, g, 1, 1)
is the only economically reasonable steady state which can be obtained for this specific model
version. Theorem 4.6 summarizes the results of the steady state and its stability property:
Theorem 4.6 Let 0 ≤ β2 ≤ 1 and β3 ≥ 0. Assume that Eq. (4.76)–Eq. (4.79) hold. Under
the assumptions of Theorem 4.2, the system Eq. (4.74)–Eq. (4.75) has a steady states E1, which
coincide with the fundamental steady state given in Theorem 4.2 by Eq. (4.71). The fundamental
steady state E1 is locally asymptotically stable if and only if all the eigenvalues ξi of the polynomial
Γ(ξ) =
ξ
νσ2GF
{
νσ2F
[
α+ (ξ − 1)G]ξ3 − λ(Fξ −G) [(β2(ξ − 1)2 − 1)G+ (G−∆ξ)ξ]}
satisfy |ξi| < 1 for i = 1, . . . , 5, in which
G = 1 + g , F = 1 + rf , and ∆ = rf − g .
Proof: See Appendix A 4.6.
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The local stability of the fundamental steady state in Theorem 4.6 is characterized by a
polynomial of order five having one trivial and four non-trivial roots which cannot be solved
analytically.30 However, numerical simulations suggest that the dynamic system might be stable
for specific choices of parameters even in the case where only chartists are in the market. While
the parameter set fixed by
ν = 1.2 , rf = 0.05 , g = 0.04 , σ = 0.2 ,
λ = 0.1 , α = 0.5 , β3 = 5.0 ,
makes the fundamental steady state E1 unstable for all β2 ∈ [0, 1], a decrease in the price ad-
justment speed of the market maker stabilizes the dynamic system. For example, for λ = 0.05
(and remaining parameters as above), the fundamental steady state E1 becomes stable for
0.32 < β2 < 0.45, where a simultaneous increase in the chartists’ risk-aversion coefficient even
enhances this effect significantly and leads to a wider stability region (see Figure 4.3). As in the
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Figure 4.3: Stability region of fundamental steady state with only chartists in the market. Both panels exhibit
the absolute values of the four non-trivial eigenvalues ξ2, . . . , ξ5 for 0 ≤ β2 ≤ 1. Note that ξ3 and ξ4 are complex
conjugate eigenvalues; therefore, for better visualization, ξ3 is denoted by a line while ξ4 is denoted by points in both
panels. An increase in the chartists’ risk-aversion coefficient ν clearly enlarges the stability region of the fundamental
steady state. In both cases the fundamental steady state E1 is stable if chartists extrapolate the future risky-asset
return from the last two realized returns in a balanced way. Otherwise, if one of the last two returns is heavily
weighted relative to its counterpart, E1 becomes unstable. The remaining parameters are rf = 0.05, g = 0.04,
σ = 0.2, α = 0.5 and β3 = 5.0.
case of the homogeneous beliefs model with only fundamentalists in the market, a low value of α
also contributes to greater stability in the system,31 whereas different choices of β3 do not seem
30From a purely mathematical point of view five further steady states with y∗ = 0, i.e., limt→∞
p∗t
pt
= 0 can be
derived. However, a numerical analysis indicates that, for a very wide range of reasonable parameter sets, these
non-fundamental steady states do not represent economically reasonable results (see the proof of Theorem 4.6 in
Appendix A 4.6 for details). In this respect the fundamental steady state is ‘quasi’ unique.
31Results for the influence of the α value for different choices of λ are not shown in detail here. However, this
point is taken up in the discussion about the heterogeneous beliefs model outlined in the next subsection.
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to greatly influence the local stability property of E1. In such stable market situations the fun-
damental steady state undergoes a (supercritical) Hopf bifurcation at a critical value βH2 , which
can, in principle, be determined numerically. At the lower boundary of the stable region numer-
ical simulations confirm that E1 undergoes a flip bifurcation for β2 < β
L
2 , i.e., the bifurcation is
subcritical.32
Figure 4.4 shows two bifurcation diagrams for two different parameter sets for the homogeneous
beliefs model with only chartists in the market. While the diagram in the left panel corresponds
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Figure 4.4: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to the chartists’ extrapolation parameter β2. The left panel exhibits
the case for a parameter set for which the fundamental steady state E1 is unstable for all choices of β2. The right
panel displays a market situation for which E1 is stable for β2 being not too close to 0 and 1. For small values of β2
the fundamental steady state undergoes a flip bifurcation, while for β2 being large enough a Hopf bifurcation occurs.
The experiments are conducted in exactly the same way as described in Figure 4.2. The remaining parameters are
ν = 1.3, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, α = 0.5 and β3 = 5.0.
to a parameter set very similar to the one fixed above,33 the right panel concentrates on a market
situation with a stable region of the fundamental steady state E1 by using the same parameters
but with λ decreased to 0.05. Let us consider the left panel first. High-order cycles (see also
Figure 4.5, upper panels) and more complex dynamic behavior occur alternately. For instance,
for β2 being approximately between 0.55 and 0.8, the return of the risky asset fluctuates around
the fundamental return with slightly less vigor, which corresponds to limit cycles in the (rt, yt)-
plane (see also Figure 4.5, middle panels). However, for β2 between 0.8 and 0.9, 5-cycles with
less fluctuation occur. In the right panel, the stable region of the fundamental steady state can
clearly be detected. For chartists’ extrapolation parameters below the critical value βL2 , a period
doubling is shown, while for relatively high extrapolation parameters a Hopf bifurcation occurs
leading to small fluctuations of the risky-asset return about its fundamental value. Finally, Figure
4.5 exhibits the same results from a slightly different perspective. It shows the time series of the
risky-asset return rt and corresponding phase space plots for three different market scenarios in
32Note that βL2 is given by β
L
2 = [νσ
2(1 + rf ){α− 2(1 + g)}+ λ(2 + g+ rf )2]/[4λ(1 + g)(2 + g+ rf )], which can
be determined in a similar way as performed in the proof of Theorem 4.5 in Appendix A 4.5.
33I have slightly increased the chartists’ risk-aversion coefficient from ν = 1.2 to ν = 1.3 simply to achieve a better
visualization of the stability properties of E1.
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(e) time series of rt for λ = 0.05 and β2 = 0.8
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Figure 4.5: Time series of risky-asset returns and corresponding phase space plots. The left panels exhibit the
time series of the risky-asset return (ex dividends) rt for different choices of the pair of parameters λ and β2 for
the homogeneous beliefs model with only chartists in the market. On the right-hand side, the projection of the
corresponding attractor on the (rt, yt)-plane is shown. While the upper panels correspond to a parameter set for
which the dynamic system stays in a region with 6-cycles, the middle and lower panels are chosen from parameter
sets providing more complex dynamics. In both market scenarios limit cycles occur, leading to fluctuating asset
returns. In the lower panels, which correspond to the region of a Hopf bifurcation, the return of the risky asset is
less volatile than shown in the middle panels. The phase space representations are generated by 50,000 iterations
from which the first 5,000 are deleted afterwards. The dynamic variables are randomly initialized in all plots. The
remaining parameters are ν = 1.3, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, α = 0.5 and β3 = 5.0.
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the parameter region constrained above. Again, a complex market dynamics can be observed in
both representations leading to the occurrence of periodic behavior and limit cycles.
4.3.3 Heterogeneous Beliefs – Fundamentalists and Chartists
In this subsection I will investigate the most general case in which both fundamentalists and
chartists participate in the artificial financial market. This will clearly result in a dynamic system
even more complex than that seen in the homogeneous cases. Summing up all relevant equations
from the model description and the specification of the investors’ trading strategies outlined in the
beginning of this section and in the previous section the dynamics of the return rt, the fundamen-
tal/price ratio yt and the difference in the average wealth proportion of investors ω¯t evolve over
time according to34
rt+1 = g + λqt + α(yt − 1) , (4.80)
yt+1 =
1 + g
1 + rt+1
yt , (4.81)
ω¯t+1 =
[1 + ω¯t](1 + βf,t+1)− [1 − ω¯t](1 + βc,t+1)
[1 + ω¯t](1 + βf,t+1) + [1 − ω¯t](1 + βc,t+1) , (4.82)
where
qt =
[(1 + βf,t)πf,t − (1 + rt)πf,t−1](1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1]
(1 + βf,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + βc,t)(1− n¯)[1− ω¯t−1]
+
[(1 + βc,t)πc,t − (1 + rt)πc,t−1](1− n¯)[1− ω¯t−1]
(1 + βf,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + βc,t)(1 − n¯)[1− ω¯t−1]
and
βi,t+1 = rf + πi,t [rt+1 − rf + (rf − g)yt] , i ∈ {f, c} , (4.83)
πf,t =
1
νσ2
[(g − rf )− β1(rt − g) + (rf − g)yt] , (4.84)
πc,t =
β2rt + (1− β2)rt−1 + (rf − g)yt − rf
ν
[
σ2 + β3σ¯2c,t
] , (4.85)
σ¯2c,t = [β2rt + (1− β2)rt−1 + (rf − g)yt − rf ]2 . (4.86)
Obviously, the system Eq. (4.80)–Eq. (4.82) is a seven dimensional system whose dimension can
be reduced by one dimension using the transformation ˇ¯ωt+1 ≡ ω¯t, which leads to
rt+1 = g + λqt + α(yt − 1) , (4.87)
yt+1 =
1 + g
1 + rt+1
yt , (4.88)
ˇ¯ωt+1 =
[1 + ˇ¯ωt](1 + βf,t)− [1− ˇ¯ωt](1 + βc,t)
[1 + ˇ¯ωt](1 + βf,t) + [1− ˇ¯ωt](1 + βc,t) , (4.89)
where
qt =
[(1 + βf,t)πf,t − (1 + rt)πf,t−1](1 + n¯)[1 + ˇ¯ωt]
(1 + βf,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ˇ¯ωt] + (1 + βc,t)(1− n¯)[1− ˇ¯ωt]
= +
[(1 + βc,t)πc,t − (1 + rt)πc,t−1](1− n¯)[1− ˇ¯ωt]
(1 + βf,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ˇ¯ωt] + (1 + βc,t)(1 − n¯)[1− ˇ¯ωt] (4.90)
34For the remainder of this chapter we assume that both investor types are characterized by a uniform risk-aversion
coefficient ν ≡ νf = νc, where possible exceptions from this general assumption will clearly be marked in the text.
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and βf,t+1, βc,t+1, πf,t, πc,t, σ¯
2
c,t, as given above. Due to this six-dimensional nonlinear dynamic
system, the following results for the steady states can be obtained:
Theorem 4.7 Let g, rf , λ, α, ν, σ
2 > 0, g < rf , n¯ ∈ [−1, 1] as well as 0 ≤ β1, β2 ≤ 1 and β3 ≥ 0.
Assume that Eq. (4.83)–Eq. (4.86) and Eq. (4.90) hold. Then the system Eq. (4.87)–Eq. (4.89)
has infinitely many steady states, namely fundamental steady states, which are given by
r∗ = g ∧ y∗ = 1 ∧ ˇ¯ω∗ ∈ [−1, 1] .
Proof: See Appendix A 4.7.
Theorem 4.7 states that the dynamic system of the heterogeneous beliefs model has in-
finitely many steady states, termed ‘fundamental steady states’.35 As already observed in the
homogeneous case, the fundamental steady states characterize market situations in which the
price of the risky asset is at the fundamental (pt = p
∗
t for all t) and the return of the risky asset
(ex dividends) equals the growth rate of dividends.36 The long-term difference in the average
wealth proportion of fundamentalists and chartists at a fundamental steady state may be given,
in general, by any ω¯t between -1 and 1.
37 However, numerical simulations of the dynamic system
confirm that the steady-state distribution of the investors’ average wealth proportion for the
fundamental steady states depends on the initial condition.
To concisely sum up the numerical simulation results for this market scenario, the heterogeneous
beliefs model with fundamentalists and chartists in the market is characterized by stable situations
and 2-cyclic behavior for a wide range of parameter settings whenever β1 is sufficiently small
(see Figures 4.6 and 4.8). Otherwise, if the fundamentalists extrapolate too much (i.e., β1 is
close to one), numerical simulations show that the dynamic system explodes in almost all cases.
Interestingly, these situations show that an increase in the investor proportion of chartists (i.e., a
decrease in n¯) might stabilize the system or at least lead to cyclic behavior. Furthermore, high-order
cycles or even limit cycles emerge only in very few cases. In contrast to the two homogeneous-
beliefs models outlined previously, the wealth distribution in the long run among fundamentalists
and chartists is another interesting issue in a heterogeneous model version. Therefore, the main
simulation outcomes for the evolution of the two different trading groups’ average wealth share
is illustrated in Figure 4.7, which concentrates on two typical market situations. Whenever a
fundamental steady state is reached the (stationary) average wealth proportion of investors ω¯∗
stays almost at its initial condition and both trading groups survive in the market in the long
run. However, whenever the system exhibits periodic behavior, chartists’ profits are always higher
than the profits made by the fundamentalists. This eventually leads to the chartist group clearly
dominating in terms of average wealth share.
35A continuum of steady states implies that one eigenvalue of the corresponding characteristic equation is ‘neutral’,
i.e., ±1. I have checked this result by using the software package Mathematica 4.1.
36From a purely mathematical point of view, eight further steady states with y∗ = 0, i.e., limt→∞
p∗t
pt
= 0 can
be derived. However, a numerical analysis indicates that, for a very wide range of reasonable parameter sets, these
non-fundamental steady states do not represent economically reasonable results (see the proof of Theorem 4.7 in
Appendix A 4.7 for details). In this respect only fundamental steady states exist for the heterogeneous beliefs model.
37Note that ˇ¯ωt = ω¯t at the steady state for all t.
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Figure 4.6: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to β2 for the heterogeneous market maker model. For a relatively
high adjustment speed (λ = 0.1) of the market maker, 2-cycles and high-order cycles occur for the chartists’
extrapolation parameter β2 being sufficiently close to 0 and 1 respectively (left panels). However, there is also a
region where a fundamental steady state is reached. The right panels exhibit a market situation when λ is chosen as
0.05. The system converges to a fundamental steady state whenever β2 is sufficiently large. For small values of β2
the fundamental steady state undergoes a flip bifurcation. An increase in the risk-aversion coefficient stabilizes the
system (lower panels). All plots show market situations in which the fundamentalists’ group strongly believe in the
fundamentals, i.e., β1 being quite close to 0. The experiments are conducted in exactly the same way as described
in Figure 4.2 whereas only 50,000 experiments are performed for the right panels. The remaining parameters are
rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, α = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
In the following discussion the summarized simulation results are outlined in further details.
Figures 4.6 and 4.8 depict representative bifurcation diagrams for the heterogeneous beliefs model.
The upper panels of Figure 4.6 exhibit two bifurcation diagrams for similar parameter sets to those
used for the homogeneous beliefs case (see Figures 4.2 and 4.4). Again, a smaller value of the market
maker’s price adjustment speed λ stabilizes the system (see upper right panel). When closely
comparing the left panel of Figure 4.4 with the upper left panel of Figure 4.6, it becomes obvious
that the fundamentalist group is able to stabilize the market. While high-order cycles and even
more complex dynamics arise for any choice of β2 values in a homogeneous chartists’ beliefs market
(see Figure 4.4 (a)), introducing an investor group of fundamentalists might bring the system to
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Figure 4.7: Time series of state variables for the heterogeneous market maker model. The plot exhibits the time
series of the risky-asset return rt, the fundamental/price ratio yt and the average investors’ wealth proportion of
ω¯t for two typical market situations for the heterogeneous beliefs model. While the upper panels correspond to
a parameter set for which a fundamental steady state is reached, the lower panels show a 2-cycle behavior of the
market dynamics. In the latter case the chartists accumulate the entire wealth share in the long run while a stable
market situation leaves the initial wealth conditions unaffected. Parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04,
σ = 0.2, α = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
converge to a fundamental steady state whenever fundamentalists use a extrapolation parameter
β1 quite close to 0 (i.e., they strongly believe in the fundamentals) and chartists extrapolate the
future risky-asset return from the last two realized returns in a balanced way (i.e., β2 approximately
between 0.38 and 0.58). Indeed, in the upper left panel of Figure 4.6 it can be detected that the
system also converges to a fundamental steady state for this specific choice of parameters.38 Note
that the upper panels of Figure 4.7 also give an example of such a market situation. The lower
panels of Figure 4.6 clearly show the stabilizing effect of an increase in the investors’ risk-aversion
coefficient ν, as already observed in the homogeneous beliefs models outlined above. Finally,
further numerical simulations suggest that, in all non-explosive simulation runs, a decrease in the
α value leads to an increased stability region in the fundamental steady states, as shown in Figure
4.8 (see lower panels) and as already observed for the homogeneous beliefs models. However, the
effect of increasing the value of α for a relatively high value of the adjustment speed λ deviates
from doing the same for a small value of the price adjustment speed λ (see upper panels). While
the stable region is slightly reduced for the latter case, an increased value of α even leads to wider
38A closer inspection of the bifurcation diagram given in Figure 4.6 (a) confirms that, for a significant number of
the 100,000 experiments carried out, the system converges to a fundamental steady state for β2 being in the interval
of 0.38 and 0.58. See also Footnote 69 and the discussion on the ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions’ outlined
thereabouts.
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stable region for relatively high choices of λ.39 Figure 4.9 exhibits the time series of the risky-asset
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Figure 4.8: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to β2 for the heterogeneous market maker model with different
choices of α. While increasing or decreasing α respectively destabilizes or stabilizes the market for a relatively low
adjustment speed (λ = 0.05, right panels) of the market maker, the effect is not as obvious for a relatively high
adjustment speed (λ = 0.1, left panels). The experiments are conducted in exactly the same way as described in
Figure 4.2 whereas only 50,000 experiments are performed here. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05,
g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
return rt, the average investors’ wealth proportion of ω¯t and the projection of the corresponding
attractor on the (rt, yt)-plane for four different market outcomes. Note that all these four market
outcomes can be assigned to their corresponding regions in the bifurcation diagrams shown in
Figures 4.6 and 4.8, since the parameter sets are chosen appropriately.40 Whenever the dynamic
system creates a limit cycle, the chartists eventually dominate the market by accumulating the
entire wealth share (see Figure 4.9 (a)–(c)). For certain parameter combinations a strange attractor
with cyclical movements of returns and wealth shares may occur (see Figure 4.9 (d)–(f)). In phases
39See also Footnote 29 for a related discussion.
40The results shown in Figure 4.9 are not ‘particular’ simulation results but describe the typical market behavior
of the heterogeneous market maker model for different parameter sets. Nevertheless, the value of β2 has to be
calibrated by hand to find all these different shapes in the phase space plots. However only Figure 4.9 (d)–(f)
represents a model outcome which is a rather rare event.
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Figure 4.9: Time series of state variables and corresponding phase space plots for the heterogeneous market
maker model. The plot exhibits the time series of the risky-asset return rt, the average investors’ wealth proportion
of ω¯t and the projection of the corresponding attractor on the (rt, yt)-plane for four market situations for the
heterogeneous beliefs model. While the first and second row of plots correspond to parameter sets for which the
market dynamics can be described by a limit cycle and strange attractor behavior, the third and fourth row of plots
correspond to market scenarios in which a fundamental steady state is eventually reached. In the latter two cases
the stable market situation leaves the initial wealth conditions more or less unaffected. Contrastingly, unstable
situations see chartists accumulate the entire wealth share in the long run or even lead to cyclical movements in
wealth share. The phase space representations are generated by 10,000 iterations (50,000 for Panel (f)) from which
the first 5,000 (25,000 for Panel (f)) are deleted afterwards. The dynamic variables are randomly initialized in all
plots. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, λ = 0.1, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0.
The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
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where the return of the risky asset is far from its fundamental value, the chartists prevail over the
fundamentalists in terms of wealth share while the fundamentalists are able to recover their initial
wealth proportion in more tranquil market situations. Otherwise, if a fundamental steady state is
reached, fundamentalists and chartists coexist with respect to their average wealth proportion in
the long run, the fundamentalists generally accumulating slightly more wealth than the chartists
(see Figure 4.9 (g)–(l)) as already observed in Figure 4.7 (c).41
4.4 Adaptive Version of the Market Maker Model
In this section a slightly different model version is considered. I will introduce an adaptive form
of expectation formation for the chartists and the beliefs of the fundamentalists are maintained.
This modification in the chartists’ trading strategy leads to noticeably more complex dynamics in
the underlying nonlinear system, with typical features such as the occurrence of high-order cycles
and convergence to limit cycles. Furthermore, the dynamics of the adaptive model will turn out
to be more stable and robust against parameter changes, leading to a considerably lower number
of explosive simulation events. In the next subsection the modified trading strategies of the two
investor groups will be specified.
4.4.1 Specification of the Trading Strategies in the Adaptive Model Version
As before, the fundamentalists’ conditional mean and variance of the risky asset are mathematically
expressed by
Ef,t(ρt+1) = g − β1(rt − g) + (rf − g)yt , β1 ∈ [0, 1] ,
σ2f,t ≡ V arf,t(ρt+1) = σ2 ,
where σ2 is a constant and the conditional mean corresponds to the expectation about the return
ex dividends
Ef,t(rt+1) = g − β1(rt − g)
as already proposed in Eq. (4.63) in Section 4.3.
The adaptive expectations of the chartists are assumed to be
Ec,t(rt+1) = rt + β2(rt − φt) , β2 ∈ [0, 1] , (4.91)
σ2c,t ≡ V arc,t(ρt+1) = σ2 + β3vt , β3 ≥ 0 , (4.92)
where
φt = δφt−1 + (1 − δ)rt , (4.93)
vt = δvt−1 + δ(1− δ)(rt − φt−1)2 (4.94)
or, for the expectations about the risky-asset return including dividends, it is
Ec,t(ρt+1) = rt + β2(rt − φt) + (rf − g)yt , β2 ∈ [0, 1] .
41The phase space plot depicted in Figure 4.7 (l) indicates that the parameter set used for this figure would have
required more than 10,000 iterations to visualize the eventual convergence to a fundamental steady state.
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The newly introduced variables φt and vt are sample mean and variance and follow some learning
processes. The parameter β2 measures the extrapolation rate. High values of β2 correspond to
strong extrapolation from the chartists. The parameter β3 weights the influence of the sample
variance on the conditional variance estimated by the chartists. Eq. (4.93)–Eq. (4.94) can be
considered as a limiting process of a geometric decay process when the memory lag length tends
to infinity (see Appendices A 4.8 and A 4.9 for details). Then, the coefficient δ measures the
geometric decay rate. From Eq. (4.5) and the beliefs Ec,t(ρt+1) and V arc,t(ρt+1) it follows that
the optimal investment proportion πc,t of the chartists can be determined by
πc,t =
rt + β2(rt − φt) + (rf − g)yt − rf
ν [σ2 + β3vt]
,
where φt and vt are given by Eq. (4.93) and Eq. (4.94) respectively.
4.4.2 Heterogeneous Beliefs – Fundamentalists and Chartists
To avoid an overly long discussion of homogeneous market situations in this chapter, I will not
go into so much detail about the homogeneous, adaptive beliefs model with only chartists in the
market, but will instead continue directly with the heterogeneous investors’ model. Nevertheless,
it should be remarked that, in contrast to the discussion outlined in Subsection 4.3.2, the homo-
geneous market model with only chartists following the adaptive form of expectation formation
specified above is even less stable in the sense that only a simultaneous increase in ν and decrease in
λ and α might lead to a locally stable fundamental steady state E1. Furthermore, the correspond-
ing dynamic system exhibits quite complex behavior in all unstable situations, leading mostly to
limit cycles in the phase space of rt and yt (see Figure 4.5 (d) and (f) for similar plots).
However, let us now consider the heterogeneous model. The resulting dynamic system with
fundamentalists and chartists is given by
rt+1 = g + λqt + α(yt − 1) , (4.95)
yt+1 =
1 + g
1 + rt+1
yt , (4.96)
ˇ¯ωt+1 =
[1 + ˇ¯ωt](1 + βf,t)− [1− ˇ¯ωt](1 + βc,t)
[1 + ˇ¯ωt](1 + βf,t) + [1− ˇ¯ωt](1 + βc,t) , (4.97)
φt+1 = δφt + (1− δ)rt+1 , (4.98)
vt+1 = δvt + δ(1− δ)(rt+1 − φt)2 , (4.99)
where
qt =
[(1 + βf,t)πf,t − (1 + rt)πf,t−1](1 + n¯)[1 + ˇ¯ωt]
(1 + βf,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ˇ¯ωt] + (1 + βc,t)(1− n¯)[1− ˇ¯ωt]
+
[(1 + βc,t)πc,t − (1 + rt)πc,t−1](1− n¯)[1− ˇ¯ωt]
(1 + βf,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ˇ¯ωt] + (1 + βc,t)(1 − n¯)[1− ˇ¯ωt] (4.100)
and
βi,t+1 = rf + πi,t[rt+1 − rf + (rf − g)yt] , i ∈ {f, c} , (4.101)
πf,t =
1
νσ2
[(g − rf )− β1(rt − g) + (rf − g)yt] , (4.102)
πc,t =
rt + β2(rt − φt) + (rf − g)yt − rf
ν [σ2 + β3vt]
. (4.103)
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Note that ˇ¯ωt+1 ≡ ω¯t is again used to reduce the dimension of the dynamic system by one dimension.
Hence, Eq. (4.95)–Eq. (4.99) exhibits a nine-dimensional nonlinear system with five independent
state variables. The following theorem characterizes the possible steady states of the adaptive
beliefs system:
Theorem 4.8 Let g, rf , λ, α, ν, σ
2, β3 > 0, g < rf , n¯ ∈ [−1, 1] as well as 0 ≤ β1, β2, δ ≤ 1.
Assume that Eq. (4.100)–Eq. (4.103) hold. Then the system Eq. (4.95)–Eq. (4.99) has infinitely
many steady states, namely fundamental steady states, which are given by
φ∗ = g ∧ v∗ = 0 ∧ r∗ = g ∧ y∗ = 1 ∧ ˇ¯ω∗ ∈ [−1, 1] .
Proof: See Appendix A 4.10.
The results of Theorem 4.8 are quite similar to the results of Theorem 4.7. Only funda-
mental steady states exist.42 Nevertheless, numerical simulations reveal some notable differences
between both model versions. As stated in Subsection 4.3.3 for the heterogeneous beliefs model
with a chartists’ strategy, which only takes into account the last two realized returns of the
risky asset for the chartists’ portfolio optimization, the dynamic system explodes for almost all
market situations in which the extrapolation parameter of the fundamentalists (i.e., β1) is chosen
too large. Interestingly, this undesirable market behavior vanishes for almost all corresponding
parameter sets for the adaptive market model modification. Hence it can be concluded that the
adaptive model is more robust with respect to parameter changes than the heterogeneous market
maker model outlined before. An increase in the fundamentalists’ extrapolation rate even seems
to stabilize the market, i.e., fundamental steady states can be reached for a wider range of β2
values.43 As in the heterogeneous market maker model outlined in Subsection 4.3.3, numerical
experiments suggest that the parameter α, which measures the impact of the stabilizing force term
in the price adjustment mechanism by the market maker, plays a crucial role for the long-term
behavior of the market. Both Figures 4.10 and 4.11 concentrate on this feature. They exhibit
typical results of the adaptive market model.
Figure 4.10 shows bifurcation diagrams for different parameter sets investigating combinations
of λ and α. Note that the left panels can be compared to Figure 4.6 (a) and (b), since the parameter
sets are chosen as identical. Although the resulting dynamics becomes even more complex in the
adaptive market maker model framework, the qualitative change from a highly complex dynamics
to a more simple one (or even to a stable situation) by decreasing λ from 0.1 to 0.05 is still obvious
(see Figure 4.10 (a) and (d)). Moreover, a low value of α might cause convergence to a fundamental
42From a purely mathematical point of view, six further steady states with y∗ = 0, i.e., limt→∞
p∗t
pt
= 0 can be
derived. However, a numerical analysis indicates that, for a very wide range of reasonable parameter sets, these
non-fundamental steady states do not represent economically reasonable results (see the proof of Theorem 4.8 in
Appendix A 4.10 for details). In this respect only fundamental steady states exist for the adaptive heterogeneous-
beliefs model.
43These results are determined by evaluating the eigenvalues of the characteristic equation by using the software
package Mathematica 4.1 as already explained in the appendices of the proofs for the previous theorems. Since a
continuum of steady states are derived for the dynamic system, the corresponding characteristic equation has one
‘neutral’ eigenvalue (see Footnote 35).
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(d) bifurcation diagram, λ = 0.05,
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Figure 4.10: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to β2 for the adaptive market maker model. For a relatively high
adjustment speed (λ = 0.1) of the market maker, the dynamic system becomes rather complex (upper panels). If
λ is decreased to 0.05, a fundamental steady state might be reached for the chartists’ extrapolation parameter β2
being sufficiently close to 0 (lower panels). Furthermore, the system becomes less complex for a low value of α, or
even becomes stable (right panels), while a relatively high value of α causes 4-cycles for almost all choices of β2
(middle panels). To make the plots comparable to the heterogeneous market model outlined in Subsection 4.3.3, the
extrapolation rate of the fundamentalists β1 are chosen as 0.1 and 0.25. This describes market situations in which
the fundamentalists’ group strongly believe in the fundamentals, i.e., β1 being relatively close to 0. The experiments
are conducted in exactly the same way as described in Figure 4.2. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05,
g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
steady state (see Figure 4.10 (f)), while a high value of α corresponds in almost all cases to a 4-
cycle behavior of the dynamic system (see Figure 4.10 (b) and (e)). From a qualitative perspective,
similar results have also been found in the heterogeneous market maker model (see Figure 4.8).
Figure 4.11 uses the same type of visualization as Figure 4.9 and corresponds to certain regions
of the bifurcation diagrams given in Figure 4.10 (a) and (b). Although the fundamentalists’
extrapolation parameter β1 is chosen higher than in the bifurcation diagrams, the dynamic behavior
remains qualitatively the same as in Figure 4.10. For almost all parameter sets there are n-cycles
or limit cycles in which chartists eventually dominate the market by accumulating the entire wealth
share. Otherwise, if a fundamental steady state is reached, fundamentalists and chartists coexist
with respect to their average wealth proportion in the long run.44
Again, a mutual increase in the risk-aversion coefficient of fundamentalists and chartists might
stabilize the system. Figure 4.12 refers to this aspect and can be compared with Figure 4.10
(a)–(c) since all other parameters are chosen identically. This shows that a fundamental steady
state is reached for sufficiently low extrapolation rates of the chartists and values of α (see Figure
44Results are not shown in detail here.
4.4 Adaptive Version of the Market Maker Model 197
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 9700  9710  9720  9730  9740  9750re
tu
rn
 o
f t
he
 ri
sk
y 
as
se
t (w
ith
ou
t d
ivi
de
nd
s)
time
t. s. of rt for the adaptive heterog. m. m. model
(a) time series of rt for α = 0.5, β1 =
0.4 and β2 = 0.5
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  50  100  150  200d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
we
al
th
 p
ro
po
rti
on
time
t. s. of omegatbar for the adaptive heterog. m. m. model
(b) corresponding time series of av-
erage wealth proportion ω¯t
 0.85
 0.9
 0.95
 1
 1.05
 1.1
 1.15
 1.2
 1.25
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4
y t
rt
projection in the (rt,yt)-plane
(c) corresponding phase space plot
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 9700  9710  9720  9730  9740  9750re
tu
rn
 o
f t
he
 ri
sk
y 
as
se
t (w
ith
ou
t d
ivi
de
nd
s)
time
t. s. of rt for the adaptive heterog. m. m. model
(d) time series of rt for α = 0.5, β1 =
0.4 and β2 = 0.72
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  50  100  150  200d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
we
al
th
 p
ro
po
rti
on
time
t. s. of omegatbar for the adaptive heterog. m. m. model
(e) corresponding time series of av-
erage wealth proportion ω¯t
 0.85
 0.9
 0.95
 1
 1.05
 1.1
 1.15
 1.2
 1.25
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4
y t
rt
projection in the (rt,yt)-plane
(f) corresponding phase space plot
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 9700  9710  9720  9730  9740  9750re
tu
rn
 o
f t
he
 ri
sk
y 
as
se
t (w
ith
ou
t d
ivi
de
nd
s)
time
t. s. of rt for the adaptive heterog. m. m. model
(g) time series of rt for α = 0.9, β1 =
0.4 and β2 = 0.15
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
we
al
th
 p
ro
po
rti
on
time
t. s. of omegatbar for the adaptive heterog. m. m. model
(h) corresponding time series of av-
erage wealth proportion ω¯t
 0.8
 0.85
 0.9
 0.95
 1
 1.05
 1.1
 1.15
 1.2
 1.25
 1.3
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4
y t
rt
projection in the (rt,yt)-plane
(i) corresponding phase space plot
Figure 4.11: Time series of state variables and corresponding phase space plots for the adaptive market maker
model. The plot exhibits the time series of the risky-asset return rt, the average investors’ wealth proportion of ω¯t
and the projection of the corresponding attractor on the (rt, yt)-plane for three non-stable market situations for the
adaptive heterogeneous-beliefs model. As already observed, in the case of high-order cycles or limit cycle behavior,
chartists accumulate the entire wealth share in the long run. The phase space representations are again generated by
10,000 iterations from which the first 5,000 are deleted afterwards. The dynamic variables are randomly initialized
in all plots. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, λ = 0.1, β3 = 5.0 and
n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
4.12 (a) and (c)) whenever both trading groups use a relatively high risk-aversion coefficient to
determine their optimal investment decision, which means that they invest in the risky asset only
moderately. Furthermore, numerical simulations suggest that a unilateral increase in the risk-
aversion coefficient (e.g., for the chartists) might also lead to a stable market situation. Indeed,
for quite a large variety of parameter sets, a unilateral increase in νc stabilizes the market.
45
Finally, the influence of the starting conditions of the dynamic system (with respect to the
investors’ population and wealth proportion) on the long-run behavior of the market should be
investigated. The results are straightforward and are visualized in Figure 4.13. Starting with an
45Results are not shown in details here.
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Figure 4.12: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to β2 for the adaptive market maker model with an increased
risk-aversion coefficient ν. Stable regions occur for values of β2 and α being sufficiently low (left and right panel).
The experiments are conducted in exactly the same way as described in Figure 4.2. The remaining parameters are
rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
unstable market situation (assume Figure 4.11 (d)–(f) as a benchmark), an increase in the popula-
tion proportion of fundamentalists might bring the dynamic system back to a fundamental steady
state (upper panels). Furthermore, an unsymmetrically distributed initial wealth proportion also
allows the dynamic system to eventually converge to one of its fundamental steady states, where
the fundamentalists only lose a marginal wealth share to the chartist group in the first few trading
periods (lower panels). Of course, both results should have been expected. Whenever the market
is exposed to disequilibrium dynamics by an appropriate choice of parameters, a decrease in the
chartists’ market power restabilizes the market. There are two ways of lowering chartists’ market
power: their endowment (i.e., their wealth) could be reduced, or the fraction of fundamentalists
could be increased (or the fraction of chartists decreased), which should also lead to a stabilization
of the market model.
4.5 Results of the Fully Developed Market Maker Model
The model versions that have been investigated so far assume a zero supply of outside stocks,
i.e., Ht = 0, which might still be considered as an overly simple assumption for two reasons. On
the one hand, it leads to the agents’ risk premium vanishing (see Eq. (4.33)), which contradicts
the natural fact that the risk premium in real financial markets for investing in risky prospects
should be positive and should be determined endogenously by the risky-asset price evolution and
the agents’ market behavior. On the other hand, in a growth model in which the investors’ wealth
increases over time, the supply of the risky asset should also grow simply because the investors
should be offered the opportunity to invest their increasing wealth in an appropriate number of
supplied risky assets. This justifies the assumption of a similarly growing asset supply. For this
reason, this final section outlines a fully-developed model version of the market maker model which
solves this evident inconsistency in the model framework. Obviously, taking this new model feature
into account will lead to a more complex and even higher dimensional dynamic system than those
investigated in the previous sections. Therefore, analytic results for the stability of steady states
will be hard to obtain even in the most simple cases of a homogeneous beliefs system and so
numerical simulations have to be performed for almost all market scenarios.
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Figure 4.13: Time series of state variables and corresponding phase space plots for the adaptive market maker
model with different population proportions and initial wealth proportions. The plot exhibits the time series of the
risky-asset return rt, the average investors’ wealth proportion of ω¯t and the projection of the corresponding attractor
on the (rt, yt)-plane for the same parameter set as used in Figure 4.11 (d)–(f), but with different starting conditions.
Sufficiently Increasing either the fundamentalists’ population or the fundamentalists’ initial wealth proportion leads
to stable market situations where fundamentalists and chartists coexist in the long run. The remaining parameters
are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, λ = 0.1, β3 = 5.0.
Let us briefly recall the main assumptions made in Subsection 4.2.4, where a market equilibrium
for the asset pricing model with a non-zero asset supply was established on its fundamental price
path. These assumptions are:
• All investors form the same rational expectations of the conditional mean and
variance of the risky asset and thus derive the same risk premium for investing in
the risky prospect.
• The resulting non-zero risk premium is assumed to be constant, which implies that
the (nominal) risky-asset supply grows in the same manner as the investors’ total
wealth in the market. Since the growth rate of total wealth naturally coincides with
the growth rate of the aggregated investors’ demand on risky assets, the growth
rate of (nominal) risky-asset supply also equals the growth rate of (nominal) risky-
asset demand, which seems an appropriate and reasonable assumption.
• The supplied number of risky assets increase linearly over time, where the growth
rate has to be chosen exogenously, but has to be sufficiently high.
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4.5.1 Model Dynamics of the Revised Market Maker Model
For the overall model dynamics of the market maker model I apply the assumption of the asset
supply process introduced in Eq. (4.48), i.e., that the number of risky assets increases uniformly
even beyond the market equilibrium. It is again assumed that only two investor groups act in the
market (see Subsections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 for the notation and details), where both investor groups
share the same knowledge of the asset supply process. Furthermore, as for the more simplified
model versions investigated in the previous sections, I want to reformulate the resulting dynamic
system as a stationary model in terms of asset return, fundamental/price ratio and investors’
wealth proportions. However, due to the newly-introduced variable Ht the model framework has
to be enlarged by another state variable which will incorporate this new variable Ht. For this
reason the ‘asset supply/total wealth ratio’ is defined:
zt ≡ Ht
W¯tI
. (4.104)
To determine the time evolution of the state variable zt, the following approximation is useful:
Ht+1 = N
s
t+1pt+1
= (1 + ns)Nst · (1 + rt+1)pt
≈ (1 + ns + rt+1)Nst pt = (1 + ns + rt+1)Ht , (4.105)
where ns · g ≪ 1 is assumed.46 Using Eq. (4.105) the time evolution of the state variable zt away
from the fundamental price path can be determined by
zt+1 =
Ht+1
IW¯t+1
=
Nst+1pt+1
I
[
(1 + β1,t+1)W¯1,t + (1 + β2,t+1)W¯2,t
]
≈ (1 + n
s + rt+1)
(1 + β1,t+1)ω¯1,t + (1 + β2,t+1)ω¯2,t
Nst pt
IW¯t
=
(1 + ns + rt+1)
(1 + β1,t+1)ω¯1,t + (1 + β2,t+1)ω¯2,t
zt , (4.106)
where rt+1 = (pt+1/pt)− 1 and ω¯i,t = W¯i,t/W¯t, i = 1, 2 is used. Using once more the notation ω¯t
from Eq. (4.23) we end up with
zt+1 =
2(1 + ns + rt+1)
[1 + ω¯t](1 + β1,t+1) + [1− ω¯t](1 + β2,t+1)zt .
Finally, the market excess demand proportion qt (see Eq. (4.24)) can be written approximately by
using the asset supply/total wealth ratio zt as
47
qt ≈ [(1 + β1,t)π1,t − (1 + rt)π1,t−1] (1 + n¯) [1 + ω¯t−1]
(1 + β1,t)(1 + n¯) [1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + β2,t)(1 − n¯) [1− ω¯t−1]
+
[(1 + β2,t)π2,t − (1 + rt)π2,t−1] (1− n¯) [1− ω¯t−1]− 4nszt−1
(1 + β1,t)(1 + n¯) [1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + β2,t)(1− n¯) [1− ω¯t−1] . (4.107)
The remaining model features are carried over from the model framework outlined in Section
4.2. Thus heterogeneity is introduced by allowing the investors to form different time-varying
46An analogous approximation has already been used in Eq. (4.53) in Subsection 4.2.4.
47The derivation of Eq. (4.107) is relegated to the Appendix A 4.11.
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beliefs about the first and second moment of the risky-asset return, though they are assumed
to share the same beliefs about the dividends process according to Eq. (4.25). More precisely,
the investors are assumed to update their beliefs about the price change over the next period by
forming beliefs about the expectation and variance of the excess return (see Eq. (4.63)–Eq. (4.65)).
However, due to the fact that both investor groups know the dividend process, they form correct
expectations about the fundamental price path which therefore evolves according to Eq. (4.43),
which is
p∗t+1 = (1 + g)p
∗
t
rRPt − g
rRPt+1 − g
,
where
rRPt = rf +
Ht
W¯tI
[
(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t]
4ν1σ21,t
+
(1− n¯)[1− ω¯t]
4ν2σ22,t
]−1
(4.108)
and p∗t being the fundamental solution of the law of motion on the fundamental price path (see
Eq. (4.44)) given by
Et(pt+1 + dt+1) = pt

1 + rf + HtW¯tI
[
(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t]
4ν1σ21,t
+
(1− n¯)[1− ω¯t]
4ν2σ22,t
]−1

under certain simplifying assumptions outlined in detail in Subsection 4.2.3.
4.5.2 Summary of the Revised Stationary Model in its State Variables
Based on the artificial financial market model under a market maker scenario proposed in the
previous sections of this chapter, a non-zero risky-asset supply has been added to this model
framework, which leads to a non-vanishing and time-dependent quantity representing the risk
premium required by the investors to hold the risky asset even on the fundamental price path.
Again, the resulting growth model can now be reformulated as a stationary model in four state
variables: the return rt, the fundamental/price ratio yt, the asset supply/total wealth ratio zt and
the difference in the wealth proportions ω¯t. This result is resumed in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.9 The fundamental/price ratio evolves according to
yt+1 =
1 + g
1 + rt+1
rRPt − g
rRPt+1 − g
yt , (4.109)
where the return (ex dividends) of the risky asset is given by
rt+1 = g + λqt + α(yt − 1) (4.110)
with
qt =
[(1 + β1,t)π1,t − (1 + rt)π1,t−1](1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1]
(1 + β1,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + β2,t)(1 − n¯)[1− ω¯t−1]
+
[(1 + β2,t)π2,t − (1 + rt)π2,t−1](1− n¯)[1 − ω¯t−1]− 4nszt−1
(1 + β1,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + β2,t)(1− n¯)[1 − ω¯t−1]
and
βi,t+1 = rf + πi,t[rt+1 − rf + (rRPt − g)yt] ,
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πi,t =
Ei,t(rt+1) + (r
RP
t − g)yt − rf
νiσ2i,t
, i = 1, 2 ,
rRPt = rf +
[
(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t]
4ν1σ21,t
+
(1− n¯)[1− ω¯t]
4ν2σ22,t
]−1
zt .
The asset supply/total wealth ratio evolves according to
zt+1 =
2(1 + ns + rt+1)
[1 + ω¯t](1 + β1,t+1) + [1− ω¯t](1 + β2,t+1)zt , (4.111)
while the difference in the average wealth proportions of the two investor groups evolves according
to
ω¯t+1 =
[1 + ω¯t](1 + β1,t+1)− [1− ω¯t](1 + β2,t+1)
[1 + ω¯t](1 + β1,t+1) + [1− ω¯t](1 + β2,t+1) . (4.112)
The system Eq. (4.109)–Eq. (4.112) forms a stationary model in four state variables: the funda-
mental/price ratio, the return (ex dividends) of the risky asset, the asset supply/total wealth ratio
and the difference in the average wealth proportions of the two investor groups.
In relation to these model equations, the following remarks are necessary in order to clarify some
more technical or mathematical issues of the dynamic system. The first remark follows immediately
while the other two will appear in the next subsections:
Technical Remark 4.10 (On the Specific Choice of the New State Variable)
The newly introduced variable rRPt is obviously crucial in the revised model framework. It describes
the time evolution of a market-inherent risk-premium term that arises because all investors are
assumed to be risk-averse due to their CRRA utility optimization procedure, and because the
supply of risky assets is non-vanishing. However, it cannot be used as the fourth state variable for
the dynamic system since rRPt depends on the variables summarized in the variable zt as well as on
the difference in the investors’ average wealth proportions ω¯t and σ
2
1,t and σ
2
2,t (see Eq. (4.108)).
Thus the time evolution of rRPt cannot be determined in a compactly closed form. For this reason
the variable zt is used as the fourth independent state variable instead. Nevertheless, the definition
of zt is slightly inconvenient from a different more technical perspective since it involves the variable
W¯t (and not the total wealth of the economyWt), which is defined as the sum of the average wealth
of each agent within group i. Thus it makes a difference in the homogeneous model for the actual
values of zt (e.g., derived in the simulation runs) if only one investor type is assumed to act in
the market (i.e., n¯ = ω¯t = ±1) or if two investor groups pursuing identical trading strategies are
assumed (i.e., n¯ = ω¯t = 0).
48 This is because the numerical value of W¯t (as well as the value of the
[. . .]−1-expression in Eq. (4.108)) will be different in both cases. However, the values of rRPt and qt
will be identical for both cases, which is satisfactory as both are the more interpretable variables
from an economic point of view. Obviously, this phenomenon has not yet occurred because the
assumption of a zero supply of outside stocks canceled out the W¯t-terms in the previous model
versions discussed in the two last sections.
48Both scenarios can easily be investigated by simulating the corresponding dynamic system. Of course, the
numerical results of the main economic (state) variables, such as rt, yt, qt, rRPt remain the same for both scenarios.
Unfortunately, this is not true for all relevant variables in the dynamic system, for instance in the case of the state
variable zt.
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Specifying the agents’ beliefs about the risky-asset return will conclude the model structure and
will lead to the resulting dynamic system showing different market and price behaviors. This will be
done in the next subsections, where different model variants with homogeneous and heterogeneous
beliefs systems are investigated.
4.5.3 Homogeneous Beliefs – Fundamentalists
As already defined in Eq. (4.63), we assume that fundamentalists believe the returns of the risky
asset will eventually move back to the relative price change of the fundamental price, i.e., r∗ = g.
Mathematically, this is expressed by
Ef,t(rt+1) = g − β1(rt − g) ,
σ2f,t = σ
2 ,
where 0 ≤ β1 ≤ 1 and σ2 > 0 are constants. Hence Theorem 4.9 can be reduced to following
dynamic system:
rt+1 = g + λqt + α(yt − 1) , (4.113)
yt+1 =
(1 + g)(rRPt − g)
(1 + rt+1)(rRPt+1 − g)
yt , (4.114)
zt+1 =
1 + ns + rt+1
1 + βf,t+1
zt , (4.115)
where
qt =
(1 + βf,t)πf,t − (1 + rt)πf,t−1 − nszt−1
1 + βf,t
, (4.116)
βf,t+1 = rf + πf,t[rt+1 − rf + (rRPt − g)yt] , (4.117)
πf,t =
1
νσ2
[
(g − rf )− β1(rt − g) + (rRPt − g)yt
]
, (4.118)
rRPt = rf + νσ
2zt (4.119)
and ν ≡ νf . Obviously, the system Eq. (4.113)–Eq. (4.115) is a six-dimensional nonlinear system.49
Due to this most simple market scenario in the revised model framework, the following theorem
can be obtained, which relates to the existence of steady states:
Theorem 4.11 Let g, rf , λ, α, ν, σ
2, ns > 0 and ns ≥ (rf − g). Furthermore, assume that 0 ≤
β1 ≤ 1 and Eq. (4.116)–Eq. (4.119) hold. Then the system Eq. (4.113)–Eq. (4.115) has a steady
state E1 given by
r∗ = g ∧ y∗ = 1 ∧ z∗ =
√
ns + g − rf
νσ2
. (4.120)
Proof: See Appendix A 4.12.
49For a comparison with the results generated by the corresponding model framework with zero supplied risky
assets (i.e., Ht = 0), we refer to Subsection 4.3.1.
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Theorem 4.11 states that one economically reasonable steady state exists for the homoge-
neous fundamental-belief model with a non-zero risky-asset supply.50 The ‘quasi’-unique steady
state E1 = (g, g, 1, 1,
√
(ns + g − rf )/(νσ2),
√
(ns + g − rf )/(νσ2)) corresponds to the fundamen-
tal steady state where z∗ is exactly the same steady-state variable as has already introduced in
Eq. (4.49). Thus it can again be concluded that z∗ is only an economically realistic steady-state
variable if the relation ns ≥ (rf − g) holds (see Eq. (4.56) and the related discussions). Otherwise,
the radical of the square root would become negative, which would be equivalent to a pure
imaginary steady-state variable z∗. In contrast to the Ht = 0 case, where the optimal investment
proportion π∗f of the investors for investing in the risky asset is equal to zero at the fundamental
steady state (see Remark 4.3), π∗f is here determined by
π∗f =
Ef,t(ρ
∗)− rf
νσ2
=
Ef,t(r
∗) + (rRP
∗ − g)y∗ − rf
νσ2
=
g + (rf + νσ
2z∗ − g)− rf
νσ2
= z∗
for the revised model framework.51 This result is summarized in the following remark:
Remark 4.12 Note that the total agent’s demand at the fundamental steady state E1 is exactly
equal to the asset supply/total wealth ratio, i.e., π∗f = z
∗.
Remark 4.12 implies that the optimal investment proportion π∗f at the fundamental steady state
might even exceed 100%, which means that investors invest more money in the risky asset than
they actually possess. Note that this procedure is not strictly forbidden by our model framework
because πi,t is assumed to be unbounded in principle. Therefore, a low risk-aversion coefficient
of investors or a relatively high growth rate in the number of outstanding shares might generally
lead to the investors taking such investment decisions. This interrelation is relatively unsurprising
since zt can also be taken as the market risk-premium RPt divided by νσ
2 (see Eq. (4.119) and
also Eq. (4.50)). Thus an increase in z∗ caused, for instance, by an increase in ns is equal to a
higher risk premium RP ∗, which will, of course, lead immediately to a higher demand amongst
investors for the risky assets if all other market parameters are left unchanged. Of course, the
same argument can be used when the growth rate of dividends g increases or the risk-free rate rf
decreases, since the risky asset becomes more competitive in both cases. However, whenever the
risk-aversion coefficient changes, the behavior of z∗ and RP ∗ is slightly different. While z∗ (and
therefore also π∗f ) increases whenever ν decreases, which is economically reasonable as the investor
becomes less risk-averse, the value of the risk premium RP ∗ = νσ2z∗ decreases52 because a lower
risk premium is now necessary to convince the investors to invest in the risky prospect. However,
in the following discussion we will mainly concentrate on market situations in which the optimal
50From a purely mathematical point of view two further steady states with y∗ = 0 and z∗ > 0, i.e., limt→∞
p∗t
pt
= 0
and limt→∞ zt = z∗ > 0, as well as three further steady states with y∗ = 0 and z∗ = 0, i.e., limt→∞
p∗t
pt
= 0 and
limt→∞ zt = z∗ = 0 can be derived. However, a numerical analysis indicates that, for a very wide range of reasonable
parameter sets, these non-fundamental steady states do not represent economically reasonable results (see the proof
of Theorem 4.11 in Appendix A 4.12 for details). In this respect the fundamental steady state is ‘quasi’ unique.
Note that the ‘quasi’ uniqueness of the steady state coincides with the results found for the Ht = 0 case outlined in
Subsection 4.3.1.
51See also the proof of Theorem 4.11 in Appendix A 4.12 for further details of the calculation.
52Note that RP ∗ = νσ2z∗ = νσ2π∗f where π
∗
f is a function of 1/
√
ν.
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investment proportion π∗ would be between 0 and 1. This can easily be guaranteed by choosing
appropriate parameter sets for our artificial market.
As in the case of the heterogeneous beliefs model variants outlined in the previous sections of
this chapter, the local stability of the fundamental steady state E1 can only be investigated either
with the help of a mathematical manipulation software package such as Mathematica 4.1 or by
using numerical simulations. The reason for this procedure is simply the high dimension of the
underlying dynamic system, which makes an analytical approach almost infeasible. Therefore, all
subsequent statements are based on these two methods of investigation, i.e., using Mathematica
4.1 to evaluate the eigenvalues of the associated characteristic equation of E1 as well as performing
extensive numerical simulations.
The overall results are comparable to those found for the corresponding Ht = 0 model frame-
work. As long as fundamentalists do not extrapolate too strongly, i.e., for β1 being sufficiently
close to zero, the fundamental steady state E1 is locally asymptotically stable and thus the dy-
namic system eventually converges to its unique steady state for wide range of parameter sets.
As before, a decrease in the price adjustment speed λ of the market maker stabilizes the dynamic
system in two ways. Firstly, the range in which the system converges to its fundamental steady
state increases significantly. Secondly, even behind this range of convergence the dynamic system
at least does not explode whenever λ is chosen relatively small. Figure 4.14 refers to this fact. It
shows four bifurcation diagrams with respect to the fundamentalists’ extrapolation parameter β1.
It can clearly be detected that the choice of a lower value of λ leads to wider range of convergence
(see upper right panel). Furthermore, numerical simulations show that the dynamic system even
explodes for certain parameter sets. This is visualized in Figure 4.14, where all panels are plotted
only in the range from 0 to 0.45, apart from the upper right panel, were λ is chosen smaller, in
this case 0.05.53 As for the corresponding Ht = 0 case, a relatively strong stabilizing force term
α leads to more unstable market dynamics (see lower left panel), while a decrease in α stabilizes
the system (see lower right panel).54 But there is also another feature that both model variants
have in common. For all parameter sets that have been investigated, the fundamental steady state
E1 undergoes a flip bifurcation when β1 increases sufficiently. This primary bifurcation can also
be easily detected in the bifurcation plots outlined here.55 Behind the flip bifurcation, limit cycles
as well as 2-cycles and high-order cycles occur whenever the dynamic system does not explode,
although it does explode for a relatively high number of parameter sets. Lastly, it is worth high-
lighting that the bifurcation plot shown in the right panel of Figure 4.2 looks almost identical to
the bifurcation plot given in the upper right panel of Figure 4.14. However, a striking difference
between these plots lies in the fact that the passage from the stable dynamics to the primary flip
bifurcation seems to be slightly noisy in all bifurcation plots of Figure 4.14. We will come back
to this phenomenon in the following model variants where this feature will be discussed in further
53Notice also that the labeling of the y-axis in these plots corresponds to a significantly larger range than normally
used in almost all other bifurcation plots exhibited before in which the terminal points of the 100,000 simulation
experiments fall for each of the four bifurcation plots of Figure 4.14.
54See also Footnotes 29 and 39 for a related discussion.
55The bifurcation point β∗1 of the primary flip bifurcation can in principle be analytically calculated, as already
done for the corresponding Ht = 0 case (see Eq. (4.73)). However, the resulting conditional equation is almost
unmanageable. Thus an analogous theorem of Theorem 4.5 is not given here.
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(c) bifurcation diagram, λ = 0.1, α = 0.9
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Figure 4.14: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to β1 for the homogeneous market maker model (Ht > 0 case).
The fundamental steady state E1 of the revised homogeneous market maker model is locally asymptotically stable
for β1 being sufficiently small, where a decrease in the parameter α slightly stabilizes the system and an increase has
the opposite effect (lower panels). By increasing β1, the fundamental steady state E1 undergoes a flip bifurcation
in all cases. For values of β1 being larger than 0.45, the dynamic system explodes in almost all simulations in which
λ is sufficiently large. The experiments are conducted in exactly the same way as described in Figure 4.2. The
remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2 and n
s = 0.03.
detail.
Before a heterogeneous beliefs model is investigated, the next subsection briefly outlines the
other case of a homogeneous belief model where all investors pursue a chartist trading strategy.
4.5.4 Homogeneous Beliefs – Chartists
This subsection concentrates on the homogeneous beliefs model with only chartists in the market.
Obviously it would appear to make sense to again use the chartist beliefs given by Eq. (4.64)–
Eq. (4.65), where
Ec,t(ρt+1) = β2rt + (1− β2)rt−1 + (rf − g)yt
has to be replaced by
Ec,t(ρt+1) = β2rt + (1− β2)rt−1 + (rRPt − g)yt (4.121)
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and
σ¯2c,t ≡ [Ec,t(ρt+1)− rf ]2 = [β2rt + (1− β2)rt−1 + (rf − g)yt − rf ]2
has to be replaced by
σ¯2c,t ≡ [Ec,t(ρt+1)− rRP
∗
t ]
2 =
[
β2rt + (1− β2)rt−1 + (rRPt − g)yt − rRP
∗
t
]2
, (4.122)
where rRP
∗
t denotes the sum of the risk-free rate and the risk premium on the fundamental price
path, which is a constant in our model structure. With these assumptions, the resulting dynamic
system is given by
rt+1 = g + λqt + α(yt − 1) , (4.123)
yt+1 =
(1 + g)(rRPt − g)
(1 + rt+1)(rRPt+1 − g)
yt , (4.124)
zt+1 =
1 + ns + rt+1
1 + βc,t+1
zt , (4.125)
where
qt =
(1 + βc,t)πc,t − (1 + rt)πc,t−1 − nszt−1
1 + βc,t
,
βc,t+1 = rf + πc,t[rt+1 − rf + (rRPt − g)yt] ,
πc,t =
[
β2rt + (1− β2)rt−1 + (rRPt − g)yt − rf
]
ν
[
σ2 + β3σ¯2c,t
] ,
rRPt = rf + ν
[
σ2 + β3σ¯
2
c,t
]
zt (4.126)
with ν ≡ νc and σ¯2c,t as given in Eq. (4.122). However, due to the variable rRPt , the resulting
dynamic system Eq. (4.123)–Eq. (4.125) would become almost mathematically intractable. This
will now be outlined in more detail in the following remark.
Technical Remark 4.13 (Infeasibility of a Non-Adaptive Expectation Formation)
In our revised model framework the market participants have to determine, inter alia, the variable
rRPt+1 in order to derive the fundamental/price ratio yt+1 of the next trading period (see Eq. (4.124)),
which obviously depends on the investors’ beliefs about the conditional variances of returns at time
t+1, which is σ¯2c,t+1, according to Eq. (4.126). Because Eq. (4.122) states that the variable σ¯
2
c,t+1
itself depends on rRPt+1 and yt+1 as well, we cannot simply derive yt+1 via Eq. (4.124) and iterate
the dynamic system as done for the corresponding simplified model variant with Ht = 0 (see
Eq. (4.74)–Eq. (4.79) in Subsection 4.3.2). Instead, we would have to solve the newly arising
equation for yt+1 first, which is not an easy task and mathematically quite laborious and therefore
left out here. To conclude, the revised trading strategies of the chartists given by Eq. (4.121) and
Eq. (4.122) cannot be simply applied to the fully-developed market maker model.
Instead, we will use the adaptive expectation formation for the chartists, which has already
been introduced in Subsection 4.4.1. Remember that chartists extrapolate the future return of
the risky asset from the sample mean and variance of the past realized returns, which follow some
learning processes. Precisely, the adaptive expectations of the chartists are assumed to be56
Ec,t(rt+1) = rt + β2(rt − φt) , β2 ∈ [0, 1] ,
56See Eq. (4.92) and the discussion thereon for further details.
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and
σ2c,t ≡ V arc,t(ρt+1) = σ2 + β3vt , β3 ≥ 0 ,
where
φt = δφt−1 + (1 − δ)rt ,
vt = δvt−1 + δ(1− δ)(rt − φt−1)2 .
Therefore, after collecting all relevant equations for this homogeneous beliefs case, the resulting
dynamic system can be summarized as follows (with ν ≡ νc):
rt+1 = g + λqt + α(yt − 1) , (4.127)
yt+1 =
(1 + g)(rRPt − g)
(1 + rt+1)(rRPt+1 − g)
yt , (4.128)
zt+1 =
1 + ns + rt+1
1 + βc,t+1
zt , (4.129)
φt+1 = δφt + (1 − δ)rt+1 , (4.130)
vt+1 = δvt + δ(1− δ)(rt+1 − φt)2 , (4.131)
where
qt =
(1 + βc,t)πc,t − (1 + rt)πc,t−1 − nszt−1
1 + βc,t
, (4.132)
βc,t+1 = rf + πc,t[rt+1 − rf + (rRPt − g)yt] , (4.133)
πc,t =
rt + β2(rt − φt) + (rRPt − g)yt − rf
ν [σ2 + β3vt]
, (4.134)
rRPt = rf + ν
[
σ2 + β3vt
]
zt . (4.135)
In comparison to the homogeneous beliefs model in the previous subsection, the dimension of the
system Eq. (4.127)–Eq. (4.131) has increased by four, i.e., it is a ten dimensional system, caused
by the chartists extrapolating the next period’s asset return rt+1 from the sample mean and the
sample variance of the prior observable return values of the risky asset measured by φt, φt−1, vt,
and vt−1. Furthermore, it can easily be verified that a similar steady state exists, as it does in the
homogeneous case with only fundamentalists in the market exist:
Theorem 4.14 Let 0 ≤ β2, δ ≤ 1 and β3 ≥ 0. Assume that Eq. (4.132)–Eq. (4.135) hold. Under
the assumptions of Theorem 4.11 the system Eq. (4.127)–Eq. (4.131) has a steady state E1 which
is given by
φ∗ = g ∧ v∗ = 0 ∧ r∗ = g ∧ y∗ = 1 ∧ z∗ =
√
ns + g − rf
νσ2
.
(4.136)
Proof: See Appendix A 4.13.
According to Theorem 4.14 the ‘quasi’-unique steady state of the homogeneous beliefs model with
only chartists in the market is the same as for the homogeneous model with only fundamentalists
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in the market.57 Thus, according to Remark 4.12 the investors’ optimal investment proportion
π∗c at the steady state E1 is again equal to the asset supply/total wealth ratio, i.e., π
∗
c = z
∗.
However, numerical simulations indicate that the fundamental steady state E1 is unstable for
almost all reasonable parameter sets regardless of the choice of β2. Note that this result was
also shown in the analogous Ht = 0 case briefly outlined at the beginning of Subsection 4.4.2.
58
Furthermore, the dynamic system is subject to explosive behavior. For instance, generating
bifurcation diagrams is almost impossible since there is a huge number of experiments for which
the dynamic system eventually explodes. For this reason, Figure 4.15 displays time series and
phase space plots for different market scenarios instead of bifurcation diagrams. The time series
of the risky-asset return rt and the risky-asset price pt as well as the corresponding phase space
plot in the (rt, yt)-plane is exhibited. Plots from two different parameter sets are shown (see
Figure 4.15 (a)–(f) and (g)–(l)), which represent typical market outcomes similar to results
already observed in the preceding model variants (i.e., high-order cycles, limit cycles and strange
attractors). Nevertheless, two aspects are worth mentioning. Firstly, the corresponding time
series of the risky-asset price pt is depicted since the price evolution of the risky asset shows a
notable volatility for certain parameter sets in contrast to all other price runs of previous model
versions (see Figure 4.15 (e) and (h)).59 While the exponential increase in the risky-asset price
is due to the fact that the market maker model is a growth model in both the asset price and
the overall investors’ wealth level, the irregular upward and downward jumps of the risky-asset
price is caused by the chartists’ revised trading strategy. The second observation is maybe even
more surprising. Note that the Panels (a)–(c) and (d)–(f) of Figure 4.15 are generated in two
experiments using the same parameter set (Shape I vs. Shape II). The same is true for the Panels
(g)–(i) and (j)–(l) of Figure 4.15. The only explanation for these occurrences can be that the
eventual outcome of the dynamic system depends on the initial conditions of the system, which
are chosen randomly in our model design. In other words the randomly generated initial values
of the underlying dynamic variables can lead to considerably different results in the long run,
which is a well-known characteristic in nonlinear chaotic systems under the notion of ‘sensitive
dependence on initial conditions’ (SDIC). Interestingly, this phenomenon has not been observed
in the experiments conducted for the preceding model variants. One reason might be that, for the
Ht > 0 case, a further state variable has been introduced which is also initialized randomly and
which simply leads to a wider basin of potential start positions for the state variables and thus
to a wider variety of possible orbits. Moreover, the fully-developed market maker model might
simply be a system of even greater complexity. It should finally be noted that the parameter sets
shown in Figure 4.15 are typical examples of simulation results obtained for this homogeneous
chartists model.
57From a purely mathematical point of view two further steady states with y∗ = 0 and z∗ > 0, i.e., limt→∞
p∗t
pt
= 0
and limt→∞ zt = z∗ > 0, as well as three further steady states with y∗ = 0 and z∗ = 0, i.e., limt→∞
p∗t
pt
= 0 and
limt→∞ zt = z∗ = 0 can be derived. However, a numerical analysis indicates that, for a very wide range of reasonable
parameter sets, these non-fundamental steady states do not represent economically reasonable results (see the proof
of Theorem 4.14 in Appendix A 4.13 for details). In this respect the fundamental steady state is ‘quasi’ unique.
58An adaptive expectation formation scheme is used here as in Section 4.4.
59The time series of the risky-asset price has always been investigated for all the previous model variants although
these results have not been shown in detail in the corresponding subsections.
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(d) time series of rt for λ = 0.1, α =
0.5, and β2 = 0.3 (Shape II)
 0
 5000
 10000
 15000
 20000
 25000
 30000
 35000
 40000
 45000
 20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180  200
pr
ice
time
t. s. of pt for the homog. m. m. model with only chartists (Ht>0)
(e) corresponding time series of
risky-asset price pt with p0 = 100
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 1.2
 1.3
 1.4
 1.5
 1.6
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4
y t
rt
projection in the (rt,yt)-plane
(f) corresponding phase space plot
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 9700  9710  9720  9730  9740  9750re
tu
rn
 o
f t
he
 ri
sk
y 
as
se
t (w
ith
ou
t d
ivi
de
nd
s)
time
t. s. of rt for the homog. m. m. model with only chartists (Ht>0)
(g) time series of rt for λ = 0.05,
α = 0.5, and β2 = 0.5 (Shape I)
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(j) time series of rt for λ = 0.05, α =
0.5, and β2 = 0.5 (Shape II)
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Figure 4.15: Time series of risky-asset returns and corresponding risky-asset prices and phase space plots for the
homogeneous market maker model with only chartists in the market (Ht > 0 case). The plot exhibits the time
series of the risky-asset return rt, the risky-asset price pt and the projection of the corresponding attractor on the
(rt, yt)-plane for four market situations. While the first and second row of plots correspond to the same parameter
set for which the market dynamics can be described by both a limit cycle and a high-order cycle, the third and
fourth row of plots also correspond to one parameter set but show market scenarios in which limit cycles and strange
attractor behavior occurs. As before the dynamic variables (i.e., rt, yt and zt) are randomly initialized in all plots.
Thus the dynamic system reacts sensitively to the chosen initial conditions of these variables. Furthermore, the time
evolution of risky-asset prices shows volatile behavior for certain market scenarios (see Panels (e) and (h)). The
phase space representations are generated by 10,000 iterations from which the first 5,000 are deleted afterwards.
The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03 and β3 = 5.0.
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In the following subsection a heterogeneous beliefs model is investigated in which both previous
trading strategies are combined.
4.5.5 Heterogeneous Beliefs – Fundamentalists and Chartists
In this subsection the fully-developed market maker model will be analyzed. It is obvious that the
resulting dynamic system will become even more complex than in the preceding subsections. Nev-
ertheless, numerical simulations and an analytical treatment with the aid of the software package
Mathematica 4.1 will help to manage the investigation of the behavior of the underlying dynamic
system. Again the subsection begins with a technical remark:
Technical Remark 4.15 (Necessarity of a Uniform Choice of ν and σ2)
Due to the complexity of the heterogeneous beliefs model with a non-vanishing risky-asset supply,
we will now assume that both fundamentalists and chartists can be characterized by identical
risk-aversion coefficients, i.e., it is assumed that ν ≡ νf = νc. Furthermore, the beliefs about the
conditional variances of returns are assumed to be given by σ2f,t = σ
2 and σ2c,t = σ
2 + β3vt as
already defined above. Of course, these assumptions are known and have already been used in the
preceding two subsections. However, the remark is still necessary because the resulting dynamic
system reveals that the absence of these assumptions would make it impossible to determine the
steady state of the dynamic system, since π∗f 6= π∗c would directly lead to β∗f 6= β∗c , making the
dynamic system almost mathematically intractable (see Eq. (4.142)).60
Taking this remark into account, the dynamic system of the heterogeneous beliefs model is
given by
rt+1 = g + λqt + α(yt − 1) , (4.137)
yt+1 =
(1 + g)(rRPt − g)
(1 + rt+1)(rRPt+1 − g)
yt , (4.138)
zt+1 =
2(1 + ns + rt+1)
[1 + ω¯t](1 + βf,t+1) + [1− ω¯t](1 + βc,t+1)zt , (4.139)
φt+1 = δφt + (1− δ)rt+1 , (4.140)
vt+1 = δvt + δ(1 − δ)(rt+1 − φt)2 , (4.141)
ω¯t+1 =
[1 + ω¯t](1 + βf,t+1)− [1− ω¯t](1 + βc,t+1)
[1 + ω¯t](1 + βf,t+1) + [1− ω¯t](1 + βc,t+1) , (4.142)
where
qt =
[(1 + βf,t)πf,t − (1 + rt)πf,t−1](1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1]
(1 + βf,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + βc,t)(1 − n¯)[1− ω¯t−1]
+
[(1 + βc,t)πc,t − (1 + rt)πc,t−1](1− n¯)[1 − ω¯t−1]− 4nszt−1
(1 + βf,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + βc,t)(1 − n¯)[1− ω¯t−1] (4.143)
and
βi,t+1 = rf + πi,t
[
rt+1 − rf + (rRPt − g)yt
]
, i ∈ {f, c} , (4.144)
60Remember that this is not true for the Ht = 0 case. Instead, for Ht = 0 it is π∗f = π
∗
c = 0 and thus β
∗
f = β
∗
c = rf
at a steady state of the corresponding dynamic system (see also the proof of Theorem 4.2 in Appendix A 4.3 for
details).
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πf,t =
1
νσ2
[
(g − rf )− β1(rt − g) + (rRPt − g)yt
]
, (4.145)
πc,t =
rt + β2(rt − φt) + (rRPt − g)yt − rf
ν [σ2 + β3vt]
, (4.146)
rRPt = rf +
[
(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t]
4νσ2
+
(1− n¯)[1− ω¯t]
4ν(σ2 + β3vt)
]−1
zt . (4.147)
Obviously, the system Eq. (4.137)–Eq. (4.142) is a twelve dimensional system for which the follow-
ing result for the steady states can be obtained:
Theorem 4.16 Let g, rf , λ, α, ν, σ
2, ns > 0, g < rf , n
s ≥ (rf − g), n¯ ∈ [−1, 1] as well as 0 ≤
β1, β2, δ ≤ 1 and β3 ≥ 0. Assume that Eq. (4.143)–Eq. (4.147) hold. Then the system Eq. (4.137)–
Eq. (4.142) has infinitely many steady states, namely fundamental steady states, which are given
by
φ∗ = g ∧ v∗ = 0 ∧ r∗ = g ∧ y∗ = 1 ∧ z∗ = 1 + n¯ω¯
∗
2
√
ns + g − rf
νσ2
∧ ω¯∗ ∈ [−1, 1] .
Proof: See Appendix A 4.14.
Theorem 4.16 states that the dynamic system of the heterogeneous beliefs model has in-
finitely many steady states.61 Note that z∗ depends on the difference of the average wealth
proportion ω¯∗ which itself can take a value between -1 and 1. Thus the variety of steady-state
values might become rather rich in our fully-developed market maker model. According to
Technical Remark 4.15 the following conclusion can be drawn:62
Remark 4.17 Note that the optimal investment proportion of fundamentalists and chartists is
the same at the fundamental steady states, i.e., it is π∗ ≡ π∗f = π∗c . Furthermore, the relationship
between the total demand of the agent and the asset supply/total wealth ratio is given by π∗ =
2z∗/(1 + n¯ω¯∗).63
Numerical simulations of the underlying dynamic system indicate that an increase in the fun-
damentalists’ extrapolation parameter β1 leads to the dynamic system exhibiting intensified explo-
sive behavior. For this reason we will concentrate on parameter sets in which β1 is chosen as 0.1,
0.25 and 0.4. This can be also seen as economically reasonable since the fundamentalists should
quite strongly believe in the fundamentals to distinguish their trading strategy from that of the
chartists’, who are just assumed to use an extrapolation scheme for their investment decisions.
Obviously, this distinction can be guaranteed by a sufficiently low extrapolation parameter β1 for
the fundamentalists.
61From a purely mathematical point of view, four further steady states can be derived with y∗ = 0 and z∗ > 0,
i.e., limt→∞
p∗t
pt
= 0 and limt→∞ zt = z∗ > 0, as well as six further steady states with y∗ = 0 and z∗ = 0, i.e.,
limt→∞
p∗t
pt
= 0 and limt→∞ zt = z∗ = 0. However, a numerical analysis indicates that, for a very wide range of
reasonable parameter sets, these non-fundamental steady states do not represent economically reasonable results
(see the proof of Theorem 4.16 in Appendix A 4.14 for details). In this respect only fundamental steady states exist
for the fully-developed heterogeneous beliefs model.
62See Appendix A 4.14 for details.
63Remember that the optimal investment proportion π∗ at the fundamental steady states might even exceed
100%. See also Remark 4.12 and the discussion around for further details.
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Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 (left panels) show six typical bifurcation diagrams for the het-
erogeneous market maker model with a non-zero risky-asset supply for different parameter sets.
Almost all parameter sets have already been used in previous model variants so that the results
of different model frameworks can easily be compared with each other (see Figures 4.6 and 4.10).
The bifurcation diagrams look slightly more noisy than the corresponding bifurcation diagrams for
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Figure 4.16: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to β2 for the heterogeneous market maker model (Ht > 0 case). As
in the case of the adaptive market maker model with a vanishing risky-asset supply (see Figure 4.10) the resulting
dynamic system becomes rather complex for a wide range of parameter sets. Moreover, the bifurcation diagrams
look rather noisy, presumably caused by randomly chosen initial conditions for the dynamic variables (see discussion
and figures below for further details). The experiments are conducted in exactly the same way as described in Figure
4.2. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03, α = 0.5 and n¯ = 0.0.
The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
the Ht = 0 case. The reason for this noise might be that the equilibrium value z
∗ for the newly in-
troduced state variable zt depends on the steady-state value of the difference of the average wealth
proportion ω¯∗, which itself can take any value between -1 and 1. Note that the initial conditions
for the dynamic state variables are again chosen randomly for the bifurcation experiments, which
might lead to a wide variety of different behavior in the underlying dynamic system. It should also
be noted that the presence of SDIC has already been observed for the homogeneous model with
only chartists in the market, i.e., the eventual outcome of the dynamic system clearly depends
on the initial conditions (see Subsection 4.5.4). For this reason it might be useful to investigate
these features in more details first: this will be done in the next paragraphs and figures. While
Figure 4.17 provides additional information on the behavior and interrelation of the chartists’ ex-
trapolation rate β2, the risky-asset return rt and the difference of the average wealth proportion
ω¯t, Figures 4.18 and 4.19 visualize the influence of the specific choice of initial conditions on the
resulting behavior of the underlying dynamic system.
As already mentioned above, Figure 4.17 (left panels) shows three typical bifurcation diagrams
with the fundamentalists’ extrapolation parameter β1 being chosen moderately low. While the
bifurcation diagrams are performed in exactly the same way as in all other previous cases, the
middle and right panels exhibit corresponding scatter plots in the (β2, ω¯t)-plane and in the (rt, ω¯t)-
plane respectively. They are generated from the same data set as used for the bifurcation diagrams
and are conducted as follows. As described in Figure 4.2, 100,000 experiments with randomly
chosen values of β2 are performed for each bifurcation plot, with 5,000 iterations being conducted
in each experiment. Now, for all 100,000 experiments, the 5000th realization of rt and ω¯t is stored
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Figure 4.17: More bifurcation diagrams with respect to β2 and corresponding scatter plots for the heterogeneous
market maker model (Ht > 0 case). While for all possible values of β2 market outcomes can occur in which the
chartists are able to prevail over the fundamentalists in the long run (see straight line at -1 in Panels (b), (e)
and (h)), the fundamentalists tend to do better and sustain their position in the market whenever the chartists’
extrapolation parameter β2 is chosen not too high or a relatively overflowed risky-asset return is realized (Panels
(d)–(f)). Obviously, an asset return rt around the steady-state value (here: r∗ = g = 0.04) mostly corresponds to
a more balanced wealth distribution among the two investor groups (right panels). While the bifurcation diagrams
are conducted in exactly the same way as described in Figure 4.2, a description of how to perform the scatter plots
can be found in the continuous text. Note that the middle row of plots, i.e., Panels (d)–(f), only shows about
45,500 experiments; this is because the underlying dynamic system has exploded during the numerical simulations.
Note that the tendency of the system to explode becomes quite apparent by the widely scattered realizations of the
risky-asset return rt (see Panel (d)). The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5,
ns = 0.03, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
and plotted as a scatter plot in both the (β2, ω¯t)-plane and the (rt, ω¯t)-plane. In other words,
for each of the 100,000 experiments a triple of (β2, rt, ω¯t) values is generated and displayed in
all possible 2-dimensional planes, i.e., the (β2, rt)-plane, the (β2, ω¯t)-plane and finally the (rt, ω¯t)-
plane. While the first scatter plot is simply the bifurcation diagram (left panels), the other two
scatter plots can help to investigate whether a certain realization of β2 implies a certain value
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of ω¯t (middle panels) or whether a certain risky-asset return rt can always be associated with a
certain value of ω¯t (right panels).
64 Indeed, the scatter plots reveal interesting insights into the
behavior of the dynamic system.65 Obviously, in many experiments a risky-asset return close to its
fundamental steady-state value corresponds to a market situation in which neither fundamentalists
nor chartists accumulate all the wealth. This result coincides with the findings from the previous
model variants. However, all scatter plots in the (β2, ω¯t)-plane clearly show that any β2 realization
makes it possible for the chartists to prevail over the fundamentalists (see straight line at -1).
Otherwise, if the risky-asset return hits exactly its fundamental steady-state value then, to some
degree, there is a tendency for fundamentalists to accumulate more wealth than the chartists in
the long run (see vertical line in the right panels). These findings clearly indicate that the precise
outcome of the revised market maker model depends significantly on the chosen initialization of
the dynamic system (i.e., the presence of SDIC). Since this seems to be a crucial issue for the
fully-developed market maker model, this fact will be addressed in further detail in the following
figures. Finally, it is worth mentioning that in almost all bifurcation diagrams a straight line can
be identified at the fundamental steady-state level rt = g = 0.04, although this is sometimes hard
to detect visually.66 This fact will become more obvious in the following figures.
Figure 4.18 shows three different ways of initializing the dynamic system for the three bifurca-
tion diagrams in Figure 4.16. The left panels depict the resulting bifurcation plots for the system
starting deterministically at its equilibrium point. The middle panels (i.e., Figure 4.18 (b), (e) and
(h)) also correspond to a deterministic model version but with start values initialized beyond the
fundamental steady states. Finally, in the right panels the dynamic system is initialized randomly,
but with a more limited pool of start values than in the ‘regular’ bifurcation experiments shown so
far.67 Let us start with the right panels. It can clearly be detected that a decreased randomization
of the initial conditions reduces the noise in the bifurcation diagrams (see especially Figure 4.18
(c) and (i) vs. Figure 4.16 (a) and (c) respectively). In other words, a dynamic system with a fairly
strong random initialization leads to a wider range of possible market behavior. This is of course
a straightforward result because, from a more mathematical perspective, intensively randomizing
the initial conditions produces a richer variety of possible orbits (or solution curves) that can be
assumed by the underlying dynamic system. Contrastingly, if the initial conditions for a system
64In all experiments the difference in the average wealth proportions of the investor groups is deterministically
initialized at ω¯0 = 0.0, which means that the wealth share of investors is equally distributed among the two investor
groups at the beginning of each experiment.
65The scatter plot results depicted in the middle and lower panels of Figure 4.17 (where β1 = 0.25 is chosen) can
be carried over to the parameter sets chosen for Figure 4.16 (a) and (c), where the fundamentalists’ extrapolation
parameter is assumed to be β1 = 0.1 (all other parameters are identical). However, the fundamentalists perform
slightly less well for the parameter set used in Figure 4.16 (a).
66This finding has also been verified by looking at the corresponding data sets, where it can be materially better
observed.
67More precisely, for the systems exhibited in the left panels the initial conditions are chosen as rt−1 = rt =
µt−1 = µt = g, yt−1 = yt = 1, vt−1 = vt = ω¯t−1 = ω¯t = 0.0 and zt−1 = zt = 0.5(1+ n¯ω¯t−1)
p
(ns + g − rf )/(νσ2),
i.e., at the equilibrium point. For the middle panels the initial conditions remain exactly same besides rt−1 and rt
which are chosen beyond the equilibrium, namely as rt−1 = g + 0.02 and rt = g − 0.01. For the right panels the
initial condition for zt−1 and zt (as well as for ω¯t−1 and ω¯t) are chosen as above, while all other variables are now
again (randomly) initialized as in all previous bifurcation diagrams.
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Figure 4.18: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to β2 for the heterogeneous market maker model (Ht > 0 case)
with different initial conditions. The parameter set is identical to the parameter set used in Figure 4.16. It can
analytically be shown, by checking the eigenvalues of the corresponding characteristic equation, that the fundamental
steady state of the upper two dynamic systems cannot be reached outside an initialization at their steady-state values
for any realization of β2 while the fundamental steady state of the system shown in the lower panels can even be
reached by an initialization outside its steady-state value for approximately β2 < 0.7. Obviously, all three systems
tend to persist at their steady-state values (at least for sufficiently small values of β2) whenever they start from
this equilibrium point, while a deterministic initialization beyond the steady state reveals the bifurcation point if it
exists (see Panel (h)). A random initialization of the system leads to more noisy bifurcation diagrams (right panels).
Again, 100,000 experiments are performed whereas for the lower panels only 50,000 experiments are conducted. The
remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03, α = 0.5, and n¯ = 0.0. A
description of the experiments and the initial conditions can be found in the continuous text.
are chosen deterministically, the possible orbits of the system are rather limited.68 This effect can
68Nevertheless, different orbits can be reached even in the case of a deterministic initialization of the dynamic
system, simply because the bifurcation parameter β2 is still randomly chosen to produce the bifurcation diagram.
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be pretty well observed in the lower panels of Figure 4.18, i.e., Panels (g)–(i). Concentrating on the
range of 0.5 and 0.7 for a moment and checking the simulated data, it is evident that the dynamic
system converges quite often to a fundamental steady state in the right Panel (i) (and even more
frequently than in Figure 4.16 (c)) but not in all cases.69 Indeed, if the system starts outside the
basin of attraction for an equilibrium point of the system, it will not inevitably converge to this
equilibrium. However, a sharp and exact division of areas of convergence and divergence can be
detected in the middle Panel (h) (where the initial conditions are chosen deterministically slightly
beyond the fundamental steady-state values).70 Moreover, the left Panel (g) shows that the dy-
namic system persists in its equilibrium point, even if the fundamental steady state is not locally
stable for such a parameter set.71 The diagrams shown in Figure 4.18 (a)–(f) can be interpreted in
a similar way. From Figure 4.18 (b) and (e) it becomes apparent that for both parameter sets the
fundamental steady state is not locally stable for any choice of β2.
72 Both upper left panels again
indicate a certain persistence of the underlying system to remain at the equilibrium point even if
the fundamental steady state is not locally stable. This is at least true whenever β2 is sufficiently
small.
The corresponding scatter plots are shown in Figure 4.19 while the top panels correspond to
the bifurcation diagrams shown in Figure 4.16. Note that, in comparison to Figure 4.18, the
parameter sets are arranged in a transposed order since I want to depict four subfigures, i.e.,
panels, per parameter set. Let us first concentrate on the findings shown in Figure 4.19 (d)–(l).
The results can be summarized as follows. For the systems shown in the upper and lower panels of
Figure 4.18 (see Panels (a)–(c) and (g)–(i) respectively), the corresponding scatter plots in Figure
4.19 indicate that fundamentalists and chartists eventually coexist in the market in the long run
whenever the system remains close to a fundamental steady state (see Figure 4.19 (d), (g) and (j)
as well as Figure 4.19 (f), (i) and (l)). However, the exact model outcome does clearly depend on
the way in which the initial conditions are chosen (i.e., the presence of SDIC). But whenever the
system clearly departs from a fundamental steady state, the chartists accumulate more wealth on
average (see the right-hand side regions within the corresponding plots). For the systems shown
in Figure 4.18 (d)–(f), the results are slightly different. According to the Panels (e), (h) and (k) of
Figure 4.19, it becomes evident that the chartists do better in the long run for sufficiently small
values of β2 (except for the system shown in Panel (e) where fundamentalists and chartists remain
at their initial wealth proportion), while sufficiently large values for the chartists’ extrapolation
rate β2 can lead to chartists and fundamentalists both prevailing, depending on the specific choice
of initial conditions (i.e., the presence of SDIC).
As already mentioned above, the corresponding scatter plots of Figure 4.16 are depicted in
Figure 4.19 (a)–(c). Obviously, these scatter plots are more noisy than the scatter plots of the
Therefore, even Figure 4.18 (a), (b), (d), (e) and (h) shows noise in the bifurcation diagram.
69See the straight line at rt = 0.4 in Figure 4.18 (i). This feature has already been observed and stated in a
previous model variant. See Footnote 38 in Subsection 4.3.3 for further details.
70This division line can be determined exactly with the help of the software package Mathematica 4.1.
71‘Locally stable’ here means, that all eigenvalues of the corresponding characteristic equation lie inside the unit
circle except for one eigenvalue, which is ‘neutral’, i.e., ±1. This eigenvalue corresponds to the state variable ω¯t.
Note, that therefore a continuum of fundamental steady states exists.
72Again this result can be analytically proved with the aid of Mathematica 4.1.
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β5 = 5.0 (see Figure 4.18 (a))
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
we
al
th
 p
ro
po
rti
on
Bifurcation Parameter β2
scatter plot in the (β2,omegatbar)-plane (noe=100000)
(e) scatter plot in the (β2, ω¯t)-
plane deterministically initialized at
steady state, λ = 0.1, β1 = 0.1,
β3 = 2.0 (see Figure 4.18 (d))
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
we
al
th
 p
ro
po
rti
on
Bifurcation Parameter β2
scatter plot in the (β2,omegatbar)-plane (noe=50000)
(f) scatter plot in the (β2, ω¯t)-
plane deterministically initialized at
steady state, λ = 0.05, β1 = 0.1,
β3 = 5.0 (see Figure 4.18 (g))
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
we
al
th
 p
ro
po
rti
on
Bifurcation Parameter β2
scatter plot in the (β2,omegatbar)-plane (noe=100000)
(g) scatter plot in the (β2, ω¯t)-plane
deterministically initialized beyond
the steady state, λ = 0.1, β1 = 0.1,
β5 = 5.0 (see Figure 4.18 (b))
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
we
al
th
 p
ro
po
rti
on
Bifurcation Parameter β2
scatter plot in the (β2,omegatbar)-plane (noe=100000)
(h) scatter plot in the (β2, ω¯t)-plane
deterministically initialized beyond
the steady state, λ = 0.1, β1 = 0.1,
β3 = 2.0 (see Figure 4.18 (e))
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
we
al
th
 p
ro
po
rti
on
Bifurcation Parameter β2
scatter plot in the (β2,omegatbar)-plane (noe=50000)
(i) scatter plot in the (β2, ω¯t)-plane
deterministically initialized beyond
the steady state, λ = 0.05, β1 = 0.1,
β3 = 5.0 (see Figure 4.18 (h))
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
we
al
th
 p
ro
po
rti
on
Bifurcation Parameter β2
scatter plot in the (β2,omegatbar)-plane (noe=100000)
(j) scatter plot in the (β2, ω¯t)-plane
weakly randomly initialized, λ = 0.1,
β1 = 0.1, β3 = 5.0 (see Figure 4.18
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(k) scatter plot in the (β2, ω¯t)-plane
weakly randomly initialized, λ = 0.1,
β1 = 0.1, β3 = 2.0 (see Figure 4.18
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0.05, β1 = 0.1, β3 = 5.0 (see Figure
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Figure 4.19: Corresponding scatter plots in the (β2, ω¯t)-plane for Figures 4.16 and 4.18. The same data sets are
used for the plots. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03, α = 0.5,
and n¯ = 0.0.
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systems shown below in the same figure where the stronger noise is caused by a less moderate
random initialization of the initial condition. Note that the same observation can be made in the
related bifurcation diagrams (see Figure 4.16 (a) vs. Figure 4.18 (c) or Figure 4.16 (c) vs. Figure
4.18 (i)). The scatter plots in the top panels of Figure 4.19 indicate that, for some parameter sets
and certain initial conditions, the fundamentalists might do even better than the chartists in the
more noisy environment (see Panel (a) and left-hand side region of Panel (b) vs. Figure 4.19 (j)
and (k)).73 More precisely, from the corresponding bifurcation plots shown in Figure 4.16 it can be
concluded that, whenever the system is initialized further away from a fundamental steady state,
it leads eventually to a risky-asset return that is also quite far away from its fundamental value.
And this, obviously from a visual perspective, favors the fundamentalists.74 Contrastingly, a less
moderate random initialization of the initial condition also leads to chartists possibly accumulating
all the wealth in the market in the long run for sufficiently small values of β2. For this purpose,
compare the straight line at -1 in Figure 4.19 (a)–(c) for all values of β2 with Panes (j)–(l) in the
same figure, where the straight line at -1 only occurs for sufficiently large values of β2.
Summarizing all the findings from Figure 4.16–Figure 4.19, it can be concluded that, for the
fully-developed market maker model with a non-vanishing risky-asset supply, the random initializa-
tion of the dynamic system leads to a considerably broader range of possible model outcomes than
under deterministic initial conditions and, perhaps more interestingly, than in the previous model
variants where a zero asset supply was assumed.75 Obviously, this means that an all-encompassing
description of all possible market outcomes for the revised market maker model is even more
difficult to outline. Finally, it should also be noted that, from a qualitative perspective, all the
findings mentioned above can be carried over to market situations in which the fundamentalists
use a slightly stronger extrapolation rate, i.e., β1 = 0.25 or β1 = 0.4.
76 Nevertheless, yet another
example of striking model behavior is shown in Figure 4.21, which is rather typical for a relatively
high fundamentalists’ extrapolation rate β1. Note that a description of the behavior can be found
in the caption of the figure.
So far the heterogeneous market maker model has been investigated with respect to the phe-
nomenon of ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions’ (SDIC), which is a common feature of
73It can clearly be visually detected that in some experiments the difference in the average wealth proportions of
investor groups ω¯t even exceed +1. These results correspond to market situations in which one investor group loses
even more money than they had at the beginning of the trading activities. Of course, such market situations can
occur in the artificial market since no restrictions (or boundaries) for the dynamic variables are defined. However,
checking the related data set of the numerical simulations shows that the occurrence of such outcomes are very rare
within the experiments.
74For similar results see Figure 4.21 as well as Figure 4.34 in the following subsubsection.
75Although these results are not shown in details here, there is a similar sensitivity analysis with different system
initialization choices for the Ht = 0 model variants. The Ht = 0 model variants do not show a notable sensitive
dependence on initial conditions, probably because of the less complex model framework (see Figure 4.20 for a quick
view). This is true at least when the pool of allowed start values for the dynamic system is not chosen overly large,
but rather in an appropriate and similar range as done above.
76Higher values of β1 beyond 0.4 enhance the tendency of the model to explode. Furthermore, an increase in
β1 might lead to market situations for which fundamentalists do significantly better than with lower values of β1
for certain parameter sets. However, these parameter sets are not shown in detail here since fundamentalists with
rather high values of β1 generally equal their chartist colleagues with respect to their trading strategy.
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(c) corresponding scatter plot in the
(rt, ω¯t)-plane, benchmark, λ = 0.1,
β1 = 0.1
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(f) corresponding scatter plot in the
(rt, ω¯t)-plane deterministically ini-
tialized at steady state, λ = 0.1,
β1 = 0.1
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(h) corresponding scatter plot in the
(β2, ω¯t)-plane, benchmark, λ = 0.1,
β1 = 0.1
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(i) corresponding scatter plot in the
(rt, ω¯t)-plane, benchmark, λ = 0.1,
β1 = 0.1
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(j) bifurcation diagram (for adaptive
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tialized at steady state, λ = 0.1,
β1 = 0.1 (see Figure 4.10 (a) as a
benchmark)
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(k) corresponding scatter plot in the
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tialized at steady state, λ = 0.1,
β1 = 0.1
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Figure 4.20: Corresponding scatter plots for Figures 4.6 (a) and 4.10 (a) of the heterogeneous market maker model
(Ht = 0 case) for different initial conditions. Obviously an apparent presence of SDIC cannot be detected visually
for these dynamic systems. The experiments are conducted in exactly the same way as described for Figure 4.19,
where 50,000 experiments are shown in the plots. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04,
σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, α = 0.5, β3 = 0.5 and n¯ = 0.0.
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Figure 4.21: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to β2 for a slightly higher value of β1 for the heterogeneous market
maker model (Ht > 0 case). The middle panel exhibits the same bifurcation diagram as the left panel but uses
a wider scale for the y-axis. It can clearly be detected that the dynamic system allows for rather high and low
risky-asset returns for this specific parameter set, which is not true for the same parameter set with lower values
of β1 (see Figures 4.16 (a) and 4.17 (d) for a comparison). From the right panel it can be seen that, as in Figure
4.17 (e), the fundamentalists might prevail over the chartist group for certain model outcomes. By checking the
corresponding data set it again becomes evident that this is the case whenever the risky-asset return assumes these
high or low values in the long run. However, if the risky-asset return remains close (but not too close) to its
fundamental steady-state value g, the chartists eventually prevail. The experiments are conducted in exactly the
same way as described in Figure 4.17. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5,
ns = 0.03, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
nonlinear dynamic systems.77 However, Figure 4.22 refers to a slightly different but related fea-
ture, namely the ‘sensitive dependence on parameters’ (SDP). More precisely, Figure 4.22 shows
four phase space plots in the (rt, yt)-plane for different values of β2 which are, nevertheless, very
close to each other. To avoid confusing SDIC and SDP, the dynamic system is deterministically
initialized at its steady state. Depending on the specific choice of the parameter β2, different shapes
occur for the phase space plots in the (rt, yt)-plane. Moreover, a further look at the related data
sets reveals that for the upper panels fundamentalists and chartists can coexist in the market, while
for both parameter sets in the lower panels the chartists are able to rule out the fundamentalists
in the long run.78
One advantage of the bifurcation and scatter plots shown above is that main aspects of the
dynamic system’s behavior can be described in one single plot for more than one realization of a
parameter (here the highly relevant parameter β2 is used as a bifurcation parameter). In other
words, these single plots offer a lot of information on the behavior of the dynamic system in a
rather compact way. However, from an economical point of view, it might be even more interesting
to look at certain specific parameter sets and see the dynamic evolution of more than one relevant
dynamic variable in further detail. Therefore, I will now concentrate on this issue and discuss some
typical market outcomes where the focus will be on the evolution of the state variables and some
other important model variables of the underlying dynamic system. Furthermore, the influence
of initial conditions with respect to the state variables as well as to the model parameters on the
long-term behavior of the dynamic system will be investigated.79
77See Medio and Lines (2001, p. 165) and Medio and Gallo (1992) for a more detailed discussion. See also Chapter
2, Appendix A 2.12.
78Results are not shown in detail here.
79See Chiarella et al. (2006) for similar results.
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Figure 4.22: Sensitive dependence study of parameters with respect to β2 for the heterogeneous market maker
model (Ht > 0 case). The plot exhibits four phase space plots in the (rt, yt)-plane for different parameter sets.
Although all parameter sets are almost identical (only the values of β2 slightly differs from each other), the resulting
dynamics varies significantly in the long run. This feature is also known as ‘sensitive dependence on parameters’
(SDP). The phase space representations are generated by 10,000 iterations from which the first 5,000 are deleted
afterwards. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03, λ = 0.1,
α = 0.5, β1 = 0.1, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The state variables of the dynamic system are deterministically initialized
at their steady-state values where ω¯t is initialized with ω¯0 = 0.0.
The bifurcation plots shown above provide evidence that the fundamentalists generally do not
accumulate more wealth than the chartists. In fact, for almost all parameter sets investigated
so far, the investor group of chartists is able to survive in the artificial financial market and,
moreover, quite often prevails over the fundamentalists in the long run.80 Figures 4.23–4.26 also
illustrate this result quite clearly. Note that the parameter sets used for these figures are chosen
in accordance with the bifurcation diagrams depicted in Figures 4.16 (a) and 4.17 (g). Thus the
outcome of the time series can be directly related to and compared with the results shown in
the bifurcation diagrams and corresponding scatter plots above. Figures 4.23 and 4.24 belong to
the same parameter set and only differ in the choice of the chartists’ extrapolation parameter β2.
While for Figure 4.23 a lower value for the extrapolation parameter of the chartists is used (see
80There are parameter sets for which the investor group of fundamentalists prevail over the chartist group (see
straight line at +1 in some scatter plots in the (β2, ω¯t)-plane in the preceding figures). Nevertheless, a further look
at the data sets of the corresponding simulations confirms that these results are quite rare.
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also left-hand side range of Figure 4.16 (a)) the plots in Figure 4.24 refer to a higher value of β2
(see also right-hand side range of Figure 4.16 (a)). More notably, they show two typical model
outcomes of the revised heterogeneous market maker model, which can even be considered as quite
universal in the sense that these model outcomes occur for a wide range of realistic parameter sets
(see also the discussion below). More precisely, whenever the phase space plot in the (rt, yt)-plane
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Figure 4.23: Time series of state variables rt, zt, ω¯t and corresponding risky-asset price pt, risk-premium term
rRPt and phase space plot for the heterogeneous market maker model (Ht > 0 case) associated to Figure 4.16 (a)
with a relatively low value of β2. For this parameter set both investor groups coexist in the market. The phase space
representations are generated by 10,000 iterations from which the first 5,000 are deleted afterwards. The dynamic
variables are randomly initialized in all plots. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2,
δ = 0.5, ns = 0.03, α = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
of the dynamic system for a given parameter set has a shape as shown in Figure 4.23 (c), the
variables rt, zt and r
RP
t (as well as yt, which are not shown here in detail) oscillate around their
fundamental equilibrium value and neither fundamentalists nor chartists accumulate more wealth
than their counterpart in the long run. Otherwise, if the shape of the phase space plot looks like a
limit cycle as depicted in Figure 4.24 (c), the chartists will always prevail over the fundamentalists
in the long run and the state variable zt converges to zero, meaning that the total wealth in the
market by far exceeds the risky-asset supply (i.e., asset supply/total wealth ratio is equal to zero).81
Furthermore, this leads to rRPt becoming equal to rf in the long run. It might be again worth
stressing that these findings are in harmony with the findings discussed above. Considering Figure
4.19 (a), which is the corresponding scatter plot to Figure 4.16 (a), it can clearly be detected that
81This can easily be understood by using Eq. (4.111). Since the chartists prevail over the fundamentalists in
this market scenario, it is ω¯t ≈ −1. Furthermore, the simulation data shows that the chartists periodically invest
much more of their wealth in the risky asset than the group of fundamentalists. Remember that short selling is not
restricted in our model framework. Thus, their growth rate of wealth (1+ βc,t+1) is regularly much higher than the
numerator (1 + ns + rt+1) of Eq. (4.111), which eventually leads to zt → 0 for t→∞.
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Figure 4.24: Time series of state variables rt, zt, ω¯t and corresponding risky-asset price pt, risk-premium term rRPt
and phase space plot for the heterogeneous market maker model (Ht > 0 case) associated to Figure 4.16 (a) with
a relatively high value of β2. Comparing these results with the preceding Figure 4.23, an increase in the chartists’
extrapolation parameter β2 obviously leads to a chartist superiority in the long run, i.e., the chartists accumulate
all the wealth in the market. Again the phase space representations are generated by 10,000 iterations from which
the first 5,000 are deleted afterwards. The dynamic variables are randomly initialized in all plots. The remaining
parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03, α = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial
condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
for low values of β2 the average wealth proportion ω¯t mostly remains around its initial value 0.0
(depending on the chosen initial conditions, i.e., presence of SDIC), while increasing β2 leads to
chartist superiority.82
The corresponding bifurcation diagram and scatter plots to Figures 4.25/4.26 are shown in
Figure 4.17 (g)–(i). Here the extrapolation rate of the fundamentalists β1 is slightly increased, the
extrapolation rate of the chartists is chosen as β2 = 0.4 and the speed of the price adjustment
of the market maker is reduced by 50%, i.e., λ = 0.05. Especially from the scatter plot in the
middle panel (see Figure 4.17 (h)), it can be assumed that the presence of SDIC might be quite
pronounced for this parameter set. Indeed, performing only a few identical simulation runs but with
randomly initialized state variables (as described in Figures 4.25/4.26) has led to three qualitatively
different model outcomes, which could already be conjectured from the corresponding scatter plot.
Depending on the concrete initial values of the state variables, there are several possible results.
First, the fundamentalists perform poorer than the chartists but survive in the long run (see Figure
4.25 (a)–(f)). In this case the corresponding phase space plot is similar to the phase space plot
shown in Figure 4.23. Second, a fundamental steady state is reached (see Figure 4.25 (g)–(l)). In
82The model outcomes in which the fundamentalists prevail over the chartists (grey colored area in Figure 4.19
(a)) are much rarer than might be expected when looking at the plot. However, a further look at the simulation
data would confirm this expectation to be incorrect.
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Figure 4.25: Time series of state variables rt, zt, ω¯t and corresponding risky-asset price pt, risk-premium term rRPt
and phase space plot for the heterogeneous market maker model (Ht > 0 case) associated to Figure 4.17 (g)–(i). For
this parameter set the presence of SDIC can clearly be detected (compare Shape I vs. Shape II vs. Shape III, where
Shape III is sourced out to Figure 4.26 for editorial reasons). Again the phase space representations are generated by
10,000 iterations from which the first 5,000 are deleted afterwards. The dynamic variables are randomly initialized
in all plots. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03, α = 0.5,
β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
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Figure 4.26: Figure 4.25 continued.
this case the fundamentalists might perform even slightly better than their chartist counterparts.
The variables rt, zt and r
RP
t (as well as yt) converge to their steady-state values and the risky-
asset price increases exponentially in an absolutely smooth way. Finally, it is also possible that the
model outcome is similar to the simulation result shown in Figure 4.24 (see Figure 4.26 (a)–(f)).
In this case only the chartists survive in the long run. Note that because of space constraints the
time series plots for pt, zt and r
RP
t are omitted. However, they are qualitatively very similar to
the corresponding time series shown in Figure 4.24.
Although many other experiments were also performed with parameter sets different to those
shown so far, it is impossible to outline all their results in this subsection. Nevertheless, I will
here summarize the main findings. Let us now assume the parameter sets used in Figure 4.23 and
Figures 4.25/4.26 as a benchmark and call it ‘λ = 0.1 parameter set’ and ‘λ = 0.05 parameter
set’.83 Then it can be observed that the simulation results for different, relatively low values of β1
are quite comparable in that a variation of the extrapolation rate β1 for the fundamentalists within
a range of relatively low values (e.g., 0.1 ≤ β1 ≤ 0.3) does not influence the results significantly.
Furthermore, a mutual increase in the risk-aversion coefficient of the fundamentalists and chartists
might stabilize the dynamics but does not lead to the underlying dynamic system exhibiting totally
different behavior. The same is true for a decrease in the risk-aversion coefficient, although the
oscillating behavior of the underlying state variables is enhanced primarily with respect to the
amplitude of their fluctuations. But let us start with the λ = 0.1 parameter set as a benchmark.
A decrease in the ‘stabilizing term’ factor α leads to n-cycles or limit cycles as in Figure 4.24 (c),
83As already mentioned above the parameter sets used for Figure 4.23 and Figure 4.24 are assumed as ‘identical’
since they belong to the same bifurcation diagram and thus to the same value of λ.
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in which chartists eventually dominate the market by accumulating the entire wealth share. These
results seem independent from the choice of the chartist extrapolation rate β2. However, for a
relatively high value of α, the dynamic system converges to a fundamental steady state where the
fundamentalists do even better than the chartists. This effect is slightly more pronounced if the
chartists use a relatively high extrapolation rate β2. A higher growth rate n
s of the risky-asset
supply makes the occurrence of a phase space plot as shown in Figure 4.23 (c) more likely than
for the benchmark model, even for relatively high chartist extrapolation rates β2. A lower growth
rate of the risky-asset supply definitely favors the chartists, who prevail over the fundamentalists
more often than for parameter combinations (with respect to the parameter β2) of the benchmark
set. A relatively low geometric decay rate δ, which makes the chartists strongly believe in the most
recent risky-asset return, leads to a more pronounced chartist superiority, while a relatively high
geometric decay rate does not produce the opposite effect, but actually benefits the chartists also.
Finally, a decrease in the parameter β3, which weights the influence of the sample variance on the
conditional variance estimated by the chartists, again benefits the chartists, who then take greater
risks in their investment decisions since their conditional expectation of the variance of the risky-
asset return rt+1 becomes smaller, thus increasing their optimal investment proportion πc,t and
allowing them to prevail clearly over the fundamentalists. Otherwise, a decrease in the β3 value
also leads to the underlying dynamic system exhibiting more explosive behavior. Contrastingly,
an increase in β3 favors the fundamentalists but only in the sense that they can survive in the
market and only if their extrapolation parameter is low enough, e.g., β1 = 0.1. For the λ = 0.05
parameter set similar observations can be made, although the fundamentalists generally do better
than with the previous benchmark parameter set. The reason for this is simply that a fundamental
steady state is reached much more often than for the λ = 0.1 parameter set. For example, both a
decrease as well as an increase in the ‘stabilizing term’ factor α mostly cause a convergence to a
fundamental steady state, regardless of the chartists’ specific choice of the extrapolation parameter
β2. A variation in δ (decrease and increase from 0.5) also leads to a wider β2 range, in which the
underlying dynamic system converges to one of its fundamental steady states. The same is true
for a variation in the parameter β3.
Most interestingly, so far it has not been possible to find either a parameter set in which the
fundamentalists are able to rule the chartists out of the market84, or a situation of coexistence
where both types of agents survive in the long run with the wealth shares exhibiting oscillatory
behavior.85 Figures 4.27 and 4.28 both give an example for the latter behavior, although the
oscillatory behavior of the dynamics, and in particular the oscillatory behavior of the wealth
shares, is not very distinctive. Nevertheless, a periodic market behavior can be detected for these
parameter sets. While Figure 4.27 (a)–(f) contains a λ = 0.1 parameter set in accordance with the
corresponding bifurcation plot in Figure 4.16 (a), Figure 4.27 (g)–(l) refers to a λ = 0.05 parameter
set where both extrapolation parameters β1 and β2 are slightly increased. Figure 4.28 shows a
similar market outcome for a λ = 0.05 parameter set which leads to a strange attractor in the
84See also Footnote 80 for a more precise statement.
85See Chiarella et al. (2006) and Figure 4.9 (d)–(f) in this thesis for such results. However, at least for the model
framework outlined in this thesis, such model outcomes are rather hard to detect since only quite specific parameter
sets are able to generate this oscillatory behavior in the wealth shares of the investor groups.
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Figure 4.27: Time series of state variables rt, zt, ω¯t and corresponding risky-asset price pt, risk-premium term rRPt
and phase space plot for the heterogeneous market maker model (Ht > 0 case) for a λ = 0.1 and a λ = 0.05 parameter
set. For both parameter combinations cyclical movements of the state variables can be detected where even the
wealth shares show this peculiarity of cycles, albeit not so pronounced. Again the phase space representations
are generated by 10,000 iterations from which the first 5,000 are deleted afterwards. The dynamic variables are
randomly initialized in all plots. The remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5,
ns = 0.03, α = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
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phase space. It should be remarked that for these kind of plots the value of β3 has to be slightly
reduced, which means that the chartists are generally willing to invest more of their wealth in the
risky asset than by using a higher value of β3 (see Eq. (4.146)). However, similar attractors can
be obtained by increasing the extrapolation rate β2 for the chartists (e.g., β2 = 0.5 or β2 = 0.6),
so that in this sense these results are not limited to very specific parameter combinations. Finally,
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Figure 4.28: Time series of state variables rt, zt, ω¯t and corresponding risky-asset price pt, risk-premium term
rRPt and phase space plot for the heterogeneous market maker model (Ht > 0 case) for another λ = 0.05 parameter
set. This parameter combination, where the parameter β3, which weights the influence of the sample variance on
the conditional variance estimated by the chartists, is slightly decreased, leads to a strange attractor with cyclical
movements of risky-asset returns, the asset supply/total wealth ratio, the risk-premium term and, less markedly,
the wealth shares. Note that the existence of a strange attractor stands in contrast to the findings shown in Figures
4.25/4.26 and Figure 4.27 (g)–(l). Again, the phase space representations are generated by 10,000 iterations from
which the first 5,000 are deleted afterwards. The dynamic variables are randomly initialized in all plots. The
remaining parameters are ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03, α = 0.5 and n¯ = 0.0. The
initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
it might be worth remembering that Figures 4.16 (c) and 4.18 (g)–(i) depict bifurcation plots for
a similar parameter set, although β3 is chosen as its ‘benchmark value’ 0.5. With this choice of β3
the resulting dynamic system is locally stable (see also Footnote 71) for approximately β2 < 0.7,
which can also be seen in the straight line at the fundamental risky-asset return value 0.04 in the
bifurcation plot in Figure 4.18 (h) and even in Figures 4.18 (i) and 4.16 (c), albeit less clearly.86 It
can thus be concluded that (at least) for the λ = 0.05 parameter set a decrease in β3 destabilizes
the market, although a decrease in β2 does not lead to total superiority for the chartist group.
I now briefly want to summarize how the artificial market will react when further model pa-
rameters and initial conditions are changed. As already stated previously, the proposed model
86See also the discussion around Figure 4.18 for further details on how the initialization of the underlying dynamic
system influences the resulting long-term behavior.
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framework does not restrict the optimal investment proportion πi,t derived by the investor groups
in general. In other words the investors are allowed to do ‘short selling’, i.e., they are allowed to
invest more money in the risky asset than they actually are endowed with (πi,t > 1). Conversely,
the optimal investment proportion can also become negative in our model framework, correspond-
ing to the fact that the investors spend more money on the risk-free asset than they currently have
in their pocket (πi,t < 0). Thus the investors are assumed in both cases to borrow money from
someone. Moreover, it should be emphasized that this investment behavior actually occurs very
often in the artificial financial market, in particular when the market dynamics does not settle
down to a fundamental steady state. Therefore, I have also investigated the market behavior for
different parameter sets when short selling is explicitly forbidden by restricting the investors’ op-
timal investment proportion between 0.01 ≤ πi,t ≤ 0.99. Interestingly, for the parameter sets that
have been investigated (e.g., the λ = 0.1 and λ = 0.05 parameter set for different realizations of
the chartists’ extrapolation rate β2, but also further parameter sets), the market behavior remains
qualitatively the same. In particular, the fundamentalists are still unable to gain superiority over
the chartists, although the prohibition of short selling seems to stabilize the situation of the funda-
mentalists for certain parameter combinations in which the fundamentalists performed quite poorly
before the restriction was enabled. However, quite often this simply means that the decline in the
fundamentalists’ wealth share (see Figures 4.24 and 4.26 (a)–(f) for an appropriate parameter set
and investors’ wealth share evolution in the benchmark setup) is slightly delayed but cannot be
stopped in the long run.
In the second step, I will investigate whether or not the initial population proportion n¯ and
the initial average wealth proportion ω¯0 have a crucial impact on the overall market behavior.
Again, diverse simulation runs for several parameter sets have been performed. However, to avoid
an overly discussion I will omit an explicit visualization of the results. Both a shift of the initial
population proportion n¯ from a balanced condition (i.e., n¯ = 0.0) towards a numerical majority
of the fundamentalists’ investor group (i.e., n¯ > 0.0) as well as an improved initial (monetary)
endowment of the fundamentalists (i.e., ω¯0 > 0.0) should strengthen the fundamentalists’ market
power, in general leading to a better overall performance for this investor group. Indeed, numerical
simulations confirm this conjecture. For the latter case it can be shown that a sufficiently higher
initial wealth level for the fundamentalists (i.e., sufficiently higher than the chartist group’s) can
allow the underlying dynamic system converge to a fundamental steady state. This is even the case
for parameter sets for which the system has not converged yet, provided that the initial wealth
level of both investor groups was assumed to be equally balanced. It might be worth mentioning
that the fundamentalists even retain their higher wealth share in the long run in these cases. Of
course, the greater the superiority of the fundamentalists over the chartists due to their initial
wealth endowment, the higher the chartists’ extrapolation rate β2 can be without the underlying
dynamic system not converging to a fundamental steady state.87 As seen before, however, the
fundamentalists cannot completely rule the chartists out of the market even in this case. This is
not surprising, because a fundamental steady state means that both investor groups are assumed to
form correct (and thus homogeneous) expectations about the fundamental price path of the risky
87Remember that an increase in the extrapolation parameter β2 of the chartists generally leads to limit cycles
and a superiority for the chartist investor group (see Figure 4.24).
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asset. Consequently, this guarantees the coexistence of both investor groups in the long run in such
a market environment. An increase in the investor population of the fundamentalist’ group shows
similar results as stated above. Again, a shift towards the fundamentalists (i.e., positive n¯) leads
to a wider range of parameter sets for which a fundamental steady state is reached. Nevertheless,
the influence that varying the initial condition for n¯ has on the behavior of the underlying dynamic
system seems less strong than in the case of ω¯0. In the case of limit cycles (see Figure 4.24) the
chartists need more trading periods to rule the fundamentalists out of the market, which is also
not surprising since more fundamentalists are in the market that has to be displaced.
In the final investigation I want to examine whether different risk-aversion coefficients used by
the investor groups have a significant influence on the resulting market behavior. Remember from
the Technical Remark 4.15 at the very beginning of this subsection that the steady states of the
underlying dynamic system cannot easily be determined analytically for these cases. Nevertheless,
numerical simulations can be performed. Furthermore, note that the assumption of non-identical
risk-aversion coefficients νf and νc for both trading groups is qualitatively the same as assuming
different σ2s for the investors, because all relevant model equations see the occurrence of a factor
νiσ
2
i,t.
88 Assuming a lower risk-aversion coefficient for the fundamentalists than for the chartists
dramatically favors the former. In almost all simulation runs they comfortably prevail over the
chartists in the long run. While this result is not unsurprising for parameter sets for which a
fundamental steady state is reached, simply because the resulting optimal investment proportion
in the equilibrium π∗f becomes higher than for the chartists, it is remarkable for situations in
which the dynamic system does not settle down to a fundamental steady state. In these cases
only a high extrapolation rate β2 for the chartists might avoid their defeat for some parameter
combinations. If νf > νc is chosen, the chartists collect the entire wealth share for almost all
parameter sets quite rapidly. Finally, if νf < νc is chosen together with a relatively low value β3
for the chartists89, which can be seen as compensation for the chartists’ more conservative risk-
aversion coefficient, the numerical results do not show any new features in the resulting market
behavior of the two trading groups. Instead, depending on the concrete combination of these three
parameters, either the fundamentalists prevail over the chartists or vice versa. However, for these
parameter combinations no cyclical movements of the state variables or even of the wealth shares
of investors can be observed as shown, for instance, in Figure 4.28.
So far the main focus of the present chapter has been on the qualitative price, return and wealth
behavior that results from the interaction of two different investor types in a model structure which
is driven by a nonlinear deterministic dynamics. However, when presenting an artificial financial
market model of this type, two further questions typically arise. First, it might be interesting to
check whether the model framework is able to generate generally realistic time series of asset prices
and asset returns by showing phases of booms and market crashes as observed in real financial data.
As seen in the discussions so far, these typical market peculiarities are practically impossible to
observable in the purely nonlinear deterministic market maker model; this is not really surprising
88This is not completely true for two model equations in which the chartists’ beliefs about the conditional variances
of returns σ2c,t is involved (see Eq. (4.146) and Eq. (4.147)).
89A β3 value close to zero in combination with a relatively high λ value leads mostly to explosions for the
underlying dynamic system.
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because it shares this lack of ‘realistic’ market behavior with almost all other prominent model
frameworks of this type.90 To overcome this problem it is an accepted procedure to combine
the nonlinear deterministic dynamic system with external noise by introducing noise terms into
one or even more model equations. If generally realistic price paths can only be obtained with
those model extensions, clearly only the interaction of the nonlinear deterministic dynamics (which
describes the economic fundamentals of the model) with the external noise (which describes the
economic deficiencies in the given model framework) will be able to generate this more realistic
market behavior. Second, closely connected with the first point mentioned above, the choice of
parameters (and of the noise level) used in the numerical experiments are of crucial interest where
the calibration of the model is always naturally related to the question of the time scale used in the
model. In the investigations so far I have not calibrated the model parameters in a specific fashion
or even calibrated them to real financial data. However, most model parameters are chosen in such a
way that they can describe our market maker model on a yearly time scale. Although these kinds of
nonlinear structural agents models are less suited to replicating certain financial market patterns
(less so than the ‘stylized facts’ of financial markets) or typical characteristics of financial time
series, the implicitly assumed relatively large time scale is still somewhat unsatisfying. Therefore,
it might be natural to consider whether or not the model will still show similar results if appropriate
model parameters are rescaled to a smaller time scale. The next two subsubsections briefly present
simulation results related to these two issues, where the model equations are recalibrated on a
daily trading period level followed by some simulation results for a simple stochastic version of our
market maker model.
Simulation Results – Daily Trading Period
In this subsubsection I want to see of the findings outlined above can be maintained, or if they
have to be revised when I scale the exogenous model parameters on a daily level by assuming
250 trading days per year. Technically speaking, the dynamic system Eq. (4.137)–Eq. (4.142) is
retained as it is where Eq. (4.143)–Eq. (4.147) still hold but the parameters are downsized (so far
they have been annually sized) according to the following transformation rules:
rfdaily = r/td , gdaily = g/td , σdaily = σ/
√
td , λdaily = λ/td , n
s
daily
= ns/td ,
(4.148)
where td denotes the trading days per year. Furthermore, I adjust the randomly driven initialization
of the dynamic system analogously by reducing the mean of the initial values by a factor 1/td and
the standard deviation by a factor 1/
√
td to keep consistency in the initial perturbation of the
system.91
90See the discussions on further prominent nonlinear deterministic model frameworks in Chapters 2 and 3 of this
thesis for further details.
91The initialization of the fundamental/price ratio yt and the asset supply/total wealth ration zt should not
have to be adjusted since the scaling factor td cancels out in the corresponding dynamic equations Eq. (4.138)
and Eq. (4.139). Nevertheless, unreckonedly, numerical simulations indicate that this always leads to undesirable
results where the system settles down to an unwanted ‘quasi’ steady state, irrespective of the choice of parameter
sets (see Figure 4.31 for a similar model outcome). Therefore, in the following discussion we will concentrate on
numerical experiments where the variable zt is also scaled down. Since zt had been hitherto initialized by a uniformly
distributed random variable in order to assure the desired positive initial value (Ht > 0 case), I here decided to
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Figures 4.29 and 4.30 show different bifurcation diagrams and corresponding scatter plots for
parameter sets already used in Figures 4.16 and 4.17 but on a daily scale (i.e., 250 trading days
per year). Although the figures seem to resemble the findings for the annual treatment outlined
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Figure 4.29: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to β2 and corresponding scatter plots for the heterogeneous market
maker model scaled on a daily basis with 250 trading days per year (Ht > 0 case). Again the resulting dynamics
becomes rather complex, although, at least for the upper and lower panels, the risky-asset return seems to reach its
fundamental steady-state level much more often than in the corresponding bifurcation plots for the annual treatment
(see Figure 4.16). Obviously, risky-asset returns quite far away from the dividend growth rate gdaily favor the chartist
group, while for returns close to gdaily the fundamentalists have the advantage. Only a relatively low value of λ in
combination with a relatively weak extrapolation rate β2 for the chartists leads to a balanced wealth distribution
among the two competing investor groups. The experiments are conducted in exactly the same way as described
in Figure 4.2. The remaining parameters are td = 250, ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03,
α = 0.5 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
use the scaling factor 1/
√
td. Admittedly, this could seem somewhat arbitrary because a factor 1/td might even be
more consistent. However, since a uniformly distributed initialization is used, the scaling factor 1/
√
td (=0.06325
for td = 250) also covers the initializations generated by a factor 1/td (=0.00400 for td = 250).
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above, the results are in fact rather disappointing. In most of the cases either the chartists or
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Figure 4.30: More bifurcation diagrams with respect to β2 and corresponding scatter plots for the heterogeneous
market maker model scaled on a daily basis with 250 trading days per year (Ht > 0 case). While the middle and
lower panels show similar results as for the corresponding parameter sets in the previous figure (β1 = 0.25 in this
figure vs. β1 = 0.1 in Figure 4.29), the upper panels show the chartists always dominating the market in the long
run. However, note that two further long-run risky-asset returns occur for the parameter set used in the middle
Panels (d)–(f), which are rather excessive (or unrealistic) for a daily model treatment (i.e., 2-cycles). Nevertheless,
the fundamentalists prevail over the chartist group for these returns. The experiments are conducted in exactly the
same way as described in Figure 4.2. The remaining parameters are td = 250, ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2,
δ = 0.5, ns = 0.03, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
the fundamentalists accumulate the total wealth in the market and a balanced coexistence of
both trading types is a much rarer model outcome than for the market scenarios in the previous
discussions.92 More importantly, the dynamic system most often behaves in a way that can only
92This statement has been checked and confirmed through a multitude of simulation runs with different parameter
sets that cannot be shown in detail here.
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be described as economically unrealistic. For example, the dynamic system scaled on a daily level
frequently seems to converge to a fundamental steady state, although checking the corresponding
data sets of the simulation shows us that this is not the case. Instead, the optimal investment
proportion πi,t of both investor types converges to zero, which implies that the supply/total wealth
ratio zt also becomes almost zero but increases slightly afterwards. Hence the investors’ growth
rate of wealth becomes equal to the risk-free rate rfdaily and the fundamental/price ratio yt becomes
1. In such market situations the fundamentalists prevail over the chartists in almost all simulation
runs.93 Figure 4.31 refers to such a market situation. All stated observations can clearly be
detected there.
Unfortunately, this model behavior is quite persistent in the sense that neither the restriction
of short selling nor an increase in the risk-aversion coefficient ν (which should in principle settle the
investors’ investment decisions) can change these results significantly.94 Only the combination of
a low λ value and a relatively low chartists’ extrapolation parameter β2 leads to market situations
in which neither the fundamentalists nor the chartists can distance themselves from one another
with respect to their wealth levels (see Figures 4.29 (h) and 4.30 (h)). Interestingly, checking
the corresponding simulation data, even in such cases, shows us that the results are not very
promising since the optimal investment proportion πi,t of both investor groups still remains very
low (most of the time less than 5%). However, when initializing the dynamic system very near to
a fundamental steady state (which might be a quite unrealistic manipulation with respect to a real
financial market situation), the system naturally converges to the fundamental steady state in the
long run. Thus the system again shows the presence of SDIC, as already discussed in some detail
in the previous section.
Another unwanted feature of the daily scaled market maker model can be observed in the
(β2, ω¯t)-plane scatter plots of Figures 4.29 and 4.30. It can clearly be detected here that the
difference in the average wealth proportions of investor groups ω¯t quite often exceeds +1. This
phenomenon has already been referred to in Footnote 73. Nevertheless, it should be remarked that
93More precisely, it can be shown that the dynamic system Eq. (4.137)–Eq. (4.142) seems to have a further steady
state, namely φ∗ = gdaily, v∗ = 0, r∗ = gdaily, y∗ = 1, z∗ = 0 and ω¯∗ ∈ [−1, 1], which leads to β∗f = β∗c = rfdaily ,
π∗f = π
∗
c = 0, r
RP
∗
= rfdaily and q
∗ = 0. Indeed, these values fulfill the steady-state condition. However, this steady
state can never be reached because zt is assumed to be always positive since it represents the asset supply/total wealth
ratio (i.e., Ht > 0 case) and therefore zt should always be initialized as a positive number (see also Eq. (4.104) and
the discussion around). Since according to Eq. (4.139) the numerator will always exceed (or equal) its denominator
with the steady-state values given above, this leads to a contradiction because then zt cannot converge to its steady-
state value z∗ = 0. To see this more clearly, note that it is {2(1 +ns+ r∗)}/{[1 + ω¯∗](1 + β∗f ) + [1− ω¯∗](1+ β∗c )} =
{1 + ns + g}/{1 + rf} ≥ 1 since it is a necessary requirement that ns + g ≥ rf according to Eq. (4.56). Note that
the scaling factor td is left out of this calculation for the sake of better readability. Note that this issue is discussed
in the proofs of the Theorems 4.11, 4.14 and 4.16, which can be found in the Appendices A 4.12, A 4.13 and
A 4.14 respectively. Thus the value set given above is not a steady state at all. Nevertheless, numerical simulations
show that the dynamic system can reach and remain in a very similar situation where it is φt = gdaily, vt = 0,
rt = gdaily, yt = 1, βf,t = βc,t = rfdaily , πf,t = πc,t = 0 and zt is almost equal to zero but slowly increases with the
growth factor {1 + nsdaily + gdaily}/{1 + rfdaily} as mentioned in the continuous text. Obviously, this growth factor
is extremely small, particularly for a parameter set scaled on a daily basis which remains the system in this status
(see Figure 4.31).
94On the contrary, an exceeding decrease in the risk-aversion coefficient ν leads to explosive behavior in the
underlying system.
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Figure 4.31: Time series of state variables rt, zt, ω¯t and corresponding risky-asset price pt, risk-premium term
rRPt and phase space plot for the heterogeneous market maker model scaled on a daily basis with 250 trading
days per year (Ht > 0 case) associated to Figure 4.29 (a) with a relatively low value of β2. For this parameter
set the fundamentalists dominate the market in the long run. The panels exhibit typical market behavior for the
daily scaled model. While in the first trading periods heavy oscillations can occur, the system rapidly settles down
to a ‘quasi’ steady state where the risky-asset return is (almost) equal to its fundamental value gdaily, the risk-
premium term rRPt is equal to the daily risk-free rate rfdaily (since πf,t = πc,t = 0, not shown here) and the asset
supply/total wealth ratio zt is almost zero but increases in the long run. Furthermore, the difference in the average
wealth proportion ω¯t being interim below -1 indicates that no economically driven restrictions are assumed for the
underlying dynamic system but also that, on a daily scale, the system behaves rather sensitively to its initialization
and runs out of its inherent (or designed) scale. The phase space representations are generated by 10,000 iterations
from which the first 5,000 are deleted afterwards. The dynamic variables are randomly initialized in all plots. The
remaining parameters are td = 250, ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03, α = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and
n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
such events occur much more frequently for the td = 250 treatment than in the previous model
versions with td = 1 (see also Figure 4.31 (f) for similar market behavior).
Figure 4.32 shows another simulation run in which a limit cycle occurs.95 As already seen in
previous simulations generating convergence to limit cycles, the chartists prevail over the funda-
mentalists in the long run. While rRPt again settles down to the daily risk-free rate rfdaily and zt
becomes almost zero, the risky-asset price pt evolves exponentially, growing in a regular periodic
mode.
Although this discussion concentrates on market situations in which the fundamentalists keep
their extrapolation parameter β1 rather small
96 I also want to emphasize that the findings men-
95The numerical experiments indicate that the dynamic system primarily generates limit cycles whenever zt is
initialized very close to zero. See also Footnote 91.
96For a motivation for this assumption, remember the discussion below-mentioned at Remark 4.17 in Subsection
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Figure 4.32: Time series of state variables rt, zt, ω¯t and corresponding risky-asset price pt, risk-premium term
rRPt and phase space plot for the heterogeneous market maker model scaled on a daily basis with 250 trading days
per year (Ht > 0 case) associated to Figure 4.29 (a) with a relatively high value of β2. Comparing these results
with the preceding Figure 4.31, an increase in the chartists’ extrapolation parameter β2 ( combined with a low zt
initialization) obviously leads to chartist superiority in the long run, i.e., the chartists accumulate all the wealth in
the market. Again the phase space representations are generated by 10,000 iterations from which the first 5,000
are deleted afterwards. The dynamic variables are randomly initialized in all plots. The remaining parameters are
td = 250, ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03, α = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial
condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
tioned above will remain qualitatively the same even if the extrapolation parameter β1 is chosen
rather high. However, as for the annually scaled model, an increase in the fundamentalists’ ex-
trapolation parameter β1 leads to intensified explosive behavior in the dynamic system, where a
simultaneous decrease in the price adjustment speed λ has a stabilizing effect on the dynamics. For
instance, an increase in β1 to the level of 0.65 (and higher) very often leads to model explosions
for λ = 0.1 but not for λ = 0.05, while for β1 = 0.4 the dynamic system remains manageable for
almost all reasonable parameter combinations. Figure 4.33 refers to two such parameter sets. In
the upper left panel it can clearly be detected that the combination of a higher β1 value and a
relatively high λ value leads to long-term returns that might become quite large; this can be seen
by the more widely scattered realizations of the risky-asset return rt (see Figure 4.33 (a) vs. Figures
4.29 (a) and 4.30 (d)). For this parameter combination the fundamentalists can theoretically pre-
vail over the chartists for all possible (and more importantly, for all reasonable) risky-asset return
realizations (at least between -0.35 and 0.35 as shown in the plots) while for low values of β1 (i.e.,
for β1 = 0.1 or β1 = 0.25) the risky-asset return has to be near to its fundamental value to show
the same result (see Figure 4.33 (c) vs. Figures 4.29 (c) and 4.30 (f)). For λ = 0.05 an increase in
4.5.5.
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Figure 4.33: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to β2 and corresponding scatter plots for a slightly higher value
of β1 for the heterogeneous market maker model scaled on a daily basis with 250 trading days per year (Ht > 0
case). While the bifurcation plots look rather similar to the corresponding bifurcation plots shown in Figures 4.29
and 4.30, the scatter plots clearly indicate that the dynamic behavior for an increased value of β1 deviates from the
model behavior for a relatively low value of β1 (i.e., β1 = 0.1 or β1 = 0.25). Again the experiments are conducted
in exactly the same way as described in Figure 4.2. The remaining parameters are td = 250, ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05,
g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, ns = 0.03, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
the extrapolation parameter β1 leads to a wider β2 range, in which a balanced wealth distribution
among the two competing investor groups can be reached (see Figure 4.33 (e) vs. Figures 4.29 (h)
and 4.30 (h)). Interestingly, the risky-asset return here sometimes moves towards a 2-cycle with
relatively high and low daily long-term returns. Note that for the corresponding parameter set
with β1 = 0.25 no 2-cycles occur, although they do when λ is chosen at the higher level of 0.1
(see Figure 4.33 (f) vs. Figure 4.30 (f)). For β1 = 0.1 2-cycles never occur. For even higher values
of β1 the 2-cycle behavior in the λ = 0.05 system holds, where the range of the 2-cycle widens
significantly.97 Figure 4.34 shows this 2-cycle behavior for a β1 = 0.4 case. As for all 2-cycle
movements that occur for this model variant, the fundamentalists accumulate all the wealth in the
market very rapidly.
In summary, one of four model outcomes occurs in the daily scaled model variant for a wide
range of meaningful parameter sets in almost all numerical experiments. The dynamic system can
converge to its ‘quasi’ steady state (see Figure 4.31) or 2-cycles in the risky-asset return can occur
(see Figure 4.34). In both cases the fundamentalists dominate. A third possible model outcome is
that the dynamics leads to limit cycles. Here the chartists do better than the fundamentalists (see
Figure 4.32). As a final highly probable model result both fundamentalists and chartists coexist
97For too high values of β1 (e.g., for β1=0.8), however, this 2-cycle behavior disappears again.
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Figure 4.34: Time series of state variables rt, zt, ω¯t and corresponding risky-asset price pt, risk-premium term
rRPt and phase space plot for the heterogeneous market maker model scaled on a daily basis with 250 trading days
per year (Ht > 0 case) associated to Figure 4.33 (d). The dynamic system stays in a region with 2-cycles, where the
fundamentalists dominate the chartists within only a few trading periods. Again the phase space representations
are generated by 10,000 iterations from which the first 5,000 are deleted afterwards. The dynamic variables are
randomly initialized in all plots. The remaining parameters are td = 250, ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2,
δ = 0.5, ns = 0.03, α = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
in the long run, but almost no risky asset is demanded in the long run (not shown here in detail).
Otherwise, a fundamental steady state will only be reached if the dynamic system is initialized
almost at this equilibrium.
Figure 4.35 exhibits two further experiments for slightly different parameter sets and with
slightly different results. While the first experiment assumes a slightly lower decay rate δ for the
geometric decay process of the sample mean and variance of the risky-asset return used by the
chartist group (see Figure 4.35 (a)–(f)), the chartists lower their weighting factor β3 that measures
the influence of the sample variance on the conditional variance V arc,t(ρt+1) of the risky-asset
return in the second experiment (see Figure 4.35 (g)–(l)).
Obviously, both parameter sets lead to cyclical movements of risky-asset returns and risky-asset
prices that show booms and crashes in rather predictable way. However, the first parameter set
provides a more complex dynamics with a strange attractor in the (rt, yt)-plane, while the dynamic
system of the second parameter set eventually stays in a region with 5-cycles in the corresponding
phase space representation.
I want to close this subsubsection with one final remark relating to the optimal investment
proportion πi,t in the experiments. Because the evolution of the variables πf,t and πc,t has not been
plotted in the figures, it should be stressed that, for the daily treatment of our model framework, the
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Figure 4.35: Time series of state variables rt, zt, ω¯t and corresponding risky-asset price pt, risk-premium term
rRPt and phase space plot for the heterogeneous market maker model scaled on a daily basis with 250 trading
days per year (Ht > 0 case) for two further parameter sets. Both experiments show market outcomes which are
rather similar to the limit cycle results depicted in a previous experiment (see Figure 4.32). Again the phase space
representations are generated by 10,000 iterations from which the first 5,000 are deleted afterwards. The dynamic
variables are randomly initialized in all plots. The remaining parameters are td = 250, ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04,
σ = 0.2, ns = 0.03, α = 0.5 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
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realizations of these variables very often reach unrealistically high values (between 5 and 30) which
is clearly not sufficiently pronounced for the td = 1 treatment. Furthermore, the magnitudes of
πf,t and πc,t differ quite significantly from each other in these simulation runs, where πc,t oscillates
with a much larger amplitude.98 Although I am no expert on the calibration issues for similar
model frameworks proposed and investigated by other authors, I might suggest that this problem
is somehow a quite general feature of this class of financial market models. For instance, note
that a tangens hyperbolicus term is assumed in Chiarella et al. (2006) for the chartist demand
function, which keeps the chartist demand in a predefined range. Furthermore, a relatively high
risk-aversion coefficient (at least above 6.0) is assumed in this paper, which might also help to
restrain the dynamic system and keep it in an appropriate and desired region. Unfortunately,
these (sometimes even radically) limiting procedures are not easy to motivate and, in this case,
even seem not to work within the model framework. For example, an increase in the risk-aversion
coefficient ν or an increase in σ2 or β3, which should lower the demand functions of the investors, is
of no advantage in calibrating and smoothing down the model dynamics, but rather leads directly
to unrealistic and undesired market behavior as shown in Figure 4.35.
Simulation Results with Noise Terms
In the final investigation of this thesis a simple stochastic version of our market maker model is
considered. At first I will introduce noisy disturbances fourfold in the dynamic equations of our
market maker model but afterwards I will switch them on step by step during the investigations
of this model variant. More precisely, it is assumed that the dividend process does not grow
deterministically but instead randomly, as already indicated by Eq. (4.25). The noise dividend
evolves according to
dt+1 = (1 + g + σǫ,dǫd,t+1)dt , (4.149)
which means that the fundamental price p∗t+1 evolves according to p
∗
t+1 = (1 + g + σǫ,dǫd,t+1)p
∗
t ,
where ǫd,t ∼ N (0, 1) are i.i.d. random shocks and σǫ,d > 0 represents the standard deviation of the
dividend (and fundamental) growth rate. Analogously, we assume that the number of outstanding
risky assets grows randomly over time, namely via
Nst+1 = (1 + n
s + σǫ,nǫn,t+1)N
s
t ,
where again ǫn,t ∼ N (0, 1) are i.i.d. random shocks and σǫ,n > 0 means the standard deviation of
the outstanding risky assets’ growth rate (see Eq. (4.48)). Obviously, this directly leads to
Ht+1 ≈ (1 + ns + g + σǫ,nǫn,t+1 + σǫ,dǫd,t+1)Ht
for the fundamental price path (see Eq. (4.53)) and to
Ht+1 ≈ (1 + ns + rt+1 + σǫ,nǫn,t+1)Ht
beyond the fundamental price path respectively (see Eq. (4.106)).
98The high values of πf,t and πc,t corresponds to market situations in which 2-cycles or limit cycles occur where
for limit cycles, in addition, πc,t ≫ πf,t is observed.
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In addition, two stochastic terms are added to the price setting equation; one of them is already
displayed in Eq. (4.58). Remember that the price setting rule is given there by
pt+1 = pt [(1 + g) + λ(qt + ǫt)] + α(p
∗
t − pt) , (4.150)
where ǫt stands for noisy excess demand in order to include, for instance, the effect of noise
traders. For consistency reasons this noise term will here be denoted by σǫ,qǫq,t. In this passage
this assumption is shown to be equivalent to
rt+1 =
pt+1 − pt
pt
= g + λ(qt + σǫ,qǫq,t) + α(yt − 1 + σǫ,yǫy,t), (4.151)
implying that the market maker adjusts the relative return of the risky asset according to the return
of dividend g, the aggregate excess demand proportion qt, the noisy demand proportion σǫ,qǫn,t at
time t and a correction term, i.e., the so-called ‘stabilizing term’. However, in contrast to Eq. (4.59),
an additional noise term σǫ,yǫy,t is built into the noisy price setting equation (4.151).
99 Again,
for both noise terms it is σǫ,q > 0, σǫ,y > 0 and ǫq,t ∼ N (0, 1), ǫy,t ∼ N (0, 1) are i.i.d. random
disturbances.
To conclude these model modifications, all relevant equations of the noisy dynamic system are
collected, resulting in the following nonlinear, stochastic system for the heterogeneous beliefs model
with two trading types acting in the model market:
rt+1 = g + σǫ,dǫd,t+1 + λ(qt + σǫ,qǫq,t) + α(yt − 1 + σǫ,yǫy,t) , (4.152)
yt+1 =
(1 + g + σǫ,dǫd,t+1)(r
RP
t − g)
(1 + rt+1)(rRPt+1 − g)
yt , (4.153)
zt+1 =
2(1 + ns + rt+1 + σǫ,nǫn,t+1)
[1 + ω¯t](1 + βf,t+1) + [1− ω¯t](1 + βc,t+1)zt , (4.154)
φt+1 = δφt + (1− δ)rt+1 , (4.155)
vt+1 = δvt + δ(1− δ)(rt+1 − φt)2 , (4.156)
ω¯t+1 =
[1 + ω¯t](1 + βf,t+1)− [1− ω¯t](1 + βc,t+1)
[1 + ω¯t](1 + βf,t+1) + [1− ω¯t](1 + βc,t+1) , (4.157)
where
qt =
[(1 + βf,t)πf,t − (1 + rt)πf,t−1](1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1]
(1 + βf,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + βc,t)(1 − n¯)[1− ω¯t−1]
+
[(1 + βc,t)πc,t − (1 + rt)πc,t−1](1− n¯)[1 − ω¯t−1]− 4(ns + σn,ǫǫn,t)zt−1
(1 + βf,t)(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + βc,t)(1 − n¯)[1− ω¯t−1]
and
βi,t+1 = rf + πi,t
[
rt+1 − rf + (rRPt − g)yt
]
, i ∈ {f, c} ,
πf,t =
1
νσ2
[
(g − rf )− β1(rt − g) + (rRPt − g)yt
]
,
πc,t =
rt + β2(rt − φt) + (rRPt − g)yt − rf
ν [σ2 + β3vt]
,
rRPt = rf +
[
(1 + n¯)[1 + ω¯t]
4νσ2
+
(1− n¯)[1− ω¯t]
4ν(σ2 + β3vt)
]−1
zt .
99The σǫ,yǫy,t-term is not easy to explain in Eq. (4.150) since Eq. (4.150) then has to be written as pt+1 = pt+1 =
pt[(1 + g) + λ(qt + σǫ,qǫq,t)] + α(p∗t − pt + ptσǫ,yǫy,t) = pt[(1 + g) + λ(qt + σǫ,qǫq,t)] + α(p∗t − pt(1 − σǫ,yǫy,t)).
However, adding σǫ,yǫy,t in Eq. (4.151) for the stochastic version of the model might be reasonable.
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Three further remarks are worth making here. First, we assume that the fundamentalists still
believe that the return of the risky asset eventually moves back to its (long-term) average return
of dividends g as formulated in Eq. (4.63)100 and that g is known by both trading types. Second,
the dividend growth rate g in the (rRPt − g) terms of the dynamic system is left undisturbed.
This is done because according to Eq. (4.35) and Eq. (4.43), the fundamental price p∗t might
easily become negative when the time-dependent dividend return gt is assumed to be normally
distributed around its long-run value g. Therefore, we assume that in these corresponding model
terms no disturbance of the dividend growth rate is applied, but we do account for the fact that
the dividends are not strictly growing deterministically (see Eq. (4.152) and Eq. (4.153)). Third, it
is important to remember that, for a daily treatment of the stochastic version of the market maker
model, the transformation rules summarized in Eq. (4.148) again have to be applied. Furthermore,
the standard deviations of the four newly introduced noise terms have to be scaled appropriately,
namely by a factor 1/
√
td.
Again, a multitude of experiments for different parameter sets and model specifications has
been conducted, the full details of which are not shown here. To summarize the findings, it was
found that enabling noise terms leads mostly of the time to model outcomes that significantly
deviate from the results obtained for the corresponding deterministic model variant. For instance,
if noise is turned on in a (fully deterministic) model version for which a fundamental steady state
can be reached and both investor types coexist pari passu in the long run with respect to their
wealth levels, one group of investors is suddenly favored and they will eventually prevail over their
counterparts. In other words there are only a few parameter combinations and model outcomes
in which both trading types can survive simultaneously in the market. Interestingly, this result is
not influenced by either the specific noise term(s) that is (are) switched on or by the size of the
chosen noise level. Neither does disabling short selling have any influence on this result. However,
no straightforward rule can be developed with which the long-term outcome of the model can be
forecasted.101 Nevertheless, some overall findings can be stated. On the one hand, the simple
stochastic version of our market maker model again shows that, for a huge variety of parameter
combinations, no balanced wealth distribution among the two competing investor groups can be
obtained. This model outcome is even more pronounced than in the deterministic model versions.
On the other hand, whenever the corresponding deterministic model variant leads to a coexistence
of both investor types (see Figures 4.23, 4.25 (f) and (l) as well as Figure 4.27), switching on the
noise term favors either the fundamentalists or the chartists. Furthermore, for deterministic model
variants favoring one group anyway (see for instance limit cycles in Figures 4.24 and 4.26 (a)–(f)),
the corresponding noisy model variants do not change this result in almost all cases. In some cases,
however, enabling noise can quite clearly slow down the process of one group being ruled out of
the market.
Figures 4.36 and 4.37 show two notable model outcomes for two different parameter sets for
100These assumptions can be motivated by referring to Eq. (4.36), which remains the same in this more general
noisy case. This is due to the fact that it is still Et[dt + 1] = Et[(1 + g + σǫ,dǫd,t+1)dt] = (1 + g)dt, so that the
derivation of Eq. (4.36) can also be taken for this special noisy case. See also Appendix A 4.2 for further details.
101Similar to the procedure in the previous simulations, the initialization of the dynamic system is chosen randomly
in all experiments. A weaker randomization of the initial conditions of the dynamic system might reduce this effect,
but this is not investigated here in further detail.
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the td = 1 treatment (i.e., one trading period per year). Figure 4.36 exhibits one of the rather rare
situations in which neither fundamentalists nor chartists can can dominate the market in the long
run. Note that Figure 4.23 uses a similar parameter set to that in Figure 4.36, leading to very
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Figure 4.36: Time series of state variables rt, yt, zt, ω¯t and corresponding risky-asset price pt and risk-premium
term rRPt for the heterogeneous market maker model (Ht > 0 case) with noise. For this parameter set both investor
groups coexist in the market although the chartists prevail over the fundamentalists after about 9500 trading periods.
Note that, in contrast to the previous figures, the upper left panel exhibits the risky-asset return including dividends.
The dashed lines refer to the ±3σ region. The dynamic variables are randomly initialized in all plots. The remaining
parameters are td = 1, ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03, α = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0.
The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
similar time series and phase space plot results as would exist for the dynamic system shown in
Figure 4.36 if the noise term was enabled. Hence both plots can be compared anyway although the
parameter sets slightly deviate from each other. Interestingly, further experiments indicate102 that
only noise in terms of a noisy excess demand (and/or weak noise in the ‘stabilizing term’ of the
price setting equation, i.e., σǫ,q > 0 and/or σǫ,y > 0) can lead to situations in which both trading
types coexist in the market. Contrastingly, enabling noise for the dividend process and/or for the
outstanding risky asset’s growth rate always favors one trading group over the other103, where the
precise model outcome depends on the realized initialization of the underlying dynamic system. As
a final remark to Figure 4.36 it is worth mentioning that the time series of the risky-asset returns
including dividends, i.e., ρt (upper left panel), is characterized by rather smooth fluctuations within
the ±3σ region, neither showing phases of high volatility nor any other ‘anomalies’ which might
102Experiments are not shown in detail here.
103This result is also independent of the chosen size of the noise level.
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give a hint to the ‘stylized facts’ that can be observed in real financial time series.104
Figure 4.37 shows another simulation experiment in which three noise terms are enabled, namely
the excess demand noise term, the noise term for the dividend process and the noise term for
the risky-asset supply. The noise levels are chosen rather low, with σǫ,q = 0.075, σǫ,d = 0.01
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Figure 4.37: Time series of state variables rt, y, zt, ω¯t and corresponding risky-asset price pt and risk-premium
term rRPt for the heterogeneous market maker model (Ht > 0 case) with noise associated to Figure 4.24. While
for the first 4000 trading periods the fundamentalists can coexist with their competitors, the chartists start to
dominate the market in the following periods. Again the risky-asset return including dividends is depicted in the
upper left panel. The dashed lines refer to the ±3σ region. Obviously, the time series of returns shows time-varying
fluctuations with phases of low volatility and higher volatility. Note that no short selling has been allowed for this
experiment, where the chartists’ investment proportion is even slightly more constrained (see the continuous text for
further details). The dynamic variables are randomly initialized in all plots. The remaining parameters are td = 1,
ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03, α = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for
ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
and σǫ,n = 0.05. Again, the outcome of the noisy dynamic system can be compared with the
outcome of the corresponding deterministic model variant which is depicted in Figure 4.24. In
both experiments the chartists dominate the market in the long run although the noisy model
variant requires many more trading periods for the chartists to achieve the dominance over the
fundamentalists. However, this result is enhanced (or manipulated) by the fact that the noisy
experiment shown in Figure 4.37 includes a ban on short selling for both trading types, as well
as the following assumption for the chartists’ group:105 in addition to the interdiction of short
104See Footnote 39 and the discussion around for further details.
105Nevertheless, even without the interdiction of short selling for both trading groups the chartists need more
trading periods to dominate the market in the noisy model variant as well as in the corresponding deterministic
model version.
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selling for both trading types, the chartists’ optimal investment proportion πc,t is assumed to be
further constrained so that it remains in the interval [0.21, 0.89]. More precisely, it is assumed that,
whenever the chartists derive a higher (lower) optimal investment proportion than 89% (21%) for
the current trading period, they adjust their investment proportion for this period to the boundaries
by hand mentioned above. Although this assumption seems rather arbitrary, the resulting model
outcome is interesting. Comparing the time series of returns of Figures 4.36 and 4.37, it becomes
obvious that the risky-asset returns in the latter model version show more clearly time-varying
fluctuations with phases of low and high volatility than can be observed in real financial data. It is
particularly notable that the ±3σ region is breached at regular but not totally predictable intervals.
Therefore, Figure 4.38 refers to further investigations of the corresponding return distribution that
have already been introduced for an extension of the BH model outlined in Subsection 2.2.3 of
Chapter 2. The left panel of Figure 4.38 compares the density function of a standard normal
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Figure 4.38: Simulation results for returns for the heterogeneous market maker model (Ht > 0 case) with noise
associated to Figure 4.37. A deviation from purely Gaussian behavior can clearly be detected (left and middle panel).
However, the ACF of absolute and squared returns does not show a significantly lower decay rate than expected
from real financial data (right panel, see also Figure 2.13 (a) in Subsection 2.2.3 of Chapter 2). The same data
set is used as for the experiment shown in Figure 4.37. The remaining parameters are td = 1, ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05,
g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, ns = 0.03, λ = 0.1, α = 0.5, β1 = 0.1, β2 = 0.6, β3 = 5.0, n¯ = 0.0, σǫ,q = 0.075,
σǫ,d = 0.01 and σǫ,n = 0.05. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
distribution with the sample probability density function of the normalized returns ρt generated
by the simulation experiment shown in Figure 4.37. Obviously, in contrast to a normal distribution
which is the selected distribution for the three noise terms in the simple stochastic model version
used in this experiment, the return distribution of the simulated model has a higher probability
for large events and, consequently, contains more probability mass around the symmetry axis of
the distribution. The same result is visualized in a slightly different way in the middle panel of
Figure 4.38, where the outer part of the distribution is exhibited. It can clearly be detected that
the probability of large returns decays significantly more slowly than under the assumption of a
Gaussian distribution with the same standard deviation.106 Hence the simple stochastic version of
the heterogeneous market maker model is able to generate return distributions that share the ‘fat-
tail phenomenon’ (or the leptokurtic character) of real financial time series, although these model
results are hardly robust against parameter modifications and changes in the size of the chosen
106For further details on the description of generating these plots we can refer again to Subsection 2.2.3 of Chapter
2.
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noise levels.107 Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that different ‘stylized facts’ of empirical
data from financial markets cannot be reproduced by the artificial market model. For instance, our
model does not share the slow decay rate of the autocorrelation function of absolute and squared
returns as observed in real financial data (see right panel of Figure 4.38 vs. Figure 2.13 (a) in
Subsection 2.2.3 of Chapter 2).
Neither Figure 4.36 nor Figure 4.37 show a time series of risky-asset prices pt that looks like
price evolutions known from real financial data. Instead, the model price of the risky asset grows
exponentially in a very smooth and regular way. To investigate the influence of switching on
different noise levels and noise types to the price evolution of the risky asset within the model
framework, several experiments are conducted which are summarized in Figures 4.39 and 4.40.
Note that for these figures the same parameter set (and the same initialization procedure for the
underlying dynamic system) is used as for Figures 4.25/4.26. It comes as no surprise that a
higher noise level tends to accompany more realistic price fluctuations showing irregular increases
and decreases in the overall model price evolution. It is also quite obvious that adding noise
to the dividend process leads to a rather pronounced effect, since the assumption of a growing
dividend process is primary responsible for obtaining a growth model in both risky-asset prices
and investors’ wealth levels (see Figure 4.39 (a)–(c)).108 Figure 4.40 depicts the corresponding
time series of average wealth proportion ω¯t. Since even for the deterministic model variant the
presence of SDIC can clearly be detected (in particular for this parameter set), leading to different
model outcomes with respect to the eventual wealth distribution among the two trading types (see
Figure 4.25 (f) and (l) as well as Figure 4.26 (f)), the corresponding results for the noisy model
variant is shown simply for the sake of completeness here.109 More precisely, no well-founded rule
can be established from these plots (or, more precisely, from these experiments). However, note
that enabling noise might favor the fundamentalists slightly more since, in general (i.e., in all
experiments that have been conducted during the preparation of this subsubsection), they seem to
dominate the chartists more often than in the corresponding deterministic model variants.
Finally, Figure 4.41 refers to a model variant where 250 trading days per year are assumed.
Again, a short selling ban is assumed for both trading types in order to stabilize the simulation
results.110 Nevertheless, as for the deterministic model variant outlined in Subsubsection 4.5.5, the
simulation results for the daily scaled market maker model are rather disappointing all in all. For
instance, the optimal investment proportion again reaches extremely high values which are very
unrealistic and often lead to model outcomes which are unrealistic. Therefore, I do not want to
exhibit more than one typical experiment that has been conducted for the daily model treatment
here. Again, the risky-asset price is growing in a rather regular way, where both trading types
can eventually survive in the market. Furthermore, the risky-asset return (including dividends) is
107This unwanted model feature has also been observed in the modified BH model (see Subsection 2.2.3 of Chapter
2).
108Experiments were also conducted in which no short selling was allowed (not shown in detail here). The findings
in these simulation runs indicate that the interdiction of short selling diminishes the occurrence of irregular price
fluctuations; this seems a rather obvious result.
109Nevertheless, note the different scales used for the x-axis in Figure 4.40.
110In contrast to the experiment shown in Figure 4.37, no further constraints with respect to the optimal investment
proportion are assumed for the chartist group in this experiment.
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Figure 4.39: Time series of risky-asset prices pt for different noise types and noise levels for the heterogeneous
market maker model (Ht > 0 case). Although the evolution of the risky-asset price pt also clearly depends on the
precise initialization of the underlying dynamic system (not shown here), an increase in the noise level generally
leads to a more unpredictable and more realistic price pattern for all noise types. Obviously, enabling noise for the
dividend process seems to affect the time evolution of risky-asset prices quite considerably. The dynamic variables
are randomly initialized in all plots. The remaining parameters are td = 1, ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2,
δ = 0.5, ns = 0.03, λ = 0.05, α = 0.5, β1 = 0.25, β2 = 0.4, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is
ω¯0 = 0.0.
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Figure 4.40: Corresponding time series of average wealth proportion ω¯t for Figure 4.39. Depending on the precise
initialization of the underlying dynamic system (not shown here) and the chosen noise type and noise level the
chartists (or, less frequently, the fundamentalists) dominate the market in the long run. The same data sets are
used as for the experiments shown in Figure 4.39. The dynamic variables are randomly initialized in all plots. The
remaining parameters are td = 1, ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, n
s = 0.03, λ = 0.05, α = 0.5,
β1 = 0.25, β2 = 0.4, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
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Figure 4.41: Time series of state variables rt, yt, zt, ω¯t and corresponding risky-asset price pt and risk-premium
term rRPt for the heterogeneous market maker model scaled on a daily basis with 250 trading days per year (Ht > 0
case) with noise associated to Figure 4.37. Fundamentalists and chartists can coexist in the market in the long run.
Again the risky-asset return including dividends is depicted in the upper left panel. The dashed lines refer to the
±3σ region. The time series of returns show no time-varying fluctuations with phases of low volatility and higher
volatility. Note that no short selling has been allowed for this experiment. The dynamic variables are randomly
initialized in all plots. The remaining parameters are td = 250, ν = 1.2, rf = 0.05, g = 0.04, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.5,
ns = 0.03, α = 0.5, β3 = 5.0 and n¯ = 0.0. The initial condition for ω¯t is ω¯0 = 0.0.
smoothly fluctuating around its mean, hardly ever breaching the ±3σ region.
4.6 Summary
This chapter presents a structural heterogeneous agents model of an artificial financial market
under a market maker scenario in a discrete time setup. Due to a CRRA expected utility opti-
mization framework used by each single investor, the time evolution of the basic state variables
of the resulting dynamic system (such as asset prices and total wealth of the market participants)
become growing processes over time and thus have to be appropriately transformed to obtain a
stationary model. As already shown in Chiarella and He (2001), such a stationary model can
be determined in terms of the return of the risky asset, the (average) wealth proportions among
different investor groups and, newly introduced here, the ‘fundamental/price ratio’ which measures
the deviation of the current price level of the risky asset from its underlying fundamental price
(see also Chiarella et al., 2006). Heterogeneity among agents is introduced by assuming them to
form different conditional expectations about the mean and the variance of the return of the risky
asset. Two different investor ‘prototypes’ are considered in our artificial market: fundamentalists,
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who believe in the eventual reversion of the current asset price back to its fundamental value, and
chartists, who extrapolate the future return of the risky asset from historical data. In addition, an
explicitly modeled supply side of the risky assets is incorporated into the model framework, directly
leading to a ‘risk-premium term’ which becomes a non-vanishing and time-dependent quantity in
the artificial market. It is endogenously determined by the risky-asset price evolution and the
market behavior of the agents. To account for this fact it is necessary to introduce a further state
variable called the ‘asset supply/total wealth ratio’. This stationary variable is mainly controlled
by the growth rate of the number of outstanding assets, the risky-asset return and the investors’
growth rate of wealth. Furthermore, it itself mainly controls the risk-premium term. Contrast-
ingly, when an asset supply of zero is assumed, the model-inherent risk-premium term vanishes
and the model falls back to a version that shares some more similarities with the model framework
outlined in Chiarella et al. (2006). A comprehensive analytic and numerical study of the market
maker model for a variety of different market situations is performed. In particular, it includes
both homogeneous model versions as well as model variants with noise terms. While the first step
sees an investigation of a simplified model version with zero supply of outside stocks, the second
step considers the fully-developed market maker model with a positive risky-asset supply. The
results of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• The proposed model is able to embed the fundamental pricing scheme as a special case into a
more general heterogeneous multi-agent types model framework. In the fundamental steady
state all agents use the rational valuation formula for stock prices to derive their demand
functions for the risky-asset return. Hence building blocks well known from the classical
quantitative pricing literature are combined with more advanced modeling features, such
as allowing for interim deviations of the risky-asset price from its fundamental value, the
observation of the wealth evolution of the market participants, and an explicit consideration
of the market-inherent and endogenously driven risk premium which market participants
have to be offered to compensate them for undertaking risky financial prospects.
• For all model variants a ‘quasi’-unique fundamental steady state or even a continuum of
fundamental steady states exists where the risky-asset return (ex dividends) equals the growth
rate of the assumed dividend process. In such market environments the price of the risky
asset increases along its fundamental price path for all time periods.
• For the simplified model version in a homogeneous-beliefs model variant with either only
fundamentalists or only chartists in the market, the resulting dynamics is already rather
multifaceted. On the one hand, convergence to the fundamental steady state occurs for
certain parameter combinations where the system might undergoes flip and Hopf bifurcations
if the agents’ extrapolation parameter is changed appropriately. On the other hand, even
more complex dynamics is possible, leading to the occurrence of periodic behavior and limit
cycles.
• For the simplified model version in a heterogeneous-beliefs model variant with fundamental-
ists and chartists competing against each other in the market, the investors’ average wealth
proportion enters as a new model variable into the focus of investigations. The dynamic
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system again converges to its fundamental steady states for a quite large range of parameter
combinations. In such situations both investor types always survive in the market in the long
run. Furthermore, the heterogeneous beliefs model is also able to exhibit 2-cycle behavior
and, albeit less frequently, high-order cycles or limit cycles. Whenever cyclical dynamics
occurs, the chartists eventually dominate the market. Parameter sets for which the funda-
mentalists prevail over the chartists are almost impossible to find. The same is true for the
occurrence of cyclical movements of wealth shares between the two investor types.
• An adaptive model version where the chartists’ expectation formation is revised does not
change the results significantly, although the resulting dynamics becomes even more complex,
and convergence to the fundamental steady states can be observed less frequently. Never-
theless, numerical experiments indicate that the adaptive model seems to be more robust
with respect to parameter changes than the heterogeneous beliefs model with the original
chartists’ expectation formation.
• The fully-developed market maker model which assumes a non-zero asset supply in the mar-
ket shows similar results to the adaptive model version with respect to its robustness of
model outcomes and the resulting long-term wealth distribution among fundamentalists and
chartists. While long-term dynamics leading to limit cycles again favors the chartists’ group
in general, the fundamentalists are mostly not able to perform significantly better than their
counterparts, as was the case before. Instead, the best result they can achieve is to survive
pari passu in the market in the long run, or at least to reckon with cyclical movements of
their wealth share. As a new observation in this revised model variant, the dynamics shows a
rather pronounced presence of ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions’ (SDIC) and ‘sen-
sitive dependence on parameters (SDP)’, which is a widely known characteristic of nonlinear
chaotic systems. Obviously, this new model behavior is mainly caused by the increased com-
plexity of the underlying nonlinear difference equation system, which describes the market
behavior of the market participants in a quite detailed and economically motivated way.
• The attempt to scale the model to daily trading periods (e.g., 250 trading days per day) does
not lead to promising and presentable results.111 For a wide range of reasonable parameter
sets the model shows a ‘convergence’ to market situation in which the investors have almost
no demand for the risky asset. However, numerical experiments can be created for the daily
model treatment, in which the fundamentalists are able to rule out the chartist group and
eventually dominate the market.
• For some simple stochastic versions of the fully-developed market maker model, model out-
comes can be generated which resemble, at least visually, real financial time series of risky-
asset prices and returns. However, scaling the stochastic model to a scale of daily trading
periods leads to disappointing results, as already observed for the deterministic model variant.
In summary, the proposed market maker model in this chapter can be classified in the line of model
frameworks that has been presented and reproduced in the preceding two chapters. While it shares
111See also the summarizing Section 3.8 of Chapter 3 and Footnote 51 given therein.
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some general ideas of the BH model framework (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter 2) as well
as of the CH model (see Chapter 3), it also provides further insights into these kind of financial
market models since it explicitly models the wealth evolution of the market participants (like the
CH model), but also eliminates some crucial limitations and inconsistencies within the CH model
framework. For instance, it assumes model-consistent expectations of all market participants on
the fundamental price path of the risky asset. Furthermore, it takes into account the risky-asset
supply, which directly leads to the appearance of a risk-premium term in the model framework
which is endogenously driven by the market over time. However, the resulting dynamics does not
change significantly in terms of possible model outcomes. Moreover, the model presented in this
chapter fails to solve any of the frequently asked open issues and unsolved problems for these model
types such as the calibration to different time scales in general and the calibration to real financial
market data in particular.
Appendix to Chapter 4
A 4.1 Derivation of Eq. (4.21) and Eq. (4.22)
From Eq. (4.10) and Eq. (4.20) we have
qt =
ζˇt
Wt
=
P2
i=1Wi,t−1 [(1 + βi,t)πi,t − (1 + rt)πi,t−1]− [Ht − (1 + rt)Ht−1]
Wt
. (A 4.1)
Using Eq. (4.14) and Eq. (4.16) it follows that the right-hand side expression of Eq. (A 4.1) can be written
as P2
i=1Wi,t−1 [(1 + βi,t)πi,t − (1 + rt)πi,t−1]− [Ht − (1 + rt)Ht−1]
Wt
=
P2
i=1[(1 + βi,t)πi,t − (1 + rt)πi,t−1]Wi,t−1 − [Ht − (1 + rt)Ht−1]P2
i=1(1 + βi,t)Wi,t−1
=
P2
i=1[(1 + βi,t)πi,t − (1 + rt)πi,t−1]NiW¯i,t−1 − [Ht − (1 + rt)Ht−1]P2
i=1(1 + βi,t)NiW¯i,t−1
,
from which Eq. (4.21) can directly be concluded by multiplying nominator and denominator with 1/I and
1/W¯t−1.
The calculation of Eq. (4.22) is very similar to the calculation of Eq. (3.23) in Theorem 3.3, Chapter
3. According to Eq. (4.6) it is
ω¯i,t+1 =
W¯i,t+1
W¯t+1
=
W¯i,t(1 + βi,t+1)
W¯t+1
=
ω¯i,t(1 + βi,t+1)
W¯t+1/W¯t
, (A 4.2)
where the denominator can be written by
W¯t+1
W¯t
=
W¯1,t(1 + β1,t+1) + W¯2,t(1 + β2,t+1)]
W¯t
= ω¯1,t(1 + β1,t+1) + ω¯2,t(1 + β2,t+1) . (A 4.3)
Combining Eq. (A 4.2) and Eq. (A 4.3) directly leads Eq. (4.22).
A 4.2 Derivation of Eq. (4.35)
As already outlined in the discussion on the BH model framework (see Subsection 2.1.1, Chapter 2), the
fundamental market equilibrium equation Eq. (4.32) has a unique fundamental solution
p∗t =
∞X
k=1
Et[dt+k]
(1 + rf )k
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if the ‘transversality condition’ holds (see Eq. (2.7) for details). Since the dividend growth process in the
deterministic skeleton is assumed to evolve according to
dt+1 = (1 + g)dt ,
we have
p∗t =
∞X
k=1
Et[dt+k]
(1 + rf )k
=
∞X
k=1
„
1 + g
1 + rf
«k
dt =
"
∞X
k=0
„
1 + g
1 + rf
«k
− 1
#
dt =
"
1
1− 1+g
1+rf
− 1
#
dt ,
which leads to
p∗t =
»
1 + rf
g − rf
− 1
–
dt ,
from which Eq. (4.35) directly follows.
A 4.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Let r∗ = rt+1 = rt = rt−1 and y
∗ = yt+1 = yt = yt−1 be the steady state of the system Eq. (4.66)–
Eq. (4.67). Then, a necessary (and sufficient) condition for the steady state to exist is determined by
r∗ = g + λq∗ + α(y∗ − 1) , (A 4.4)
y∗ =
1 + g
1 + r∗
y∗ ,
which implies „
y∗ 6= 0 ∧ y∗(1−
1 + g
1 + r∗
) = 0
«
∨ (y∗ = 0 ∧ r∗ = g + λq∗ − α) , (A 4.5)
where
q∗ =
(β∗f − r
∗)π∗f
1 + β∗f
, β∗f = rf + π
∗
f {(r
∗ − rf ) + (rf − g)y
∗}
and
π∗f =
1
νσ2
{(rf − g)(y
∗ − 1)− β1(r
∗ − g)} .
(i) Analysis of the Left-Hand Side of Eq. (A 4.5)
From the condition on the left-hand side of Eq. (A 4.5), the steady state E1 can be determined in the
following way. Firstly, it is easy to see that r∗ = g, which implies
q∗ =
(β∗f − g)π
∗
f
1 + β∗f
, β∗f = rf + π
∗
f {(rf − g)(y
∗ − 1)} , π∗f =
1
νσ2
{(rf − g)(y
∗ − 1)} .
Using the abbreviating notation C ≡ νσ2, ∆ ≡ rf − g and X ≡ y
∗ − 1, it follows that
β∗f = rf +
∆2
C
X2 and π∗f =
∆
C
X
and thus
q∗ =
“
rf +
∆2
C
X2 − g
”
∆
C
X
1 + rf +
∆2
C
X2
. (A 4.6)
Inserting Eq. (A 4.6) in Eq. (A 4.4) leads to
−
α
λ
X =
“
∆+ ∆
2
C
X2
”
∆
C
X
1 + rf +
∆2
C
X2
(A 4.7)
which can easily be solved and yields
X = ±
s
−{αC2(1 + rf ) + ∆2Cλ}
∆2 {∆λ+ αC}
.
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However, note that y∗ 6= 1 has to be assumed for this manipulation because Eq. (A 4.7) can be divided by
X, which is defined by X ≡ y∗−1 as stated already above. Since α, λ,C,∆ are all positive parameters, the
square root has no real solution, which implies that the assumption y∗ 6= 1 does not lead to a reasonable
result for our economic model. However, the assumption y∗ = 1 (which means X = 0) does lead to a
meaningful result and directly implies that q∗ = 0 (i.e., no market excess demand in the steady state),
π∗f = 0 and β
∗
f = rf .
(ii) Analysis of the Right-Hand Side of Eq. (A 4.5)
Finally, the condition on the right-hand side of Eq. (A 4.5) has to be investigated, i.e., the case y∗ = 0.
This directly implies that
r∗ = g + λq∗ − α ,
where
q∗ =
(β∗f − r
∗)π∗f
1 + β∗f
, β∗f = rf + π
∗
f (r
∗ − rf ) , π
∗
f =
1
νσ2
{(g − rf )− β1(r
∗ − g)} . (A 4.8)
Unfortunately, this system of equations is analytically almost intractable. For this reason, the possible
steady states for y∗ = 0 are numerically investigated for a wide range of reasonable parameter sets with the
help of the software package Mathematica 7. The chosen parameter sets enclose the following parameter
ranges:
ν = 1.2 , 0.05 ≤ σ ≤ 1.15 , 0.02 ≤ rf ≤ 0.18 , 0.02 ≤ g ≤ 0.18 ,
0.1 ≤ β1 ≤ 0.9 , 0.05 ≤ λ ≤ 0.1 , 0.1 ≤ α ≤ 0.9 .
Note that, according to Eq. (A 4.8), the parameters ν and σ always occur as a factor νσ2, so that only one
of both parameters has to be changed within the parameter sets. An extensive numerical analysis reveals
that almost no economically reasonable (non-fundamental) steady state exists within these parameter
ranges. Only for very low choices of σ does one economically reasonable (non-fundamental) steady state
exist which, however, is always accompanied by negative values of π∗f and a return (ex dividends) of the
risky asset slightly higher than the risk-free rate. Note that the following conditions have to be fulfilled to
arrive at an economically reasonable (non-fundamental) steady state:
β∗f ≥ 0 , rf > g , r
∗ ≥ −1 (note that r∗ < −1 leads to negative prices) ,
as well as
r∗, q∗, β∗f , π
∗
f ∈ R and ¬(g ≥ r
∗ ∧ r∗ > −1) .
The last condition has to be fulfilled because Eq. (4.67) states that the growth rate of the state variable
yt is given by (1+ g)/(1+ rt+1) and that y0 > 0 is used as an initial condition for the dynamics of yt in all
the investigations of the underlying dynamic system. This means that a steady state with y∗ = 0 cannot
be reached as long as g ≥ r∗ and r∗ > −1 because it is then yt+1 ≥ yt > 0 for all t. This completes the
proof.
A 4.4 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Since determining analytically the local stability property of the fundamental steady state E1 is rather
complex even in the most simple homogeneous case with only fundamentalists in the market, the analysis
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of the stability properties of the homogeneous model is performed with the assistance of the software
package Mathematica 4.1, which provides analytical as well as numerical solutions.
In the first step the system Eq. (4.66)–Eq. (4.67) is equivalently transformed into its canonical form of
first-order difference equations.112 By introducing a new set of variables:
at+1 = rt+1 , bt+1 = rt , ct+1 = yt+1 , dt+1 = yt ,
the system Eq. (4.66)–Eq. (4.67) can be rewritten as
at+1 = g + λQ(βf,t, πf,t, πf,t−1, at) + α(ct − 1) ,
bt+1 = at ,
ct+1 =
1 + g
1 + g + λQ(βf,t, πf,t, πf,t−1, at) + α(ct − 1)
ct ,
dt+1 = ct ,
where Q(·, ·, ·, ·) is defined as
Q(u, v, w, x) ≡
(1 + u)v − (1 + x)w
1 + u
.
Note that Q(βf,t, πf,t, πf,t−1, at) = fct.(rt, rt−1, yt, yt−1) or, using the new set of variables,
Q(βf,t, πf,t, πf,t−1, at) = fct.(at, bt, ct, dt).
Now, in the second step, the Jacobian of the fundamental steady state E1 can easily be determined as
J1 ≡ J|(r∗=g,y∗=1) =
0
BBBBBB@
−β1λ
νσ2
β1λ(1+g)
(1+rf )νσ
2 α+
λ(rf−g)
νσ2
λ(1+g)(g−rf )
(1+rf )νσ
2
1 0 0 0
β1λ
(1+g)νσ2
− β1λ
(1+rf )νσ
2 1−
α+
λ(rf−g)
νσ2
1+g
−
λ(g−rf )
(1+rf )νσ
2
0 0 1 0
1
CCCCCCA ,
from which the characteristic equation can be derived as
Γ1(ξ) ≡ det (ξI− J1) =
ξ
(1 + g)(1 + rf )νσ2
{λ [ξ(1 + rf )− (1 + g)] [β1(ξ − 1)(1 + g) + ξ(rf − g)]
+ξ2(1 + rf ) [α+ (ξ − 1)(1 + g)] νσ
2¯ (A 4.9)
by using the Laplace’s expansion rule. Simple transformations show that Eq. (A 4.9) is equivalent to
Eq. (4.72). Note that Γ1(ξ) is a polynomial of order four with one trivial eigenvalue ξ1 = 0 and three
further non-trivial eigenvalues ξ2, ξ3, ξ4 which are generally non-zero and are given by the solution of the
expression in the curly brackets of Eq. (4.72). This completes the proof.
A 4.5 Proof of Theorem 4.5
According to Eq. (A 4.9) it is
Γ1(1) =
λ(rf − g)
2 + α(1 + rf )νσ
2
(1 + g)(1 + rf )νσ2
,
which is non-zero for α 6= 0, λ 6= 0 and rf > g. Therefore, from
Γ1(−1) =
−λ(−2− rf − g) [−2β1(1 + g)− (rf − g)]− (1 + rf ) [α− 2(1 + g)] νσ
2
(1 + g)(1 + rf )νσ2
it can be concluded that a flip bifurcation occurs at β∗1 , which is given by Eq. (4.73). This completes the
proof.
112See Medio and Lines (2001, Chapter 1) for further details on this procedure.
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A 4.6 Proof of Theorem 4.6
Let r∗ = rt+1 = rt = rt−1 = rt−2 and y
∗ = yt+1 = yt = yt−1 be the steady state of the system Eq. (4.74)–
Eq. (4.75). The ‘quasi’ uniqueness of the fundamental steady state E1 can be proven using a very similar
procedure, as already applied in the proof of Theorem 4.2 in Appendix A 4.3. Again, the necessary (and
sufficient) condition for the steady state to exist can be expressed by„
y∗ 6= 0 ∧ y∗(1−
1 + g
1 + r∗
) = 0
«
∨ (y∗ = 0 ∧ r∗ = g + λq∗ − α) , (A 4.10)
where
q∗ =
(β∗c − r
∗)π∗c
1 + β∗c
, β∗c = rf + π
∗
c {(r
∗ − rf ) + (rf − g)y
∗}
and
π∗c =
(r∗ − rf ) + (rf − g)y
∗
ν
ˆ
σ2 + β3 {(r∗ − rf ) + (rf − g)y∗}
2
˜ .
(i) Analysis of the Left-Hand Side of Eq. (A 4.10)
From the condition on the left-hand side of Eq. (A 4.10) it is again r∗ = g and thus
q∗ =
(β∗c − g)π
∗
c
1 + β∗c
, β∗c = rf + π
∗
c {(rf − g)(y
∗ − 1)} , π∗c =
(rf − g)(y
∗ − 1)
ν [σ2 + β3(rf − g)2(y∗ − 1)2]
. (A 4.11)
Using the notation C ≡ νσ2, ∆ ≡ rf − g, X ≡ y
∗ − 1 and equating q∗ from Eq. (A 4.11) with r∗ =
g + λq∗ + α(y∗ − 1) (note that it is r∗ = g) finally leads to a bi-quadratic equation in the variable
Y ≡ ∆2X2 being of the form
Y 2 + pY + q = 0 (A 4.12)
with p, q > 0. Note that the condition y∗ 6= 1 again has to be fulfilled in order that the algebraic
manipulation can be performed because of a division by the variable X (see also proof of Theorem 4.2 in
Appendix A 4.3 for a very similar argument). Note that the transformation is quite laborious and p and
q are quite unmanageable expressions in the variable ν,α, λ, rf , C and ∆. However, since p, q are positive
numbers for all economically meaningful choices of values for the underlying parameters, it follows that
the real roots of Eq. (A 4.12) are both negative (if existing). This leads to X2 < 0. Thus there is no (real)
steady state with r∗ = g, y∗ 6= 0 and y∗ 6= 1. Assuming instead y∗ = 1 leads to σ¯2
∗
c = q
∗ = π∗c = 0 and
β∗c = rf . Hence E1 = (g, g, g, 1, 1) is the fundamental steady state of the system.
(ii) Analysis of the Right-Hand Side of Eq. (A 4.10)
Assuming y∗ = 0 (see the condition on the right-hand side of Eq. (A 4.10)) directly leads to
r∗ = g + λq∗ − α ,
where
q∗ =
(β∗c − r
∗)π∗c
1 + β∗c
, β∗c = rf + π
∗
c (r
∗ − rf ) , π
∗
c =
r∗ − rf
ν [σ2 + β3(r∗ − rf )2]
.
This system of equations is again analytically almost intractable. For this reason, the possible steady
states for y∗ = 0 are numerically investigated for a wide range of reasonable parameter sets with the help
of the software package Mathematica 7, as already performed for the proof of Theorem 4.2 in Appendix
A 4.3. The chosen parameter sets enclose the following parameter ranges:
ν = 1.2 , 0.05 ≤ σ ≤ 1.15 , 0.02 ≤ rf ≤ 0.18 , 0.02 ≤ g ≤ 0.18 ,
0.05 ≤ λ ≤ 0.1 , 0.1 ≤ α ≤ 0.9 , 2 ≤ β3 ≤ 10 .
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An extensive numerical analysis reveals that no economically reasonable (non-fundamental) steady state
exists within these parameter ranges, where the same conditions as in the proof of Theorem 4.2 in Appendix
A 4.3 are used to define an economically reasonable (non-fundamental) steady state.
(iii) Stability of Fundamental Steady State E1
Note that the complexity (i.e., the high dimensionality) of the dynamic system means that the analysis of
the stability of the steady state E1 is again conducted with the aid of Mathematica 4.1. Thus only the
main steps are outlined here. Very similar to the proceeding used in the proof of Theorem 4.4 in Appendix
A 4.4, the system Eq. (4.74)–Eq. (4.75) can easily be reformulated in its canonical form of first-order
difference equations. A new set of variables is again introduced:
at+1 = rt+1 , bt+1 = rt , ct+1 = rt−1 , dt+1 = yt+1 , et+1 = yt .
Hence the system Eq. (4.74)–Eq. (4.75) can be rewritten as
at+1 = g + λQ(βc,t, πc,t, πc,t−1, at) + α(dt − 1) ,
bt+1 = at ,
ct+1 = bt ,
dt+1 =
1 + g
1 + g + λQ(βc,t, πc,t, πc,t−1, at) + α(dt − 1)
ct ,
et+1 = dt ,
where Q(·, ·, ·, ·) is again defined as
Q(u, v, w, x) ≡
(1 + u)v − (1 + x)w
1 + u
.
Note that Q(βc,t, πc,t, πc,t−1, at) now also depends on rt−2. It is Q(βc,t, πc,t, πc,t−1, at) =
fct.(rt, rt−1, rt−2, yt, yt−1) or, using the new set of variables, Q(βf,t, πf,t, πf,t−1, at) = fct.(at, bt, ct, dt, et)
respectively. The characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian of the dynamic system evaluated at the fun-
damental equilibrium point E1 can be determined by
Γ1(ξ) =
1
(1 + g)(1 + rf )νσ2
(
ξ
»
− λ(−1 + ξ − g + ξrf )
h
− 1− g + β2(ξ − 1)
2(1 + g)
+ξ(1 + g + ξg − ξrf )
i
+ ξ3 [α+ (ξ − 1)(1 + g)] (1 + rf )νσ
2
–)
, (A 4.13)
which is a product of an ordinary polynomial of order four and the linear factor ξ. Therefore, E1 has one
trivial eigenvalue ξ1 = 0 and four further non-trivial eigenvalues ξ2, . . . , ξ5 which are implicitly given by
the expression in the big square brackets in Eq. (A 4.13). This completes the proof.
A 4.7 Proof of Theorem 4.7
The proof of this theorem can be conducted in exactly the same way as the proofs of the corresponding
Theorems 4.2 and 4.6 for the homogeneous beliefs models. However, the resulting equations become even
more laborious. Therefore, only the main steps of the proof are outlined here.
Analysis 1
For y∗ 6= 0 it is r∗ = g. For y∗ 6= 1 it can be shown that y∗ has to fulfill the equation
Y 3 + pY 2 + qY + r = 0
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with p, q, r > 0, where p, q, r are again functions of ν, α, λ, rf , C,∆ (with C ≡ νσ
2 as before) as well as of
(1± n¯) and (1± ˇ¯ω∗) which are all non-negative numbers. Furthermore, it is Y ≡ ∆2X2 with ∆ ≡ rf − g
and X ≡ y∗ − 1. Again, there is no (real) y∗ that can satisfy this condition. Otherwise, it can easily be
verified that it is σ¯2
∗
c = q
∗ = 0 and thus π∗f = π
∗
c = 0 as well as β
∗
f = β
∗
c = rf for y
∗ = 1. From this it can
directly be concluded that at the equilibrium point (r∗ = g, y∗ = 1) the equation (4.89) is fulfilled for any
choice of ˇ¯ω∗ (see proof of Remark 3.7 in Appendix A 3.6, Chapter 3 for a similar discussion).
Analysis 2
For y∗ = 0 the following equations have to be solved simultaneously:
r∗ = g + λq∗ − α ,
where
q∗ =
(β∗f − r
∗)π∗f (1 + n¯)[1 + ˇ¯ω
∗] + (β∗c − r
∗)π∗c (1− n¯)[1− ˇ¯ω
∗]
(1 + β∗f )(1 + n¯)[1 + ˇ¯ω
∗] + (1 + β∗c )(1− n¯)[1− ˇ¯ω
∗]
, β∗f = rf + π
∗
f (r
∗ − rf )
and
β∗c = rf + π
∗
c (r
∗ − rf ) , π
∗
f =
1
νσ2
{(g − rf )− β1(r
∗ − g)} , π∗c =
r∗ − rf
ν [σ2 + β3(r∗ − rf )2]
,
as well as
ˇ¯ω∗ =
[1 + ˇ¯ω∗](1 + β∗f )− [1− ˇ¯ω
∗](1 + β∗c )
[1 + ˇ¯ω∗](1 + β∗f ) + [1− ˇ¯ω
∗](1 + β∗c )
.
As in the case of the homogeneous-beliefs model variants, this system of equations is analytically almost
intractable.113 For this reason, the possible steady states for y∗ = 0 are again numerically investigated for
a wide range of reasonable parameter sets with the help of the software package Mathematica 7. The
chosen parameter sets enclose the following parameter ranges:
ν = 1.2 , 0.05 ≤ σ ≤ 1.15 , 0.02 ≤ rf ≤ 0.18 , 0.02 ≤ g ≤ 0.18 ,
0.1 ≤ β1 ≤ 0.9 , 0.05 ≤ λ ≤ 0.1 , 0.1 ≤ α ≤ 0.9 , 2 ≤ β3 ≤ 10
and n¯ = 0.0. An extensive numerical analysis reveals that almost no economically reasonable (non-
fundamental) steady state exists within these parameter ranges. Similar to the observations for the ho-
mogeneous beliefs model with only fundamentalists in the market, only for very low choices of σ, one
economically reasonable (non-fundamental) steady state exist which, however, is always accompanied by
negative values of π∗f , positive values of π
∗
c , ˇ¯ω
∗ = 1, and a return (ex dividends) of the risky asset which is
slightly higher than the risk-free rate. Note that the following conditions are used to define an economically
reasonable (non-fundamental) steady state:114
β∗f ≥ 0 , β
∗
c ≥ 0 , rf > g , r
∗ ≥ −1 (note that r∗ < −1 leads to negative prices) ,
as well as
r∗, q∗, β∗f , β
∗
c , π
∗
f , π
∗
c , ˇ¯ω
∗ ∈ R and ¬(g ≥ r∗ ∧ r∗ > −1) .
This completes the proof.
113π∗f = π
∗
c as well as β
∗
f = β
∗
c does not hold for y
∗ = 0. This implies that ˇ¯ω∗ reaches a unique value when y∗ = 0
is assumed instead of a continuum of values, i.e., ˇ¯ω∗ ∈ [−1, 1], as was seen for y∗ 6= 0.
114See also the proof of Theorem 4.2 in Appendix A 4.3 for further details.
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A 4.8 Geometric Decay Process
In this appendix a generalization of the conventional sample mean and sample variance of the return rt is
considered in which the current realization of the return and the mean of the former ones can be weighted
by a weighting factor. For this, consider the sample mean and the sample variance of the return (ex
dividends) rt up to the time period T
φT =
1
T + 1
TX
i=0
ri
vT =
1
T + 1
TX
i=0
(ri − φT )
2 .
It can be shown (see Appendix A 4.9 for details), that the sample mean and the sample variance can be
written as
φT = δφT−1 + (1− δ)rT (A 4.14)
vT = δvT−1 + δ(1− δ)(rT − uT−1)
2 (A 4.15)
where δ is determined by δ ≡ T/(T+1). Now, an obvious generalization of these sample mean and variance
is to allow for δ to assume any value between 0 and 1. This leads to the following process on mean and
variance
φt = δφt−1 + (1− δ)rt
vt = δvt−1 + δ(1− δ)(rt − φt−1)
2 , δ ∈ [0, 1] .
The resulting process can be interpreted as a limiting process of a ‘geometric decay process’ with the decay
rate δ when the memory lag length tends to infinity. For instance, assume that rt = r¯ is constant for all t.
Furthermore, exclude the pathological cases and let δ be non-zero and smaller than 1. Then, for φt−T <∞
it follows that
φt = r¯(1− δ)
T−1X
i=0
δi + δTφt−T
T→∞
−→ r¯(1− δ)
∞X
i=0
δi ≡ φ∞ ,
from which the geometric decay property of the process becomes obvious. Using the properties of geometric
series, it is easy to verify that φ∞ = r¯ as a definition of a mean should suffice. Furthermore, using the
properties of telescopic sums, it is φt = r¯ if φt−T = r¯ is assumed. For δ = 0, the generalized sample mean
φt is equal to current realized return rt for all t. In this case the generalized sample variance vt is zero if
and only if v0 = 0. Contrastingly, if δ = 1, φt and vt are determined by the first observed return of the
process, i.e., both the sample mean φt and the sample variance vt equal their initial value r0 and v0 for all
t. Finally, for 0 < δ < 1 the half life t∗ of a shock exposed to the process can be considered. Without loss
of generality, assume that the process is exposed to a shock on the scale of k at time t = 0, i.e., φ0 = k.
Then the half life of the shock is defined by
k
2
= δt
∗
k ,
which leads to
t∗ = −
ln 2
ln δ
.
Thus for δ = 0.9 the half life of the shock is 6.5 trading periods, while for δ = 0.999 the half life is about
692 trading periods.
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A 4.9 Derivation of the Sample Mean and Sample Variance
Consider the sample mean of the returns up to time T and split the expression into two parts such as
φT =
1
T + 1
TX
i=0
ri
=
1
T + 1
T−1X
i=0
ri +
1
T + 1
rT
=
T
T + 1
φT−1 +
1
T + 1
rT
= δφT−1 + (1− δ)rT (A 4.16)
with δ ≡ T/(T + 1), as proposed in Eq. (A 4.14). Applying the same idea to the sample variance leads to
vT =
1
T + 1
TX
i=0
(ri − φT )
2
=
1
T + 1
T−1X
i=0
(ri − φT )
2 +
1
T + 1
(rT − φT )
2
=
1
T + 1
T−1X
i=0
[(ri − φT−1) + (φT−1 − φT )]
2 +
1
T + 1
(rT − φT )
2
=
1
T + 1
T−1X
i=0
ˆ
(ri − φT−1)
2 + (φT−1 − φT )
2˜+
+
(
1
T + 1
T−1X
i=0
2(ri − φT−1)(φT−1 − φT )
)
+
1
T + 1
(rT − φT )
2
=
T
T + 1
vT−1 +
T
T + 1
(φT−1 − φT )
2 +
1
T + 1
(rT − φT )
2
= δvT−1 + δ(φT−1 − φT )
2 + (1− δ)(rT − φT )
2 ,
where, inter alia, the term in the curly brackets is equal to zero. Note that from Eq. (A 4.16)
φT−1 − φT = φT−1 − δφT−1 − (1− δ)rT = (1− δ)(φT−1 − rT )
and
rT − φT = rT − δφT−1 − (1− δ)rT = δ(rT − φT−1) .
Thus,
vT = δvT−1 + δ(1− δ)
2(φT−1 − rT )
2 + (1− δ)δ2(rT − φT−1)
2
= δvT−1 + (rT − φT−1)
2 · {δ(1− δ)2 + (1− δ)δ2}
= δvT−1 + δ(1− δ)(rT − φT−1)
2
as given in Eq. (A 4.15).
A 4.10 Proof of Theorem 4.8
The proof proceeds analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.7 in Appendix A 4.7. Thus only the main steps
are sketched here. Obviously, it is φ∗ = r∗ as well as v∗ = 0. Following now the considerations outlined
in Appendix A 4.7 it can be concluded that the ‘quasi’-unique steady state is given by (r∗ = g ∧ y∗ = 1)
where it is q∗ = 0. Again, it is π∗f = π
∗
c = 0 and β
∗
f = β
∗
c = rf from which ˇ¯ω
∗ ∈ [−1, 1], φ∗ = g and v∗ = 0
can directly be obtained. In the same way very similar results can be obtained for y∗ = 0, as already
stated in the proof of Theorem 4.7 in Appendix A 4.7. This completes the proof.
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A 4.11 Derivation of Eq. (4.107)
Again, we use the approximation performed in Subsection 4.2.4 (see Eq. (4.53)), where ns · g ≪ 1 is
assumed, thus
qt =
[(1 + β1,t)π1,t − (1 + rt)π1,t−1] (1 + n¯) [1 + ω¯t−1]
(1 + β1,t)(1 + n¯) [1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + β2,t)(1− n¯) [1− ω¯t−1]
+
[(1 + β2,t)π2,t − (1 + rt)π2,t−1] (1− n¯) [1− ω¯t−1]− 4 [Ht − (1 + rt)Ht−1] /(W¯t−1I)
(1 + β1,t)(1 + n¯) [1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + β2,t)(1− n¯) [1− ω¯t−1]
≈
[(1 + β1,t)π1,t − (1 + rt)π1,t−1] (1 + n¯) [1 + ω¯t−1]
(1 + β1,t)(1 + n¯) [1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + β2,t)(1− n¯) [1− ω¯t−1]
+
[(1 + β2,t)π2,t − (1 + rt)π2,t−1] (1− n¯) [1− ω¯t−1]− 4 [(1 + n
s + rt)Ht−1 − (1 + rt)Ht−1] /(W¯t−1I)
(1 + β1,t)(1 + n¯) [1 + ω¯t−1] + (1 + β2,t)(1− n¯) [1− ω¯t−1]
,
from which Eq. (4.107) directly follows. This completes the proof.
A 4.12 Proof of Theorem 4.11
As before, let r∗ = rt+1 = rt = rt−1, y
∗ = yt+1 = yt = yt−1 and z
∗ = zt+1 = zt = zt−1 be the steady
state of the system Eq. (4.113)–Eq. (4.115). From Ht > 0 it follows that it is zt > 0 for all t and thus
rRP
∗
= rf + νσ
2z∗ ≥ rf > 0. Assuming that z
∗ 6= 0, i.e., limt→∞ zt = z
∗ > 0. Then it can directly
be concluded that β∗f = n
s + r∗. Analogous to the proofs for the Ht = 0 case outlined previously, the
necessary (and sufficient) condition for the steady state to exist can be expressed by„
y∗ 6= 0 ∧ y∗(1−
1 + g
1 + r∗
) = 0
«
∨ (y∗ = 0 ∧ r∗ = g + λq∗ − α) (A 4.17)
where
q∗ =
(β∗f − r
∗)π∗f − n
sz∗
1 + β∗f
=
ns(π∗f − z
∗)
1 + β∗f
, β∗f = rf + π
∗
f
˘
(r∗ − rf ) + (rf − g)y
∗ + νσ2z∗y∗
¯
and
π∗f =
1
νσ2
˘
(rf − g)(y
∗ − 1) − β1(r
∗ − g) + νσ2z∗y∗
¯
.
(i) Analysis of the Left-Hand Side of Eq. (A 4.17)
For y∗ 6= 0 (see left-hand side of Eq. (A 4.17)) it is obvious that r∗ = g and thus
q∗ =
ns(π∗f − z
∗)
1 + β∗f
, π∗f =
1
νσ2
˘
(rf − g)(y
∗ − 1) + νσ2z∗y∗
¯
, β∗f = rf + π
∗
f
2
νσ2 (A 4.18)
as well as β∗f = n
s + g. As a consequence it is π∗f = ±
p
(ns + g − rf )/(νσ2), where the square root has
real solutions since ns ≥ (rf − g) is assumed in the theorem. The next steps are quite similar to the steps
outlined in Appendix A 4.3 for the proof of Theorem 4.2. From the π∗f -expression in Eq. (A 4.18) it follows
that
z∗ =
1
y∗

π∗f −
1
νσ2
[(rf − g)(y
∗ − 1)]
ﬀ
. (A 4.19)
Inserting Eq. (A 4.19) into the q∗-expression of Eq. (A 4.18) leads to
q∗ =
Ans(y∗ − 1)
By∗
, (A 4.20)
where A ≡ π∗f + (rf − g)/(νσ
2) and B ≡ 1 + ns + g. Rewriting Eq. (4.113) as q∗ = −(α/λ)(y∗ − 1) and
combining it with Eq. (A 4.20) yields
y∗ = −
A
B
nsλ
α
, (A 4.21)
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where y∗ 6= 1 has to be assumed in order that the algebraic manipulation leading to this result can be
performed. Inserting Eq. (A 4.21) into Eq. (A 4.19) leads to
z∗ = −
1
C
−
1
νσ2
(rf − g)
with C ≡ nsλ/(Bα), which is always a negative expression and thus leads to a contradiction because it is
assumed that z∗ > 0. Consequently, y∗ has to be equal to 1, which directly leads to z∗ = π∗f and q
∗ = 0.
Since z∗ is assumed to be positive as outlined above, only the positive square root of π∗f is valid and the
fundamental steady state E1 is given by r
∗ = g, y∗ = 1 and z∗ =
p
(ns + g − rf )/(νσ2).
Remaining at the assumption y∗ 6= 0 (see left-hand side of Eq. (A 4.17)), but assuming that it is z∗ = 0,
i.e., limt→∞ zt = z
∗ = 0 directly leads to
r∗ = g , rRP
∗
= rf , q
∗ =
(β∗f − r
∗)π∗f
1 + β∗f
, π∗f =
1
νσ2
{(rf − g)(y
∗ − 1)} , β∗f = rf + π
∗
f
2
νσ2 .
(A 4.22)
Equating the q∗-expression of Eq. (A 4.22) with q∗ = −(α/λ)(y∗ − 1) (which can be rewritten from
Eq. (4.113) as already done above) by using all other relevant equations yields
−
α
λ
=
1
νσ2
(rf − g)A(y
∗)
B(y∗)
, (A 4.23)
where again y∗ 6= 1 has to be assumed and A(y∗) and B(y∗) are positive functions of y∗. Obviously,
Eq. (A 4.23) cannot be fulfilled since the left-hand side is a negative expression while the right-hand side
is a positive expression. Consequently, y∗ has to be equal to 1, which directly leads to π∗f = 0, β
∗
f = rf
and q∗ = 0. However, from Eq. (4.115) it follows that
zt+1 =
1 + ns + g
1 + rf
zt , (A 4.24)
which cannot converge to zero, since it is zt > 0 for all t (see the beginning of the proof) and because
ns + g ≥ rf is assumed in the theorem, which leads to a growth factor of ≥ 1 in Eq. (A 4.24). Thus a
steady state with z∗ = 0 and y∗ 6= 0 does not exist.
(ii) Analysis of the Right-Hand Side of Eq. (A 4.17)
Finally, the condition on the right-hand side of Eq. (A 4.17) has to be investigated, i.e., the case y∗ = 0.
For z∗ > 0 this directly leads to
r∗ = g + λq∗ − α ,
where
β∗f = n
s + r∗ , q∗ =
(π∗f − z
∗)ns
1 + β∗f
, π∗f =
1
νσ2
{(g − rf )− β1(r
∗ − g)} , β∗f = rf + π
∗
f (r
∗ − rf ) ,
(A 4.25)
while for z∗ = 0 this implies
r∗ = g + λq∗ − α ,
where
q∗ =
(β∗f − r
∗)π∗f
1 + β∗f
, π∗f =
1
νσ2
{(g − rf )− β1(r
∗ − g)} , β∗f = rf + π
∗
f (r
∗ − rf ) . (A 4.26)
Unfortunately, both systems of equations are analytically almost intractable. For this reason, the possible
steady states for y∗ = 0 ∧ z∗ > 0 and for y∗ = 0 ∧ z∗ = 0 are numerically investigated for a wide range of
reasonable parameter sets with the help of the software package Mathematica 7. The chosen parameter
sets enclose the following parameter ranges:
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ν = 1.2 , 0.05 ≤ σ ≤ 1.15 , 0.02 ≤ rf ≤ 0.18 , 0.02 ≤ g ≤ 0.18 ,
0.1 ≤ β1 ≤ 0.9 , 0.05 ≤ λ ≤ 0.1 , 0.1 ≤ α ≤ 0.9 , 0.02 ≤ n
s ≤ 0.18 .
Note that according to Eq. (A 4.25) and Eq. (A 4.26) the parameters ν and σ always occur as a factor νσ2,
so that only one of the two parameters has to be changed within the parameter sets. An extensive numerical
analysis for both dynamic systems reveals that no economically reasonable (non-fundamental) steady state
exists within these parameter ranges. Note that, similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2 in Appendix A 4.3,
the following conditions have to be fulfilled to arrive at an economically reasonable (non-fundamental)
steady state:
β∗f ≥ 0 , rf > g , n
s ≥ (rf − g) , r
∗ ≥ −1 (note that r∗ < −1 leads to negative prices) ,
as well as
r∗, q∗, β∗f , π
∗
f ∈ R and ¬(g ≥ r
∗ ∧ r∗ > −1) .
This completes the proof.
A 4.13 Proof of Theorem 4.14
Since δ 6= 0 it is φ∗ = r∗ and v∗ = 0 and thus rRP
∗
= rf + νσ
2z∗ ≥ rf > 0 with the same argument as in
the preceding proof outlined in Appendix A 4.12.
Analysis 1
It is easy to see that for y∗ 6= 0 (leading to r∗ = g) the conditional equations for determining the steady
states of the system are exactly the same as the corresponding equations in the proof of Theorem 4.11.
Therefore it can be concluded that for z∗ > 0 only the fundamental steady state exists, where z∗ = π∗c ,
q∗ = 0 and thus r∗ = g, y∗ = 1 and z∗ =
p
(ns + g − rf )/(νσ2) and no steady state exists for z
∗ = 0.
Analysis 2
However, for y∗ = 0 the resulting equations differ from the corresponding equations in the proof of Theorem
4.11. For y∗ = 0 and z∗ > 0 it is
r∗ = g + λq∗ − α ,
where
β∗c = n
s + r∗ , q∗ =
(π∗c − z
∗)ns
1 + β∗c
, β∗c = rf + π
∗
c (r
∗ − rf ) , π
∗
c =
r∗ − rf
νσ2
,
while for y∗ = 0 and z∗ = 0 it directly follows that
r∗ = g + λq∗ − α ,
where
q∗ =
(β∗c − r
∗)π∗c
1 + β∗c
, β∗c = rf + π
∗
c (r
∗ − rf ) , π
∗
c =
r∗ − rf
νσ2
.
These systems of equations are again analytically almost intractable. For this reason, the possible steady
states for y∗ = 0 ∧ z∗ > 0 as well as for y∗ = 0 ∧ z∗ = 0 are numerically investigated for a wide range of
reasonable parameter sets with the help of the software packageMathematica 7, as already performed for
the proof of Theorem 4.11 in Appendix A 4.12. The chosen parameter sets enclose the following parameter
ranges:
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ν = 1.2 , 0.05 ≤ σ ≤ 1.15 , 0.02 ≤ rf ≤ 0.18 , 0.02 ≤ g ≤ 0.18 ,
0.05 ≤ λ ≤ 0.1 , 0.1 ≤ α ≤ 0.9 , 0.02 ≤ ns ≤ 0.18 .
An extensive numerical analysis reveals that no economically reasonable (non-fundamental) steady state
exists for y∗ = 0 ∧ z∗ > 0 within these parameter ranges but that economically reasonable (non-
fundamental) steady states do exist for y∗ = 0 ∧ z∗ = 0 within these parameter ranges. Note that the same
conditions as in the proof of Theorem 4.11 in Appendix A 4.12 are used to define an economically reasonable
(non-fundamental) steady state. Further numerical simulations confirm that these (non-fundamental)
steady states are not stable. Furthermore, these (non-fundamental) steady states are accompanied by
quite unrealistically high values for r∗, q∗, β∗c , and π
∗
c . This completes the proof.
A 4.14 Proof of Theorem 4.16
Again it is φ∗ = r∗ and v∗ = 0 since it is δ 6= 0. Furthermore it is rRP
∗
≥ rf > 0 since it is zt > 0 for all t.
Therefore the necessary (and sufficient) condition for the steady state to exist can once more be expressed
by „
y∗ 6= 0 ∧ y∗(1−
1 + g
1 + r∗
) = 0
«
∨ (y∗ = 0 ∧ r∗ = g + λq∗ − α) , (A 4.27)
where the explicit expressions for q∗, β∗f , β
∗
c , π
∗
f and π
∗
c are not displayed here in order to avoid an overly
long presentation of the proof.
(i) Analysis of the Left-Hand Side of Eq. (A 4.27)
Knowing already that it is r∗ = g for y∗ 6= 0 (see left-hand side of Eq. (A 4.27)), it also becomes obvious
that it is π∗f = π
∗
c in this case (denoted by π
∗ in the following) and as a direct consequence that it is
β∗f = β
∗
c (denoted by β
∗ in the following). The first equality implies that β∗ = rf + νσ
2π∗2 while from the
latter equality it follows that β∗ = ns + g when z∗ 6= 0, i.e., limt→∞ zt = z
∗ > 0 is assumed in addition.
Both equations together lead to π∗ = ±
p
(ns + g − rf )/(νσ2). Furthermore, it is
rRP
∗
= rf +
2νσ2
1 + n¯ω¯∗
z∗ .
The following steps of the proof proceed in a very similar way to that in the proof of Theorem 4.11. It can
easily be calculated that z∗ can be written as
z∗ =
˘
π∗ − 1
νσ2
[(rf − g)(y
∗ − 1)]
¯
2
1+n¯ω¯∗
y∗
, (A 4.28)
while q∗ is again given by
q∗ =
Ans(y∗ − 1)
By∗
,
where A ≡ π∗ + (rf − g)/(νσ
2) and B ≡ 1 + ns + g (see Eq. (A 4.20)). Using the same manipulations as
in the proof of Theorem 4.11 finally leads to
y∗ = −
A
B
nsλ
α
, (A 4.29)
where again y∗ 6= 1 has to be assumed in order that the algebraic manipulation leading to this result can
be performed. Inserting Eq. (A 4.29) into Eq. (A 4.28) yields
z∗ = −

1 + n¯ω¯∗
2
»
1
C
+
1
νσ2
(rf − g)
–ﬀ
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with C ≡ nsλ/(Bα), which is always a negative expression and thus leads to a contradiction because it is
assumed that z∗ > 0. Hence, instead, y∗ has to be equal to 1, which directly leads to z∗ = (1 + n¯ω¯∗)π∗/2
and q∗ = 0. Since z∗ is assumed to be positive as outlined above, only the positive square root of π∗ is valid
and the fundamental steady state E1 is given by r
∗ = g, y∗ = 1, z∗ = [(1 + n¯ω¯∗)/2]
p
(ns + g − rf )/(νσ2)
and ω¯∗ ∈ [−1, 1].
Again, for the assumption y∗ 6= 0 (see left-hand side of Eq. (A 4.27)), the case z∗ = 0, i.e., limt→∞ zt =
z∗ = 0 has to be considered separately. Fortunately, it can easily be seen that even for this case it is
φ∗ = r∗, v∗ = 0, π∗f = π
∗
c and β
∗
f = β
∗
c and that the resulting equations for r
∗, rRP
∗
, q∗, π∗f and β
∗
f are
identical to the corresponding equations of the homogeneous beliefs model with only fundamentalists in
the market, i.e., identical to Eq. (A 4.22). From following the lines in this proof (see Appendix A 4.12 for
details), it can be concluded that no steady state exists for z∗ = 0 and y∗ 6= 0.
(ii) Analysis of the Right-Hand Side of Eq. (A 4.27)
For y∗ = 0 (see right-hand side of Eq. (A 4.27)) the following two systems of equations have to be solved
simultaneously:
r∗ = g + λq∗ − α ,
where
q∗ =
(β∗f − r
∗)π∗f (1 + n¯)[1 + ˇ¯ω
∗] + (β∗c − r
∗)π∗c (1− n¯)[1− ˇ¯ω
∗]− 4nsz∗
(1 + β∗f )(1 + n¯)[1 + ˇ¯ω
∗] + (1 + β∗c )(1− n¯)[1− ˇ¯ω
∗]
, β∗f = rf + π
∗
f (r
∗ − rf )
and
β∗c = rf + π
∗
c (r
∗ − rf ) , π
∗
f =
1
νσ2
{(g − rf )− β1(r
∗ − g)} , π∗c =
r∗ − rf
νσ2
,
as well as
ˇ¯ω∗ =
[1 + ˇ¯ω∗](1 + β∗f )− [1− ˇ¯ω
∗](1 + β∗c )
[1 + ˇ¯ω∗](1 + β∗f ) + [1− ˇ¯ω
∗](1 + β∗c )
and r∗ =
[1 + ω¯∗](1 + β∗f ) + [1− ω¯
∗](1 + β∗c )
2
− (1 + ns)
for z∗ > 0, and
r∗ = g + λq∗ − α ,
where
q∗ =
(β∗f − r
∗)π∗f (1 + n¯)[1 + ˇ¯ω
∗] + (β∗c − r
∗)π∗c (1− n¯)[1− ˇ¯ω
∗]
(1 + β∗f )(1 + n¯)[1 + ˇ¯ω
∗] + (1 + β∗c )(1− n¯)[1− ˇ¯ω
∗]
, β∗f = rf + π
∗
f (r
∗ − rf )
and
β∗c = rf + π
∗
c (r
∗ − rf ) , π
∗
f =
1
νσ2
{(g − rf )− β1(r
∗ − g)} , π∗c =
r∗ − rf
νσ2
,
as well as
ˇ¯ω∗ =
[1 + ˇ¯ω∗](1 + β∗f )− [1− ˇ¯ω
∗](1 + β∗c )
[1 + ˇ¯ω∗](1 + β∗f ) + [1− ˇ¯ω
∗](1 + β∗c )
for z∗ = 0. As in the case of the homogeneous-beliefs model variants, these two systems of equations are
analytically almost intractable.115 For this reason, the possible steady states for y∗ = 0 ∧ z∗ > 0 as well
as for y∗ = 0 ∧ z∗ = 0 are again numerically investigated for a wide range of reasonable parameter sets
with the help of the software package Mathematica 7. The chosen parameter sets enclose the following
parameter ranges:
115π∗f = π
∗
c as well as β
∗
f = β
∗
c does not hold for y
∗ = 0. This implies that ˇ¯ω∗ reach a unique value when y∗ = 0
is assumed instead of a continuum of values, i.e., ˇ¯ω∗ ∈ [−1, 1], as we have seen for y∗ 6= 0.
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ν = 1.2 , 0.05 ≤ σ ≤ 1.15 , 0.02 ≤ rf ≤ 0.18 , 0.02 ≤ g ≤ 0.18 ,
0.1 ≤ β1 ≤ 0.9 , 0.05 ≤ λ ≤ 0.1 , 0.1 ≤ α ≤ 0.9 , 0.02 ≤ n
s ≤ 0.18
and n¯ = 0.0. An extensive numerical analysis reveals that no economically reasonable (non-fundamental)
steady state exists within these parameter ranges. Note that the following conditions are used to define
an economically reasonable (non-fundamental) steady state:116
β∗f ≥ 0 , β
∗
c ≥ 0 , rf > g , n
s ≥ (rf − g) , r
∗ ≥ −1 (note that r∗ < −1 leads to negative prices) ,
as well as
r∗, q∗, β∗f , β
∗
c , π
∗
f , π
∗
c , ˇ¯ω
∗ ∈ R and ¬(g ≥ r∗ ∧ r∗ > −1) .
This completes the proof.
116See also the proof of Theorem 4.2 in Appendix A 4.3 for further details.
Conclusion and Future Research
Price fluctuations observed in financial markets seem too volatile to be explained by standard
asset pricing models mainly based on the geometric Brownian motion price process. Furthermore,
traditional economic theories in finance cannot explain some of the typical market behavior
observed in financial markets, such as volatility clustering and fat-tail phenomena, nowadays also
known as the ‘stylized facts’ of asset returns in academic literature. Interestingly, these models
and theories are almost all built on the assumption of economic agents having homogeneous and
‘correct’ beliefs, and are based on three building blocks (or ‘paradigms’) of economic modeling:
the ‘Rational Expectation Hypothesis’ (REH), the ‘Efficient Market Hypothesis’ (EMH) and
the ‘Representative Agent Hypothesis’ (RAH). However, it is widely held that trade among
individuals is mainly based on their specific tastes such as their risk attitude or other more
general preferences, their current endowments and their individual beliefs, which will differ
among the individuals and which might even change over time. For this reason, introducing
heterogeneity among individuals into a financial market model might be a first step in bringing
the model to a more realistic level, where it might be able to explain some of the typical market
behavior observed in financial markets and to reproduce realistic asset price dynamics. This is
the aim of the thesis and thus it follows a broad strand of literature that has emerged in the
past few years. More precisely, heterogeneity has been introduced threefold in this thesis, namely
by risk aversion, by wealth and by expectation. Asset price and wealth dynamics have been
investigated with two different market clearing scenarios, i.e., Walrasian scenario and market
maker scenario. In particular, different types of market participants have been by defining stylized
representations, fundamentalists and chartists, whose heterogeneity seems to be one of the driving
economic mechanisms of price dynamics in financial markets. The proposed model framework
uses a deterministic nonlinear model approach and investigates whether nonlinear economic laws
can explain a significant part of observed (irregular) fluctuations in economic and financial markets.
Remark: Since a comprehensive summary of each chapter can be found at the end of
each of them, the following two subsections will almost exclusively concentrate on the last chapter
of this thesis because this contains my own model framework and thus the main results I want to
contribute to the field of research.
Conclusion
My deterministic nonlinear structural agent model is largely motivated by three asset pricing
frameworks proposed by Brock and Hommes, Levy, Levy and Solomon, and Chiarella and He, and
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is examined in Brock and Hommes (1997b,a, 1998, 1999); Levy et al. (1994, 1995); Levy and Levy
(1996); Levy et al. (1996); Chiarella and He (2001) and Chiarella et al. (2006). After recapitulating
these model frameworks in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, where I also generalized a modified version
of the Brock-Hommes model proposed by Gaunersdorfer (2000) to give a more realistic and more
complex model variant, and did the same for the Chiarella-He model by introducing the risk-
aversion coefficient as an exogenous parameter, I proposed my own model framework in Chapter
4. The model presented in this chapter is similar to the asset pricing models mentioned above,
but differs in several crucial aspects. It is similar because my model is based on a nonlinear,
evolutionary system with two competing trading strategies under a utility maximization scheme
using CRRA utility preferences. As in the Chiarella-He model, a stationary model in terms of
return and wealth proportion among heterogeneous investors can be established, leading to a
dynamic system for which steady states can be derived whose local stability can be determined by
a combination of an analytical and a numerical treatment. The crucial features distinguishing my
model from the others are the following:
• Although my model shares the assumption of a CRRA utility function for the agents leading
to a growth model in both risky-asset prices and agents’ wealth, it differs from Chiarella and
He (2001) by using expectation formation rules for the future return on the risky asset. These
rules are consistent with the existing (fundamental) steady states in the model, meaning that
all agents form ‘correct’ expectations of the fundamental price path.
• In harmony with the agents’ growing demand for risky assets, I model the risky-asset supply
explicitly by letting it also growing over time.
• Due to the growing risky-asset supply, the risk premium demanded by the market participants
for taking the market risk can be determined endogenously within my model framework.
As mentioned earlier, the resulting dynamic model can be formulated as a stationary system by
expressing the law of motion in terms of risky-asset price changes, fundamental/price ratio, asset
supply/total wealth ratio and wealth proportions of the two types of agents. It was found that
the presence of fundamentalists and chartists in the market leads the stationary model to have
a continuum of fundamental steady states, where the price is at its fundamental price level, and
that the steady-state wealth level distribution the system eventually reaches depends on the initial
condition. As expected, the local stability of the fundamental steady states depends crucially on
the chosen parameters. In this respect the extrapolation parameters used by the two trading types
as well as the price adjustment speed used by the market maker play an important role. More
precisely, choosing sufficiently high values of these parameters or an appropriate combination of
them destabilizes the dynamic system. Thus the model is able to show the dynamic system
displaying rather complex behavior and with a wide range of dynamic scenarios. These are local
stability, bifurcation routes to complicated asset price dynamics, limit cycles, periodic orbits, and
evidence of strange chaotic attractors. There are also two additional important features. On the one
hand, the model shows a strong dependence on small changes in the parameters and in the initial
conditions. On the other hand, the model allows us to investigate the interrelation of the risky
asset’s price fluctuations and the evolution of the wealth distribution among the two trading types.
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The model suggests that, whenever the risky-asset price converges to a fundamental steady state,
neither of the two trading types, i.e., neither fundamentalist nor chartist, is able to prevail over the
other group. Instead, both types of agents survive in the long run and keep (more or less) their
initial wealth proportion. However, when the dynamic system runs into a limit cycle, the chartists
are able to control the market and the fundamentalists cannot accumulate as much wealth as the
chartists. Moreover, numerical simulations indicate that specific parameter combinations produce
market situations in which both trading types can eventually coexist in the market with an equally
distributed wealth share, although the dynamic system does not settle down to a fundamental
equilibrium. At any rate, the fundamentalists generally do not accumulate more wealth than the
chartists. From a qualitative point of view, these results are in good accordance with the findings
published in Chiarella et al. (2006), although our model framework might be even more complex,
but also more realistic. In sum, I have shown how the risk attitudes and rather simple expectation
formation schemes leading to competing trading strategies among the investor groups can be used
to generate and explain a significant proportion of observed fluctuations in financial markets and
how these can lead to the emergence of complicated and complex dynamics for asset prices.
Future Research
Although my proposed model framework already results in a rather complex and highly nonlinear
dynamic system, the analysis in this thesis is still based on a simplified model and some extensions
might be economically significant in developing an even more realistic framework. I would thus
propose six extensions.
First, as in most of the papers that motivated this thesis, especially those studying the Brock-
Hommes model and the Chiarella-He model, my analysis has mainly focused on a deterministic
dynamic model commonly seen in this strand of literature as the deterministic skeleton of a stochas-
tic model with noisy dividend process (see Chiarella et al. (2006)). Although I have also investi-
gated a stochastic version of the model, this analysis might be worth intensifying by implementing
more sophisticated and more realistic stochastic components into the deterministic skeleton and
by analyzing the resulting dynamics in greater detail. Second, my analysis has shown that the
calibration of this type of model (e.g., a transformation of the model parameters on a daily level)
is still an open issue. Although results for a rescaled model version are shown in this thesis, my
findings are somewhat unsatisfactory and this issue remains an unsolved problem. It might be
worth stating that some of the ‘stylized facts’ mentioned above can only be detected on a daily or
even intra-daily scale, meaning that a calibration of this type of model highly desirable if it should
then be able to generate such phenomena observed in real financial time series. Third, it has been
found that for certain parameter combinations the optimal investment proportion of the chartists
derived by a standard CRRA utility maximization scheme clearly exceeds the optimal investment
proportion of the fundamentalists, which might be a rather unrealistic assumption. Although
Chiarella et al. (2006) solve this problem by assuming a tanh-function for the chartists’ demand
function, I would suggest there is a better approach needed that helps to reduce the relatively
high risky-asset demand of the chartists that results from the given model framework. Fourth, the
proportions of agents using a certain trading strategy is fixed in my model. As the market envi-
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ronment might change over time, the agents should be allowed to switch between certain trading
strategies using the information about their realized profits or wealth level as a decision criterion
(for instance, according to the ‘Adaptive Belief System’ (ABS) introduced by Brock and Hommes
(1997a, 1998)). However, although the introduction of a switching mechanism and time-varying
proportions of agents might be an interesting extension of the existing model variants, it has to
be analyzed whether such a model variant could simply lead to a market situation in which all
agents accumulate the same wealth on average through displaying a kind of ‘herding’ behavior
by using the same trading strategies in most of the trading periods. My fifth suggestion is more
a better alternative to the model framework, which refers to a rather concrete modification of
the model design. Eq. (4.41) shows us that the pricing formula for the risky asset is given by
an analytically intractable expression in the model. To simplify the problem, an idea could be
adopted from Poterba and Summers (1986), which also appears in Manzan (2003). They approxi-
mate the pricing formula given in Eq. (4.41) by a first-order Taylor expansion around the mean of
the required one-period holding return. Checking whether this modification leads to significantly
different results might be worth investigating. Sixth, a financial market consists of hundreds of
heterogeneous agents and the inclusion of more than two stylized representations of agents would
certainly be interesting.
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